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ABSTRACT
Expectations are a keystone concept in macroeconomics, employed across numerous 
theories and models. The intention of this thesis is to draw upon the richness of 
economic debate to explore the manner which economic agents form their 
expectations regarding inflation. Employing direct measures of expectations 
reported in prominent surveys published in the United States, this study empirically 
analyses key differences regarding the utilisation of information across agents. The 
various chapters within this thesis reconsider the analysis of recent studies and offer 
new insights regarding information and expectation formation.
The general theme examined in this study concerns differences in expectation 
formation across agents and macroeconomic conditions; however other issues are 
also analysed. These include: (i) the consistency of survey inflation forecasts with 
conventional theories of adaptive and rational expectations; (ii) the impact of 
household demographics on expectations formation, forecast accuracy and group- 
specific disagreement; (iii) the presence and class of information rigidities embodied 
amongst the expectations of both professionals and households.
The main results of this study can be summarised as follows. Firstly, whilst the 
forecast accuracy of agents is identified to be time-variant, it is shown that neither 
professionals, nor households, consistently outperform the other agent class in terms 
of realised forecast errors. Moreover, the aggregate inflation forecasts reported by 
both professionals and households are not invariably consistent with the predictions 
of traditional expectation theory; instead, information rigidities appear embodied 
within the expectations of both agent classes. Household expectations are further 
disaggregated by demographic characteristics. Across sample periods, ‘more 
advantaged households’ are observed to report smaller forecast errors and lower 
levels of disagreement; these groups are also found to be more attentive to various 
forms of news. Similarly, the forecasts reported by men exhibit greater accuracy and 
are updated more frequently than those of women. Limited differences are however 
observed across age groups and regions.
To summarise, agent expectation formation is time-variant whilst various similarities 
and differences are observed in the utilisation of information and forecast behaviour 
between professionals and households.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This thesis comprises a collection of essays relating to the manner which economic 
agents form expectations. Utilising survey data from the United States over a period 
of approximately thirty years, the main objective is to establish differences between 
the manner which professionals form expectations relative to those formed by 
households. Drawing upon recent contributions, this study considers whether survey 
expectations are consistent with the predictions of various theories proposed by 
economists, and analyses the manner which agents acquire and process information.
Expectations are keystone economic variables, widely employed in macroeconomic 
modelling, and are defined by Pesaran (1987:14) as “attitudes, dispositions or 
psychological states of mind’ that relate to events the outcomes of which are 
uncertain.” The uncertainty associated with the future dictates that agents need form 
expectations to allow for appropriate decision making. Moreover, Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001) highlight that the formation of appropriate expectations are 
critical to the time-path of the economy which subsequently exerts a feedback effect 
upon the formation of future expectations.
The role of expectations within macroeconomics has been long emphasised by the 
literature; whilst classical economists assumed that expectations were exogenously 
determined, with variables taken to be known with some degree of certainty, the 
behaviour of firms was identified by Keynes (1936) to be dependent upon forward- 
looking expectations. Various approaches to the mathematical modelling of 
expectations have subsequently been proposed by economists including the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis advocated by Cagan (1956), Friedman (1957) and Nerlove 
(1958), and the influential rational expectations hypothesis of Muth (1961). In 
recent years, interest in expectation modelling has been renewed with models of 
adaptive learning1, predictor choice (Brock and Hommes, 1997, Branch, 2007), 
sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002, 2007, Mankiw et al., 2003, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko, 2010, 2012) and rational inattentiveness (Sims, 2003, 2006) being 
developed.
1 Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a detailed survey o f expectational learning mechanisms.
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Expectations are also of critical importance for numerous macroeconomic 
relationships, including the Phillips Curve relationship between output and 
unemployment, and stabilisation policy. The trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment was formally presented by Phillips (1958), whilst Phelps (1967) and 
Friedman (1968) develop an expectations-augmented approach, proposing that 
agents are able to interpret the effect of inflation upon real wages. The resulting 
reduction in unemployment following an increase in inflation can thus only be 
maintained in the short-run. In the presence of rational expectations, agent 
expectations are immediately able to incorporate the effect of policy upon 
macroeconomic variables, thus leading to an increase in inflation with no change in 
unemployment. Furthermore, the theory of rational expectations is key to the 
neutrality or policy ineffectiveness debate as proposed by Lucas (1972), Sargent 
(1973) and Sargent and Wallace (1975), which ultimately implies that monetary 
policy will be ineffective as agents are able to correctly forecast systematic changes 
in policy.
Expectations are therefore central to economic theory; however, there is little 
consensus regarding the manner in which agents form their expectations. The 
conclusions from previous empirical studies concerning traditional theories of 
expectation formation are dependent upon the sample period analysed and the 
assumptions concerning the available information set. A key focus of this study, in 
accordance with recent contributions in macroeconomics, concerns the assumption 
that the formation of expectations is costly. Consequently, agents must consider the 
relative costs of acquiring and processing relevant information, and the associated 
improvements in forecast accuracy, against the opportunity costs of inattentiveness. 
Mitigating the informational assumptions of rational expectations, models of 
information delay and rigidity have provided interesting insights regarding the 
formation of agent expectations. There is however some debate concerning whether 
models of noisy information, as proposed by Sims (2003, 2006), Woodford (2003) 
and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2010), or those of sticky information, 
advocated by Mankiw and Reis (2003, 2007), Carroll (2003, 2006), Lanne et al. 
(2009) and Nunes (2009) are best able to accommodate the evolution of agent 
forecasts.
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The main objective of this study is to contribute to the understanding of 
expectational differences between professionals and households, and determine 
whether demographic backgrounds impact on the behaviour of expectation formation 
amongst households. Furthermore, acknowledging that expectation formation and 
the utilisation of information may vary overtime, and in response to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions, this study shall consider distinct sample periods to 
determine whether the observed relationships are time-variant. Utilising survey data 
various models of expectation formation shall be empirically examined; the use of 
survey data is relevant for empirical analysis with Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) 
reporting that survey inflation forecasts outperform those generated from time-series 
or Phillips Curve models.
Chapter 2 considers direct measures of expectations, introducing the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF) compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia and the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumers 
(Michigan Survey). Moreover, elementary differences between the expectations 
reported by professionals and households are identified, whilst the issues of 
employing survey forecasts in modelling the expectation formation process of agents 
are discussed. Extending the analysis of Chapter 2, aggregate survey forecasts are 
empirically analysed in Chapter 3 to determine whether agent expectations are 
consistent with the assumptions of traditional theories. Tests of both backward- 
looking adaptive expectations, and the forward-looking rational expectations 
hypothesis, shall be appraised and empirically examined.
Whilst Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 utilise consensus survey forecasts, in line with 
Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001a, 2001b), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers 
(2003), Souleles (2004) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2008, 2010), Chapter 4 
acknowledges that agent expectations are not homogeneous across individuals. 
Utilising disaggregate Michigan Survey inflation expectations, forecast behaviour is 
found to be dependent upon demographics with past inflation experiences, the 
observation o f specific prices, and the interpretation of survey questions, impacting 
upon the reported inflation forecasts of households. The empirical analysis in 
Chapter 3 considers both asymmetries across demographic disaggregations, and the 
cross-sectional disagreement within individual groups. Moreover, in a similar 
manner to Lamia and Lein (2008), Easaw and Ghoshray (2010), Lamia and Maag
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(2012) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013), the impact of news on the level of cross- 
sectional disagreement is examined.
In response to traditional expectation theory being unable to replicate the observed 
dynamics of economic variables, the economic literature has devoted attention to 
models which mitigate the issues and limitations of standard approaches. In Chapter 
5, the analysis considers an intriguing contribution to expectation formation, namely 
sticky information, as proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002). The concept of sticky 
information is centred upon the premise that in each period only a proportion of 
agents update their information; news thus slowly diffuses across the population, 
resulting in a delayed response in aggregate behaviour to economic innovations. 
Whilst those agents with the latest information form expectations consistent with 
RE, the remainder formulate current expectations utilising outdated information.
Microfoundations for Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky information model are 
presented by Carroll (2003, 2006) within an epidemiological framework, proposing 
that agents infrequently absorb inflation forecasts reported by the news media, which 
themselves reflect the ‘rational’ forecast reported by professionals. To determine 
whether the updating frequency estimated by Carroll (2003) is time-variant and 
sensitive to household demographics, the survey-updating model shall be analysed 
for disaggregate expectations across various sample periods. Alternatives to 
Carroll’s (2003) survey-updating model, namely the naive sticky information 
approach presented by Lanne, Luoma and Luoto (2009), and the rational-updating 
model proposed by Nunes (2009) shall also be reassessed for both aggregate and 
disaggregate expectations over the various sample periods, to determine whether 
households exhibit heterogeneous updating behaviour.
Following recent work by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012), Andrade and 
Le Bihan (2010), Clements (2012), and Dovem et al. (2012, 2013) Chapter 6 
analyses whether professional forecasts are characterised by information rigidities. 
Exploiting the multi-horizon structure of the SPF, the analysis shall consider whether 
revisions to fixed-event forecasts, updates to fixed-horizon forecasts, and 
disagreement amongst professionals, are consistent with the predictions of both 
sticky information and noisy information models.
16
The final chapter provides some concluding remarks regarding the observations and 
contribution of this work to the literature regarding macroeconomic expectation 
formation and further considers directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2: INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND 
FORECAST PROPERTIES -  AN INTRODUCTION AND 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
The introduction identified that expectations are keystone macroeconomic variables. 
Focusing on inflation, specifically CPI, the purpose of this study, to empirically 
examine the manner which professionals and households acquire and process 
information to form their expectations, has also been introduced. To achieve this 
objective, inflation expectations of both professionals and households shall be 
empirically examined; this chapter shall introduce the data series to be employed 
throughout this study and commences the empirical investigations, evaluating a 
variety of elementary forecast performance measures.
Despite the extensive development of expectation models and their theoretical 
importance throughout macroeconomics, investigations concerning direct tests of 
actual empirical data have been limited. Over the past decade there has however 
been some renewed interest with Thomas (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2003) 
evaluating forecast performance whilst Carroll (2003, 2006), Branch (2004, 2007) 
and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) have empirically examined specific 
theories of expectation formation. This study attempts to evaluate the results of 
existing studies and extend the analysis by empirically examining the 
appropriateness of several key developments and a range of models concerning the 
formation of macroeconomic expectations.
That expectations are unobservable is a common problem concerning direct 
empirical tests; indeed, it is not possible to collect subjective expectations for the 
entire population. One method of evaluating expectations is to solve an economic 
model where expectations are explicit variables with certain assumptions; this 
method was popular amongst RE models (Berk, 1999). However, Berk (1999) 
highlights that empirical analysis utilising this approach is limited as expectations 
are observed indirectly and are conditional upon the assumptions of the model.
An alternative, and the preferred option of this study, is to use more direct sources of 
information concerning agent expectations. There are a number of surveys that 
consider price or inflation expectations for various populations and economies 
including the Livingston Survey of Professional Economists, the ECB Survey of
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Professional Forecasters and the recently established Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York Survey of Consumer Expectations. For direct comparability with previous 
empirical studies regarding expectations, this study shall focus upon household 
expectations from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers (Michigan 
Survey), and professional expectations from the US Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF). These series have been frequently employed by empirical 
economists and are generally considered a credible basis to measure agent beliefs.
Although survey data is not without its own issues , they are preferred for this study 
as they are publicly available and not dependent upon model assumptions, cover a 
wide variety of agent classes and allow for direct comparability with the increasingly 
wide literature concerning expectations. One notable issue concerns measures of 
central tendency. Both mean and median expectations are widely employed by 
empirical economists. Whilst the mean is useful to establish the arithmetic average 
or consensus expectation of the population it is not a robust statistic where 
expectations are not normally distributed or exhibit skewness. Furthermore, the 
median is more robust to outliers and may provide a superior measure of the actions 
of the representative agent, particularly where the expectations distribution is 
skewed. Moreover, median survey responses are often noted to appear to track the 
realised inflation series more closely (Pfajfar and Santoro, 2008, Meyer and 
Venkatu, 2011). This shall be re-evaluated for both professional and household 
expectations for the sample period employed throughout this study.
The next section of this chapter provides a discussion regarding the various data 
series employed in this work, identifying various benefits and limitations which may 
affect the empirical understanding of the manner which agents form expectations. 
Furthermore the sample period, and various sub-periods, to be employed in the 
following empirical examination shall be established. Next, we utilise basic forecast 
comparison techniques to consider whether the forecasts of households are 
fundamentally different to those of professionals and whether this relationship is 
time-variant. The final section of this chapter evaluates the key differences between
2 The issues with survey data shall be explored in more detail in 2.1.3.
3 However, Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) find that over highly inflationary periods, mean expectations 
appear to track the evolution of inflation comparatively better than the median.
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the expectations of households and professionals and discusses alternative theories of 
expectations which shall be explored later.
20
2.1 Introducing Data for Empirical Analysis
The key objectives of this study relate to the evaluation of the relative performance 
of professional and household forecasts, examining whether these forecasts are 
consistent with the assumptions and predictions of conventional expectation theory, 
and identifying whether these relationships are time-variant. These issues are of an 
empirical nature thus requiring the identification of data sources suitable for 
hypothesis testing.
This section introduces the various data series which shall be employed in the 
empirical analysis of this study, namely inflation, and professional and household 
inflation forecasts. Specifically, this section considers the various alternative series 
which are available and presents some elementary statistics regarding their evolution 
over the four sample periods. The final section provides a discussion of the issues 
with employing survey expectations in empirical analyses, considering the effect of 
cross-sectional heterogeneity and disagreement amongst participants, and the effect 
of the wording of questions in influencing reported forecasts.
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2.1.1. Inflation
Economists consider inflation, defined as the general rate of price increases 
throughout the economy, to be a concept of critical importance. Moreover, inflation 
is essential for many theoretical models whilst inflation dynamics influence the 
behaviour of business cycles and the conduct of monetary policy (Gall and Gertler, 
1999). The two most prominent measures of inflation considered by economists 
concern the consumer price index (CPI) and the GDP deflator
The BLS defines the Consumer Price Index as “a measure of the average change
over time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer
goods and services” (stats.bls.gov). To calculate the CPI the BLS assigns a weight
to each item contained within the market basket based upon total family expenditure.
In contrast, the GDP deflator measures the price level across all goods and services
across the economy. Specifically, the GDP deflator analyses the ratio of nominal
GDP to real GDP and can be formally calculated as:
Nominal GDP (2.1.1)
GDP Deflator  = — — — — -  x 100 v 7
7 Real GDP
Nominal GDP relates to aggregate output at current prices whereas real GDP is 
defined as aggregate output measured at a constant base year price level. As the 
GDP deflator does not depend upon a market basket of goods4 it thus automatically 
responds to changes in the composition of output. In contrast, to ensure that the CPI 
is representative of consumer spending patterns, intermittent revisions to the market 
basket are essential. In the event of infrequent reweightings, the CPI market basket 
in any particular period may be outdated, failing to include innovations to consumer 
spending behaviour; in contrast, the GDP deflator is constructed in a manner that 
reveals changes and new expenditure patterns. Nevertheless, the CPI is considered 
the most prominent measure of inflation published by the media and amongst the 
wider public.
The economic literature has naturally considered the various inflation measures and 
associated expectations and forecast errors: the GDP deflator is used by Gall and 
Gertler (1999), Romer and Romer (2000), Croushore (2010) and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012). Meanwhile, Roberts (1997), Ang et al. (2007) and Stock
4 The basket o f the GDP deflator consists o f all domestically produced goods and services.
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and Watson (2010) consider personal consumption expenditure (PCE) inflation. 
Whilst the GDP deflator indicates the proportion of nominal GDP growth 
attributable to price rises, the PCE aims to capture changes in prices of goods and 
services paid by consumers, much like CPI. Both the GDP deflator and PCE have 
much broader scope than CPI. Whilst the CPI considers the prices of commodities, 
including imported goods, purchased by (urban) consumers, the GDP deflator 
considers total domestic production. This is inclusive of economic activity by the 
rural, investment and government sectors which are excluded from (urban) CPI 
calculations. In addition to consumer expenditure captured by CPI, the PCE 
includes spending by non-profit and religious institutions, government agencies 
including Medicare and Medicaid, and also includes financial services and insurance 
programs with no identifiable market price (Clark, 1999, Hakkio, 2008). The PCE 
also omits noisy disturbances associated with energy price fluctuations (Stock and 
Watson, 2010).
Despite the availability of several viable alternatives, the inflation measure employed 
throughout this study shall be CPI. Consistency with a large number of previous 
studies is thus maintained. There are also several other advantages. Unlike other 
measures, CPI is not revised (Roberts, 1997). The inflation series for empirical 
analysis is therefore consistent with the information available for the formation of 
agent expectations; forecast errors can thus be calculated unambiguously and allows 
for a coherent analysis. Nevertheless, Roberts (1997) advocates the PCE as a 
superior approximation of the cost of living, whilst Ang et al. (2007) highlight that in 
conducting monetary policy, this measure is the Federal Reserve’s preferred 
indicator of inflation. In forecasting inflation however, Ang et al. (2007) observe 
larger RMSE’s amongst PCE survey expectations in comparison to ARMA(1,1) 
models. Contrastingly, CPI survey expectations do not exhibit this characteristic.
Furthermore, whilst data concerning CPI is available from the BLS since 1913, PCE 
inflation data has only been publicly available since 1992 (Roberts, 1997).
Therefore, information regarding this measure of inflation index was not readily 
available for the first ten years of this study5. Consequently, the timeframe for which 
PCE forecasts are available is considerably shorter than for alternative inflation
5 Although not published until 1992, quarterly data concerning the PCE dating back to 1947Q2 is 
available from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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measures. Whereas the SPF first began including CPI inflation forecasts in the third 
quarter of 1981, PCE expectations have only been published since 2007Q1.
Forecasts for the GNP/GDP price index have been available from the SPF since its 
inception in 1968, however, the target variable has changed over time. Since 1996, 
the series considers forecasts for the GDP price index, yet prior to 1992, expectations 
concerned the GNP deflator whilst for 1992-1996, expectations considered the GDP 
implicit deflator. Changes to the target variable would likely result in distinct and 
systematic breaks in the manner which expectations are formed. Consequently, 
analysis will have to determine whether changes to expectations are purely due to the 
different measure of inflation forecasted or some other underlying factor relating to 
the wider macro-economy6. This is particularly noteworthy as the question relating 
to inflation expectations in the Michigan Survey does not explicitly specify any 
individual inflation measure to focus consumer expectations. It is primarily for this 
reason that CPI shall be the prominent inflation measure employed throughout this 
study.
Some caution needs to be exercised in evaluating CPI prior to 1983 as interest rates, 
which influence homeownership costs, were included in determining the value of 
inflation (Romer and Romer, 2000). As this study focuses upon expectations rather 
than alternative relationships concerning monetary policy for example, the inclusion 
of interest rates under CPI is unlikely to have a substantial role in the forthcoming 
analysis, particularly as the composition of the consumption basket is subject to 
intermittent adaptions. Nevertheless, this does impose an additional degree of 
interpretation upon agents in a similar manner to that reported by Bruine de Bruin et 
al. (2010b, 2010c). Moreover, the representative market basket employed for 
calculating CPI is argued by Roberts (1997) to be frequently out of date. Disparities 
between expectations and realised inflation values may consequently be magnified.
Furthermore, Bryan and Cecchetti (1993) highlight the presence of both 
measurement and weighting biases which are detrimental to the accuracy of CPI.
The measurement bias potentially arises from transitory noise relating to specific 
economic sectors resulting in the inaccurate recording of individual prices. The 
weighting bias is more systematic. The relevance of CPI relative to consumption
6 Moreover, interesting empirical results may arise from considering whether the change in the target 
variable alters the manner which agents form expectations. This is left for future investigation.
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behaviour is maintained through intermittent updating. However, this process results 
in the attachment of inappropriate weightings to individual commodities. Whilst 
changes in consumer preferences may result in excessive weights being attached to 
included commodities, insufficient weight may be attached to others resulting from 
technological innovation. It would thus be interesting to determine whether agent 
expectations are able to appropriately respond to amendments to the consumption 
basket in a timely manner. Moreover, the immediate periods following the exclusion 
of interest rates may be of particular interest. These issues are however beyond the 
scope of this study.
Considering the advantages and limitations of these inflation measures, the CPI has 
been adjudged to be the most suitable for the empirical investigations of this study. 
Specifically, the CPI-U compiled by the BLS shall be employed as the measure of 
inflation in this study. This accounts for 80-90% of urban consumers in the US 
including wage earners, self-employed, unemployed, retirees and labour market non­
participants. Furthermore, the CPI-U is the most widely reported inflation statistic 
by the media and is calculated from a basket of goods which is representative of the 
purchases of a typical American consumer living in an urban area.
Prior to evaluating expectations, the behaviour of inflation shall first be considered. 
As biases are embodied within CPI, alternative measures of inflation have been 
considered by the economic literature; CPI shall thus be compared to the GDP 
deflator (GDPD) which is frequently employed by economists in empirical analysis. 
Utilising a sample period consisting of quarterly inflation observations for 1982Q3 -
n
2011Q1 inclusive , Table 2.1.1 reports some elementary statistics of inflation whilst 
Figure 2.1.1 graphically illustrates the behaviour of both inflation measures:
Table 2.1.1: Inflation Statistics (1982Q3 -  2011Q1)
CPI GDP Deflator
Mean 2.994 2.491
Maximum 6.221 6.047
Minimum -1.623 0.216
Std. Dev. 1.285 0.984
7 The choice o f sample period is dictated by the availability o f survey data and shall be discussed in 
relation to the SPF and Michigan Survey in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively.
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Figure 2.1.1: U.S. Inflation Rate (1982Q3 -  2011Q1)
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Figure 2.1.1 and Table 2.1.1 illustrate that both measures of inflation have varied 
dramatically over the sample period and unsurprisingly exhibit similar trends with 
the difference generally small. During the 1980’s and from 2006 to the end of the 
sample inflation appears particularly volatile, with the latter period coinciding with
o
the onset of the recent financial crisis and subsequent recession . In contrast, 
inflation from the early 1990’s to the mid-2000’s appears more stable and lies within 
the 1 % to 4% range. Furthermore, the range and standard deviation of CPI is larger 
than that associated with the GDP deflator indicating greater volatility within the 
former.
These observations prompt a disaggregation of the sample to analyse the behaviour 
of inflation and associated expectations over distinct macroeconomic environments 
in a similar manner to Thomas (1999) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010). Identifying a 
structural break in the inflation process and associated expectations between pre- and 
post-1988, Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) split their sample period into two, with the 
earlier sub-sample accommodating the high inflation and subsequent disinflation of 
the late 1970’s and early 1980's. In a similar manner, this study shall consider a
8 Although the financial crisis did not become acute until the second half o f 2007, for example large 
increases in money market interest rates arising in August 2007, economic conditions in the U.S. 
began to deteriorate approximately a year earlier for example the fall in house prices and associated 
increase in housing delinquencies commencing in mid-2006 (Taylor, 2009).
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sample period comprising 1987Q2-2011Q1 which shall remove the period of 
Volcker chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, often associated with disinflation, 
from the whole sample period. This sub-period shall be classified as the Greenspan- 
Bemanke period referring to the chairmen of the Federal Reserve over this sub­
period.
Nevertheless, inflation and associated expectations and forecast errors may be 
subject to significant skewness over the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period. This arises 
from two periods of distinct macroeconomic volatility. The first is associated with 
the 1987 'Black Monday’ stock market crash and subsequent recession; whilst the 
second concerns the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the 
late 2000’s global financial crisis. Therefore, two further sub-sample periods shall 
be investigated: the period 1990Q1-2006Q2 shall be identified as the stable sub­
period whilst 2006Q3-2011Q1 shall be referred to as the volatile sub-period.
Table 2.1.2 below re-evaluates the summary statistics of inflation presented in Table
2.1.1 for the three sub-periods identified above:
Table 2.1.2: Inflation Statistics (Sub-Sample Periods)
CPI GDP Deflator
G-B Stable Volatile G-B Stable Volatile
Mean 2.916 2.915 2.076 2.314 2.282 1.785
Maximum 6.224 6.224 5.303 4.175 3.838 3.083
Minimum -1.623 1.252 -1.623 0.216 1.063 0.216
Std. Dev. 1.303 1.011 1.769 0.857 0.723 0.867
The elementary statistics presented above indicate that despite the exclusion of the 
deflationary Volcker period, both mean CPI and GDP deflator inflation rate remain 
substantially unchanged. In fact, CPI is slightly more variable during the Greenspan- 
Bemanke sub-period than for the whole sample period. Moreover, inflation is least 
dispersed for the stable period despite little change in mean CPI in comparison to 
either the whole or Greenspan-Bemanke periods. Despite macroeconomic 
uncertainty arising from the Global financial crisis, mean inflation is lower for the 
volatile sub-period in comparison to the other three sample periods. For CPI, this 
can be partly explained by three quarters of deflation occurring between 2009Q1- 
2009Q3, whilst the GDP deflator falls from 3.083 in 2006Q3 to 0.216 in 2009Q3 and
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remains low until the end of the sample. Nevertheless, the standard deviations of 
both inflation measures for the volatile sub-period are relatively large indicating 
greater inflation variability in comparison to the stable sub-period. This could 
consequently contribute to agents realising greater forecast errors, an issue that shall 
be returned to in empirical investigations to follow.
Over the sample the properties of inflation have been found to be changeable with 
distinct periods of greater stability and volatility being identified. Variation in 
inflation is likely to influence the formation and accuracy of expectations. Prior to 
formal empirical testing of expectation theory, the SPF and Michigan Survey shall 
be formally introduced including a brief examination of their respective inflation 
forecasts.
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2.1.1 Professional Forecasts -  An Introduction to the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters
Professional forecasts are extensively employed by macroeconomists for empirical 
analysis of expectations and provide a reliable measure of informed opinion from 
experts with sufficient knowledge and experience regarding economic conditions 
(Croushore, 1993). In obtaining professional expectations from the U.S. suitable for 
empirical analysis, three alternative candidates are considered: the Livingston Survey 
of Professional Economists, Consensus Economics and the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF), with the latter deemed the most appropriate9.
Although the Livingston Survey shall be referred to intermittently, particularly with 
reference to previous studies, formal analysis of professional expectations shall be 
entirely conducted upon the SPF. Promising results concerning the Consensus 
Economics series have emerged, with Dovem and Weisser (2011) concluding that 
inflation forecasts are generally unbiased and efficient, the data comprises a shorter 
time span than the SPF. Furthermore, utilising the SPF shall also maintain 
compatibility with the quarterly Michigan Survey data and to allow for direct 
comparisons with a number of key studies in the ensuing analysis.
The SPF requires professional forecasters to provide predictions of a number of 
economic variables for six different horizons: the previous quarter, the current 
quarter and for the following four quarters ahead. As the forecast for the previous 
quarter is formed following the publication of actual data for that quarter10 forecasts 
are found to be broadly accurate (Manzan, 2011). In Figure 2.1.2, professional 
expectations of period t inflation formed in period t — 4 (SPF(-4)) are illustrated 
against the actual rate of inflation (CPI), whilst Table 2.1.3 presents summary 
statistics for SPF inflation forecasts:
9 Appendix 2.2 discusses these alternative surveys o f professional expectations.
10 The data available concerns the first release and is therefore subject to revisions.
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Figure 2.1.2: Actual Inflation and Expectations of Professionals
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Table 2.1.3: Professional Inflation Forecasts -  Elementary Statistics
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
Mean 3.246 2.949 2.894 2.166
Maximum 6.000 5.000 4.500 2.500
Minimum 1.800 1.800 1.800 1.800
Std. Dev. 1.072 0.863 0.635 0.234
Table 2.1.3 indicates that over the past thirty years, professional inflation forecasts 
have tracked inflation reasonably well. Nevertheless, substantial deviations from 
inflation are observed during the early and mid-1980’s and from the mid-2000’s to 
the end of the sample1 \  Whilst the latter can be attributed to recent years of 
macroeconomic uncertainty during the volatile period identified in 2.1.1, Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2013) identify the earlier period with a lack of Federal Reserve credibility 
which was only gradually restored under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker. From 
Table 2.1.3 it is also possible to reconcile Pfajfar and Santoro’s (2013) observation 
that expectations appear anchored from the early 1990’s to the end of the sample; 
this is despite greater inflation volatility, as previously observed in Table 2.1.1.
The standard deviation of professional forecasts is also much lower than that 
associated with inflation itself, indicating that expectations tend to under predict 
fluctuations in actual inflation. Moreover, SPF forecasts do not appear sensitive to
The properties of forecast errors realised by professionals shall be investigated in 2.2.2.
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short-run inflation volatility; instead expectations appear to evolve slowly, in 
accordance with shifts to permanent inflation innovations. Indeed, from Table 2.1.3, 
the standard deviation of SPF CPI forecasts for the volatile sub-period is small 
indicating that forecasts are tightly dispersed around the mean despite large 
fluctuations in inflation consistent with transitory shocks.
The presence of the professional forecaster introduces several interesting questions 
regarding their evaluation of macroeconomic outcomes. At an elementary level, it 
shall be intriguing to determine whether the expectations of professionals outperform 
those of households or consumers in terms of accuracy and forecast errors. 
Furthermore, it shall be interesting to analyse whether professional forecasts are 
more consistent with conventional expectation theory. In addition, expectations may 
have some other role in influencing macroeconomic developments, depending upon 
their intended purpose and how they are employed and disseminated. A potential 
role of professional forecasts is to act as a focal point, informing households about 
future economic conditions and aligning their expectations appropriately (Ottaviani 
and Sorensen, 2006). The sensitivity of household expectations to the arrival of new 
information and macroeconomic disturbances is thus reduced, which in turn reduces 
the volatility of the forecasted variable (Bemanke, 2007, Beechey et al., 2011). The 
epidemiological model presented by Carroll (2003, 2006) is formulated upon the 
notion that information contained within professional forecasts slowly disseminates 
throughout the population; similarly, Easaw et al. (2011) present empirical evidence 
indicating that in the long-run, household expectations adjust in response to 
professional forecasts. Later chapters shall extensively examine these concepts in 
relation to information rigidity theories and models.
The use of professional forecasters should provide a series of expectations for 
empirical analysis with superior properties compared to those of households.
Notably, in analysing epidemiological expectations, Carroll (2003) concludes that 
the SPF is more rational than Michigan Survey forecasts, allowing households to 
update towards the professional forecast. Professional expectations are however 
expected to exhibit a degree of inaccuracy. An objective of this study is to determine 
the manner which professional expectations are formed, the extent which they are 
erroneous in comparison to those of households and establish the efficiency with 
which expectations exploit available information.
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2.1.2 Household Expectations -  An Introduction to the Michigan Survey of 
Consumers
Although often considered an important indicator of future macroeconomic 
innovations, it can be argued that professional expectations are of lesser importance 
than those formed by private sector agents; indeed, Leung (2009) argues that the 
behaviour of household expectations provide an indication of the stability of the 
economy. Not only is the consumer population substantially larger than the number 
of professionals; in many macroeconomic theories and applications, the response of 
public expectations have a determining impact upon aggregate outcomes. It was 
identified in 2.1.1 however, that professional expectations may have some role in 
informing private sector opinion and aligning their expectations; analysis of this 
issue shall be the focus of later chapters. Firstly, a sample of expectations formed by 
private sector agents needs to be identified and analysed to determine the manner 
which non-professionals forecast inflation.
For compatibility with SPF data, and for comparability with several key studies 
(Thomas, 1999, Carroll, 2003, Mankiw et al., 2003, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 
2010), the subjective household expectations series employed throughout this study
1 9shall refer to those from the Michigan Survey . One of the main advantages of the 
Michigan Survey over other surveys such as the Livingston survey, as identified by 
Branch (2004), is that it considers the expectations of households in preference to 
professionals. However, given the diverse nature of households across many 
demographic characteristics including age, gender, education and income, the 
distribution of expectations is likely to be wide which often results in distortions to 
some measures of central tendency including the mean. Indeed, that there are greater 
disparities between household expectations corresponds with conventional theory 
that a proportion of non-professionals produce less efficient forecasts (Branch, 2004) 
Nevertheless, as detailed in the following analysis, the Michigan Survey is often 
found to track the level of inflation reasonably well: in fact, it is often observed that 
median responses from the Michigan Survey outperform the forecasts of 
professionals (Bruine de Bruin et al., 201 lb).
12 The composition o f Michigan Survey forecasters and the methodology employed to obtain 
household forecasts is discussed in Appendix 2.1.
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There are substantial differences in the manner which the Michigan Survey obtains 
quarterly inflation expectations from households in comparison to the methodology 
employed by the SPF for professional expectations. SPF participants provide 
quantitative expectations to a mailed questionnaire for four specific measures of
13inflation for the current and four successive quarters . Michigan Survey 
expectations can be considered more ambiguous as a given measure of inflation is 
not specified14. Moreover, many of the questions posed by the Michigan Survey 
have a generally qualitative nature15. Namely, rather than providing an exact value, 
households instead indicate whether they believe personal and general economic 
conditions will improve or worsen16. The procedure to extract inflation expectations 
does however have both a qualitative and quantitative component. The qualitative 
component precedes the quantitative component and verifies that the numerical 
forecast provided by the respondent is an accurate reflection of their expectation of 
future price behaviour. The presence of the quantitative component allows for direct 
empirical testing on consumer inflation forecasts and enhances the understanding of 
the formation of private sector inflation expectations.
As previously alluded to, empirical investigations to expectations often conclude that 
household expectations are superior to those formed by professionals (Thomas,
1999, Mehra, 2002, Mankiw et al., 2003). This shall be investigated in due course. 
Firstly, in Figure 2.1.3, household expectations of period t inflation formed in period 
t — 4 (MS(-4)) are illustrated against the actual rate of inflation (CPI) with key 
elementary statistics presented in Table 2.1.4:
13 See Appendix 2.1 for an example of a questionnaire mailed to SPF participants.
14 It was noted in 2.1.1 that as information concerning CPI is most prominently available, expectations 
shall be analysed with respect to this inflation measure.
15 As this methodology has been widely adopted by alternative surveys, Pesaran and Weale (2006) 
argue that it is evident that an advantage exists in obtaining qualitative responses and a trade-off exists 
between the precision provided by quantitative responses and the increased accuracy and reduced 
ambiguity provided by qualitative methods.
16 See Appendix 2.1 for details regarding the procedure conducted by the Michigan Survey to obtain 
household inflation expectations.
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Figure 2.1.3: Actual Inflation and Expectations of Households
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Table 2.1.4: Household Inflation Forecasts -  Elementary Statistics
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
Mean 3.103 3.063 2.933 3.211
Maximum 5.000 5.000 4.700 5.000
Minimum 0.900 0.900 0.900 2.100
Std. Dev. 0.578 0.570 0.488 0.711
Figure 2.1.3 indicates that household expectations have tracked inflation reasonably 
well over the past thirty years. Substantial deviations are however noted during the 
period of rising inflation during the late 1980’s and for the recent period of greater 
macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast to professionals, household expectations do 
not appear as well anchored, particularly during the recent volatile period with the 
standard deviation increasing as shown in Table 2.1.4; instead, household 
expectations appear to respond to realised values of inflation with forecasts 
appearing to lag inflation. The effect is evident across the whole and all three sub­
periods.
From Figure 2.1.3, there are several episodes which appear to emphasise this point 
including the increase and subsequent fall in inflation in the early 1990’s and during 
the volatile sub-period between 2007Q3 and 2009Q1. Furthermore, between
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2001Q2 and 2002Q1, CPI falls from 3.38 percent to 1.25 percent, yet Michigan 
Survey forecast appear not to anticipate this; instead, households appear to 
incorporate the increase in inflation into future forecasts. Specifically Michigan 
Survey forecasts made between 2001Q2 and 2001Q4 for inflation four quarters later 
fall from 3.1 percent to 0.9 percent, approximately matching the fall in inflation 
observed over this period. Therefore, it appears that the direction of current inflation 
is a strong predictor of the future path of household expectations.
Furthermore, Michigan Survey forecasts also appear more sensitive to transitory 
shocks than professional forecasts; for the volatile sub-period, the standard deviation 
for household forecasts from Table 2.1.4 is much larger than that presented in Table
2.1.3 for professional forecasts. Nevertheless, the standard deviation associated with 
inflation, observed in Table 2.1.1, remains substantially greater indicating that 
households may fail to appropriately accommodate the variable nature of inflation 
into reported forecasts. Despite this, for the period of increased stability during the 
1990’s, household expectations appear relatively constant at approximately 3 
percent17; yet following the stock market crash of 2000-2002 household expectations 
exhibit greater variation. Unlike professional forecasts which appear to remain fairly 
constant throughout the latter half of the sample, household expectations exhibit a 
rapid increase in mid to late 2002 and a sharp increase followed by a sharp fall in 
2009, further suggesting that household forecasts are sensitive to transitory shocks.
Household expectations are extensively employed throughout economics and are 
useful in determining the manner which consumers make their economic decisions 
which in turn are essential for macroeconomic dynamics. Despite the issues 
highlighted regarding the Michigan Survey, this unique dataset shall enable analysis 
of pre-existing expectation theories and shall provide an indication to the manner in 
which consumers respond to information. Comparisons with the SPF may also be 
drawn to determine whether consumers exhibit a degree of sophistication in their 
forecasting techniques more accustomed to professionals.
17 There may exist some focal point for expectations. It is not conjectured as to what the focal point 
may in fact be although a number o f alternatives can be suggested including professional forecasts, an 
implicit inflation target, the actual inflation rate or consistent rises in the rate of individual 
commodities.
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2.1.3 Issues with Survey Expectations
As discussed, throughout this study, empirical analysis shall be conducted upon 
forecasts sourced from surveys, namely the SPF and Michigan Survey. These 
surveys publish various statistics regarding agent expectations including individual 
responses and interquartile ranges. The expectations of individual respondents are 
used by several studies, notably the percentile time series approach employed by 
Pfajfar and Santoro (2008); however, in accordance with many empirical studies 
(Carroll, 2003, Mankiw et al., 2003, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010) measures of 
central tendency shall be predominantly employed in the following investigations. 
Nevertheless, there is some scepticism regarding the use of survey expectations for 
empirical testing.
A common grievance is that surveys do not offer the appropriate incentives for 
agents to report accurate forecasts (Keane and Runkle, 1990, Roberts, 1998,
Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006). Despite many studies which empirically examine 
expectation theory utilising survey forecasts from non-professionals, Keane and 
Runkle (1990) argue that these agents lack the economic incentives to report precise 
expectations. Consequently, survey forecasts from non-professionals may be 
excessively noisy as indicated by Roberts (1998) Instead, Keane and Runkle (1990) 
deem professional forecasts more reliable as the reported survey forecasts are 
assumed to be the same as those sold on the market. Nevertheless, as the SPF is 
composed of forecasters from various industries, systematic differences in their 
expectations may still be observed, as demonstrated by Laster et al. (1999). Should 
all forecasters be solely motivated by ultimate accuracy, disagreement amongst 
professionals would be expected to be small; if instead there are industry specific 
incentives which trade-off accuracy with publicity for example, systematic 
differences across forecasters may arise as some forecasters seek to “stand out from 
the crowd” and express an extreme view regarding macroeconomic conditions 
(Laster et al., 1999).
A further criticism of the SPF and Michigan Survey is that the participants do not 
remain constant from period to period; both surveys instead exhibit rotating or 
pseudo-panel characteristics. Consequently, the distribution of expectations is not 
only subject to innovations in agent perceptions of future inflation but also to
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changes in the characteristics of respondents (Stark, 2004). Therefore, it is not 
possible to draw like-for-like comparisons over extended periods of time for 
individual participants. Assuming that the distribution of agents remains relatively 
constant, it is however possible to draw comparisons across average expectations 
which can be considered to be consistent with those of the representative agent. It is 
the latter approach which this study employs throughout. More specifically, the 
median expectation is employed which, as already discussed, is more robust to shifts 
in the distribution of expectations than alternative measures of central tendency.
A further issue regarding the use of survey data concerns the presence of cross- 
sectional heterogeneity and disagreement amongst respondents. These issues arise 
due to model uncertainty, diverse information sets, and variation in agent priors 
resulting in different interpretations of signals (Curtin, 2005, Manzan, 2011). As the 
Michigan Survey intends to provide opinions representative of a cross-section of the 
US population, these issues arise as consumers from distinct demographics have 
distinct past price experiences (Jonung, 1981), have contrasting consumption 
patterns (Bryan and Venkatu, 2001a) and encounter different relative price changes 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 201 lb).
In contrast, some may consider professionals to be sufficiently well informed 
regarding macroeconomic behaviour that their expectations would not exhibit 
significant heterogeneity. Nevertheless, Croushore (1993) notes that due to 
variations in expertise and experience, SPF forecasts remain subject to a degree of 
disagreement. Moreover, Mankiw et al. (2003) document that whilst household 
expectations exhibit larger levels of dispersion, the SPF remains subject to 
substantial disagreement and exhibits substantial co-movement with Michigan 
Survey disagreement.
As briefly noted in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, there are issues pertaining to individual surveys. 
A prominent issue concerns the procedure employed to obtain price or inflation 
forecasts: whilst the SPF requests participants to forecast future levels of various
price indices, the question relating to inflation and prices poised by the Michigan
18Survey is much more ambiguous, referring to prices in general . Where the
18 See Appendix 2.1 for more detail regarding the procedure employed by the SPF and Michigan 
Survey to obtain inflation or price forecasts from participants.
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respondent provides a “Don’t Know” response to question A 12b the question is 
rephrased using the term “cents on a dollar”19.
As the Michigan Survey does not state a specific price index, preferring to use the 
term ‘prices in general’ Bruine de Bruin (2010c, 201 lb) and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010) argue that participants may interpret the survey question 
differently. Consequently, a range of responses arises, encompassing alternative 
economic definitions of inflation including aggregate measures and individual 
consumption bundles (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Consequently, difficulty 
arises in establishing forecast errors for the Michigan Survey subject to a single
90definition of inflation and may result in further heterogeneity and disagreement 
than in the presence of a specific inflation definition. Conversely, should consumer 
surveys of inflation expectations request a specific definition alternative issues arise. 
Mainly, the proportion of the sample population with relatively low levels of 
financial and economic literacy may thus fail to fully understand the concept of a 
particular definition of inflation (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2010c, Burke and Manz, 
2010). Consequently, the percentage of “Don’t Know” responses is likely to be 
greater whilst expectations from those participants providing a quantitative response 
are likely to be characterised by greater inaccuracies. The Michigan Survey question 
can thus be deemed appropriate for its target audience of consumers and households.
An alternative to using survey forecasts is to solve an economic model where 
expectations are explicit variables with certain assumptions. Comparing Phillips 
curve, term structure model, ARIMA models and survey forecasts Ang et al. (2007) 
show that SPF, Livingston and Michigan surveys outperform the three alternative 
sources of expectations. This is attributed to aggregation capturing large volumes of 
information which subsequently has a positive impact on forecast accuracy. The
superiority of surveys over simple time-series forecasts has also been demonstrated
21by Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) . The superior performance of surveys 
compared to econometric or term-structure forecasts may be considered surprising as 
surveys are less inclined to utilise the most up to date information (Ang et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, survey participants possess the advantage of being able to exercise a
19 See Appendix 2.1 for further details.
20 The inflation definition used throughout this study shall be CPI as mentioned in 2.1.1.
21 As shall be explored in more detail in section 2.2.1.
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degree of judgement when forming expectations in conjunction with their employed 
forecasting model or rule-of-thumb behaviour.
Despite the common use of survey expectations by macroeconomists to empirically 
examine expectation theory, several issues with these data sources have been 
highlighted. These include the lack of appropriate incentives to ensure respondents 
report an accurate or true expectation and the prevalence of heterogeneity and 
disagreement across forecasters. Nevertheless, survey forecasts provide a useful 
proxy for expectations of various agent classes and thus enable the ability to 
empirically examine theoretical hypotheses concerning the formation of agent 
expectations in economics. Furthermore, it was noted that survey forecasts are 
frequently reported to outperform other sources of expectations (Thomas, 1999, 
Mehra, 2002, Ang et al., 2007). The empirical examination to follow shall thus 
reassess the relative performance of survey forecasts and provide an overview 
regarding the manner which agent expectations are formed, determining whether the 
SPF and Michigan Survey are consistent with the assumptions and predictions of 
conventional expectation theory.
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2.2 Forecast Properties
Before attempting to model how heterogeneous agents form inflation expectations, it 
is useful to analyse the properties of their forecasts and determine whether 
significant and time variant disagreement exists between the expectations of 
professionals and households, as indicated by Mankiw et al. (2003). As reported in 
the data introduction above, median expectations shall be considered in preference to 
the mean or individual responses, thus mitigating the impact of outliers and 
heterogeneity; however, the degree of disagreement observed will still prove 
empirically and economically interesting.
One might expect professional forecasters to produce more accurate expectations 
than households due to the possession of greater economic knowledge and access to 
more sophisticated forecasting tools (Carroll, 2003, Mankiw et al., 2003). However, 
several studies have reported greater expectational accuracy amongst households 
(Thomas, 1999, Mehra, 2002, Mankiw et al., 2003, Nunes, 2009). These findings 
shall be re-examined; furthermore the analysis shall be extended to include specific 
focus upon recent years and examine the impact of the global financial crisis and 
economic aftermath upon inflation expectations.
This section shall firstly evaluate the debate concerning regarding the performance 
of household inflation forecasts relative to those of professionals, with particular 
attention to those studies which examine the properties of expectations across 
distinct sub-sample periods. Empirical tests shall then be performed on SPF and 
Michigan Survey inflation forecasts across the sample periods identified in the 
previous section to determine whether the performance of the two surveys is time- 
variant and dependent upon the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, 
this section shall specifically focus upon how expectations evolve over time with 
particular reference to forecast errors. Finally, this section considers the dynamic 
properties of inflation, testing for stationarity and unit roots in inflation and 
expectations. The results from these tests have the potential to impact on the 
relevance of certain macroeconomic models and is thus crucial to prevent spurious 
results. The final section provides general conclusions founded upon the results of 
the preceding sections and identifies the intentions of the empirical investigations to
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follow which aims to advance the understanding of how agents form their 
expectations.
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2.2.1 Literature Review
The properties of agent forecasts formed by agents is of paramount importance to 
macroeconomists, thus the existing literature concerning expectations has devoted 
some attention to analysing available data from surveys. Recurring themes include 
the comparative performance of household forecasts to those formed by 
professionals and whether forecast properties are affected by the presence of 
sustained periods of increasing and falling inflation. The literature acknowledges a 
degree of time-variant disagreement exists amongst agent forecasts. It is the 
intention of this section to provide an overview of the debate highlighting a number 
of important and interesting contributions and determining whether there exists some 
general agreement amongst economists concerning the properties of inflation 
expectations.
There is some general agreement that the expectations of both professionals and 
households exhibit some degree of accuracy. A degree of coherence between the 
Livingston and Michigan Surveys is observed by Thomas (1999) whilst Mankiw et 
al. (2003:213) the Livingston Survey, Michigan Survey and SPF as ‘relatively 
accurate’. Moreover, Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) find that forecasts obtained 
from surveys are more accurate than Fisher forecasts or those generated from naive 
rules. Survey forecasts therefore appear to contain information regarding the future 
path of inflation that naive rule-of-thumb or backward-looking behaviour is unable 
to accommodate. This view is further advocated by Mehra (2002) who demonstrates 
that both SPF and Michigan Survey forecast Granger-cause inflation, thus indicating 
that survey forecasts contain information beyond that incorporated in past inflation 
rates.
The examination of forecast errors is frequently employed by economists to analyse 
the accuracy of expectations and the relative forecasting performance of various 
agent classes. There is however some debate concerning whether the forecasts of 
households outperform those formed by professionals. Several studies have 
compared forecast error statistics between the Livingston Survey, SPF and Michigan 
Survey. Comparing the mean absolute forecast error (MAFE) and root mean square 
forecast error (RMSFE) over 1960Q1-1997Q4, Thomas (1999) reports that the 
Michigan Survey outperforms the Livingston Survey; utilising a sample period
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comprising 1982Q3-2002Q2 these results are replicated by Mankiw et al. (2003)
22who also observe that the Michigan Survey outperforms the SPF . In contrast, for 
1961Q1-2000Q3, Mehra (2002) that the Livingston Survey mean forecast error 
(MFE) and MAFE is superior compared to the Michigan Survey. Moreover, using 
European data for a smaller and more recent sample period, Lamia and Lein (2008) 
find that in terms of mean square forecast error (MSFE) and RMSFE, the
'j'i
expectations of professionals outperform those reported by consumers . The 
evidence thus suggests that the relative performance of these surveys is dependent 
upon the sample periods over which the survey, and the study, is conducted.
A key objective of this study is to determine the response of agent forecasts to 
distinct periods of macroeconomic stability and volatility. This shall extend the 
analysis of several studies which have examined whether the properties of agent 
expectations are sensitive to certain macroeconomic conditions. For 1960Q1- 
1980Q2 when inflation is upward trending, Thomas (1999) reports that both 
professionals and households under-predict inflation, realising positive forecast 
errors. Moreover, for the earlier sample period considered by Thomas (1999) the 
MFE, MAFE and RMSFE for the Livingston Survey are larger than those associated 
with the Michigan Survey. In contrast, for the later period of downward trending 
and low inflation comprising 1980Q3-1997Q4, both agent classes overpredict 
inflation, realising negative forecast errors; furthermore the Livingston Survey 
outperforms the Michigan Survey in terms of these statistics. Similar results are 
reported by Mehra (2002) who additionally observe that for the latter period 
comprising 1980Q3-2000Q3, median forecasts from the Michigan Survey are 
superior to both Livingston Survey and SPF forecasts. Agent inflation forecasts and 
associated errors therefore appear to be sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. 
Furthermore, the relative accuracy of surveys appears time-variant. This study shall 
thus re-evaluate the results of existing studies regarding the relative performance of 
agent forecasts over the previously identified sample periods, identifying the
22 Considering the maximal samples o f each survey Mankiw et al. (2003) again report that the MAFE 
and RMSFE relating to the Michigan Survey is again superior to that relating to the Livingston 
Survey. However, the maximal sample period o f the Livingston Survey is considerably longer than 
for the Michigan Survey thus direct comparisons are imprudent.
23 Household expectations employed by Lamia and Lein (2008) are taken from German consumers 
within the EU business and consumer survey whilst Consensus Economics provides professional 
expectations from Germany.
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response of forecast errors to distinct periods of macroeconomic stability and 
uncertainty.
Although average household forecasts are found to exhibit superior accuracy over 
certain sample periods, the consensus forecast is likely to conceal the inaccuracies 
across individual expectations; in reality the typical professional is likely to produce 
superior expectations to the typical household or consumer (Zamowitz and Braun, 
1993, Thomas, 1999). Forecast error statistics based on measures of central 
tendency provide an overview regarding the performance of agent expectations but 
fail to reveal variations in expectations over time and the nature of disagreement 
across individuals. Considering these issues Mankiw et al. (2003) show that a 
degree of disagreement exists amongst both professionals and consumers with the 
Michigan Survey exhibiting a distribution with a much wider inter-quartile range and 
longer tails than the Livingston Survey and SPF. Similarly, Thomas (1999) observes 
that whilst mean forecasts from the Livingston Survey only marginally exceed those 
of the median across much of the sample, indicating few outliers, the difference 
between the Michigan Survey mean and median forecasts is generally much larger, 
averaging approximately 1 percentage point and is attributable to those households 
with excessively high expectations. These results clearly favour employing median 
forecasts for empirical analysis in providing a coherent evaluation of expectation 
formation, particularly for households.
Moreover, the level of disagreement among both agent classes is shown by Mankiw 
et al. (2003) to be greater during periods of high inflation. Furthermore, the 
disagreement within each series exhibits substantial co-movement with correlation 
coefficients between the SPF, Michigan and Livingston surveys for actual quarterly 
data shown to be in excess of 0.524. Consequently, empirical studies need to 
consider the impact of macroeconomic conditions and differences amongst 
individuals to fully understand the manner which agents form expectations.
Although this chapter shall primarily consider the differences between aggregate 
household and professional expectations, subsequent chapters shall examine the 
disagreement amongst agent forecasts in relation to the assumptions and predictions 
of expectation theories.
24 The correlation coefficients associated with five-quarter centred moving averages are even higher.
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2.2.2 Elementary Examination of Inflation Forecasts and Associated Forecast 
Errors
In 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the SPF and Michigan Survey were introduced along with the 
examination of some key statistics regarding their respective inflation forecasts. The 
analysis of the two surveys shall now be advanced, focusing on the relative 
performance of forecasts reported by professionals and households. Specifically, the 
analysis shall consider differences between the consensus median forecasts, whilst 
forecast errors shall be defined and evaluated to assess accuracy between the two 
agent classes.
Firstly, the difference between the forecasts reported by the two surveys shall be 
considered. Specifically, the difference between the median four-quarter ahead 
forecasts reported by the Michigan Survey and the SPF shall be defined as:
6t = E t \ n t+4] — E[[nt+4], where E^[n t+4] and E f[n t+4] represent the four period 
ahead inflation forecasts of households and professionals respectively. Therefore, 
where Qt is positive (negative) the median household expectations is greater (less) 
than the median professional expectation. Figure 2.2.1 illustrates the difference 
between the expectations of the two agent classes over the whole sample period 
whilst Table 2.2.1 presents elementary statistics concerning Qt for the whole and the 
three sub-sample periods:
Figure 2.2.1: Difference between Household and Professional Inflation 
Forecasts (1982Q3-2011Q1)
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Table 2.2.1: Expectations Differences -  Elementary Statistics
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
Mean -0.143 0.113 0.040 1.045
Maximum 2.600 2.600 1.150 2.600
Minimum -2.300 -1.550 -1.550 0.150
Std. Dev. 0.938 0.786 0.531 0.626
From Table 2.2.1, the difference between SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts is 
generally negative for the 1980’s and early 1990’s indicating that households expect 
lower levels of inflation than professionals. From the late 1990’s onwards the trend 
has been reversed. Nevertheless, during this period notable differences are observed 
in the latter half of 2001, early and mid-2008 and early 2011. The large differences 
are most likely to arise from variations in household forecasts which were observed 
in 2.1.2 to exhibit greater variation than professional forecasts which were observed 
in 2.1.1 to appear anchored between 2 and 3 percent across this period with a low 
standard deviation. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) identify the 
larger difference between the expectations of the two agent classes with household 
sensitivity to oil prices which experienced large increases between 2009 and 2011.
Of further interest is to establish whether the differences between household and 
professional forecasts observed in Figure 2.2.1 and Table 2.2.2: Equality of Means 
and Variances for Michigan Survey and SPF Inflation Forecasts are significant. 
Specifically, the ANOVA F-Test and Levene test shall be employed to respectively 
examine whether the mean and variance between household and professional
25forecasts, across the four sample periods, are equal , with the results presented in 
Table 2.2.2 below:
Table 2.2.2: Equality of Means and Variances for Michigan Survey and SPF 
Inflation Forecasts
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
Mean
Variance
F-Statistic 
Levene Value
1.594
66.732***
1.147 
29 224***
0.160
15.314***
37.015***
6.434**
*,**,*** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
25 Both tests employ two numerator degrees of freedom and N  — 2 denominator degrees of freedom 
where N  is the number of observations
46
For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the ANOVA F-test is unable 
to reject the null hypothesis thus indicating that, statistically, median SPF and 
Michigan Survey inflation forecast have equal means over these periods. This 
supports the findings of Mankiw et al. (2003) who report that differences between 
professional and household expectations are relatively small. However, for these
26three sample periods, the Levene test rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances . 
Recalling from Table 2.1.3 and Table 2.1.4 that for these three periods, the standard 
deviation of SPF inflation forecasts is greater than that for the Michigan Survey, 
these results suggest that professionals may respond to news and adjust expectations 
more rapidly than households whose forecast may exhibit a degree of ‘stickiness’. 
Nevertheless, for the volatile sub-period, the null hypothesis of both the ANOVA F-
27test and the Levene test are rejected . Recalling that Michigan Survey forecasts are 
higher and exhibit a larger standard deviation than SPF forecasts, these results may 
further indicate that household expectations are more sensitive to transitory inflation 
innovations than professional expectations.
Although useful for simple comparative analysis, the raw survey data is not 
particularly informative in establishing the characteristics and differences across 
agent inflation forecasts. It is therefore common practice to examine the accuracy of 
expectations through the analysis of forecast errors. Consistent with statistical 
convention, can be defined as the difference between actual inflation and 
expectations, namely:
e t,i =  ~  Ei , t-j [” t] (2-2.1)
Again, period t  inflation is defined as n t , whilst Ei t_j[nt\ represents they-period 
ahead forecast of n t reported by agent i, and eti is the period t  forecast error 
realised by agent i.
As indicated in 2.2.1, several recent studies (Thomas, 1999, Mehra, 2002, Mankiw et 
al., 2003) demonstrate that over certain sample periods, the forecasts of households 
are more accurate than those of professionals. SPF and aggregate Michigan Survey 
forecast errors are presented in Figure 2.2.2 below:
26 Similar results are also obtained from employing the Brown-Forsythe test which analyses the 
equality o f variances from the absolute median difference instead o f the absolute mean difference 
employed by the Levene test.
27 Similar results are once more obtained from employing the Brown-Forsythe test.
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Figure 2.2.2 SPF and Michigan Survey Forecast Errors (1982Q3 -  2011Q3)
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The forecast errors illustrated in Figure 2.2.2 follow a similar pattern to CPI depicted 
in Figure 2.1.1. Furthermore, the accuracy of both surveys has generally been 
similar over time, yet certain periods are noteworthy. During the early and mid- 
1980’s when inflation was downward-trending, both surveys generally realised 
negative forecast errors, indicative of over-predictions whilst in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s when inflation was upward trending, peaking in excess of 6 percent, 
positive forecast errors were realised by both surveys, indicative of under­
predictions. These observations are consistent with the behaviour observed by 
Mehra (2002). For the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty both surveys 
realise large positive errors followed by large negative errors. As previously 
discussed in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, these observations appear to indicate that both agent 
classes fail to anticipate the increase in inflation from 2007, and the subsequent 
period of deflation between 2009Q1 and 2009Q3. Moreover, the characteristics of 
forecast errors where inflation is more volatile suggest that both agent classes exhibit 
backward-looking behaviour in forming their forecasts during this period, and shall 
be extensively examined in later chapters.
Moreover previous studies frequently evaluate forecast accuracy utilising the mean 
forecast error (MFE), mean squared forecast error (MSFE), mean absolute forecast 
error (MAPE), root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE) and mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE). The MFE provides an elementary indication of
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forecasting bias (Thomas, 1999) and shall be employed to determine the relative 
precision of agent forecasts. The MFE for agent i k -period ahead forecasts can be 
calculated by:
The MFE is however a poor measure of the accuracy of expectations due to the 
cancelling out effect of positive and negative errors which have the potential to be 
relatively large. The MFE may indicate a degree of bias in expectations but provides 
little indication of the relative accuracy of the forecast series. More suitable tests of 
unbiasedness will nevertheless be considered in relation to the rational expectations 
hypothesis in following chapters. One alternative to the MFE is the MSFE which 
has quadratic loss characteristics which penalise larger forecast errors more heavily 
than smaller errors (Kennedy, 2003). Moreover, these statistics are not affected by 
the cancelling out of positive and negative errors. The MSFE and RMSFE for agent 
i k -period ahead forecasts is calculated by:
Although useful for assessing forecast accuracy, alternative measures to the MFE 
including the MAPE are commonly employed by economists when evaluating 
expectations. The MAPE can be calculated as follows:
Rather than penalising the numerical size of the error, the MAPE penalises 
percentage deviations of expectations to the realised value of the forecasted variable.
The MFE, MSFE, RMSFE and MAPE statistics for SPF and Michigan Survey 
inflation forecasts are presented in Table 2.2.3 below whilst simple hypothesis tests 
are presented in Table 2.2.4:
MFE( — — E(n t+k Et+k-ji [ftt+k]) (2 .2 .2)
MSFEi = e f = E{nt+h -  E ^ . j ^ n ^ ] ) 2 (2.2.3)
1
RMSFE = y/MSFE = (ef) 2
(2.2.4)
MAPE,
t= 1
(2.2.5)
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Table 2.2.3: Forecast Error Statistics for SPF and Michigan Survey Inflation 
Forecasts
W HOLE G-B STABLE V O LATILE
M FE SPF -0.433 -0.115 -0.114 -0.175
MS -0.194 -0.140 -0.050 -1.177
M SFE SPF 1.778 1.128 0.777 2.913
MS 1.820 1.893 0.760 6.103
RM SFE SPF 0.889 0.564 0.388 1.456
MS 0.910 0.947 0.380 3.051
M APE SPF 94.099% 97.603% 30.438% 382.745%
MS 123.178% 140.058% 28.059% 595.520%
Table 2.2.4: MFE and MSFE Hypothesis Testing
W HOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
M FE SPF T-Statistic 
MS T-Statistic 
ANOVA F-Statistic
-3.664***
-1.552
1.927
-1.064
-0.994
0.019
-1.050
-0.466
0.172
-0.437
-2.299**
2.377
M SFE ANOVA F-Statistic 0.005 1.443 0.009 1.140
* ** *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively
For the whole period the MFE statistics presented in Table 2.2.3 are generally in 
accordance with those of previous studies (Thomas, 1999, Mehra, 2002, Mankiw et 
al., 2003, Nunes, 2009) with aggregate households on average realising smaller 
errors than professionals. Furthermore, the MFE’s are negative indicating that both 
agent classes, on average, overestimate the future value of inflation. This is 
consistent with the results for the later periods presented by Thomas (1999) and 
Mehra (2002). Nevertheless, from Table 2.2.4 it is not possible at conventional 
significance levels to reject the null hypothesis that the Michigan Survey MFE is 
equal to zero; however, the null hypothesis of a zero SPF MFE is rejected at a very 
high significance level. Therefore for the extended sample period, Michigan Survey 
forecasts appear to outperform those of professionals. The Michigan Survey MSFE 
and RMSFE however is fractionally greater than that for the SPF; these results are in 
accordance with the later period presented by Thomas (1999). Nevertheless, the 
ANOVA F-test is unable to reject that the Michigan Survey and SPF MSFE’s are 
equal indicating that the magnitude of forecast errors made by the two surveys are 
statistically similar.
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In comparison to the whole sample period, the MFE from Table 2.2.3 for both 
professionals and households, across the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sub­
periods, is lower. This replicates the Greenspan period results presented by Mehra 
(2002) who attributes greater bias during the Volcker period to agents discrediting 
the deflationary nature of central bank policy. Furthermore, from Table 2.2.4 t-tests 
are unable to reject the null hypothesis of zero MFE’s for either agent class whilst 
the ANOVA F-test is unable to reject the equality of MFE’s.
For the volatile sub-periods, the MFE, MSFE and RMSFE of SPF forecasts is greatly 
superior to that of Michigan Survey forecasts. Although both agent classes 
overestimate inflation, the MFE for households is over six times greater than that 
realised by professionals whilst the Michigan Survey MSFE is more than twice as 
large as that for the SPF. These results appear to indicate that whilst household and 
professional expectations exhibit similar accuracy during periods of greater 
macroeconomic stability, in the presence of increased volatility professional 
expectations are greatly superior. The greater inaccuracy in household expectations 
over the volatile sub-period corresponds with Curtin (2009) who attributes greater 
forecast errors to negative values of CPI between 2009Q1-2009Q3 which households 
have greater difficulty in interpreting. Moreover, up to 2009, households had only 
encountered positive inflation, therefore, failing to experience deflation may have 
positively biased expectations (Malmendier and Nagel, 2009) with households 
placing an implicit zero bound on inflation expectations. However, as for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the ANOVA F-tests from Table 2.2.4 are 
unable to reject the equality of MFE’s or MSFE’s for the volatile period, thus 
implying that on average there is no significant difference in the size and magnitude 
of household and professional errors with the relationship persisting across a range 
of macroeconomic conditions.
To further analyse the predictive content of SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts, 
tests of Granger-causality between the surveys and CPI shall be examined akin to 
Mehra (2002). Tests of Granger-causality, initially proposed by Granger (1969), 
consider the predictive content of time-series. Specifically, these tests will be used 
to determine whether past values of survey forecasts improve upon the explanation 
of inflation, beyond that already contained within the past history of inflation, and
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vice versa. Results from Granger-causality tests between the two surveys and 
inflation across the four sample periods are presented in Table 2.2.5 below:
Table 2.2.5: Granger-Causality between Survey Forecasts and Inflation
F-Statistic: 
E i . t - l f a t ]  TTt
F-Statistic:
n t E t
Whole Sample Period: 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 3.926*** 4 729***
MS 1.465 2.537**
Greenspan-Bernanke Sub-Sample Period: 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF 6.980*** 5.529***
MS 1.645 0.843
Stable Sub-Sample Period: 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF 2.806** 3.363**
MS 3.483** 0.767
Volatile Sub-Sample Period: 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 1.533 3.318
MS 1.634 0.248
* ** *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively
Table 2.2.5 illustrates that, for the whole Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, 
SPF forecasts Granger-cause inflation whilst Michigan Survey forecasts only 
Granger-cause inflation for the stable sub-period. As highlighted by Mehra (2002), 
this indicates that SPF forecasts contain information regarding future inflation 
beyond that incorporated into past inflation; yet for the whole and Greenspan- 
Bemanke periods, Michigan Survey inflation forecasts appear to have limited 
predictive power. Furthermore, inflation Granger-causes SPF and Michigan Survey 
forecasts for the whole sample period indicating that both professionals and 
household forecasters exhibit backward-looking behaviour in reporting their 
expectations.
For the volatile sub-period, Granger-causality is not observed in either direction 
between the two surveys and CPI. This indicates that for the most recent period of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, survey forecasts have limited predictive power, 
corresponding with the error statistics previously observed. Furthermore, survey 
forecasts over the volatile sub-period appear not to be consistent with backward- 
looking behaviour and shall be investigated in more detail in subsequent chapters.
The analysis of this section indicates that the differences between professional and 
household forecasts are generally small. Elementary statistics indicate that the
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forecasts of both agent classes have similar means; furthermore, forecasts track 
inflation closely, particularly over longer sample periods. Although the MFE and 
MSFE are generally lower for professionals, tests fail to reject the equality of MFE’s 
and MSFE’s across the two agent classes across all four sample periods. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the economic environment is crucial in determining 
the accuracy of expectations; for periods of greater stability, all measures of forecast 
accuracy are generally lower than for periods which are characterised by greater 
macroeconomic volatility. The properties examined in this section provide an 
overview and basic analysis of the formation of agent inflation expectations. These 
have however been targeted at an elementary level, thus following chapters shall 
consider more complex techniques to determine the dynamic properties of agent 
expectations.
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2.2.3 Stationarity Properties
In addition to the elementary statistics analysed in 2.2.2, the dynamic properties of 
inflation and associated expectations also require consideration; of particular 
importance is whether the aforementioned time-series are characterised as unit-root 
or stationary processes. If stationarity is present, a time-series will fluctuate around 
a constant mean value, the variance will be constant across the sample period and the 
covariance between two values within the series will be dependent upon the time 
interval between the values rather than the date of observation (Hill et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, Berk (1999) warns that where either inflation or associated 
expectations are non-stationary, parameter estimates from empirical experiments will 
be inconsistent even where standard errors are appropriately corrected. Moreover, 
Culver and Pappell (1997) recognise that various economic theories including sticky 
prices and standard Phillips-curve relationships are inconsistent with inflation 
exhibiting unit root properties.
The dynamic properties of inflation and expectations have been extensively 
investigated by economists. To examine inflation persistence, economists have 
analysed various tests. A simple measure as employed by Pivetta and Reis (2007) 
and Fuhrer (2009) concerns the first-order autocorrelation of inflation. Utilising 
rolling sample estimates, both Pivetta and Reis (2007) and Fuhrer (2009) identify 
that the first order autocorrelation coefficient is time-varying; specifically low levels 
of autocorrelation are observed during the 1960’s, rising to approximately 0.8 during 
the 1970’s, remaining high until the mid-1990’s. During the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s autocorrelation varies between 0.4 and 0.6 before falling again in the late 
2000’s.
A more stringent test of persistence as examined by Barsky (1987), Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995), Stock and Watson (2007) and Fuhrer (2009) concerns the 
autocorrelation function. For the post-war era, Barsky (1987) identifies that US CPI 
inflation exhibits greater levels of persistence than for the pre-war era; moreover 
autocorrelations for the 1960-1979 period are observed by Barsky (1987) to be 
particularly high. Similarly, for US inflation between 1965 and 1993, Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995) report that inflation is autocorrelated up to lags of about four years. 
Similarly, considering the univariate process of GDP price index inflation, Stock and
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Watson (2007) observe that changes in inflation are significantly correlated with 
inflation at the first and forth lags. To re-examine the persistence properties of 
inflation, Figure 2.2.3 presents the correlation function for CPI across the whole 
sample period.
Figure 2.2.3: Correlation Functions for CPI Inflation 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.814 0.814 78.123 0.000i l i " 1
i . .......1 rr i 2 0.578 -0.248 117.90 0.000
i i i i 3 0.377 -0.025 134.98 0.000
i □ '[ i 4 0.210 -0.068 140.32 0.000
i =3 i __ j 5 0.228 0.430 146.66 0.000
i Z3 E i 6 0.241 -0.217 153.86 0.000
i □ * [ i 7 0.195 -0.097 158.60 0.000
3 i | i 8 0.157 0.025 161.70 0.000
i ]> i 3i 9 0.092 0.123 162.78 0.000
i 1 i i[ i 10 0.047 -0.096 163.07 0.000
i 1 i i i 11 0.045 -0.024 163.33 0.000
i | i i i 12 0.035 0.006 163.48 0.000
Comparable to the results presented by Barsky (1987) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), 
the inflation rate is observed to be significantly autocorrelated up to the eighth lag. 
Inflation over the whole sample period can thus be classified as highly persistent, yet 
is much lower than the degree of autocorrelation reported by Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995), suggesting that inflation has been less persistent over recent years. 
Nevertheless, regressing inflation upon four lags of itself produces an R2 value of 
0.688 indicating that inflation remains highly forecastable as previously observed 
for post-1960 inflation by Barsky (1987).
The correlation functions for the Greenspan-Bemanke, stable and volatile periods are 
presented in Appendix 2.3. Excluding the Volcker era appears to have little impact 
on the persistence of inflation with significant autocorrelation for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke sample period observed up to the eighth lag. Nevertheless, supporting the 
argument above that inflation has been less persistent in recent years, significant 
autocorrelation for the stable sample period is observed only up to the fourth lag. 
Moreover, for the volatile sub-period, inflation is significantly autocorrelated for the 
first lag only; the lower persistence of inflation for the most recent sample period 
associated with increased levels of macroeconomic uncertainty may have resulted in
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the inflation rate being less forecastable with agents resultantly realising larger 
forecast errors.
Additionally, the persistence properties of inflation forecasts with the correlation 
functions for professionals and households across the whole sample period presented 
in Figure 2.2.4 and Figure 2.2.5 respectively:
Figure 2.2.4: Correlation Functions for SPF CPI Forecasts 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.941 0.941 104.59 0.000i .... :..  1
0.889 0.023 198.66 0.000i i 1 /
i 1 i 3i 3 0.851 0.107 285.72 0.000
i - • -1 i ]> 4 0.824 0.082 367.98 0.000
i i 3i 5 0.808 0.120 447.90 0.000
i C i 6 0.766 -0.209 520.37 0.000
i i i ] i 7 0.733 0.072 587.22 0.000
i A C i 8 0.685 -0.183 646.21 0.000
i i I i 9 0.644 0.031 698.87 0.000
i i 1 ' 10 0.619 0.042 747.93 0.000
i .1 i 3i 11 0.601 0.128 794.63 0.000
i \ i i 12 0.588 0.011 839.78 0.000
Figure 2.2.5: Correlation Functions for Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts 
1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
i ..i i 1 0.597 0.597 42.096 0.000
i i i 2 0.345 -0.018 56.278 0.000
i Z3 i U 3 0.307 0.169 67.638 0.000
i =3 i I i 4 0.271 0.038 76.540 0.000
i 13 i i 5 0.191 -0.016 81.008 0.000
i Z3 i =1 6 0.247 0.178 88.528 0.000
i □ iE i 7 0.183 -0.099 92.723 0.000
i 3' i i 8 0.123 0.024 94.621 0.000
i 3i i | i 9 0.089 -0.035 95.619 0.000
i ]i i i 10 0.070 -0.017 96.247 0.000
i ] i i ]i 11 0.082 0.073 97.111 0.000
i a i 11 i 12 0.065 -0.061 97.667 0.000
In accordance with the results presented in Figure 2.2.3, for the whole sample period, 
the inflation forecasts of both professionals and households exhibit positive and 
significant levels of autocorrelation; nevertheless, whilst for households significant 
autocorrelations are observed up to the eighth lag, a much higher order of correlation 
is observed for professionals. Forecasts reported by professionals thus exhibit 
greater levels of persistence and suggest that they are less sensitive to shocks relative 
to those reported by households. Similarly, correlograms for forecast errors indicate
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that the forecast errors realised by professionals are more persistent than those 
associated with household expectations; this however is not necessarily informative 
regarding the comparative degrees of accuracy exhibited by either agent class.
The presence of autocorrelation amongst inflation and expectations data has potential 
consequences for empirical analysis, particularly under the assumptions of ordinary 
least squares (OLS). To ensure that estimates remain efficient, robust standard errors 
will thus be required; specifically, standard errors will thus be corrected utilising the 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent coefficient matrix proposed by 
Newey and West (1987).
To examine whether the inflation and surevy forecast series are stationary, the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test shall be employed for each of the three 
seriesacross the four sample periods. Following Culver and Papell (1997), ADF 
tests shall be specified to include a constant but no linear trend, consistent with a 
non-accelerating but positive inflation rate, providing the following regression:
The current inflation rate and forecasts from the two agent classes are denoted y* t , 
representative of n t , EPt[nt+h] and EH t [nt+h], whilst the lag length k  is 
automatically selected in accordance with Culver and Papell (1997), using a Schwarz 
information criterion with kmax = 16.
The ADF test assumes a null hypothesis of non-stationarity; however, due to the low 
power of the ADF test to distinguish between a stationary series and those 
characterised by a unit-root, Campbell and Perron (1991), Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) 
Berk (1999), and Fujihara and Mougoue (2007) highlight that the rejection of the 
null hypothesis does not necessarily signify a non-stationary series. Therefore, in 
addition to ADF tests, the stationarity properties of inflation and associated survey 
forecasts shall be further analysed utilising the Phillips-Perron (1988) and KPSS 
LM-tests proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). The Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
employs a modified ADF test equation to prevent serial correlation impacting upon 
the t-statistics, whilst the KPSS contrasts to the ADF in that the null hypothesis 
concerns stationarity rather than the presence of a unit-root. Nevertheless, as thew
k
(2 .2 .6)
7 =  1
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sub-periods employed in this study have relatively small sample sizes, the KPSS test 
will also be of low power. Therefore, due to the inherent limitations of these tests, 
some judgement may be required in determining whether the series are stationary or 
otherwise.
The stationarity properties of inflation and associated expectations have been 
examined by various existing studies; Nelson and Schwert (1977), Barsky (1987), 
Ball and Cecchetti (1990), Hassler and Wolfers (1995), and Berk (1999) have 
indicated that inflation is non-stationary and instead exhibits unit-root properties. 
These results are supported by Culver and Pappel (1997) and Lee and Wu (2001) 
who both report that the ADF null hypothesis of a unit-root is only rejected for 4 out 
of 13 OECD countries. In contrast, analysing US CPI between 1953 and 2004, 
Lanne (2006) is unable to reject the ADF unit root null hypothesis; similarly between 
1947 and 2005, Fujihara and Mougoue (2007) argue that the US inflation rate is 
stationary after accommodating infrequently changing means.
The conclusions regarding stationarity and unit roots may however be dependent 
upon the test employed, as demonstrated by, Hassler and Wolters (1995) and 
Brissimis and Migiakis (2011). Analysing the US price index between 1969 and 
1992, Hassler and Wolfers (1995) report that high lag order ADF, and KPSS tests 
indicate the presence of a unit root, whilst low lag order ADF, and Phillips-Perron
jo
tests favour stationarity . Similarly, Brissimis and Migiakis (2011) report that 
whilst standard Dickey-Fuller and PP tests are unable to reject the unit root null 
hypothesis, GLS modified tests favour the alternative of stationarity29. There is thus 
some disagreement amongst economists regarding the dynamic properties of 
inflation; consequently, US inflation data and the two survey forecasts shall be 
analysed to determine whether these series exhibit stationarity or unit root properties, 
using the ADF, PP and KPSS tests detailed above.
To determine whether inflation observations are characterised by stationarity, the 
ADF test identified by (2.2.6), and the Phillips-Peron and KPSS tests shall be 
performed on the CPI data explored in 2.1.1 across the four sample periods with the
28 Hassler and Wolfers (1995) report similar evidence for the UK, France, Germany and Italy.
29 Lein and Maag (2011) also report differences between the ADF and KPSS tests for various 
European countries.
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results presented in Appendix 2.4 . For CPI across both the whole and Greenspan- 
Bemanke sample periods, the ADF and PP tests reject their respective null
i
hypotheses indicating that inflation does not have a unit root and is instead 
stationary. In contrast, for the stable and volatile sub-periods, both the ADF and PP 
tests are unable to reject the unit root null hypothesis; for these sub-periods, inflation 
is 7(1) and can thus be classified as difference stationary. Nevertheless, these results 
appear to be dependent on the test employed as the KPSS test rejects the null 
hypothesis that inflation is stationary, in favour of a single unit root, for both the 
whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods. Moreover, the KPSS test is unable 
to reject the null hypothesis for the stable and volatile sub-periods.
These results support the argument by Hassler and Wolters (1995) and Fujihara and 
Mougoue (2007) that evidence of stationarity, or otherwise, is dependent upon the 
methodology employed and the sample period examined. Nevertheless, given the 
general low power of unit root tests, the disparity between the results could indicate 
that inflation exhibits near unit root properties as previously indicated by Barsky 
(1987) and Brissimis and Migiakis (2011). Moreover, the relatively small sample 
sizes, particularly for the volatile sample period, further contributes to the low power 
of these tests, and, as argued by Gagnon (2008), may be representative of short-term 
regime shifts.
The persistence properties relating to the SPF and the Michigan Survey are also 
presented in Appendix 2.4. For SPF forecasts, neither the ADF or Phillips-Perron 
tests are able to reject the unit root null hypothesis for the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable periods, whereas for these three periods the results relating to 
Michigan Survey forecasts favour stationarity; the results relating to the KPSS 
support these observations. The presence of unit roots amongst professional 
forecasts is consistent with the results from various previous studies including Evans 
and Wachtel (1993), Luoma and Luoto (2009), however, they contrast with the 
recent work by Hubert and Mirza (2014); moreover, the observation that Michigan 
Survey forecasts are stationary contrasts with the results of Evans and Wachtel 
(1993) and Luoma and Luoto (2009) who observe that household forecasts contain
30 Throughout this thesis, larger tables shall be presented in the appendies.
31 For the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the ADF test rejects the unit root null hypothesis at a 
10% level o f significance.
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unit roots. Again these results may be influenced by the low power of unit root tests 
induced by the relatively short sample periods employed throughout this study.
The results presented in Appendix 2.4 are consistent with the argument presented by 
Fujihara and Mougoue (2007) and Brissimis and Migiakis (2011) that evidence 
regarding the presence of unit roots or stationarity of inflation and expectations is 
dependent upon the methodology employed and the sample period for which the test 
is performed. Nevertheless, due to the low power of these tests, particularly for 
small sample periods there are some questionability regarding the reliability and 
significance of these results. The conflicting results from the various tests, 
particularly amongst inflation may thus indicate that the data contains near unit root 
properties as previously highlighted by Barsky (1987) and Brissimis and Migiakis 
(2011).
As highlighted by Culver and Papell (1997), the timespan of the data may result in 
conventional stationarity analyses, including ADF tests, to reject the unit-root null 
hypothesis. To further examine the stationarity properties of inflation and survey 
forecast series, the GLS modified Dickey-Fuller test (ADF-GLS), as proposed by 
Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) shall be employed across the four sample 
periods “which has substantially improved power when an unknown mean or trend is 
present” (1996:813). In accordance with the initial ADF tests, rejection of the unit 
root null hypothesis would be indicative of stationarity for the given series.
The ADF-GLS test is performed using (2.2.7) which is again specified to include a 
constant but no linear trend whilst y f t denotes the detrended inflation and survey 
forecast series employed, representative of n j,  Ep t [nt+h] and Eht [nt+h\. The 
results from these tests are presented in Table 2.2.6.
k
kyJx = r  +  aylt-i  +  ^  Pj^ylx-j +  et (2 .2.7)
y=i
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Table 2.2.6: ADF-GLS Tests
W G-B S V
Significance 10% -1.615 -1.615 -1.614 -1.607
Critical 5% -1.944 -1.944 -1.946 -1.960
Values 1% -2.585 -2.589 -2.600 -2.692
ADF-GLS
t-Statistics
CPI -0.083 -2.526** -1.187 -2.473**
SPF 0.192 -0.205 -0.240 -1.525
MS -0.493 -4.257*** -2.949*** -3.251***
*** ** * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels
For CPI, the results presented in Table 2.2.6 indicate that CPI has unit root properties 
for the whole and stable periods; in contrast, the unit root null hypothesis is rejected 
for the Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile periods at the 5 and 10 percent levels 
respectively. Similarly, for Michigan Survey expectations, rejection of the unit root 
null hypothesis, in favour of stationarity, is observed for the Greenspan-Bemanke, 
stable and volatile periods but not for the whole sample period. However, 
supporting the results from the baseline ADF tests presented in Appendix 2.4, across 
all four sample periods, it is not possible to reject the presence of unit roots for the 
SPF.
As for the baseline unit root tests presented in Appendix 2.4, the ADF-GLS tests are 
unable to provide conclusive evidence regarding whether the three series need be 
treated as unit-root or stationary processes. Moreover, the use of individual unit-root 
tests are generally appreciated to be of low power (Levin et al., 2002). To further 
assess whether inflation and the two survey forecast series can be deemed to be 
collectively stationary, the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit-root test for panel data 
shall be performed on the three aforementioned series. The test evaluates the null 
hypothesis that the individual series are integrated versus the alternative of 
stationarity with the results presented in Table 2.2.7 below:
Table 2.2.7: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) Panel Unit-Root Test
W G-B S V
t-Statistics -3.793*** -0.215 -1.549* -2.028**
The results presented in Table 2.2.7 indicate that for the whole, stable and volatile 
periods, the unit-root null hypothesis is rejected in favour of collective stationarity 
amongst the three series at a 1, 10 and 5 percent significance level respectively. For 
the Greenspan-Bemanke period, the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) unit-root null
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hypothesis cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance; therefore 
whilst for periods of relative macroeconomic stability there is again some evidence 
in favour of the presence of unit-roots, conclusions are not entirely unambiguous.
The results presented in this section are fairly inconclusive; consistent with the 
arguments presented by Fujihara and Mougoue (2007) and Brissimis and Migiakis 
(2011) the presence of unit-roots or stationarity of inflation and survey expectations 
is dependent on both the sample period and methodology employed. Whilst the 
evidence generally supports the stationarity hypothesis, particularly for the whole 
sample period, for the SPF and periods of greater macroeconomic stability, evidence 
favouring the presence of unit-roots is observed. These conflicting results may be 
indicative of near unit-root properties as highlighted by Barsky (1987) and Brissimis 
and Migiakis (2011). As the panel unit-root tests presented in Table 2.2.7 are more 
in favour of stationarity, the subsequent analysis shall be conducted under the 
premise that the series do not contain unit-roots; moreover, this shall maintain 
consistency with the methodology conducted by the extant literature concerning 
models of expectation formation. Nevertheless, the use of non-stationary time-series 
may lead to spurious analysis, therefore, a level of caution within the following 
empirical analysis must be exercised.32.
32 To alleviate the concerns of OLS analysis, various studies including Luoma and Luoto (2009) 
advocate the use o f vector autoregressive models. These shall be employed with relation to 
professional expectations in Chapter 6.
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2.3 Discussion
The objective of this chapter has been to introduce the SPF and Michigan Survey and 
establish key differences between the properties of household and professional 
inflation forecasts over a period of approximately 30 years. The analysis has also 
identified distinct periods of macroeconomic stability and volatility and investigated 
whether forecast properties are time-variant and sensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions. From tests of SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts, and associated errors, 
there is insufficient evidence to robustly conclude that household forecasts are 
significantly different to those of professionals.
In accordance with previous studies (Thomas, 1999, Mehra, 2002, Mankiw et al., 
2003, Nunes, 2009), the MFE associated with household forecasts outperforms that 
for professionals for the whole sample period and the stable sub-period, however, for 
the Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sub-periods the SPF MFE is smaller than that 
associated with the Michigan Survey. Furthermore, professional MSFE’s are 
consistently smaller than those for households. Nevertheless, it is generally not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the MFE’s and MSFE’s are equal across 
agent classes, and questions whether the SPF or Michigan Survey is superior to the 
other. This has potential implications for numerous economic models which employ 
expectations or directly concern the formation of agent forecasts and shall be 
discussed in more detail in subsequent analysis.
Moreover, despite identifying the similarities and differences between two agent 
classes, disagreement may also prevail between individual professional forecasters 
and also between individual households as highlighted by Mankiw et al. (2003).
33Rather than analysing the expectations of individual agents , an interesting direction 
would be to consider whether expectations sustainability differ amongst 
heterogeneous groups such as between academic and business economists or 
between households with differing demographic characteristics. Heterogeneity and 
disagreement across household expectations shall be analysed in Chapter 4 whilst 
disagreement amongst professional expectations shall be examined in relation to 
information rigidities in Chapter 6.
33 Difficulties would arise under such analysis due to the pseudo-panel structure o f the Michigan 
Survey.
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The performance of agent expectations, as investigated in this chapter, has 
established the relative accuracy of professional and household inflation forecasts 
across an extended time-period and various macroeconomic environments. 
Although interesting for macroeconomists, this analysis is not particularly 
informative regarding the manner which agents form their expectations. Instead, 
economists have devoted substantial attention to the derivation and empirical 
examination of various models to explain expectation formation. Several key 
models shall be evaluated in the following chapters to determine whether they are 
able to adequately accommodate the forecasting process employed by agents across 
various macroeconomic conditions. The next chapter introduces some traditional 
theories of expectation formation and empirically evaluates whether SPF and 
Michigan Survey inflation forecasts are consistent with the assumptions and 
properties of these models.
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CHAPTER 3: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF 
EXPECTATION FORMATION
The previous chapter analysed the elementary properties of survey expectations, 
finding evidence that the accuracy of agent inflation forecasts is time-variant. 
Furthermore, the accuracy of household forecasts relative to those reported by 
professionals is dependent upon the statistical test employed and the sample period 
examined. This chapter extends the analysis of agent expectations by examining 
traditional expectation theories which have received widespread attention through 
the economic literature. The theoretical modelling of agent expectation formation 
was extensively developed throughout the latter part of the last century, and to date 
remains of keen interest for economists in terms of theory, application and empirical 
consistency.
Keynes brought expectations to the forefront of economic debate, yet his approach 
relied principally upon the concept of animal spirits, thus formal modelling of 
expectations was omitted. Nevertheless, various approaches have since been 
adopted by economists to mathematically model the formation of agent expectations. 
Early methods considered backward-looking approaches including static 
expectations which postulated that agents predict that the current value of an 
economic variable shall persist into the future. Models of adaptive expectations, 
which advocated that agents extrapolate past information in predicting the future 
value of some variable, became prominent during the 1950’s and 1960’s. In the 
1970’s, the forward-looking rational expectations hypothesis (REH) revolutionised 
the modelling of agent expectations. Initially proposed by Muth (1961), the REH 
was advanced by Lucas (1972, 1973, 1976), Sargent and Wallace (1975), Fischer 
(1977) and others and has since been widely employed in economic theory, 
providing the foundations for numerous important contributions throughout the 
macroeconomic literature and beyond.
This chapter shall reassess the theory upon which these approaches have been 
developed and empirically evaluate whether survey forecasts are consistent with the 
properties and assumptions of these models. Traditional backward-looking 
approaches to expectation formation are considered in 3.1 whilst 3.2 examines the 
rational expectations hypothesis. Both these sections analyse empirical tests to
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determine whether survey forecasts are consistent with the properties and 
assumptions implied by these theories. Section 3.3 introduces several alternate 
models of expectation formation and discusses the approach taken to overcome the 
issues concerning traditional theories prior to more detailed analysis in subsequent 
chapters. The final section provides a discussion of the preceding analysis and 
assesses whether survey forecasts are consistent with the predictions of traditional 
theories.
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3.1. Backward Looking Expectations
The modelling of agent expectation formation has been developed throughout the 
20th century and to date remains a matter of keen theoretical and empirical interest to 
economists. This section considers conventional backward-looking approaches to 
the modelling of expectations. The intuition and theory upon which these models are 
founded shall be examined, and their relevance shall be analysed by empirically 
testing whether survey forecasts are consistent with the assumptions and predictions 
of these models.
The importance of expectations in determining economic outcomes was established 
by classical economists. However, Keynes (1937:212) argues “that at any given 
time facts and expectations were assumed to be given in a definite and calculable 
form” suggesting that expectations were exogenously determined with forecasted 
variables taken to be known with some degree of certainty. Moreover, as current 
levels of macroeconomic variables were assumed to persist over the forecast horizon, 
expectations were not considered sufficiently significant to require direct modelling. 
Instead, to achieve market clearing equilibria, economists implicitly assumed that 
agents possessed static expectations with movements around some fixed level 
(Minford, 1986:103).
The manner which classical theory approaches expectations is argued by Keynes to 
be overly abstract, assuming that agents lack knowledge of the future when making 
decisions concerning the present. In The General Theory, Keynes (1936) departs 
from classical theory by suggesting that expectations are formed purely upon current 
economic conditions; past expectations only matter in the sense that they are 
embodied in past decisions which determine the current economic state. Moreover, 
Keynes (1936:51) highlights that economic conditions “remain substantially 
unchanged from one day to the next”. Expectations are subsequently modelled 
under the assumption that the economy evolves as a sequence of static equilibria, 
equated to the most recently observed value, synonymous with static approaches, 
except in the knowledge of foreseeable changing circumstances.
Despite proposing that short-term expectations exhibit properties akin to static 
formulations, in relation to long-term expectations, Keynes (1936) further recognised 
the requirement for agents to possess higher order beliefs. Specifically, Keynes
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(1936:156) famously likened decisions to those of a beauty contest “where [agents] 
devote [their] intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects average 
opinion to be”. Some may argue that the beauty contest analogy and the requirement 
to accommodate the behaviour of other agents as a factor for the expected path of the 
forecast variable pre-empts certain aspects of rational expectations theory. Indeed, 
Townsend (1978:482) argues that “ a concern with the beliefs of others is consistent 
with rationality”. Moreover, Begg (1982:28) demonstrates that Keynes’s approach 
of exogenously determined expectations can be re-interpreted such that in the 
absence of unanticipated shocks, The General Theory could be amendable to 
accommodate rational expectations. Similarly, Gerrard (1994) illustrates that 
Keynes’s analysis can encompass the implications of the REH. Nevertheless, as 
Minford (1986:104) highlights, despite accommodating certain aspects of rational 
expectations, Keynes’s use o f ‘animal spirits’ in determining expectations, as 
explained below, cannot be considered synonymous with RE.
Nevertheless, despite Keynes’s greater appreciation of expectations than his classical 
predecessors, the mathematical derivation of expectations remains unexplained. 
Some, including Sargent (1983), blame this omission on the lack of analytical tools 
available to Keynes which have since been developed. Instead, The General Theory 
makes repeated references to ‘animal spirits’, defined as “a spontaneous urge to 
action rather than inaction” (Keynes 1936:161). Keynes thus argues that the 
economic decisions taken by some agents are independent of any mathematical 
structure; actions are instead characterised by greater subjectiveness, motivated by 
spontaneous instincts which quantitative measures are unable to accommodate.
This treatment of expectations is argued by Begg (1982) and Bray (1985) to result 
from the acknowledgement by Keynes that agents possess incomplete information 
thus cannot specify the statistical distribution of random economic variables required 
for creating a cohesive model of expectations formation. Furthermore, associating 
the formation of expectations to ‘animal spirits’ is interpreted by Minford (1986) and 
Koppl (1991:204) as a deus ex machina34, an arbitrary solution to avoid the 
expectations issue. This would imply that economic outcomes are sensitive to 
autonomous fluctuations in individual sentiment and instinct (Blinder, 1987).
34 The term “diabo lu s ex  m a ch in a” is preferred by Koppl (1991:204).
68
Moreover, despite the acknowledgement of higher-order beliefs, the notion of 
‘animal spirits’, and the proposition that “positive activities depend upon 
spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical expectation” (1936:161) appears to 
indicate that Keynes would have been a critic of rational expectations theory.
Whilst Keynesian economists generally adopted static approaches to expectation 
formation, the adaptive expectations hypothesis derived in the 1950’s by Cagan 
(1956), Friedman (1957) and Nerlove (1958), introduced formal mathematical 
modelling to expectation theory. These models proposed that agents would adjust 
their expectations upon the observation of forecast errors. These models suggest that 
expectations are predictably adjusted relative to past conditions and are unaffected 
by news or by individual sentiment as embodied in Keynesian ‘animal spirits’. 
Nevertheless, in accordance with static approaches, expectations maintain a degree 
of persistence, and are often found to be a reasonable explanation of inflation and 
associated expectations (Ball, 2000). Despite being neglected following the advent 
of rational expectations in the 1970’s, interest in backward-looking models which 
employ elements of the adaptive expectations hypothesis, has been renewed in recent
35years .
This section shall analyse several backward-looking approaches to expectation 
modelling. The discussion in 3.1.1 shall introduce the theoretical framework upon 
which these models are founded and establish whether previous studies consider 
forecasts to be consistent with backward-looking behaviour. Sub-section 3.1.2 
introduces formal empirical tests of backward-looking theories and examines 
whether survey forecasts are consistent with the predictions of these models. 
Moreover, these tests shall be conducted across the four previously identified sample 
periods to determine whether the prevalence of backward-looking behaviour is 
dependent upon macroeconomic conditions. The final sub-section discusses the 
appropriateness of backward-looking expectation hypotheses, analysing their 
limitations for wider macroeconomic models and evaluates whether survey forecasts 
empirically conform to the predictions of the various hypotheses.
35 These models shall be formally introduced in 3.3 with a certain class o f models extensively 
analysed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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3.1.1. Theoretical Development of Backward-Looking Expectations and 
Literature Review
The importance of expectations for macroeconomic theory, in particularly for 
determining output and employment outcomes, was acknowledged by Keynes 
(1936); the mathematical modelling of expectations was however omitted. In the 
following decades, macroeconomists have since devoted attention to deriving formal 
models to explain the manner of agent expectation formation which have included 
theories of static, regressive and adaptive expectations. Prior to analysing whether 
survey forecasts are consistent with the assumptions and predictions of these models, 
the theoretical foundations on which these theories are established shall be presented 
whilst previous studies which assess the empirical validity of these models shall also 
be reviewed.
The static expectations hypothesis is often considered as the most primitive theory of 
expectation modelling. This theory assumes that agents expect the current level of 
the forecasted variable to be maintained over the forecast horizon and implies that 
the economy has achieved a steady state equilibrium. Static expectations of inflation 
can thus be represented by (3.1.1) and (3.1.2):
Et-hM  = n t- h = Pt-h ~  Vt—2h (3-1-1)
Etfrt+hi = n t = P t -  Pt-h C3-1-2)
This specification consequently assumes that expectations of the h-period ahead 
inflation rate are equal to the current level of inflation. However, the expected rate 
of change in the price level p in period t is non-zero, and is instead equal to the rate 
of change observed between period t — h and t. If instead agents expect the price 
level to remain constant over the forecast horizon, expectations of inflation would 
equal zero:
Et-hiPt] =  Pt-h (3-1-3)
Et-h M  = Et-h [Ptl -  Pt-h = 0 (3-1-4)
The specification of the static expectations hypothesis in (3.1.1) and (3.1.2) thus 
assumes that there is no relationship between current expectations Et [nt+h] and 
lagged inflation n t_h. Therefore, the static expectations hypothesis assumes that
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only current inflation enters the information set; all other information, including the 
past history of inflation, is ignored, thus “The static expectations individual not only 
suffers from myopia but also an extreme form of amnesia” (Shaw, 1984:24).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, survey forecasts have been observed to 
outperform those of static forecasts. Both Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) report 
that forecasts from the Livingston Survey, SPF and Michigan Survey realise smaller
”3/:
MAE’s and RMSE’s than those from naive forecasting rules . Consequently, 
survey forecasts are deemed to utilise wider information than that embodied within 
past inflation, and thus are considered more sophisticated than the restrictive 
assumptions implied by the static expectation hypothesis. Several alternative 
backward-looking models were thus proposed by economists in attempt to better 
characterise expectation formation.
An extension of the static expectations model proposed by Hicks (1939) concerns the 
regressive expectations hypothesis. This theory proposes that expectations will 
equal the most recently observed inflation rate, including some adjustment to allow 
for the trend over the forecast horizon as represented by (3.1.5):
Ei,tln t+h\ = n t + Y f a  -  n t_h) (3.1.5)
The manner which expectations respond to inflation trends is represented by y; 
where y > 0, illustrates that agents expect current inflation trends to be extrapolated, 
whereas y < 0, the trend is expected to be reversed and expectations can thus be 
considered regressive. Two interesting cases arise where y  = — 1 and y = 0. 
Considering the former, current expectations of the /i-period ahead inflation rate are 
equal to the h-period lagged inflation rate; expectations thus assume that inflation 
trends will be entirely reversed. For the latter, the static expectations model (3.1.2) 
arises. Consequently, static expectations can be considered an extreme version of
(3.1.5) which entirely discounts the past such that expectations are solely formed 
upon current experiences.
Empirically testing a regressive expectations model for Livingston Survey data 
between 1947 and 1975, Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) find 0 < y < 1 for both
36 Both Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) identify the contemporaneous CPI inflation rate as the one- 
year ahead naive forecast.
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consensus and individual forecasts. Professional expectations are thus deemed to 
evolve in response to, and in the same direction as, recent inflation trends. 
Examining Livingston Survey data for 1952-70, Lahiri (1976) in contrast observes a 
negative y  coefficient indicating that professional inflation forecasts exhibit 
regressive behaviour. These results thus suggest that backward-looking behaviour 
on the part of professionals is time-variant. Splitting the sample period, time-variant 
behaviour is further observed by, Tumovsky (1970). Whilst the extrapolative 
coefficient is positive for the earlier 1954-1964 sub-period associated with relatively 
high inflation, the coefficient is negative for the latter 1962-1969 period associated 
with more stable inflation. These results thus suggest that backward-looking 
behaviour is not only time-variant but dependent upon macroeconomic conditions.
As previously discussed, the static expectations hypothesis assumes that agents are 
excessively myopic. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, in response to this criticism, 
economists developed the adaptive expectations hypothesis (AEH) as an alternative 
theory. Initially developed by Cagan (1956), Friedman (1957) and Nerlove (1958), 
the AEH continued to assume that agents employ backward-looking rules in forming 
expectations. Specifically, Cagan (1956:37) advocates that “The expected rate o f  
change in prices is revised per period o f time in proportion to the difference between 
the actual rate o f change in prices and the rate o f change that was expected. ” 
Consequently, in accordance with the static expectations hypothesis, agent 
expectations remain determined by the past value of inflation.
For the h period forecasting horizon, Cagan’s hypothesis can be formally 
represented by:
Ef.tfo+ftl -  Ei:t- h[nt] =  A(nt -  F j.t- j tM ) (3.1.6)
The rate which expectations are updated period to period is determined by X which 
Cagan defines as the “coefficient of expectation”. Expectations of the h period 
ahead inflation rate are determined by /i-period lagged expectations for current 
inflation and some adjustment for the most recently realised forecast error. 
Consequently, where forecast errors are zero, expectations remain unchanged.
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Through simple rearrangement of (3.1.6), the adaptive expectations hypothesis can 
be represented by a weighted average model of current inflation and /i-period lagged 
expectations:
Ei.tfrt+h] =  An-t +  (1 -  A)Eiit. h[nt] (3.1.7)
Once more, two extreme scenarios can be envisaged: should X = 0, expectations are 
insensitive to changes in inflation, whereas should X = 1, (3.1.7) reduces to the static 
expectations model (3.1.2). Moreover, the value of the adaptive coefficient is also 
demonstrated by Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) to illustrate agent beliefs regarding 
the inflation process. Where forecast errors are believed to have arisen in response 
to permanent innovations, X will be much larger than if the inflation process is 
largely driven by transitory shocks.
Alternatively, one may wish to consider adaptive forecasting behaviour by analysing 
the change in expectations over the forecast horizon. From (3.1.7) the same 
relationship must hold h-periods earlier as illustrated by (3.1.8) below:
= Xnt_h + (1 -  X)Ei>t_2 hbrt] C3-1-8)
Subtracting (3.1.8) from (3.1.7) the change in expectations between periods t — h 
and t can be expressed as a weighted average of the change in inflation and the 
previous change in expectations:
Ei,tln t+hi ~  Ei,t-hl^t] (3.1.9)
A(7Tf 7r£_ft)
+ (1 -  X){Ei t_h[nt] -  Eix_2h[nt])
The two extreme scenarios X = 0 and X = 1 can again be considered: the former 
suggests that forecast updates are equal to the h-period lagged forecast update whilst 
the latter proposes that the change in expectations is equal to the observed change in 
inflation over the forecast horizon.
The initial model proposed by Cagan (1956) is extended by Carlson and Parkin 
(1975) who propose that rather than solely adapting expectations to accommodate 
the most recent inflation observation, agents also respond to the rate of change in
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inflation akin to regressive expectations. Formally, they propose that expectations 
are subject to second-order error-leaming mechanisms with agents responding to the 
previous two forecast errors as demonstrated by (3.1.10) below:
(3.1.10)
—  Xi(u  ^ —  Ei
+ X2 ( j l t-h  ~  Ei t -2 h \ j t t - tS )
Examining data from the Livingston Survey, Lahiri (1976), Tumovsky (1970) and 
Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) test whether professional forecasts are consistent with 
the predictions of adaptive expectations. The value of the adaptive coefficient 
reported by Lahiri (1976) and Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) is positive and 
significant indicating that professionals adjust their expectations to accommodate 
previous errors. In contrast, for the earlier 1954-1964 sub-period, Tumovsky (1970) 
reports that the adaptive coefficient associated with both 6- and 12-month ahead 
expectations is insignificant; instead, expectations are argued to be solely a function 
of past forecasts. Nevertheless, for the later 1962-1969 period, the adaptive 
coefficient reported by Tumovsky (1970) is positive and significant, with a value 
greater than 0.70 for both 6- and 12-month forecasts implying that professional 
expectations are highly sensitive to current inflation.
Analysing SPF CPI forecasts for a more recent 1985-2009 period, the adaptive 
coefficient observed by Maugeri (2012) is insignificant. Instead, professional 
forecasts are more consistent with static expectations, with the coefficient attached to 
one-period lagged expectations close to one. Similarly, analysing Bloomberg 
expectations of US CPI for 1999-2010, the adaptive coefficient observed by Arnold 
(2013) is again insignificant. Moreover, the null hypothesis that the coefficients add 
to one is rejected in favour of the coefficients summing to less than one which 
Arnold (2013) claims to indicate that expectations are regressive, with professionals 
expecting inflation trends to be reversed over the forecast horizon.
A key objective of this study is to examine the time-variant properties of survey 
forecasts; this shall extend the analysis of several previous studies which have 
evaluated whether macroeconomic conditions impact upon the relevancy of 
backward-looking models. As highlighted above, Tumovsky (1970) observes that
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whilst the adaptive coefficient for the earlier period is insignificant, Livingston 
Survey forecasts are highly sensitive to inflation for the more stable latter sub­
period. Moreover, during periods of increased inflation volatility, Figlewski and 
Wachtel (1981) observe that the value of the adaptive coefficient falls, consistent 
with Livingston Survey professionals recognising that the inflation process is 
primarily driven by transitory shocks. Similarly, utilising the error-leaming model
(3.1.10), Carlson and Parkin (1975) find that when UK inflation rates were low, 
expectations exhibit greater autoregressive behaviour, yet when UK inflation was 
much higher, expectations exhibit second-order error-leaming characteristics. There 
is thus some agreement that professional forecasts are consistent with adaptive 
behaviour however, the sensitivity of forecasts to current inflation appears dependent 
upon the sample period and macroeconomic conditions.
Moreover, the adaptive principle identified in (3.1.7) must also hold for expectations 
of n t formed in previous periods:
E u - h M  =  A ( n t - h )  +  (1 - '0 £ i ,t -2  h l ^ t - h l  (3.1.11)
By extending (3.1.11) to the n-period forecast horizon and substituting back into 
(3.1.7), adaptive expectations hypothesis can be represented by the following 
geometrically distributed lag model:
Ei,tln t+hi = k (n t)  + ^(1 “  X)nt- h + A(1 -  X)2n t_2h (3.1.12)
+ ------ h A( 1 — X)nllt -nh
71 (3.1.13)
E i A n t+ h l  =  A f r t )  +  ' Y j ~  ^  U t ~ i h
j =i
Furthermore as 0 < A < 1, the weight on lagged inflation values decreases, the more 
distant it was realised. The Cagan type model demonstrated by (3.1.12) and (3.1.13) 
thus asserts that whilst the most recent experiences are highly prominent when 
forming current expectations, past experiences enter the information set albeit with a 
lesser effect the more distant is the past.
The distributed lag model demonstrated by (3.1.12) and (3.1.13) has been subject to 
empirical testing by various studies. Analysing Livingston Survey forecasts, Tanzi
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(1980) reports that the distributed lag model has a high R2 for both six- and twelve­
month expectations. However, Tumovsky (1970) reports that for the earlier 1954- 
1964 sample period, the R2 associated with the distributed lag model was 
considerably lower than for the latter 1962-1969 sample period. Moreover, whilst 
Tumovsky (1970) argues that the distributed lag model provides a worse fit to 
Livingston Survey forecasts than comparative adaptive or extrapolative models, 
Lahiri’s (1976) results slightly favour the former. The distributed lag properties of 
professional expectations may thus be sensitive to the sample period.
Furthermore, whilst (3.1.12) and (3.1.13) indicate that the weight on lagged values of 
the forecast variable the more distant in the past, the results presented by Tumovsky 
(1970), Lahiri (1976) and Tanzi (1980) do not appear to satisfy this property. The 
coefficient associated with current, inflation is generally larger than that associated 
with one-period lagged inflation, the coefficient for j  = n is generally larger than for 
j  = n — 1. However, as these studies restrain n to either 2 or 3, the larger 
coefficient associated with j  =  n may indicate a role for higher order lags, and the 
past history of inflation, for the formation of professional expectations. Moreover, 
extending (3.1.13) to also include the unemployment rate and treasury bill rate, 
Mankiw et al. (2003) reject the null hypothesis that Livingston Survey, SPF and 
Michigan Survey expectations are formed in accordance with to adaptive 
approaches. Instead, both professional and households are deemed to possess more 
sophisticated expectations than assumed by simple backward-looking rules.
Utilising a percentile time-series, Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) consider whether 
Michigan Survey forecast are consistent with adaptive expectations. Adaptive 
behaviour in expectations is observed by Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) to generally be 
larger for forecasts greater than the median, with a peak of approximately 0.4 around 
the 60th percentile. Furthermore, the R2 associated with the Pfajfar and Santoro’s 
(2010) approach exhibits a hump-shaped pattern between the 40th and 99th percentile, 
peaking at approximately the 75th percentile. In contrast the adaptive coefficient 
between the 1st and 10th percentiles and between the 30th and 40th percentiles is 
insignificant37. Consequently, the results presented by Pfajfar and Santoro (2010)
37 Between the 10th and 30th percentiles, the adaptive coefficient is negative.
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question the relevancy of adaptive behaviour on an aggregate level, with forecasts 
below the median inconsistent with the assumptions of the AEH.
Previous empirical studies of traditional backward-looking models appear to indicate 
that survey forecasts are more sophisticated than these theories predict. However, as 
expectations are concerned with a variables future value, economists have attempted 
to accommodate simple forward-looking rules into adaptive expectations models. 
Analysing whether expectations are backward or forward-looking, Curtin (2005) 
regresses Michigan Survey forecasts on past, current and future inflation rates.
Whilst lagged inflation is observed to be insignificant, both the contemporaneous 
and future inflation rates are significant. Consequently, Curtin (2005) dismisses the 
AEH for Michigan Survey forecasts indicating that households employ more 
sophisticated techniques than extrapolating past outcomes. In contrast, Madeira and 
Zafar (2012) find that the coefficient on current inflation is much larger than that 
associated with future inflation, thus Michigan Survey forecasts are suggested to be 
more consistent with adaptive expectations than forward-looking rules. However, as 
the contemporaneous inflation rate is published with some lag, and future inflation is 
significant at the 1% level, household forecasts can be considered more sophisticated 
than predicted by backward-looking models. Empirical tests in 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 shall 
re-evaluate these arguments.
Despite the foundations of the AEH remaining fairly simplistic and continuing to 
assume that agents utilise backward-looking rules to formulate expectations, it is a 
theoretical improvement on the static expectations hypothesis. Firstly, it assumes 
that agents are sufficiently sophisticated to learn from past errors, adapting their 
expectations accordingly. Furthermore, it asserts that where inflation is relatively 
stable, expectations will progressively adjust towards the prevailing inflation rate 
whilst errors converge towards zero (Shaw, 1984). Therefore, providing that 
0 < A < 1, expectations will eventually achieve a close approximation of inflation, 
with the rate of adjustment more rapid for larger values of A; nevertheless, full 
convergence and the realisation of zero errors will never be achieved. Moreover, 
empirical studies have generally found that the AEH is a reasonable approximation 
of post-war expectations; nevertheless, as post-war US inflation has been highly
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persistent, Ball (2000) argues that these results are unlikely to extend to other 
economies or monetary regimes.
Although conventional backward-looking theories are often criticised for imposing 
overly restrictive information assumptions and excessive agent myopia, these models 
are useful for establishing differences in the formation of household and professional 
inflation forecasts. Empirical studies have generally refuted excessively naive 
models including the static and regressive expectation theories, however, evidence 
concerning the AEH is more mixed. Whilst studies from the 1980’s and 1990’s 
appear generally supportive of adaptive behaviour, more recent studies (Mankiw et 
al., 2003, Curtin, 2005) are less inclined to support any form of backward-looking 
model. The remainder of this section presents formal empirical tests of these 
traditional theories to determine whether survey forecasts are consistent with the 
assumptions and predictions across a period of approximately 30 years.
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3.1.2. Empirical Examination of the Consistency of Survey Forecasts with 
Backward-Looking Expectation Theory
The literature review in 3.1.1 indicated that there is a general consensus that 
traditional backward-looking models are insufficiently sophisticated to adequately 
accommodate the formation of agent expectations. Utilising SPF and Michigan 
Survey inflation forecasts, these conclusions shall be reassessed across the 
previously identified sample periods. Specific attention shall once more be devoted 
to whether the forecasts of either agent class are more consistent with these models 
and determine if backward-looking behaviour is more prominent for periods of 
increased macroeconomic stability or volatility.
In 3.1.1 the static expectations hypothesis was identified as the most basic theory of 
expectation formation. Given the multi-horizon forecasting structure adopted by 
these two surveys, to examine the performance of the static expectations hypothesis 
(3.1.14) shall be estimated across the four sample periods for both agent classes:
E i . t - n f r t ]  =  a 0 +  a i K t - h  +  € t  (3.1.14)
Specifically, (3.1.14) asserts that the /i-period ahead inflation forecast for agent i is 
determined by the current level of inflation; all other information relating to past 
macroeconomic conditions and the future path of inflation is ignored. To determine 
whether agent forecasts are consistent with the predictions of static expectations, the 
Wald x 2 test shall examine the joint hypothesis a 0 = 0;a 1 = 1. The non-rejection 
of the Wald null hypothesis would indicate that agent inflation forecasts employ 
static behaviour, exclusively extrapolating the current rate of inflation. The analysis 
of previous studies in 3.1.1 would however suggest that (3.1.13) will be too 
restrictive to accommodate the manner in which both agent classes formulate 
expectations. The rejection of the Wald test null hypothesis would instead indicate 
that agents exploit wider information regarding macroeconomic conditions.
The results from testing (3.1.14) by OLS with Newey-West corrected standard errors 
for four-period ahead SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts (h = 4), are presented in 
Appendix 3.1 Panel A. For all four sample periods, Panel A clearly illustrates that 
neither the SPF or Michigan Survey forecasts are consistent with the predictions of 
static expectations; the Wald x 2 tests is rejected at a very high level of significance.
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The results from Panel A are, however, useful in understanding differences in the 
behaviour of households in comparison to professionals.
Firstly, across all four sample periods, R2 and R2 are greater for the Michigan 
Survey than for the SPF indicating that (3.1.14) better accommodates the formation 
of household forecasts and supports the hypothesis that professional forecasts exhibit 
greater sophistication. Secondly, a 0 is invariably significant, potentially indicating 
that agent forecasts are anchored to a positive inflation rate, incorporating inflation 
innovations from observations of the current level. Nevertheless, this argument has 
little economic appeal due to the simplistic structure of static expectations; instead 
a0 may be indicative of missing variables suggesting that more sophisticated models 
of expectation formation are required.
Considering the coefficient values, the SPF exhibits a greater a 1 value for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods; professional forecasts thus appear more 
attentive to the current inflation rate than those of households. The attentiveness of 
both agent classes to macroeconomic news shall be extensively evaluated in later 
chapters. Focusing on the volatile sub-period, a 0 for both agent classes is 
particularly large whilst a 1 is relatively small, albeit significant. Nevertheless, a ± is 
larger for households than for professionals. Recalling that the standard deviation of 
inflation for the volatile period is high, this may indicate that household forecasts are 
more sensitive to transitory inflation shocks than professionals.
Tests of (3.1.14) evidently indicate that survey forecasts are inconsistent with the 
properties of static expectations. The assumption of the simultaneous arrival of new 
information regarding inflation and its incorporation into information sets which 
agents form expectations appears unrealistic. Inflation news may instead enter 
information sets with a short lag. Recalling from the previous chapter that survey 
forecasts were observed to peak several quarters after inflation, and that US inflation 
data is released halfway through the following month to which it is realised (Curtin, 
2005), the information assumptions concerning static expectations appear to provide 
an over-simplistic representation of agent behaviour. One alternative would be to 
replace the contemporaneous inflation rate with the one period lagged inflation rate 
as demonstrated by (3.1.15) below:
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(3.1.15)
The results from testing (3.1.15) for four-period ahead SPF and Michigan Survey 
forecasts (h = 4), are presented in Appendix 3.1 Panel B, however, only marginal 
differences are observed relative to Panel A. Specifically, a0 remains invariably 
significant across both agent classes and all four sample periods, whilst for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, a 1 remains larger for professionals 
than households.
Interestingly, whereas the baseline model (3.1.14) appears to perform better in terms 
of R2 and R2 for Michigan Survey forecasts, the lagged specification (3.1.15) 
appears a superior explanation of SPF forecasts. Therefore relative to the 
contemporaneous static model (3.1.14), professional forecasts appear to be better 
represented by lagged values of the forecast variable; this may further indicate that 
professional expectations are more backward-looking relative to those formed by 
households. Nevertheless, the Wald x 2 statistics relating to (3.1.15) again reject the 
null hypothesis a 0 = 0, cc1 = 1 across the four sample periods for both agent classes. 
Consequently, survey forecasts can be considered inconsistent with the properties of 
static expectations.
As noted in 3.1.1, an agent whose forecasts are consistent with the properties of 
static expectations not only behaves myopically, but also ignores all other 
information, including the past history of inflation. An alternative backward-looking 
theory introduced in 3.1.1 concerns regressive expectations (Hicks, 1939,
Tumovsky, 1972). Rather than expectations simply extrapolating past inflation, 
agents adjust forecasts to account for the past trend in inflation occurring between 
t — h and t, specifically:
Ei,t[nt+h\ = a 0 + ajTTf] + a 2[nt -  n t. h] + et (3.1.16)
To carefully examine the response of expectations to inflation trends, the unrestricted 
form of (3.1.16) shall be compared to the restricted model which imposes full 
extrapolation of expectations, implying a ± = 1. Where a significant value of a 2 is 
observed, agent forecasts expect the inflation trend observed over the previous four
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quarters to be replicated over the following four quarters. Tests of (3.1.16) are 
presented in Appendix 3.2.
Tests of (3.1.16) and the regressive expectations hypothesis again reveal differences 
in the formation of professional and household inflation forecasts. For SPF 
forecasts, the value of a 2 across the four sample periods is invariably negative and 
highly significant; yet, for the Michigan Survey, it is not possible to reject the t-test
38null hypothesis a 2 — 0 for any sample period . This indicates that whilst 
professionals anticipate a reversal of inflation trends, households do not incorporate 
inflation trends into expectations. Furthermore, whilst regressive expectations are an 
improvement upon static hypotheses for professionals, increases in R2 are small. 
Both professionals and households thus appear to utilise wider information than the 
inflation rate and associated trends when forming expectations; consequently, survey 
forecasts appear more sophisticated than the regressive expectations hypothesis.
In accordance with previous studies, the results from Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 
3.2 indicate that survey forecasts are not fully compatible with the predictions of 
either static or regressive expectations. Nevertheless, the discussion in 3.1.1 
suggested these naive models were overly restrictive and assumed agents exercised 
excessive myopia in forming expectations, and instead proposed the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis as a credible alternative. The AEH proposes that agents 
update previous expectations in proportion to forecast errors as demonstrated by
(3.1.6) and (3.1.7). The AEH shall be formally examined using SPF and Michigan 
Survey forecasts across the four sample periods using the following empirical 
models:
E i A n t+h \  =  a o +  a i  E i , t - A n t \  +  « 2 ^ ]  +  e i,t (3.1.17) 
E i . t f r t + h .] =  tfo +  « i  E i , t - j [ n t - j + h \  (3.1.18)
+  a 2( n t -  Ei t - h[nt ])  +  e t
38 For the whole and volatile sub-periods, the t-test null hypothesis is rejected at a 10% level of 
significance.
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Given the four period ahead structure of survey forecast employed in this study 
(h = 4), (3.1.17) and (3.1.18) shall be analysed for both one-period (J = 1) and four 
period (j = 4) adjustments.
The results for the Cagan specification (3.1.17) are presented in Appendix 3.3. For 
both agent classes, a2 is invariably significant across all for sample periods, 
indicating that expectations are updated as new information regarding inflation is 
revealed. Interestingly, the value of a 2 is invariably larger for Michigan Survey 
forecasts; this may indicate that household forecasts exhibit greater sensitivity to 
current conditions and transitory shocks while professional forecasts appear more
39anchored . Moreover, comparing a 2 for j  = 1 and j  = 4, the adjustment to four- 
period ahead forecasts is notably larger thus indicating that agents expect inflation to 
steadily evolve over the forecast horizon. Nevertheless, expectations do not fully 
conform with the weighted average predictions of the AEH as Wald x 2 tests 
generally reject the null hypothesis a1 + a 2 = 1. Furthermore, for both j  — 1 and 
j  = 4, (3.1.17) the R2 and R2 values indicate that (3.1.17) is a relatively good 
explanation of survey forecasts, with the values particularly high for SPF forecasts 
across the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods. Furthermore, for 
both agent classes, the adaptive expectations model (3.1.16) outperforms the 
regressive model (3.1.18). These results are analogous to Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) 
and indicates that error adjustment better captures expectation revision than trend 
extrapolation. For both agent classes however, the value of the constant remains, in 
general, large and significant. Therefore, although (3.1.17) is less restrictive than 
naive models, survey forecasts appear to be more sophisticated, utilising wider 
information sets than assumed by the Cagan hypothesis.
As demonstrated by (3.1.18), the AEH can also be specified to consider the evolution 
of expectations with respect to forecast errors. However, given the four period 
structure of survey data employed in this study, there are complications regarding the 
appropriate lag j  with empirically testing (3.1.18). For both j  — 1 and j  = 4, both 
a x and a2 are positive and significant for both agent classes; however, the value of 
a2 is larger for Michigan Survey forecasts consistent with agents exhibiting larger
39 Greater anchoring behaviour on the part o f professionals also conforms with the observation of low 
standard deviation values previously observed for the SPF in the previous chapter.
83
errors making larger adjustments (Madeira and Zafar, 2012). Moreover, the smaller 
value of a 2 associated with the error adjustment of SPF forecasts may further 
indicate that professional expectations are less sensitive to transitory shocks. 
Furthermore, for both agent classes the adaptive coefficient is larger for longer 
forecast horizons (j  = 4) than for shorter horizons (J = 1); however, this is 
unsurprising as agent forecasts react to a greater volume of new information, or 
‘news’, in the intervening period.
Moreover, as with the initial Cagan specification, the R2 and R2 values indicate that 
the variance amongst survey forecasts is reasonably well explained by (3.1.18). 
Interestingly, whereas SPF forecasts for j  — 1 exhibit larger R2 and R2 values than 
for j  = 4, the reverse is observed for Michigan Survey forecasts. As previously 
suggested, this may indicate that households respond to new information with some 
lag, whilst professionals have the processing capability to immediately incorporate 
new information into expectations. Despite the apparent pervasiveness of adaptive 
backward-looking behaviour, to be consistent with the AEH, survey forecasts must 
satisfy the Wald null hypothesis of a 0 = 0 ,a 1 + a 2 = 1. The x 2 statistics presented 
in Appendix 3.4 however indicate that for both j  — 1 and j  = 4, neither SPF nor 
Michigan Survey forecasts are consistent with this property of the AEH. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence suggesting that professional forecasts are 
consistent with a weighted average of past forecasts and forecast errors. However, 
as a0 is generally positive and significant, survey forecasts again appear more 
sophisticated than the assumptions of adaptive expectations.
For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the values of a 1 and a 2 
associated with SPF forecasts are generally analogous suggesting that the adaptive 
behaviour of professional expectations is fairly insensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions. In contrast, whilst the adaptive behaviour of Michigan Survey forecasts 
is approximately identical for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, 
the value of a± for the stable sub-period is substantially lower; this is accompanied 
by increases in both a 0 and a 2. This could indicate that information during periods 
of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty is more widely available; consequently, the 
information acquisition and processing costs associated with the formation of 
household expectations are reduced.
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For the volatile sub-period, where the magnitude of forecast errors was previously 
observed to be large, it may be expected that agents employ greater error adjustment 
behaviour to expectation behaviour. However, although for both agent classes the 
adaptive coefficient remains positive and significant, the value of a 2 conforms with 
the three alternative sample periods. This may indicate that both agent classes do not 
believe that large forecast errors result from permanent shocks; moreover, as 
remains significant and relatively high, agents may consider forecast errors a result 
of transitory shocks. Nevertheless, the constant a 0 for both agents is generally much 
larger than for the three alternative sample periods, whilst the Wald x 2 statistics also 
reject the Wald null hypotheses. Consequently, survey forecasts can again be 
considered inconsistent with the predictions of the AEH, which for the most recent 
period of macroeconomic uncertainty, remains insufficiently sophisticated to fully 
distinguish the formation of agent expectations.
Although both agent classes were deemed to exhibit more sophisticated than the 
initial Cagan specification of the AEH, it was further observed in Appendix 3.4 that 
professional forecasts exhibited some consistency with a weighted average structure 
of past forecasts and errors. In 3.1.1 however, the baseline adaptive model was 
identified with a more general geometrically distributed lag specification of past 
inflation. To assess whether survey forecasts are compatible with the distributed lag 
specification of the AEH, the following model, akin to those presented by 
Tumovsky (1970), Lahiri (1976), Tanzi (1980) and Mankiw et al. (2003), shall be 
empirically examined:
Results from testing (3.1.19) for SPF and Michigan Survey forecast across the four 
sample periods are presented in Appendix 3.5 and Appendix 3.6 respectively; 
specifically, due to the four-period horizon of inflation forecasts the last four
specification identified in (3.1.12), the coefficients on lagged inflation clearly do not 
follow a geometric progression with steadily declining weights the more distant is
40 Furthermore, n  = 7 is synonymous to the tests employed by Mankiw et al. (2003).
n (3.1.19)
7 = 1
(n = 3) and eight (n = 7) inflation observations are considered40. Unlike the
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the past. Furthermore, the Wald x 2 test null hypothesis that expectations are a 
weighted average of past inflation observations 2f = 1 = 1 is invariably rejected at 
very high levels of significance. Moreover, as previously highlighted regarding the 
results presented in Appendix 3.3 and Appendix 3.4, the constant a0 remains large 
for n = 3 and n = 7 for both agent classes across all four sample periods. Again, in 
accordance with the conclusions of Mankiw et al. (2003) and Curtin (2005), these 
results indicate that survey forecasts are more sophisticated than the solely 
backward-looking assumptions of adaptive expectations.
The adaptive expectations hypothesis has proven empirically useful for analysing the 
manner which agents formulate expectations. Primarily, the AEH appears most 
relevant for professional expectations with the adaptive coefficient invariably 
significant whilst high values of R2 and R2 were also observed. Interestingly, whilst 
tests of the baseline adaptive model indicate that professional forecasts are best 
associated with adjustments to one-period lagged expectations in response to errors, 
adjustments to four period lagged expectations in response to errors appear to better 
characterise the adaptive forecasting behaviour of households. This suggests that 
whilst professional expectations evolve period to period in response to new 
information, this information slowly diffuses into household information sets. 
Furthermore, it may indicate a seasonality effect within the evolution of household 
expectations. The former is an issue that shall be returned to in later chapters with 
particular reference to sticky information and epidemiological models of Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003).
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3.1.3. Discussion of Backward-Looking Expectations
Until the latter decades of the 20th century, macroeconomic theory predominantly 
employed backward-looking techniques of expectation formation; these models 
induce a degree of persistence and are often found to be a reasonable explanation of 
inflation and associated expectations (Ball, 2000). These models restrict an agents 
information set to consist exclusively of contemporaneous and lagged values of the 
forecast variable, expectations and associated errors; all other information regarding 
economic conditions is implicitly assumed to be embodied within these variables. 
This section has reconsidered several key theories relating to backward-looking 
expectations and has examined whether survey forecasts are consistent with the 
predictions of these models.
In accordance with previous studies, the forecasts of both professionals and 
households are deemed inconsistent with the properties of static expectations. The 
assumptions of static forecasting can thus be considered as excessively myopic and 
furthermore, fails to acknowledge the variable nature of inflation established in the 
previous chapter. In contrast, tests concerning the AEH indicated that the 
expectations of both professionals and households exhibit significant adaptive 
behaviour across all four sample periods.
The results indicate that professional forecasts are more consistent with simple 
backward-looking rules during periods of greater macroeconomic stability, when 
forecasting errors are less costly, but employ more sophisticated techniques during 
periods of greater macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast, the results further 
suggest that household expectations utilise wider information when it is more freely 
available during periods of greater stability whilst backward-looking rules are 
reverted to when there are greater costs associated with the acquisition and 
processing of information.
The AEH illustrated by (3.1.17) and (3.1.18) assumes that agents expectations 
evolve steadily through extrapolating past values of actual and expected inflation and 
associated forecast errors. The AEH improves upon static modelling of 
expectations, recognising that agents are able to learn from experiences, adjusting 
expectations in response to forecast errors. Adaptive behaviour appears most 
relevant for professional expectations during periods of greater macroeconomic
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stability; nevertheless, the adaptive coefficient was also significant for household 
forecasts across all four sample periods. However, it was concluded that survey 
forecasts exhibit greater sophistication than predicted by the AEH.
Utilising four-period ahead survey expectations from the SPF and Michigan Survey, 
the AEH under (3.1.18) was examined considering both one-period ahead (J = 1) 
and four-period ahead (J = 4) forecast updates. These specifications may however 
be considered unable to accurately accommodate modifications to agent forecasts. 
Firstly, whilst j  = 1 attempts to analyse the period-to-period evolution of forecasts, 
the error of the one-period lagged forecast error has yet to be realised; instead, the 
contemporaneous forecast error relates to four-period lagged forecasts.
Nevertheless, utilising j  = 4 is also unsatisfactory as (3.1.18) consequently implies 
that expectations across a four-period horizon evolve independently of each other41.
One solution to these issues would be to consider how agents adapt their 
expectations across the forecast horizon for a given target period. Empirically, this 
can be examined by varying both h and j  within a specification akin to (3.1.18) and 
also requires the employed survey data to exhibit multi-horizon properties. As noted 
in Chapter 2, whilst the SPF provides multi-horizon inflation forecasts, the Michigan 
Survey is only concerned with year ahead forecasting; therefore, whilst it would be 
possible to examine the consistency of SPF forecasts with the AEH, subject to 
forecast revisions, the structure of the Michigan Survey is not compatible with a 
similar empirical strategy. As a key objective of this study is to compare the forecast 
properties across the two agent classes, the analysis of the AEH subject to forecast 
revisions is left for future research42.
A limitation of backward-looking expectation theories is that they require the 
forecast variable to exhibit a substantial degree of persistence. Due to the 
persistence of post-war US inflation, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
backward-looking behaviour is likely to perform reasonably well. Thus, it is not 
particularly surprising that survey forecasts from the past thirty years are fairly 
consistent with the properties of the AEH. However, in accordance with the Lucas
41 This specification does however assume that information arising across the intervening three 
periods is embodied within the forecast error upon which expectations are modified.
42 In later chapters associated with professional forecasts and information rigidity, the multi-horizon 
structure of the SPF shall be analysed and examined in greater detail.
Critique, where an economy is characterised by an alternative monetary regime 
where inflation is less persistent, backward-looking expectation models are likely to 
be greatly inferior. For example, in the presence of an inflation target, Ball (2000) 
demonstrates that inflation would exhibit negative serial correlation as policy will act 
to reverse deviations from target; consequently, expectations which exhibit 
backward-looking behaviour will realise systematic forecast errors. The Lucas 
Critique instead implies that agents are more forward-looking and incorporate the 
objectives of policy into their information set and subsequently their expectations. 
Therefore, to accommodate agent behaviour across various monetary regimes and 
inflation dynamics, a more comprehensive approach to expectation formation is 
required.
Despite traditional backward-looking models being a key contribution of expectation 
theory, the empirical analysis in this section indicates that backward-looking 
expectation theory is unable to fully characterise the formation of survey inflation 
forecasts. Nevertheless, these models have been useful in distinguishing differences 
in the manner which various agent classes form expectations. Whilst Michigan 
Survey forecasts exhibit greater consistency with static behaviour, SPF forecasts are 
more consistent with adaptive expectations. Nevertheless, survey forecasts appear to 
be more sophisticated than the simplistic assumptions of traditional backward- 
looking models allow.
An alternative strategy is thus required to capture the manner which agents form 
expectations. The restrictive and myopic nature of backward-looking models could 
be relaxed, permitting agents to form expectations on a range of macroeconomic 
variables or some proxy which incorporates this information43. Considering 
forward-looking models is another option where agents can rationally accommodate 
information regarding future macroeconomic innovations into expectations. Nesting 
backward-looking behaviour into these models has previously been productive 
(Curtin, 2005, Madeira and Zafar, 2012) and provides an alternative option. More 
recent models, including the sticky-information and epidemiological models 
(Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Mankiw et al., 2003, Carroll, 2003) have also applied 
backward-looking behaviour to expectation theory and shall be analysed in Chapter
43 The epidemiological model o f Carroll (2003) which shall be examined in the following chapter is a 
prominent example that accommodates this concept.
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5. In 3.2, the prominent forward-looking rational expectations hypothesis shall be 
formally introduced whilst empirical tests shall examine whether survey forecasts are 
consistent with various properties required for rationality.
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3.2. Rational Expectations
In 3.1.3, a number of criticisms with backward-looking expectation theories were 
identified, questioning their suitability for macroeconomic analysis. As survey 
forecasts are not robustly consistent with the predictions of these models, particularly 
across periods associated with increased macroeconomic volatility, a more general 
theory of expectation formation is required. In the latter 20th century, the rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH) was proposed and developed; it has since become 
widely employed throughout the macroeconomic literature with many theoretical 
implications which include generating efficient labour and capital markets, and 
providing the necessary conditions for policy neutrality.
The notion of RE was first proposed by Muth (1961:316) indicating that 
“expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially 
the same as the predictions of relevant economic theory”. In the 1970’s, the concept 
was widely adopted by macroeconomists, revolutionising new classical theory, with 
notable contributions by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent amongst others. Despite 
recognising that past decisions are irrelevant for forming current expectations, 
Keynes’ General Theory appears to refute the theoretical foundations of the REH; 
specifically, Keynes argues that the resources required for agents to acquire and 
process information would be sub-optimal given the assumption of substantially 
unchanging circumstances. Nevertheless, despite advocating a backward-looking 
expectation regime, Keynes appreciates that expectations may depart from the path 
of static equilibria in the event of foreseeable circumstances.
The properties of the REH assume the efficient utilisation of all available 
information; consequently, agent expectations consistent with RE are devoid of 
systematic errors with deviations from actual outcomes resulting entirely from 
unanticipated disturbances. The economic literature has thus established a number 
of properties which forecasts are required to satisfy to be deemed consistent with RE 
theory.
This section discusses the theory behind the concept of RE and analyses whether 
survey forecasts are consistent with the properties required for rationality. Sub­
section 3.2.1 defines the concept of RE within economics, identifying the various
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properties of the REH and their applicability to survey forecasts. The empirical 
results of previous studies are also considered in 3.2.1 to determine whether 
economists have established a consensus regarding the empirical relevancy of the 
REH. Sub-section 3.2.2 presents formal empirical tests of the REH and examines 
whether survey forecasts satisfy the conditions required for rationality. Specifically, 
the results shall be analysed to identify similarities and asymmetries between the 
rationality of SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts. Furthermore, these tests shall be 
conducted over the four previously identified sample periods to ascertain whether 
consistency with the various properties of the REH is time-variant and dependent 
upon prevailing macroeconomic conditions. The final sub-section provides a 
discussion of the results presented in this section, determining whether the REH is 
applicable to survey forecasts and examines various criticisms associated with RE.
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3.2.1. The Theoretical Background of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis
As the REH states that agents utilise all available information, such that expectations 
mirror those derived by economic theory, a rational forecast must exhibit the 
following properties: unbiasedness, efficiency and consistency. The economic 
literature has proposed and examined various tests to determine whether agent 
expectations conform to the predictions of the REH. This sub-section shall formally 
introduce these properties, identify the appropriate empirical predictions and 
determine whether previous empirical studies have established a general consensus 
regarding the rationality of agent expectations.
The first key property of the REH concerns the unbiasedness of expectations. For 
expectations to be consistent with this property, unpredictable and randomly 
distributed forecast errors are required; expectations are therefore not permitted to 
systematically deviate from actual values. Although expectations are not required to 
exhibit full accuracy, errors must be consistent with white noise residuals which, by 
definition, have zero mean and finite variance. Unlike the AEH, current 
expectations are therefore independent of past errors, as their random nature does not 
contain any relevant information regarding the future path of the forecast variable.
Following Brown and Maital (1981), Gramlich (1981) and Adam and Padula (2011),
(3.2.1) presents the unbiasedness property for /i-period ahead forecasts:
n t = a 0 + a iE iit_h[nt] +  6i>t (3.2.1)
For expectations to be consistent with the unbiasedness property a 0 = 0 ,a 1 = 1 
must be satisfied, whilst e* t must be a white noise residual. Should agent forecasts 
be inconsistent with this elementary property, expectations cannot be considered as 
fully rational44.
Despite being a fairly weak test of rationality, empirical studies commonly analyse 
whether expectations are consistent with the unbiasedness property. Moreover, 
failure to conform to this simple property of the REH would indicate that
44 Keane and Runkle (1990) note that in the presence o f differential costs between positive and 
negative forecast errors, expectations may still be formed rationally despite inconsistency with the 
unbiasedness property. Similarly, Lai (1990) report that where the mechanisms generating the 
forecast variable change over time, violations o f the unbiasedness property are not sufficient to reject 
the rationality of expectations.
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expectations are non-rational and be unable to conform to the predictions of stronger 
requirements of rationality. Early empirical studies which considered the rationality 
of professional expectations often rejected the unbiasedness property. Analysing the 
Livingston Survey, Figlewski and Wachtel (1981), Gramlich (1983) and Bryan and 
Gavin (1986b) reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness, whilst Zamowitz (1985)45 
and Bagehstani and Kianian (1993) also report that SPF forecasts do not conform to 
this elementary property of the REH. However, the results of these studies may be 
dependent upon the sample period employed. More recent studies which analyse the 
SPF, including Keane and Runkle (1990), Romer and Romer (2000), Mehra (2002), 
Mankiw et al. (2003)46, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), Croushore (2010), 
Adam and Padula (2011), and Brissmis and Migiakis (2011) report that professional 
inflation forecasts are consistent with the unbiasedness property.
Despite Thomas (1999) and Mehra (2002) being unable to reject the unbiasedness of 
Livingston Survey expectations for their respective full sample periods, this property 
of the REH is not observed by either study when examined for sub-periods 
characterised by either increasing and decreasing inflation. This suggests that 
professional forecasts deviate from the predictions of RE during periods with distinct 
macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, extending the analysis of unbiasedness to 
consider the individual expectations of the SPF, Capistran and Timmerman (2009) 
reject the unbiasedness null hypothesis for over 50% of professional forecasters. 
However, bias at an individual level is not necessarily an indicator that average 
professional forecasts violate the unbiasedness property and the REH in general.
Similarly, there is some debate regarding whether household expectations are 
empirically consistent with the unbiasedness property. Although Gramlich (1983) 
and Mankiw et al. (2003) report that household expectations violate the unbiasedness 
condition, there is some general consensus that Michigan Survey inflation forecast 
are consistent with this property of RE. Indeed, Bryan and Gavin (1986b), Batchelor 
and Dua (1989), Rich (1989), Baghestani (1992), Thomas (1999), Mehra (2002)47 
and Curtin (2005) are unable to reject the unbiasedness null hypothesis for the
45 The rejection o f the unbiasedness property reported by Zarnowitz’s (1985) is argued by Keane and 
Runkle (1990) to arise from the use of revised data.
46 The unbiasedness null hypothesis for the Livingston Survey is rejected by Mankiw et al. (2003).
47 Although Mehra (2002) does not observe systematic bias across median Michigan Survey forecasts, 
the x 2 null hypothesis o f unbiasedness is rejected for the mean series
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Michigan Survey over various sample periods. Thus, despite often being considered 
less informed than professionals, there is some general agreement amongst previous 
studies that consensus household forecasts are not systematically biased.
There is however some disagreement amongst empirical studies concerning whether 
the unbiasedness of household forecasts is time-variant. Despite being unable to 
reject the unbiasedness of the Michigan Survey for a period of approximately 25 
years, Gramlich (1983) finds that for the 1970-80 sample period household inflation 
forecasts violate this property of the REH. Nevertheless, for earlier sample periods 
encompassing the 1970’s, neither Thomas (1999) nor Mehra (2002) are unable to 
reject the unbiasedness condition for mean Michigan Survey forecasts; however, 
both studies reject the unbiasedness null hypothesis for later sample periods. The 
unbiasedness of mean Michigan Survey forecasts thus appears to be time-variant. 
Similarly, Thomas and Grant (2008) find that whilst median Michigan Survey 
forecasts satisfy the unbiasedness property for the whole sample and early sub­
periods, the null hypothesis is violated for the latter period associated with low and 
stable inflation. Moreover, conclusions appear dependent upon the series employed. 
Although median inflation forecasts were unavailable from the Michigan Survey 
until 1978, Thomas (1999) nor Mehra (2002) are able to reject the unbiasedness of 
median Michigan Survey, albeit solely for more recent sample periods.
Despite being a key indicator of whether agent forecasts are consistent with the 
REH, tests of unbiasedness are often considered fairly weak in classifying 
expectations as rational. The efficiency property has broader scope, requiring 
expectations to make use of the available information set ensuring that forecast 
errors are unpredictable (Mankiw et al., 2003), and is thus considered a stronger 
indicator of the rationality of expectations. Although previous empirical studies 
have employed various tests of efficiency, the orthogonality property, implying that 
forecast errors are necessarily uncorrelated with any information available when 
agents form their expectations, is commonly analysed. This can be mathematically 
represented as follows:
N (3.2.2)
j =i
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The available information set available in period t — h is  represented by It_h. To 
conform to the orthogonality property, the non-rejection of the joint null hypothesis 
a 0 = 0, <Xj = 0 for all j  is required. Many economists however consider these 
assumptions to be overdemanding of agent expectations; empirical studies, including 
Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) and Rich (1989), have thus replaced It_h and the 
assumption of all available information with the most recent forecast error. 
Consequently, (3.2.3) requires respecifying as follows:
n't -  Eix- h[nt] =  a 0 +  -  E;,t-h-il>rt]) +  et (3.2.3)
Again, orthogonality requires the non-rejection of the joint null hypothesis a0 =
0,a 1 = 0; otherwise, information embodied within past errors is not fully exploited,
48violating the efficiency property required by the REH . Although evidence of 
serially correlated forecast errors is often considered sufficient of the rejection of the 
REH, the length of the forecast horizon needs to also be considered. Indeed, 
expectations may be considered rational despite the presence of serially correlated 
forecast errors, providing that the order of correlation does not exceed the forecast 
horizon.
Early empirical studies of the REH often reject the rationality of the Livingston 
Survey, primarily for the failure to satisfy the efficiency property. Whilst Brown and 
Maital (1981) find that both 6-month and 12-month ahead forecasts are unable to 
efficiently exploit the available information set, Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) and 
Gramlich (1983) observe serially correlated forecast errors. Moreover, despite 
respecifying Gramlich’s (1983) model to resolve inconsistencies regarding the 
forecast horizon and sampling frequency, the results presented by Bryan and Gavin 
(1986b) continue to reject the efficiency property for Livingston Survey 
expectations. Similarly, Zamowitz (1985) observes that SPF errors are 
autocorrelated suggesting that professional forecasts are robustly inconsistent with 
the error orthogonality condition for earlier sample periods.
More recent studies have also analysed whether professional forecasts are consistent 
with the efficiency property. Despite Thomas (1999) observing weak form
48 Should agents be unable to distinguish between permanent and transitory shocks, Cukierman (1986) 
suggests that’ the observation of serially correlated forecast errors is not a clear violation of the REH.
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efficiency for Livingston Survey expectations, Mankiw et al. (2003) find that both 
Livingston Survey and SPF forecast errors are persistent. Moreover, Mehra (2002) 
and Mankiw et al. (2003) find that neither the Livingston Survey nor the SPF exhibit 
strong-form efficiency; instead, correlation between forecast errors and various 
macroeconomic variables is observed49. Similarly, Molnar and Reppa (2009) report 
that SPF forecasts are strongly inefficient with respect to a range of macroeconomic 
variables. Due to failure to satisfy the efficiency criteria, these studies thus conclude 
that professional forecasts are not fully rational. Similarly, Thomas (1999) rejects 
the efficiency of Livingston Survey forecasts due to failure to accommodate 
information regarding the output gap. However, Thomas’s (1999) results are based 
on real time information, but as Mehra (2002) and Orphanides and van Norden 
(2005) demonstrate, real-time data concerning the output gap is subject to significant 
revision. Consequently, Thomas’s (1999) results can be interpreted to show that the 
Livingston Survey is in fact consistent with the efficiency property subject to the 
information available to agents at the time that forecasts were formed.
Moreover, Thomas (1999) reports that Michigan Survey forecast errors are also 
uncorrelated with all macroeconomic information except the output gap. Similarly, 
Roberts (1997) and Mehra (2002) cannot reject x 2 null hypothesis that median 
Michigan Survey forecasts are efficient with respect to past information. These 
results are in accordance with those of Rich (1989) who observes that Michigan 
Survey forecasts do not violate various GMM tests of orthogonality and efficiency.
In comparison to professional forecasts, there thus appears greater evidence that 
household expectations are more consistent with the efficiency criteria required for 
rationality; however, this view is far from unanimous. For example, Mankiw et al. 
(2003) find that Michigan Survey forecast error are persistent and jointly correlated 
with various macroeconomic variables. There thus appears some debate regarding 
whether household expectations satisfy the efficiency criteria required for rationality.
The failure to satisfy the error orthogonality condition strongly indicates that 
expectations are not rational; however, other attributes of expectations also 
contribute to the efficiency property. One additional feature concerns the
49 Whilst Livingston Survey forecasts are found to be correlated with revised data concerning 
economic variables, Mehra (2002) is unable to reject the efficiency o f the Livingston Survey when 
real-time data is employed.
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consistency condition. To conform with this property, expectations over multiple 
forecast horizons for the same target date must be generated recursively (Mullineaux, 
1978). Specifically, the period t forecast for inflation in period t + h must equal the 
forecast formed in period t  — k  for the same target date (Pesaran and Weale, 2006); 
revisions are thus solely dependent upon the arrival of new information. The 
consistency property can be represented as:
E i A n t+h] =  Ei,t -k[n  t+ft] +  e t (3.2.4)
Under the simplifying assumption that the relevant information set comprises of the 
past history of inflation, Pesando (1975) examines an alternate specification of the 
consistency property. Specifically, expectations are required to consistently apply 
the information embodied in past inflation rates across multi-horizon forecasts as 
demonstrated by (3.2.5):
Et[n t+h]  =  a l n t +  a 2n t - l  H b a nu t - n  +  u t ^ 2  5 )
&t - i M  =  P l E t - l M  +  P l K t - 1 +  -  +  PnKt-n  +  Ut - 1
For expectations to be consistent with the consistency property requires = /?j for
all i = 1,..., n. Despite being unable to reject the efficiency condition of utilising 
information in past inflation rates, Pesando (1975) rejects the null hypothesis of the 
rationality of Livingston Survey expectations due to failure to satisfy the consistency 
condition. In contrast, Mullineaux cannot reject the consistent condition for either 
adjusted or unadjusted Livingston Survey forecasts. A more recent study by Patton 
and Timmermann (2012) utilising Federal Reserve Greenbook CPI and GDP deflator 
forecasts rejects the consistency property. Consequently, there appears limited 
evidence that professional forecasts satisfy the consistency condition required for 
efficiency and rationality50.
Although tests of the unbiasedness, error orthogonality and consistency conditions 
are useful in ascertaining whether agent expectations are consistent with the REH, 
economists are additionally interested in determining whether the forecasts of one 
agent class are more rational relative to their counterparts. Several studies including 
Bryan and Gavin (1986a) and Batchelor and Dua (1989) have analysed the relative
50 Due to the structure of the Michigan Survey and the need for multi-horizon forecasts to examine 
tests akin to (3.2.4), empirical evidence concerning the consistency of household forecasts is limited.
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efficiency of competing forecasts. To be considered efficient, an agents forecast 
cannot be improved by utilising information embodied within the forecast of some 
other agent. To examine whether the Michigan Survey forecast is ‘conditionally 
efficient’ to those reported by the Livingston Survey, Bryan and Gavin (1986a) 
evaluate the following model:
n t = a0 + fcEp't-bl n t\ +  P2EHit- h[nt] +  et (3.2.6)
Where EP t_h[nt] and EHt_h[nt] denote the /i-period ahead forecasts of 
professionals and households respectively. The efficiency of professional forecasts 
requires the non-rejection of the joint null hypothesis a 0 =  0,/?i = l ,/?2 = 0, whilst 
the efficiency of household forecasts requires a0 =  0,/?! = 0,/?2 = 1. Evaluating 
(3.2.6), Bryan and Gavin (1986a) conclude that between 1949-1985, Michigan 
Survey forecasts are efficient relative to the Livingston Survey; however, 
professional expectations reported by the Livingston Survey could be improved by 
utilising information embodied within household forecasts. However, for 1978 — 
1985, Baghestani (1992) observes that monthly Michigan Survey forecasts have less 
predictive power than adaptive forecasts. Consequently, whilst the results of Bryan 
and Gavin (1986a) appear to indicate that the expectations of households exhibit 
greater rationality than those of professionals, the greater predictive power of 
adaptive expectations, as observed by Baghestani (1992), also questions the 
relevancy of Michigan Survey forecasts.
A similar test of efficiency to determine whether the expectations of one agent class 
are more informative than the other is presented by Batchelor and Dua (1989). 
Specifically, Batchelor and Dua (1989) regress the professional (household) forecast 
error upon the contemporaneous household (professional) forecast as demonstrated 
below:
7it -  Epit- h[jit] = a 0 + f t f t , , t- / i M  + et (3.2.7)
nt -  EHit_h[nt] = a0 +  f cE p . t -n M  +  6t (3 -2 -8)
If the forecasts of the other agent class contain some additional information, the null 
hypothesis f t  = 0 will be rejected. Analysing Michigan Survey and Livingston
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Survey forecasts between 1956-1983, Batchelor and Dua (1989) do not find any 
evidence that the forecasts of either professionals or households are significantly 
more informative than the other51.
For the last forty years, the REH has been widely employed by macroeconomists and 
has important theoretical implications for various models. However, to be classified 
as ‘rational’, expectations are required to satisfy the various properties and 
conditions as identified above. Nevertheless, previous empirical studies which have 
analysed survey forecasts have indicated that both professional and household 
expectations are, at best, partially rational. Moreover, the results from previous 
studies appear dependent upon the sample period employed indicating that the 
rationality of survey forecasts is sensitive to prevailing macroeconomic conditions.
Despite the empirical conclusions of previous studies identified above, opponents of 
RE question whether the strong form Muthian hypothesis, advocating that 
expectations mirror the actual structure of the economy, is over-restrictive to be 
considered as an appropriate assumption of agent forecasts. Moreover, Prescott 
(1977) and Sargent (1982) argue that the theoretical foundations and policy 
implications of RE are deliberately abstract, and not derived from direct empirical 
evidence. Furthermore, Pesaran (1987) argues that testing the REH based on any 
form of empirical data is unable to provide a reliable evaluation as observed 
expectations, including survey forecasts, only consider a small sample of the 
population and are likely to be error ridden. However, to assume that RE is 
empirically artificial implicitly asserts that real-world forecasts, including those 
reported in surveys, are irrational, which has uncomfortable implications for 
macroeconomic modelling (McCallum, 1979). Furthermore, Lucas (1980) and 
Lovell (1986) acknowledge that the relevance of any theory can only be judged upon 
its empirical performance. Yet, whilst the empirical analysis of RE is essential, 
rather than determining whether agent forecasts support the theory of RE, testing 
must instead consider whether forecast observations are consistent with the 
predictions of the RE (Prescott, 1977).
Considering various tests akin to those identified in this sub-section, 3.2.2 
empirically re-examines whether SPF and Michigan Survey inflation forecasts are
51 Similar results are also presented by Batchelor and Dua (1989) for various sub-periods.
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consistent with the properties of the REH and determine the relative rationality of 
professional and household expectations. Furthermore, following Thomas (1999) 
and Mehra (2002) it shall be identified whether violations of the various criteria 
required for rationality are time-variant and dependent upon the sample period and 
underlying macroeconomic conditions.
3.2.2. Empirical Examination of the Consistency of Survey Forecasts with 
REH Properties: Methodology and Results
Given the theoretical structure of RE, and the results of previous studies, discussed 
in 3.2.1, models to test the validity of the REH shall now be considered. This sub­
section analyses whether survey forecasts satisfy the aforementioned properties 
required by RE and shall investigate whether professional forecasts are more 
consistent with the predictions of RE than those formed by households. These 
relationships shall also be examined across the four previously identified sample 
periods and determine whether macroeconomic conditions impact upon the degree of 
rationality exhibited by agent expectations.
The first property of the REH identified in 3.2.1 concerned unbiasedness; this 
condition examines whether expectations systematically deviate from the actual 
values of the forecasted variable, resulting in predictable forecast errors. To examine 
whether survey forecasts are consistent with the unbiasedness property, (3.2.1) shall 
be examined utilising four-period ahead SPF and Michigan Survey inflation 
forecasts (h = 4) with the results presented in Appendix 3.752. To be consistent 
" with the unbiasedness property, 3.1.1 identified that expectations are required to 
satisfy the joint null hypothesis a 0 = 0, a 1 = 1.
For the whole sample period, the slope coefficient in Appendix 3.7 significantly 
differs from unity for both agent classes; however, for the Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sub-periods, which are associated with reduced levels of macroeconomic 
uncertainty, = 1 cannot be rejected for either professionals or households. 
Moreover, whilst the joint Wald x 2 test of a 0 = 0 ,a1 = 1 associated with SPF 
forecasts is rejected for three of the four sample periods, the null hypothesis of 
unbiasedness associated with Michigan Survey forecasts is only rejected for the 
volatile sub-period. In accordance with various studies (Gramlich, 1983, Thomas, 
1999, Mehra, 2002, Thomas and Grant, 2008), the results presented in Appendix 3.7 
thus indicate that compliance with the unbiasedness condition for both agent classes 
is time-variant and dependent upon macroeconomic conditions.
52 Tests o f the predictive power of forecast errors, as employed by Mankiw et al. (2003), yields 
synonymous results.
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Furthermore, Magueri (2012) highlights that tests of unbiasedness should have 
limited predictive power. From Appendix 3.7, the R2 and R 2 valuesassociated with 
SPF forecasts for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods are larger than 
those associated with the Michigan Survey, again indicating that household forecasts 
are more consistent with this property of the REH. The observation that household 
forecasts are less biased than those formed by professionals for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods is consistent with the results for the 
later period (1980Q3-2000Q3) presented by Mehra (2002).
The only period in which forecasts from both agent classes are consistent with the 
unbiasedness property is the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period; similarly, removing 
the era of Volcker chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, Mehra (2002) cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of unbiasedness for either SPF or (median) Michigan Survey 
forecasts for the Greenspan era (1987Q4 -  2000Q3)53. Contrastingly, for the volatile 
sub-period, neither agent class forms expectations consistent with the unbiasedness 
property. These results appear to confirm the arguments of Mehra (2002) and 
Croushore (2010) that the unbiasedness of expectations is dependent upon the 
sample period and the economic environment in which expectations are formed. 
Consequently, during the most recent period of macroeconomic volatility, survey 
forecasts appear less likely to be formed ‘rationally’ than for periods characterised 
by greater stability. Nevertheless, in the presence of differential costs between 
positive and negative forecast errors, the failure of survey forecasts to comply with 
the unbiasedness property is not sufficient to comprehensively reject the REH 
(Keane and Runkle, 1990).
Although tests of the unbiasedness condition indicate that survey forecasts are not 
invariably consistent with this elementary property of the REH, the rationality of 
expectations necessarily requires evaluation upon a range of properties, which 
unbiasedness is just the first54. The second theoretical property of RE identified in 
3.2.1 concerns error orthogonality and examines whether forecast errors are 
independent of information embodied within past errors. To examine whether
53 For the same sample period, the x 2 null hypothesis o f unbiasedness is however rejected by Mehra 
(2002) for both Livingston Survey and mean Michigan Survey forecasts.
54 The rejection of the unbiasedness null hypothesis for both agent classes is however a strong 
indication that expectations formed during the volatile sub-period are non-rational.
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survey forecasts are consistent with this property of the REH, the following model 
shall be tested:
nt+h ~ Eiit[nt+h] = a0 + tr^ TTf -  Ei>t_h[nt]) + et (3.2.9)
To evaluate whether survey forecasts are consistent with the error orthogonality 
condition, the joint null hypothesis a 0 = 0, a1 = 0 shall be examined utilising the 
Wald chi-square test. The results from testing (3.2.9) for h = 4 are presented in 
Appendix 3.8.
For all four sample periods, it is not possible to reject the joint x 2 null hypothesis 
a 0 = 0, a 1 = 0 for either agent class; SPF and Michigan Survey forecast error are 
thus uncorrelated with their respective four-period lagged errors, which were the 
most recently available at the time forecasts were formed. The results therefore 
indicate that both professionals and households are able to exploit the information 
embodied in past errors across various macroeconomic conditions, conforming to the 
error orthogonality condition associated with efficiency and the REH. This appears 
to refute the observations of Adam and Padula (2011) who observe autocorrelated 
SPF forecast errors and Mankiw et al. (2003) who observe robust evidence of 
autocorrelated forecast errors for the SPF, Livingston Survey and Michigan Survey .
The error orthogonality condition examined in (3.2.9) is however a weak test of the 
efficiency property. Many empirical studies consider stronger tests which analyse 
whether expectations efficiency incorporate a variety of macroeconomic information 
using a model akin to (3.2.2). However, there are issues with examining this class of 
models. Firstly, as agents utilise a wide range of information sources and 
macroeconomic indicators in forming their expectations, some discretion would be 
required in determining which variables to include. Consequently, rather than 
examining the efficiency of expectations to the available information set, empirical 
tests will only examining whether forecast errors are correlated with a distinct set of 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, should It_h be sufficiently specified, 
including a wide variety of variables, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) 
demonstrate that it will not be possible to reject the joint null hypothesis ctj = 0 for 
all j .  However, testing for the presence of serial correlation between forecast errors
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is thus able to determine whether current expectations incorporate the omitted 
information associated with previous forecast errors.
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3.2.3. Discussion of Rational Expectations
The REH has been extensively employed by macroeconomic models for the last 
forty years; however, the notion of RE, where agents are required to form 
expectations consistent with economic theory remains a theoretical rather than an 
empirical observation. Moreover, Minford (1986:115) highlights that there are some 
who argue that rational expectations are an unbelievable concept. Firstly, critics may 
argue that agents are unable to efficiently exploit the available information set, and 
thus resort to backward-looking rule-of-thumb behaviour, akin to adaptive 
expectations. Secondly, whilst agents may report informationally efficient 
expectations, uncertainty regarding the structural economic relationships results in 
systematic forecast errors. The conditions necessary for rationality are however 
more reasonable from an aggregate expectations perspective. Despite the restrictive 
assumptions and stringent requirements of RE, the concept remains widely employed 
throughout economics, provides a useful rule of thumb for economists in deriving 
consistent models and generates powerful results particularly in relation to monetary 
policy.
As previously noted in 3.2.1, any debate concerning the empirical relevance of the 
REH is misguided. Rather than interpreting violations of the various properties as a 
rejection of the REH, analysis should instead question the degree which agent 
forecasts conform to the predictions of rationality. Consequently, rather than 
seeking a model which explains the manner which agents form expectations, future 
research may instead wish to devote attention into improving survey measures to 
provide expectations consistent with economic theory55.
In accordance with previous studies, including Figlewski and Wacthel (1981), 
Thomas (1999), Mehra (2002) and Mankiw et al. (2003), the empirical examinations 
of this section indicate that both professional and household inflation forecasts do 
not invariably consistent with the criteria and predictions required under RE. For the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, whilst the forecasts reported 
by the SPF violate various properties required under rationality, Michigan Survey 
forecasts appear more consistent with the REH. Nevertheless, greater deviations
55 Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010a, 2010b) analyse whether inflation expectations can be improved by 
alterations to survey questions.
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from RE are observed for both agent classes for the volatile sub-period, thus 
reinforcing the results of Thomas (1999), Mehra (2002), Souleles (2004) and Pfajfar 
and Santoro (2010) that the degree of rationality exhibited by agent expectations is 
dependent upon prevailing macroeconomic conditions.
In Chapter 2, it was previously noted that as the volatile sub-period extends over a 
relatively short time span of 19 quarters, the results need to be interpreted with some 
caution. For example, violations of the unbiasedness property imply that agents 
repeatedly realise one-sided forecast errors; yet, over short horizons, agents may be 
unable to distinguish permanent inflation innovations and accommodate these into 
their expectations (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1982). Consequently, agent expectations 
would violate the unbiasedness condition required under RE during the short-run; 
yet, in the long-run, as agents learn about permanent innovations, appropriately 
incorporating them into information sets, expectations become free from systematic 
error. Moreover, Souleles (2004) suggests that a sample period of roughly five years 
would not be long enough to comprehensively determine whether agent forecasts 
exhibit systematic bias, and further questions that even twenty years may remain 
insufficient to allow forecast errors to fully average out56. Therefore given the short 
time span and the macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the volatile sub­
period, confusion regarding whether innovations are permanent or transitory may 
contribute to short-run deviations from rationality.
In 3.2.1 it has highlighted that the REH implicitly assumes that agents can freely 
exploit the available information set to form model consistent expectations. This 
assumption is often considered artificial and abstract; agents are instead faced with
C H
information acquisition and processing costs . An agents optimal decision, or 
expectation, thus involves equating information costs to the perceived benefit from 
forecast improvements (Pesaran, 1987). Consequently, empirical examinations may 
conclude that agent forecasts deviate from the theoretical predictions of the REH; 
however, economists may still consider these expectations as conditionally rational. 
Therefore, the larger deviations from rationality observed for the volatile sub-period
56 The rejection of the unbiasedness property for a period of twenty years, as highlighted by Souleles 
(2004), would however be noteworthy and provoke interesting debate amongst economists regarding 
the causes and consequences o f systematic forecast bias amongst agents.
57 The concept o f non-zero information acquisition and processing costs shall be examined in greater 
detail in relation to incomplete information in 3.3.1 and information rigidities and inattentiveness in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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in 3.2.2 may have resulted from conceivably higher costs associated with the 
acquisition and processing of information arising from increased levels of 
macroeconomic uncertainty.
Although the evidence suggests that Michigan Survey forecasts are more consistent 
with the predictions of the REH than those reported by the SPF, the results need to 
be interpreted with some caution. Investigating the accuracy of average survey 
forecasts, Batchelor and Dua (1989) report that the Michigan Survey consistently 
outperforms the Livingston Survey; however, individual RMSE’s for the Livingston 
Survey are much lower reflecting greater disagreement or forecast dispersion 
amongst households. Additionally, Zamowitz and Braun (1993) and Thomas (1999) 
acknowledge that whilst tests of consensus forecasts may indicate that households 
outperform professionals, individual professional forecasts are likely to be more 
consistent with RE than those formed by the typical non-professional. In preference 
to utilising consensus forecasts, future research may thus wish to extend the analysis 
of this section by examining the rationality of individual forecasts from various agent 
classes akin to Pfajfar and Santoro’s (2010) percentile time-series approach. 
Alternatively, in a similar manner to Souleles (2004), Pfajfar and Santoro (2008), 
Curtin (2005) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c, 201 la), the rationality of 
disaggregate survey data may be analysed, considering the forecasts of professionals 
with varying experience or expertise in specific industries, and those from 
households with heterogeneous demographic characteristics.
As noted by Lai (1990), forecasts may violate the unbiasedness property yet may still 
be considered rational providing that the mechanisms generating the forecast
58variable change over time . To resolve these issues, there has been interest in 
determining whether expectations are directionally rational. The concept of 
directional rationality was introduced by Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton 
(1981) and is based on the premise that “A forecast is said to be rational if, given the 
forecast, no investor would modify his prior in the opposite direction of the forecast” 
(Merton, 1981:3 84). In contrast to much of the analysis presented in this section 
which examined the size of forecast errors, these studies are highlighted by Pons
58 As previously noted, Keane and Runkle (1990) similarly report that in the presence o f differential 
costs between positive and negative forecast errors, expectations may be formed rationally, despite 
violating the unbiasedness condition.
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(2001) consider the predicted and actual directional change of the forecast variable. 
In a similar manner to Patton and Timmerman (1992), Ash et al. (1998), Pons (2001) 
and Easaw and Heravi (2009), the tests of rationality examined in this section may 
be re-evaluated to consider whether survey forecasts are directionally rational. This 
may prove interesting particularly over sample periods characterised by distinct 
macroeconomic conditions; however, this is beyond the scope of this study.
In accordance with previous empirical studies which analyse direct tests of the REH, 
the results in this chapter are fairly mixed; violations of the various RE criteria are 
agent-specific, time-variant and dependent upon macroeconomic conditions. 
However, it is interesting to note that both the SPF and Michigan Survey satisfied 
the error orthogonality condition across all four sample periods. This suggests that 
there is some minimum level of forecast efficiency, or rationality, attainable by both 
agent classes regardless of prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, 
further research is required to determine the how longer periods of macroeconomic 
volatility and uncertainty impact upon the rationality of survey forecasts. 
Additionally, it may be of interest to examine the rationality of agent expectations in 
response to a range of distinct macroeconomic shocks. As the REH is subject to a 
number of criticisms, including assumptions regarding freely available information, 
the economic literature has investigated various alternative models of expectation 
formation. The next section introduces various criticisms regarding the RE paradigm 
and considers several alternative approaches to the modelling of expectations theory.
109
3.3. Beyond Rational Expectations -  Macroeconomic Forecasting 
for the 21st Century
The empirical results presented in 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 reveal that traditional expectations 
theory is unable to fully accommodate the manner which professionals or households 
formulate inflation forecasts reported in prominent surveys. Indeed, Pesaran 
(1987:xi) argues that the adaptive expectations and the REH “represent two different 
extremes [of expectation formation], both of which are based on untenable 
assumptions and are empirically unsatisfactory.” Attention thus needs to be devoted 
to alternate theories which mitigate the issues and limitations concerning standard 
approaches. Of particular interest is the utilisation of information in expectation 
formation under the aforementioned theories and selected alternatives, and forms the 
general foundations of the forthcoming discussion.
The REH has been influential in the development of macroeconomic theory and 
debate. Despite the prevalence of RE, a number of criticisms and limitations have 
been highlighted. Although it is not unreasonable to assume that, on average, agents 
can correctly predict the future path of inflation, the underlying assumptions of the 
REH regarding information and individual foresight are artificial. Furthermore, the 
manner which agents ascertain and process the required knowledge to from model 
consistent expectations is left unexplained (Friedman, 1979, Pesaran, 1987). Thus, 
despite the contributions of RE, including Sargent and Wallace’s (1975) policy 
ineffectiveness proposition, there has been marked interest in deriving models which 
mitigate the perceived limitations of RE. Moreover, several new concepts have been 
introduced which extend the understanding of expectation theory. Nevertheless, 
Roberts (1998) warns that RE should not be abandoned lightly due to the 
compatibility of the theory with standard optimising behaviour of agents.
This section proposes to highlight the key issues regarding traditional expectations 
hypotheses, specifically with RE, and how economists have attempted to overcome 
them with particular reference to the signal extraction literature and islands analogy 
(Phelps, 1970, Lucas Jr., 1972, 1973). Subsequently, the applicability of several 
interesting alternative theories shall be introduced with particular attention devoted 
to models of adaptive learning. These models relax the stringent assumptions of RE 
but are sufficiently sophisticated to avoid suffering from the simplicity of naive
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expectation hypotheses (DeCanio, 1979, Blume and Easley, 1982, Evans and 
Honkapohja, 2001). Finally, theories of information rigidity including sticky 
information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002), information epidemiology (Carroll, 2003, 
2006) and noisy information (Sims, 2003, Woodford, 2003, Mackowiak and 
Wiederholt, 2009) shall be introduced prior to more detailed analysis and empirical 
evaluation in the subsequent chapters of this study.
I l l
3.3.1. Incomplete Information
The most common and pronounced limitations which question the validity of the 
aforementioned expectation hypotheses concern the assumptions regarding 
information. Whereas traditional backward-looking models utilise overly restrictive 
information sets, consisting of past inflation rates, expectations and errors, it can be 
argued that the REH assumes that agents possess too great knowledge regarding the 
structural parameters characterising the economy (Pesaran, 1987). Indeed, the 
Muthian hypothesis implies that as agent expectations mirror those predicted by 
economic theory, information is assumed to be used efficiently such that aggregate 
expectations are free from systematic error. To resolve these informational issues, 
economists have devoted substantial attention to developing models which 
incorporate incomplete information. These models are founded upon assumptions 
less restrictive than those of naive expectation hypotheses but are not as substantial 
as those required for rationality. Key contributions to incomplete information theory 
include signal extraction and the Lucas-Phelps islands model, and bounded 
rationality.
The REH implicitly assumes that information is freely available, thus allowing 
agents to form model consistent expectations by exploiting the available information. 
Replacing this with the more realistic assumption of costly information acquisition 
and processing implies that agents face an additional decision regarding the quantity 
of information to utilise in forming expectations. In economics, where profit or 
utility maximising is an agent’s ultimate objective, the optimal decision requires 
equating marginal benefit to marginal costs; applying this concept to expectation 
theory assumes that agents will acquire information to the point where the cost is 
equivalent to the perceived improvement in forecast errors59. Consequently, agents 
possess incomplete information regarding macroeconomic conditions and formulate 
sub-optimal expectations. Even if information is exploited efficiently, systematic 
errors shall ensue; consequently expectations cannot be consistent with the 
unbiasedness property required under rationality.
59 The relevance o f the information is unknown prior to acquisition therefore the perceived value of a 
given piece o f information is related to a probability distribution and the a p r io r i  economic model 
employed by the individual (Pesaran, 1987).
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In response to the critics of RE, McCallum (1979) argues that any alternative implies 
that agents are irrational which many economists consider uncomfortable. To 
mitigate the issues regarding unreasonably large information requirements imposed 
by the REH without succumbing to the shortfalls of naive backward-looking 
expectation frameworks, the notion of bounded rationality has been presented as an 
alternative theory of expectation formation. Initially proposed by Simon (1955) to 
explain discrepancies in organisational behaviour between economic models and 
reality, bounded rationality can also be applied to expectation theory and explain 
departures from RE theory. Compared to RE, bounded rationality is a less 
demanding assumption regarding expectations with agents possessing less a priori 
knowledge; instead, agents are assumed to behave ‘artificially intelligent’ (Sargent, 
1993), acting as econometricians who are able to adapt their expectations model in 
response to new information.
Despite introducing more realistic assumptions regarding the formation of agent 
expectations subject to incomplete information, bounded rationality theory is not 
devoid of issues. Firstly, as some adjustment is required regarding the imperfection 
of agent rationality, bounded rationality introduces a degree of arbitrariness to 
expectation modelling. Moreover, as agents form expectations utilising a ‘plausible 
rule’ whilst learning the structural economic parameters given their limited 
perceptions, two models must therefore exist: the model employed by agents, and the 
true model representative of the economy. Consequently, neither model provides the 
equilibrium mutually established by both models. Furthermore, bounded rationality 
does not allow agents to modify their learning rule; consequently, Pesaran (1987) 
illustrates that in the absence of a priori knowledge of the structural parameters, 
expectations will not converge to a rational expectations equilibrium. Therefore, 
despite being more a more intuitively plausible theory of agent foresight, there are 
distinct issues regarding bounded rationality theory.
An alternative approach to incomplete information in expectation formation 
concerns the utilisation of signal extraction procedures. Rather than estimating the 
parameters of the model, signal extraction is concerned with obtaining optimal 
estimates for unobservable components of economic variables. Specifically, to 
predict the future path of the forecast variable, agents utilise the observable
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components of economic variables which convey information regarding the 
unobservable components. More formally, signal extraction refers to the 
decomposition of a noisy signal s% into the perceived value of the variable x t and 
some noise component n t where s£ = x t + n t . Where the noise component has zero 
variance, McCafferty (1990) identifies that the optimal estimate of the signal x t is 
equal to the observed value of the signal, yet as the noise component increases, the 
optimal estimate of the variable converges towards the mean value.
A well-known example of signal extraction within an adaptive expectations 
framework is presented by Muth (1960). Namely, Muth (1960) assumes that agents 
are faced with forecasting some time-seriesyt which comprises both a permanent 
component and a transitory component r]t ; moreover, rjt is assumed to be 
independently distributed with mean zero and variance whilst the permanent
component is a linear function y*t = y^_± + et = €j 60. Forecasts thus take the 
adaptive form Ei(yt) = EJLiyt-y which is shown by Muth (1960) to be optimal in 
minimising the error variance. However, from the single set of past observation of 
the permanent component, Muth (1960) identifies that it is not possible to determine 
both the transitory component rjt and the random disturbance et . Instead, where 
disturbances to the permanent component are small relative to the noise, Muth 
(1960) identifies that the transitory component cancels out and forecasts are formed 
on approximately equal weighted past observations. In contrast, where disturbances 
to the permanent component are much larger, forecasts apply greater weight to more 
recent information, exponentially decreasing the more distant the past.
An interesting application of signal extraction methodologies is employed by Hey 
(1994) who undertakes an experimental analysis to determine the expectation 
formation behaviour of agents. Specifically, agents are requested to forecast three 
simplistic first-order autoregressive time-series with varying parameters given 
information regarding the series past history61; specifically, the first series is 
designed as a practice series, the second is relatively stable, whilst the third series 
includes some structural break. The results presented by Hey (1994) indicate that
60 The random disturbance €j is assumed to be serially independent with mean zero and variance a j
61 Hey (1994) argues that where agents are unable to identify the properties of the time-series under 
these conditions, it is reasonable to suggest that they would also be unable to identify the properties of 
more complex time-series.
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agents do not form expectations arbitrarily, but instead make use of simple signal 
extraction procedures, including fitting patterns to lagged data, and utilising this 
information to forecast the future values of the time-series.
Indeed, Hey (1994) observes that some agents almost perfectly extrapolate past 
values with regressive analysis indicating that the weight upon the one-period lagged 
actual is insignificantly different from unity for 36 of 48 individuals, whilst other 
extrapolate recent trends. The weighting upon lagged actual values thus appears 
consistent with the various backward-looking expectation models examined in 
section 3.1. Consequently, where lagged values of the forecast variable act as 
reliable signals of the future path, Hey’s (1994) analysis suggests that agents employ 
suitable signal extraction procedures and formulate statistically accurate forecasts. 
However, as Hey (1994) identifies dispersion amongst the adjustment procedure 
employed by agent forecasts for the stable series, one may suggest that where 
previous trends act as signals, they are not necessarily fully extracted. Nevertheless, 
for the more volatile series, Hey (1994) observes larger weights upon previous trends 
being employed more uniformly across agents; however, agents generally fail to 
identify the structural break. Therefore, where a series is more volatile, agents may 
devote greater resources to signal extraction procedures, but do not necessarily 
possess the techniques which are sufficiently sophisticated to fully identify and 
extract the relevant signals.
The islands model of Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972) introduces the signal 
extraction problem to a RE setting. The ‘islands’ analogy is metaphorical for the 
independent actions of agents forming economic decisions without the ability to 
obtain and observe complete information concerning aggregate economic activity
f\0and the actions of all other agents . It is assumed by Phelps (1970) that information 
flows across islands are costly, hence each island specific information set is 
incomplete. Consequently, when forming expectations regarding aggregate 
outcomes, a weak form of RE prevails with agents efficiently utilising their available 
information set. However, as an agent’s information set is likely to differ from the
62 Indeed, Morris and Shin (2006) later note that agents are only able to observe a small sliver o f 
information regarding economic activity, and that only when this information is aggregated 
‘mosaically’ will complete information regarding economic activity be revealed.
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process generating macroeconomic outcomes, systematic errors shall result, violating 
the assumptions of strong form Muthian RE.
A key contribution of the Lucas-Phelps islands model is the impact of shocks under 
incomplete information. Where some shock is consistently recognised and 
understood by all islands, Phelps (1970) demonstrates that complete signal extraction 
results with no real impact upon expectations or aggregate outcomes. In contrast, 
where a shock is perceived as partially island specific, Phelps (1970) illustrates that 
signal extraction across some agents is incomplete with some islands misinterpreting 
the impact of the disturbance on other islands. Consequently, expectations across 
islands are inconsistent as agents adapt their perceptions less than proportionally to 
the shock, resulting in real impacts and non-neutrality in macroeconomic outcomes.
Similarly, Lucas (1972) allocates agents to two structurally identical markets (or 
islands) with relative prices and real disturbances determined by the allocation of 
agents, whilst the economy is also subject to stochastic monetary disturbances.
Where only one shock is in operation, Lucas (1972) demonstrates that rational agents 
can fully extract the relevant signals and short-run neutrality arises with equilibrium 
levels of macroeconomic variables remaining unchanged. Considering the general 
case of both real and monetary disturbances, Lucas (1972) demonstrates that whilst 
agents are informed of the ratio of real and monetary disturbances through 
observations of the current price level, they are unable to distinguish between the 
individual shocks, resulting in some impact to macroeconomic outcomes.
Despite formally introducing incomplete information and signal extraction theory to 
a RE framework, the Lucas-Phelps islands model has been subject to some criticism. 
Notably, Woodford (2003) argues that the Lucas (1972) model does not fully 
accommodate the extent of differential information considered by Phelps (1970). 
Whilst Lucas (1972) only considers uncertainty regarding the aggregate money 
supply, Phelps (1970) highlights the additional uncertainty arising from higher-order
fs'Xbeliefs in a similar manner to Keynes’ (1936) beauty contest . In addition,
Woodford (2003) and Trabandt (2007) argue that the islands model is unable to 
account for the observed persistence across macroeconomic variables. As the Lucas
63 Specifically, this concerns imperfect information regarding the information sets expectations and 
decision processes on other ‘islands’ and requires the formation of expectations with respect to the 
expectations of others.
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model assumes that aggregate information is costlessly available with a one-period 
lag, shocks are highly transitory. Moreover, as the Lucas model assumes that 
aggregate information is costlessly available with a one-period lag, shocks are highly 
transitory. Consequently, Woodford argues that the islands-model is unable to 
replicate long-run persistence of aggregate disturbances as identified by Christiano et 
al. (2005). Therefore, although the Lucas-Phelps model provides an explanation of 
macroeconomic dynamics in the presence of imperfect information, the predictions 
do not appear empirically plausible.
The literature regarding incomplete information provides some useful departures 
from traditional expectation theories and employs more realistically pleasing 
information assumptions. Moreover, models of bounded rationality and signal 
extraction introduce new issues regarding the acquisition and utilisation of 
information in forming model consistent expectations; these models may however 
lack empirical plausibility. Subsequently, expectation theory has advanced with 
economists devoting particular attention to models of adaptive learning, assuming 
that agent expectations evolve dynamically to converge towards rational 
expectations equilibria.
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3.3.2. Expectations and Adaptive Learning
As previously discussed, the modelling of expectations in recent decades has 
attempted to mitigate the issues and limitations relating to RE. Two crucial issues 
regarding RE concern firstly, the process under which the true structural model of 
the economy arises, and secondly, the manner in which agents ascertain the 
knowledge required to form model consistent expectations. In an attempt to provide 
an asymptotic justification of RE, contemporary macroeconomic theory has thus 
devoted attention to deriving dynamic models where expectations and economic 
outcomes mutually influence each other (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). More 
specifically, these models that the structural parameters of the economy are unknown 
to agents; learning thus arises through feedback from the relationship between 
incorrectly specified parameters and actual outcomes (Pesaran, 1987).
Early applications of learning processes, including Cyert and De Groot (1974), 
Townsend (1978) and Friedman (1979) assume that agents possess correctly 
specified models but learn the values of the coefficients through repeated 
observations of actual outcomes. These models thus derive a consistent rationale for 
convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). An alternate approach, 
advocated by Blume and Easley (1982) and De Canio (1979) assumes that agents do 
not possess correctly specified rules thus have to modify or adapt their forecasting 
rules given observations of actual outcomes. However, Blume et al. (1982) note that 
convergence may arise to either rational or non-rational equilibria which may or may 
not be stable. More recently, the general approach employed by advocates of these 
dynamic mechanisms assume that agents are artificially intelligent (Sargent, 1993), 
acting as Bayesian econometricians to optimise their diverse a priori models, 
undertaking a process of adaptive learning given the constraints of the available 
information.
Learning mechanisms thus relax the stringent assumptions associated with RE in a 
similar manner to bounded rationality concepts; akin to a trial-and-error process, 
expectations formed under dynamic learning principles are adapted as new 
information becomes available. Nevertheless, rather than being an alternative theory 
of expectation formation, the adaptive learning approach instead justifies the REH. 
This is illustrated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) using the cobweb model with
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unobserved i.i.d. shocks: where agents form expectations using the mean of past 
prices, convergence upon the RE value will gradually emerge. The two principal 
issues surrounding adaptive learning mechanisms concerns whether agents can 
establish the appropriate learning rules, and whether this process is dynamically 
stable, to enable expectations to converge upon RE.
To model expectations under learning it is assumed that agents possess knowledge of 
the underlying economic model yet the structural parameters are unknown (Evans 
and Honkapohja, 2001). Mathematically, it is assumed that the rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) of inflation is characterised by64:
n t = a + bWf.! + £t (3.3.1)
The structural parameters a and b are unknown whilst wt_1 represents a vector of 
observable exogenous shocks. This expression is often referred to as the ‘perceived 
law of motion’ (PLM). An agents objective is to estimate the values of a and b 
subject to their preferred econometric technique. Given information acquired up to 
period t — 1 and the premise of bounded rationality, agents subsequently formulate 
expectations of n t which take the form:
E[nt\ = a + bwt- ± + st (3.3.2)
The parameters a and b are thus approximated appropriately and are revised on a 
period by period basis as the information set develops. The economic structure
(2.2.1) and expectations derived under (3.3.2) establish the dynamic process to 
which the economy evolves, otherwise referred to as the ‘actual law of motion’ 
(ALM).
The critical issue concerns whether the PLM maps towards the ALM; that is whether 
a t -> a and bt -> b as t -> oo, where a and b denote the optimal values that 
characterise the REE. Following the implications of early studies concerning 
convergence, as detailed above, Bray and Savin (1986) and Marcet and Sargent 
(1989) proclaim that convergence cannot arise to any equilibrium other than the 
REE. More generally, where a and b slowly converge to the ALM parameters 
implied by the REE, forecasts are defined as expectationally stable (E-stable).
64 The following notation follows the representation presented by Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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Recently, a consensus has developed that for E-stable convergence to the REE, the 
differential equations concerning the mapping of the ALM to PLM are locally 
asymptotically stable (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
Despite the intuition behind the adaptive learning literature which assumes that 
agents have a correctly specified PLM which will converge towards the ALM as 
t -» oo, several key issues have been noted. Firstly, De Canio (1979) and Evans and 
Ramey (1992) report that the costs associated with econometric learning, may 
prevent agents obtaining a PLM with consistent mapping to the ALM65.
Additionally, for convergence to the REE to arise, agents must possess a PLM that is 
not only correctly specified, but is appropriately parameterised to include at least all 
the variables which make up the ALM, such that the true values of the model can be 
learned (Berardi, 2007). Given that adaptive learning theories recognise that agents 
possess bounded knowledge, it appears implausible that agents are aware of the true 
ALM. In these cases, the learning process would thus be incomplete and the PLM 
misspecified. Consequently, convergence to the REE does not occur as agents 
instead realise systematic forecast errors. Nevertheless, Bray and Savin (1986), 
Evans and Ramey (1992), Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Berardi (2007) 
demonstrate that the PLM may still converge; however, rather than the REE, the 
PLM converges to a range of Pareto inefficient restricted perceptions equilibria66.
From a disaggregate or individual viewpoint, adaptive learning appears a more 
realistically pleasing methodology for modelling expectations compared to RE, 
acknowledging both incomplete information and bounded rationality whilst also 
accommodating broader information and greater sophistication than traditional 
backward-looking models. However, in order for expectations under learning to 
establish an efficient long-run equilibrium, several rigorous requirements including 
the E-stability principle need to be satisfied. Despite this additional sophistication 
and complexity, adaptive learning provides a useful extension to the development of 
the REH, providing some indication regarding the process undertaken by agents to 
achieve expectations consistent with RE. Future studies may wish to empirically 
evaluate the relative learning behaviour of professionals and households, establishing
65 The costs are assumed to be positively related to the difficulty in obtaining a PLM with consistent 
mapping to the ALM.
66 These may also be referred to as misspecification or incomplete convergence equilibria.
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whether PLM’s of the two agent classes’ map towards the ALM and determine the 
response of learning to structural shocks. Nevertheless, other intriguing extensions 
to the RE analysis have also been developed including models of predictor choice 
(Brock and Hommes, 1997, Branch, 2007) information rigidities (Mankiw and Reis, 
2002, Mankiw et al., 2003, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010, 2012) and rational 
inattentiveness (Sims, 2003).
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3.3.3. Introduction to Information Rigidities
It is commonly observed that agents act inertially to new information as “in reality 
ordinary people only have finite information processing capacity; consequently they 
cannot observe and process all available information about the state(s) perfectly 
when making economic decisions” (Luo, 2008:366). This distinction is vital for 
macroeconomics in determining the behaviour of various variables, particularly the 
adjustment of expectations or prices. Rather than assuming agents continuously 
optimise in response to macroeconomic conditions, information rigidity models 
acknowledge that agents are constrained by information acquisition and processing 
costs. Consequently, agents cannot make fully accurate inferences regarding the 
macroeconomic state which thus leads to sub-optimal responses and forecast errors 
following some shock (Sims, 2006).
These constraints upon agent behaviour had not however been brought to 
prominence in the economic literature until the 21st century with the development of 
information rigidity models. Important contributions to the information rigidity 
literature include sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Reis, 2006a, 2006b), 
noisy information (Sims, 2003, Woodford, 2003, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), 
information diffusion (Carroll, 2003) and heterogeneous priors and signals 
(Capistran and Timmermann, 2009, Patton and Timmermann, 2010). These models 
further relax the information constraints inherent within the RE framework, yet each 
have distinctive characteristics which are worth examining further. The concept 
encompassing all these models concerns the assumption that in any given period, 
information is incomplete; instead, information diffuses slowly through the 
economy.
The approach advocated by models of noisy information, as proposed by Woodford 
(2003), Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) asserts that whilst 
information sets are continuously updated by agents, information is in some way 
imperfect. Departing from Lucas’s (1973) assumptions that information is publicly 
available following a one-period lag, Woodford (2003:30) proposes that agents 
receive news regarding economic conditions through some “noisy channel”; 
consequently, expectations of future conditions, formed on the basis of this 
information will be imperfect. Moreover, in the presence of higher-order beliefs and
122
strategic complementarity, Woodford (2003) demonstrates that noisy information 
results in sluggish agent actions; whilst own expectations are shown to adjust fairly 
rapidly to disturbances, as the degree of strategic complementarity and the 
uncertainty regarding the predictions of others increase, the average response 
exhibits greater inertia.
Similarly, Sims (2003) presents a model of rational inattention where agents face an 
optimisation problem given a probability distribution of information and limited 
processing capacity. Specifically, Sims (2003) proposes that agents receive a signal 
regarding the macroeconomic state, which is assumed to be random; agents thus 
process the signal through a channel to formulate expectations. Where endogenous 
noise enters the channel, Sims (2003) demonstrates that agents cannot make full 
inferences regarding the macroeconomic state and thus following some exogenous 
shock, sub-optimal responses arise. However, comparing the welfare implications of 
rationally inattentive consumers to those of RE, Luo (2008) demonstrates that the 
utility improvement from acting attentively to new information is trivial; 
specifically, the rational expectations and rational inattention consumption functions 
are found to have similar volatilities even where the channel capacity is low. 
Consequently, Luo (2008) argues that it is reasonable for agents to devote reduced 
channel capacity to the processing of information in formulating economic decisions. 
Furthermore, Sims (2006) argues that in addition to the intuitive appeal that agents 
are confronted by more information that they can realistically process, rational 
inattention can also explain the smooth and delayed behaviour of macroeconomic 
time-series without the necessity of an arbitrary device such as the Lucas-Phelps 
‘islands’ metaphor67.
Utilising a similar approach to Sims (2003), Mackowiak and Wiederholt’s (2009) 
present a model which is able to replicate persistent real effects in response to 
nominal aggregate demand shocks. The model assumes that agents are required to 
devote attention to both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions, and proposes that the 
degree of attention is related to the variance in relative conditions. Despite firms 
being able to adjust prices each period, impulse response function indicate that prices 
act with inertia to shocks; Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) thus propose that the
67 Considering the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), Luo (2008) demonstrates that rational 
inattention theory may also explain excessive sensitivity to anticipated changes in income.
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idiosyncratic component of decisions is more variable relative to the aggregate 
component. Consequently, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) demonstrate that 
decision profiles respond with greater inertia to aggregate disturbances in 
comparison to those from idiosyncratic conditions. Moreover, due to feedback 
effects with the price level responding less to aggregate shocks than under perfect 
information, Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) suggest that the attention of 
individual firms are strategic complements. Namely, the less attention devoted to 
aggregate conditions, the larger becomes the relative volatility of idiosyncratic 
conditions, resulting in a reduced incentive for firms to remain attentive to aggregate 
information. Noisy information and rational inattention can thus be shown to 
replicate persistence amongst macroeconomic variables in the presence of shocks.
An alternative approach advocated by Mankiw and Reis (2002), concerns models of 
sticky information. Responding to criticisms of the new Keynesian Phillips curve, 
including Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995) observation that it cannot explain observed 
inflation persistence, Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) model is derived from replacing 
standard sticky price assumptions with the concept that macroeconomic information 
slowly diffuses across the population. The sticky information model proposed by 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) combines imperfect information, akin to Lucas (1973) with 
elements of Calvo’s (1983) random adjustment sticky-price model. The combination 
is motivated by conflict between Calvo’s (1983) prediction that inflation responds 
immediately to aggregate disturbances and empirical studies which generally observe 
a delayed response of inflation to shocks.
The sticky information model presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose that 
despite being able to undertake price adjustment in any given period, firms do not 
necessarily make pricing decisions upon the most up-to-date information. Namely, 
in each period, all firms reset their prices, however, only a proportion X of firms 
update their information , computing optimal current and future prices. The 
remaining proportion 1 — X is inattentive to news and set prices according to 
information acquired in previous periods. Information is thus ‘sticky’ with agents 
only gradually updating expectations in response to news.
68 Where agents update, Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume that information is noiselessly incorporated 
into optimal decision profiles.
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The attentiveness parameter X is proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to be fixed 
and exogenously determined. Consequently, within Sims’s (2003) methodology, 
Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky information model is argued by Trabandt (2007) to 
assume that agents have either unlimited or zero information processing capacity, 
dependent upon whether they exogenously receive information updates. Moreover, 
whilst Mankiw and Reis (2002) postulate that expectations are formed rationally, the 
infrequent updating of information is argued by Begg and Imperato (2001) to result 
in a weakening of the orthogonality property as although individual forecast errors 
are unpredictable, they may be correlated with information available to other agents.
Furthermore, Mankiw and Reis (2002) do not formally model the arrival of new 
information which is instead assumed to follow a Poisson process where each firm 
has an identical probability of updating their information regardless of the interval 
since their previous update. The process which agents update information is argued 
by Carroll (2006a) however to be likely to differ from a Poisson process. More 
formally, Reis (2006a) introduces assumptions of costly information acquisition and 
processing in expectation formation; although expectations are formed rationally, 
information and decision profiles are proposed to be updated infrequently. As only a 
fraction of agents are attentive in any given period, Reis (2006a) demonstrates that 
consumption is excessively smooth, failing to adequately respond to income shocks. 
Moreover, the degree of inattentiveness and sensitivity to shocks is shown by Reis 
(2006a) to be determined by the extent of information costs which are argued to be 
dependent upon the volatility of macroeconomic conditions.
Comparing sticky information and various noisy information hypotheses, Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2012) recognise that these theories all predict that agent 
forecasts exhibit slower responses to shocks relative to the respective forecast 
variable. Forecast errors are thus identified by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
to exhibit serial correlation and possess the same sign as the forecast variable. In 
contrast, noisy information models propose that an agents’ behaviour is formed on 
information that is subject to a common signal and an idiosyncratic private signal, 
both of which are noisy. Forecast errors are thus dependent upon the signal-to-noise 
ratio; given idiosyncratic differences in private signal noise, agents may thus be 
sensitive to some class of shock. Consequently, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012)
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demonstrate that the response of forecast errors to shocks is dependent upon the 
properties of the disturbance.
Furthermore, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) identify asymmetries concerning 
the response of disagreement to disturbances between noisy information and sticky 
information models; the former are shown to predict that disagreement does not 
respond to shocks, whilst the latter predict a positive response. Namely, under noisy 
information, as agents continuously update, dispersion of beliefs only arises from 
idiosyncratic noise which is independent of shocks. In contrast, as sticky 
information assumes that agents infrequently update, those without the latest 
information lack knowledge of shocks and thus possess different beliefs from those 
who recently updated. From empirical analysis of both SPF and Michigan Survey 
data, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) deem both household and professional 
inflation forecasts to be most consistent with the predictions of noisy information69.
In an attempt to provide microfoundations for Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky 
infonnation hypothesis, Carroll (2003, 2006) devises an epidemiological model 
where information regarding the forecast variable, embodied within the news media, 
diffuses to agent expectations akin to a disease. This information is assumed to 
reflect professional opinion. The stickiness implicit in Carroll’s model is derived 
from the assumption that households infrequently absorb the informational content 
within the news media with probability A70; the remaining 1 — A proportion of 
households, whom fail to absorb the latest news, formulate their expectations upon 
outdated information. The model presented by Carroll (2003) offers a relatively 
simple methodology to empirically assess information stickiness embodied within 
agent expectations and further provides a potential explanation for the lagged 
behaviour and persistence of expectations relative to inflation, as previously 
demonstrated in Chapter 3.
As identified by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), various extensions to the 
prominent information rigidity hypotheses have been proposed including 
heterogeneous priors or signals (Patton and Timmermann, 2010) and asymmetric
69 Utilising Livingston Survey forecasts from individuals in commercial banking, consulting and 
business, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) present similar findings for firms.
70 This assumption relies on Carroll’s (2003) observation that Michigan Survey inflation forecasts are 
Granger-caused by SPF forecasts.
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loss (Capistran and Timmermann, 2009). Whilst these models provide interesting 
analysis regarding agent expectation formation, and shall be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 6 in relation to professional forecasts, the focus shall primarily focus on 
the more prominent noisy information and sticky information theories.
The development of information rigidity theory is an intriguing development in 
expectation modelling, acknowledging the costs in the acquisition and processing of 
information faced by agents in forming expectations. The following chapters aim to 
explore these models in greater detail with particular attention to the analysis of 
Carroll (2003, 2006) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012). Empirical tests 
shall be constructed and examined to determine whether survey forecasts are 
consistent with the predictions of these models and determine whether information 
rigidity theory can reasonably accommodate the manner which agents form 
expectations.
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3.4. Concluding Remarks
The theoretical modelling of agent expectations has been subject to extensive 
macroeconomic research. Various theories have been extensively analysed and 
developed throughout the latter half of the last century, and to date remains a topic of 
keen interest to economists. This chapter has assessed the assumptions and validity 
of several prevalent expectation hypotheses, and has empirically analysed whether 
professional and household inflation forecasts reported in prominent surveys are 
consistent with the predictions implied by these theories.
Traditional backward-looking models of expectation formation, examined in section 
3.1 were judged to be unable to fully characterise the formation of survey forecasts. 
Neither professional nor household expectations were deemed consistent with the 
properties of static expectations, as implicitly adopted by classical and Keynesian 
economists. Instead, static forecasting behaviour was deemed to assume excessive 
myopia on the part of agents. In contrast, the adaptive expectations hypothesis 
provided a more reasonable account of survey forecasts. However, whilst 
professional forecasts are more consistent with adaptive behaviour for periods of 
greater macroeconomic stability, backward-looking models appear more relevant for 
household forecasts across periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty. As 
alluded to in section 3.3, and as shall be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, this 
suggests that for periods of distinct macroeconomic stability or uncertainty, there are 
asymmetries in the manner which professionals and non-professionals utilise 
information to formulate expectations.
Despite backward-looking theory being unable to fully characterise the formation of 
survey forecasts, agent expectations were found not to be fully consistent with the 
predictions of the rational expectations hypothesis either. Nonetheless, in 
accordance with Mehra (2002), the results presented in 3.2.2 indicated that 
household expectations exhibit greater consistency with the properties of the REH 
relative to those reported by professionals. Violations of the required criteria were 
however observed to be agent-specific, time-variant and dependent upon 
macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, for the whole Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sample periods, Michigan Survey forecasts were observed to exhibit greater 
consistency with the properties of the REH relative to professionals. However, for
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the most recent sub-period associated with increased levels of macroeconomic
uncertainty, larger deviations from rationality were observed for both agent classes. 
Nevertheless, in section 3.2 it was noted that both SPF and Michigan Survey 
forecasts invariably satisfy the error orthogonality condition; there thus appears to be 
some minimum level of forecast efficiency, or rationality, which both agent classes 
consistently attain. The observation that expectations comply with the error 
orthogonality condition supports the results presented by various studies including
Rich (1989), Roberts (1997), Thomas (1999), Mehra (2002) and Thomas and Grant
The results presented in 3.1 and 3.2 thus indicate that survey forecasts are neither 
purely adaptive nor purely rational. An interesting test by Roberts (1997) examined 
whether survey forecasts were consistent with an average of adaptive and 
mathematical rational expectations. However, neither Livingston Survey nor 
Michigan Survey expectations were deemed consistent with the predictions of this 
model. Thus in addition to being neither purely rational, nor purely adaptive, survey 
forecasts cannot be represented as a weighted average of the two hypotheses.
Moreover, to examine whether expectations are formed in a forward- or backward- 
looking manner, (3.4.1) below, as presented by Curtin (2005) shall be tested upon 
survey forecasts:
Specifically, if a 1 is significant whilst a 3 is insignificant expectations would appear 
to exhibit forward-looking characteristics; contrastingly, evidence in favour of 
backward-looking behaviour requires a3 to be significant whilst a ± is insignificant. 
In support of the results in 3.1 and 3.2, the results from testing (3.4.1), as presented 
in Appendix 3.9 do not offer conclusive evidence that agent expectations favour 
either forward- or backward-looking behaviour; the coefficients for inflation over 
both the four-leading and four-lagged quarters are repeatedly rejected, most notably 
for the volatile sub-period. Therefore, additional investigations, and alternative
(2008).
4 4 (3.4.1)
7 =  1 
4
7 =  1
7 =  1
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models which mitigate the limitations of traditional expectation approaches by 
relaxing various assumptions, are thus required.
In addition to examining whether these results are robust to alternative definitions of 
inflation, given the multi-horizon structure of the SPF, future studies may wish to 
reconsider examining whether professional forecasts are more consistent with the 
properties of traditional theories as the forecast horizon shortens. Moreover, it will 
prove interesting to determine whether professional forecasting behaviour switch 
from backward-looking behaviour at longer forecast horizons to greater rationality as
71the event period nears .
Following on from the discussion in 3.3, which introduced several contemporary 
approaches to the modelling of macroeconomic expectations, the subsequent 
chapters shall consider models which relax the assumptions of traditional theories. 
Although both incomplete information and adaptive learning provide interesting 
departures from conventional theory, the analysis shall primarily consider models of 
information rigidity, as introduced in 3.3.3, which consider the manner which agents 
acquire and process information in forming their expectations. Specific attention 
will be devoted to analysing models of rational inattention (Sims, 2003, 2006), 
noisy-information (Woodford, 2003, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), sticky- 
information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Mankiw et al., 2003, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko, 2010, 2012) and epidemiology (Carroll, 2003, 2006), and 
determining whether survey forecast are consistent with the predictions of these 
models.
71 In subsequent chapters the multi-horizon structure of the SPF shall be exploited in relation to 
information rigidities.
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CHAPTER 4: HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHICS AND 
EXPECTATIONAL HETEROGENEITY
In Chapter 3 aggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts were empirically 
analysed to determine whether they were more consistent with the predictions of 
traditional expectation theory relative to those reported by professionals in the SPF. 
However, these tests solely considered consensus forecasts and ignored 
heterogeneity amongst the forecasts of individual survey participants. In recent 
years, economists have become increasingly interested in relaxing the assumptions 
of homogeneous agents and analysing the implications of expectational 
heterogeneity on macroeconomic outcomes.
Although the focus in this study has thus far been limited to aggregate expectations, 
there is a general appreciation amongst economists that agents are not equally 
informed about future macroeconomic outcomes; instead, Mankiw et al. (2003) 
acknowledge that there is a dispersion of beliefs amongst individuals. The economic 
literature identifies two distinct sources of expectational heterogeneity; first, akin to 
noisy information models presented by Woodford (2003), Sims (2003) and 
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), agents are subject to idiosyncratic signals 
regarding the future values of economic variables, and secondly, as demonstrated by 
Patton and Timmermann (2010) agents possess asymmetric priors and utilise 
different models when forming their expectations. The presence of expectational 
heterogeneity has various important economic consequences as summarised by Gnan 
et al. (2011). Firstly, in in the presence of idiosyncratic signals, Sims (2009) argues 
that heterogeneity may require policymakers to construct ‘multi-tiered’ 
communication strategies to ensure expectations are formed with respect to a 
common anchor. Moreover, Bomberger (1996) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) 
identify heterogeneity as an indicator of perceived levels of uncertainty which thus 
affects the economic behaviour of agents, including consumption, investment and 
saving decisions. Finally, Doepke and Schneider (2006) indicate that heterogeneity 
in expectations may be an indication of the asymmetric wealth effects of inflation 
and suggest a role for fiscal policy to adjust for the impact across households.
The Michigan Survey distinguishes between households with various demographic 
characteristics, grouping participants by age, education, gender, income and region
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of residence. However, due to the construction of the Michigan Survey cross­
demographic results are expected to be similar as each individual household is 
classified within each disaggregation; the data is constructed from the same set of 
survey responses yet disaggregated by different characteristics. Furthermore, certain 
demographic characteristics are likely to be intrinsically related; for example, it is 
conceivable that more educated households have greater knowledge and skills and 
thus exhibit greater productivity resulting in higher income.
This chapter introduces the demographically disaggregated inflation forecasts 
available from the Michigan Survey, and empirically analyses the key differences 
between the various groups, in a manner akin to the analysis in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, the reported forecasts and associated forecast errors derived from 
measures of central tendency are not particularly informative regarding the 
differences within each individual group. To determine whether individual 
demographic groups exhibit greater intra-group disparity relative to others, the 
concept of disagreement shall be introduced and analysed. In section 4.1, the 
analysis of previous studies shall be considered, introducing various key results and 
establishing whether there is some general consensus regarding the impact of 
demographic characteristics on agent forecasts. The disaggregated data from the 
Michigan Survey shall be formally introduced in 4.2, which shall also evaluate the 
key statistical differences between the various demographic groups. Intra-group 
disagreement is analysed in 4.3 and determines whether the forecasts of more 
advantaged households exhibit greater agreement than those reported by lesser 
advantaged households. The final section provides a discussion on the role of 
demographics for expectation formation.
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4.1. Demographics of Inflation Expectations: Literature Review
As highlighted in the introduction, for analytical simplicity many macroeconomic 
models treat expectations across agents as homogeneous. However, increasing 
attention is being devoted to heterogeneity and the impact of demographics upon 
economic decision making. Moreover, there is some general agreement amongst 
empirical studies including Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001a, 2001b), 
Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003), Souleles (2004), Pfajfar and Santoro (2008),
Burke (2010) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c, 201 lb), that households do not 
anticipate inflation homogeneously.
One of the earliest studies to recognise that survey data is subject to the dispersion of 
agent beliefs was conducted by Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) who observed a 
positive relationship between both Livingston Survey and Michigan Survey inflation 
expectations and the variance in actual inflation. More recently, Carlson and Valev 
(2003) and Souleles (2004) report a positive relationship between the dispersion of 
beliefs and the inflation rate. More recently, Mankiw et al. (2003) show that whilst 
professional forecasts exhibit a reasonable degree of consensus with an interquartile 
range (IQR) of 1 Vi to 3 percent72, the Michigan Survey has a much wider IQR of 0 
to 5 percent with the distribution exhibiting much longer tails. Consequently, 
household inflation forecasts appear subject to much greater levels of heterogeneity 
relative to those formed by professionals; moreover, whilst average forecasts may 
indicate that differences in expectations between professionals and households are 
small, the typical professional is likely to report superior expectations compared to 
the typical household (Thomas, 1999).
Analysing Swedish survey data, Jonung (1981) reports that demographic 
characteristics, namely age and gender, are significantly related to differences in 
inflation expectations. Utilising approximately twenty years of data collated from 
the Michigan Survey, Souleles (2004) finds that forecast errors are correlated with 
household demographics, arguing that shocks do not affect all agents 
homogeneously. Similarly, using data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland/Ohio State University (FRBC/OSU) Inflation Psychology Survey, Bryan
72 To analyse the distribution o f professional forecasts, Mankiw et al. (2003) pool responses from the 
Livingston Survey and SPF.
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and Venkatu (2001a, 2001b) find that men generally have lower inflation 
expectations than women, whilst households in the lowest education or income 
categories report greater levels of expected inflation than more advantaged 
counterparts.
A potential explanation for forecast heterogeneity, as identified by Michael (1979), 
Idson and Miller (1997), Hobijn and Lagakos (2005), McGranahan and Paulson 
(2006), Hobijn et al. (2009) and Menz and Poppitz (2013) concerns asymmetries 
between inflation experiences across demographic groups. Specifically, Idson and 
Miller (1997) find that those agents with lower levels of education experience higher 
levels of inflation ; moreover, McGranahan and Paulson (2006) find that less 
advantaged households experience more variable rates of inflation relative to their 
more advantaged counterparts. To analyse these differences, various studies have 
constructed and analysed price indices based upon group-specific expenditure. For 
the 1970’s, Michael (1979) reports that the difference between the means of group- 
specific indices are small, whilst no group experiences consistently higher or lower 
inflation relative to others. On an aggregate level, Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) 
similarly report that individual categories are unlikely to experience above average 
inflation in consecutive years. Nevertheless, considering expectations of German 
households Menz and Poppitz (2013) report the RMSE associated with group- 
specific measures of inflation is smaller for all demographic groups compared to the 
respective RMSE associated with aggregate inflation. As previously highlighted by 
Michael (1979), whilst the analyses of group-specific indices is useful for examining 
the dispersion of forecasts within an individual group, they are uninformative 
regarding differences across demographics.
Furthermore, McGranahan and Paulson (2006) and Menz and Poppitz (2013) 
identify that older respondents report higher expectations of inflation relative to 
younger respondents, which the former attribute to relatively high health care 
expenditure which is documented by Amble and Stewart (1994) to be subject to 
larger price increases relative to alternative expenditure categories. Indeed, Curtin 
(2009:4) states that “It makes no economic sense to assume that people pay attention 
to an inflation rate higher or lower than the one they actually encounter.”
73 Utilising European data Colavecchio et al. (2011) report similar evidence that less socio-advantaged 
households experience higher levels o f inflation.
Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that demographics influence the rate of 
inflation experienced by households.
An experimental study conducted by Bruine de Bruin et al. (201 lb) similarly 
suggests that expectational heterogeneity arises as a proportion of agents report 
forecasts influenced by specific prices whilst the remainder form expectations which 
consider the overall rate of inflation. Specifically, Bruine de Bruin et al. (201 lb) 
find that those agents asked to recall specific prices reported higher expectations than 
those asked to recall prices in general; furthermore, agents were found to have a 
tendency to recall extreme increases or decreases. Moreover, gas and food prices 
were found to be particularly influential upon agent expectations which Bruine de 
Bruin et al. (201 lb) attribute to not only large price increases amongst these goods, 
but also to repeat purchases. Similarly, Bates and Gabor (1986) assert that the 
weight an agent places on individual goods in forming their general price 
expectations is dependent upon its share of overall household expenditure, whereas 
Ranyard et al. (2008) and Georganas, Healy and Li (2014) argure that more 
frequently purchased items are more salient in decision making scenarios. These 
results thus suggest that expectational heterogeneity arises from both household 
experiences and the attentiveness of some households being diverted to goods with 
more volatile prices.
As the wording of the Michigan Survey contains the phrase “prices in general” as 
opposed to specifically referring to “inflation”, all households face the task of 
interpreting the survey question; yet, those with greater financial or economic 
literacy are found by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) to 
report more accurate expectations, suggesting that more advantaged groups are most 
likely to relate the ‘prices in general’ wording with the overall rate of inflation. 
Similarly, utilising UK data, Blanchflower and Kelly (2008) and Blanchflower and 
MacCoille (2009) observe higher non-response rates to survey questions regarding 
the inflation rate among the young, the less educated, those on low income, and 
women whilst Drager and Fritshce (2013) report that low education groups and 
women have a higher non-response to quantitative inflation questions than other 
groups. There thus appears some general appreciation amongst previous studies that
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the groups who are found to report the largest forecast errors, have the greatest 
difficulty in interpretating survey questions relating to inflation.
Previous empirical studies which examine disaggregated survey forecasts have 
highlighted substantial differences between the inflation expectations of men and 
women. Considering survey data from Sweden for the late 1970’s Jonung (1981) 
reports that women expect a higher rate of inflation than men74. Later studies by 
Palmqvist and Stromberg (2004), Linden (2005) and del Giovane et al. (2009) 
present evidence in support of Jonung’s (1981) observations utilising Swedish and 
European data respectively. Similarly, employing US survey data, both Bryan and 
Venkatu (2001b) and Meyer and Venkatu (2011) report that men have lower
n c
expectations of inflation than women . Moreover, analysing gender disaggregated 
inflation forecasts against the inflation differentials between category inflation and 
the overall CPI-U inflation rate, Anderson et al. (2012) report significant differences 
between the forecasts of men and women. Inflation differentials across all categories 
are found by Anderson et al. (2012) to be jointly significant. However, significant 
heterogeneity is only observed in response to inflation differentials across the 
apparel and transportation categories; therefore, unlike Jonung (1981), Anderson et 
al. (2012) do not observe differences in the food and beverages inflation differential 
between men and women. Nevertheless Anderson et al. (2012) indicate that the 
most significant difference concerns lagged inflation which women weight more 
heavily than men, indicating that women may be subject to greater adaptive 
behaviour when formulating inflation forecasts.
A common explanation for gender differences in expectations, as provided by 
Jonung (1981), is that women are more greatly influenced by food prices which tend 
to experience relatively high levels of inflation; indeed, during the late 1970’s, food 
prices in Sweden are shown by Jonung (1981) to have been rising more rapidly 
relative to other commodities. However, in recent years Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) 
argue that US food price inflation has tended to be marginally lower than the
74 Women were also found by Jonung (1981) to report higher perceptions of past price increases.
75 Whilst Meyer and Venkatu (2011) employ approximately ten years o f Michigan Survey data 
starting in 2000, Bryan and Venkatu utilise data sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland/Ohio State University Inflation Psychology Survey.
76 The inflation differential categories analysed by Anderson et al. (2012) concern medical, food and 
beverages, housing, apparel and transport commodities.
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aggregate CPI, whilst Meyer and Venkatu (2011) observe that women tend to report 
higher inflation expectations than men even during periods where food inflation is 
relatively low. In recent years, gender differences in expectations thus appear to be 
dependent upon non-market basket factors. These conflicting arguments may be the 
result of cultural differences between Sweden and the US whilst social change over 
the intervening period over which these studies are conducted may also have affected 
the consumption behaviour, and consequently expectation formation, of both men 
and women.
In accordance with women reporting higher expectations, and the general trend that 
households overestimate the rate of inflation, various studies have established that 
women realise larger forecast errors. Examining Michigan Survey data Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2008) report that the sum of squared errors (SSE) of women is in excess of 
25 percent larger relative to the SSE of men. Similarly, utilising data from the Bank 
of England’s Inflation Attitudes Survey, Blanchflower and MacCoille (2009) 
establish that the probability of inflation expectations and perceptions of men lie 
within some ‘correct’ interval is larger relative to women. Furthermore, considering 
Irish data from the EU Consumer Survey, Duffy and Lunn (2009) report that 
perceived levels of inflation for women are higher, and more likely to over- and 
underestimate actual inflation, relative to men.
An alternative explanation for the higher expectations and inferior accuracy of 
women is proposed by Curtin (2009) who argues that men generally have greater 
interest in economics and thus have a superior understanding of the implication of 
various variables and statistics on the inflation rate. Similarly, Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2008), Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c), Burke and Manz (2010) and Lusardi et al. 
(2008) find that in comparison to men, women have lower economic and financial
77literacy, shorter financial planning horizons and lower financial confidence . 
Consequently, women may experience higher information acquisition and processing 
costs which result in larger forecasting errors. Indeed, in accordance with Jonung 
(1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001b), and Meyer and Venkatu (2011), both Bruine de 
Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) report that female respondents 
expect a higher level of inflation than their male counterparts. Furthermore, Bruine
77 Older women are found by Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) to exhibit particularly low levels of 
financial literacy.
de Bruin et al. (2010c) find that a large percentage of women report inflation 
expectations in excess of 5 percent, whilst Burke and Manz (2010) find that women 
exhibit significantly larger absolute forecast errors. Nevertheless, accounting for 
economic and financial literacy, Burke and Manz (2010) report that gender 
differences in expectations and associated forecast errors are insignificant; indicating 
that gender is not a primary cause of expectational heterogeneity per se; instead, 
heterogeneity arises as a result of different cultural and educational influences 
between men and women.
There is also considerable interest amongst economists regarding the role of 
increased education and income upon expectations. Previous studies considering 
these socio-demographic factors have often found that educational attainment and 
household income exert a strong influence on reported forecasts. Specifically, 
Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001a), Palmqvist and Stromberg (2004),
Linden (2005), Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) 
observe that households with lower levels of education or income report higher 
expectations of inflation than their more advantaged counterparts. In accordance 
with households overestimating the future rate of inflation, Pfajfar and Santoro
(2008) and Ehrmann et al. (2014) report that those with higher levels of income and 
education realise smaller forecast errors. A potential explanation for these findings, 
as shall be thoroughly explored in Chapter 5 in relation to sticky information and 
epidemiology theories, relates to the ability of more advantaged households to 
acquire and process greater levels of information. Moreover, assuming that 
information is a normal good, Fishe and Idson (1990) argue that households with 
increased levels of education or income will have greater demand for information, 
which resultantly reduces the size and dispersion of forecast errors.
A further cause of expectational heterogeneity amongst Michigan Survey forecasts 
relates to the age of the respondents; however, previous studies have failed to 
establish a consensus regarding the impact of age upon expectations. Whereas 
Jonung (1981) and Madeira and Zafar (2012) report that younger respondents expect 
higher levels of inflation than older respondents, Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) 
and Blanchflower and MacCoille (2009) find that older respondents in the UK have 
higher expectations of inflation. In contrast, Bryan and Venkatu (2001a) and
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Palmqvist and Stromberg (2004) find that household expectations have a U-shaped 
relationship with age, whilst Linden (2005) reports that EU expectations are hump­
shaped; despite the disagreement between the two studies, they both indicate that the 
expectations reported by middle-aged respondents differ to those of younger and 
older agents.
The observation of heterogeneity across age disaggregated inflation forecasts may 
however not result from an inherent forecasting bias per se; instead, Lombardelli and 
Saleheen (2003) and Malmendier and Nagel (2009) find a correlation between 
expectations and past inflation experiences. More specifically, employing adaptive 
learning processes, Malmendier and Nagel (2009) argue that whilst more recent 
inflation experiences receive the greatest weight in agent expectation formation, 
historic experiences continue to influence the expectations of older respondents. In 
accordance with this argument, Madeira and Zafar (2012) find that high levels of 
inflation during the 1970’s have a larger impact upon the expectations of younger 
respondents throughout the 1980’s, whilst the expectations of older respondents 
retain some bias arising from low inflation experiences throughout the 1950’s and 
1960’s78.
The remainder of this chapter seeks to re-evaluate demographic differences across 
disaggregated Michigan Survey inflation forecasts and determine whether inter­
group heterogeneity and intra-group disagreement is time-variant and dependent 
upon macroeconomic conditions. The next section shall formally introduce 
disaggregated Michigan Survey forecasts and empirically assess key statistical 
differences across groups.
78 Within a sticky information framework, the expectations o f younger households
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4.2. Empirical Investigations Regarding Household Forecast 
Heterogeneity
In accordance with the general approach undertaken by previous research regarding 
heterogeneous expectations (e.g. Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al. (2003), Nunes
(2009)), and the analysis in the previous chapters, median survey forecasts shall 
continue to be employed in the forthcoming empirical investigations. However, 
utilising measures of central tendency to analyse expectation heterogeneity is not 
without limitations; for example, a point estimate fails to acknowledge intra-group 
disagreement in expectations, an issue which shall be examined in greater detail in
4.3. Moreover, although two or more demographic groups may report average 
expectations which are approximately equal, the expectations of one group may be 
more widely dispersed relative to others.
A further issue with empirically analysing disaggregated survey forecasts, as 
previously identified in 4.1, concerns inflation inequality, namely households 
experiencing significantly higher or lower inflation than the official measure. This 
issue is particularly notable recalling that the Michigan Survey wording uses the 
term “prices in general” rather than inflation per se79; whilst some respondents 
provide an expectation of the general price level, others may base their forecast on 
own consumption experiences. Consequently, utilising aggregate inflation measures 
may be considered inappropriate for the analysis of disaggregate forecasts and result 
in an exaggeration of the forecast errors, or introduce some bias, of various groups. 
Whereas Michael (1979) and Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) construct group-specific 
inflation rates from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and CPI data, the analysis 
shall continue to focus on publicly available CPI as an aggregate inflation measure; 
this shall ensure that forecast errors can be consistently analysed across 
demographics. Moreover, the use of aggregate measures avoids the issue presented 
by Michael (1979) that the utilisation of specific price indices results in shifting the 
focus away from the differences across demographics to dispersion within individual 
groups.
79 Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Burke and Manz (2010) provide a more detailed analysis 
regarding survey wording and the resulting impact upon responses.
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To provide an elementary understanding of the heterogeneity across disaggregate 
expectations, the relative forecasting performance of disaggregate household 
inflation forecasts shall be analysed. As for aggregate expectations, the analysis 
shall first consider some key elementary statistics as presented in Appendix 4.1 and 
Appendix 4.2, whilst Appendix 4.3 through to Appendix 4.7 consider the equality of 
mean forecasts across each disaggregation. However, as noted in Chapter 2 these are 
relatively uninformative; therefore, the mean forecast error (MFE) and mean squared 
forecast error (MSFE) statistics, which indicate the relative accuracy of each 
demographic, are presented in Appendix 4.8 with the associated tests of cross- 
sectional equality of MFE’s and MSFE’s presented in Appendix 4.9 and 0.
Unsurprisingly, the results presented in Appendix 4.1 and Appendix 4.2 are similar 
to those presented for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations in Chapter 2 with 
mean forecasts around three percent across the four sample periods. Nevertheless, 
several key differences are observed across demographics. Firstly, the mean 
forecasts reported by less advantaged households are generally higher than those 
from more advantaged groups; moreover, the mean forecast reported by women is 
invariably larger than that reported by men. These results are in accordance with 
those reported by various studies including Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu 
(2001a, 2001b), Palmqvist and Stromberg (2004), Linden (2005), Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2008) and Meyer and Venkatu (2011). The reported point forecasts of 
demographic groups thus appear subject to different influences which may include 
heterogeneous information, group-specific price experiences, and differential 
interpretation of the survey question.
Nevertheless, unlike Bryan and Venkatu (2001a), Palmqvist and Stromberg (2004) 
and Linden (2005), whom report U-shaped or hump-shaped relationships between 
inflation expectations and age, there is no discernible evidence from Appendix 4.1 
and Appendix 4.2 that expectations are influenced by age; similarly, there is little 
evidence of regional disparity across point forecasts of inflation. Moreover, 
Appendix 4.3 through to Appendix 4.7 further analyse whether group mean inflation 
forecasts are equal to those reported by the SPF. In accordance with the results for 
aggregate Michigan Survey forecasts presented in Chapter 2, the evidence for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods indicate that the point forecasts of
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some groups, particularly the old, women, and those with lower levels of education 
and income, are significantly different to those of professionals. In contrast, the 
ANOVA F-tests presented in Appendix 4.3 are unable to reject the equal mean null 
hypothesis for each pairing of age groups for the Greenspan-Bemanke, stable and 
volatile periods; nevertheless, for the whole sample period, the mean forecasts of 
younger households are found to be statistically different to those reported by 
middle-aged and older households. Similarly, for regionally disaggregate 
expectations, the ANOVA F-tests presented in Appendix 4.7 are unable to reject the 
equal mean null hypothesis at any reasonable level of significance for any sample of 
the four sample periods. Furthermore, for the recent period of increased 
macroeconomic uncertainty, the ANOVA F-test rejects the equal mean null 
hypothesis for all demographic groups. Given the results presented in Appendix 4.2 
which highlight that SPF forecasts exhibit a lower mean and standard deviation 
relative to all demographic groups, these results support the argument presented in 
Chapter 2 that household expectations are more sensitive to transitory 
macroeconomic shocks, whilst professional expectations appear ‘well anchored’.
In accordance with aggregate Michigan Survey expectations, the MFE’s reported by 
demographic groups across all four sample periods, as presented in Appendix 4.8, 
are generally negative indicating that all households have a tendency to over-predict 
the future inflation rate. Demographic differences are also observed with larger 
errors (in absolute terms) observed for the young, less educated, women and low 
income households; the MFE’s associated with the expectations of these agents are 
also statistically different from zero. Moreover, considering the MSFE’s, there is a 
general trend for older respondents to exhibit larger MSFE’s relative to younger and 
middle aged respondents, whilst households with higher levels of income and 
education exhibit lower MSFE’s than their more advantaged counterparts. Similarly, 
men consistently realise lower MSFE’s relative to women; however, as observed for 
MFE’s, there is no discernible difference between the MSFE’s realised by 
households across the four regions. These results indicate that certain demographic 
characteristics, namely education, income and gender, appear to greatly influence the 
magnitude of forecast errors realised by households, whereas others, including the 
respondents region of residence, appear to have little, if any, effect.
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Moreover, the size of MFE’s and MSFE’s appear to be time-variant, the size of 
MFE’s are generally smaller for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods relative 
to the whole sample period indicating greater accuracy amongst respondents for 
periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sample periods only those households within the lowest income 
or education categories, and women, report MFE’s which are statistically different 
from zero. Compared to the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, Appendix 4.8 
clearly indicates that for the recent period of macroeconomic volatility, all 
demographic groups exhibit a fall in forecast accuracy with larger (absolute) MFE’s 
and MSFE’s. Moreover, the majority of groups report MFE’s significantly different 
from zero; nevertheless, substantial heterogeneity remains evident with the null 
hypothesis unable to be rejected at a 5 percent level for those aged 18-34, with 
college degree or graduate education, men, or in the top two income groups. These 
larger forecast errors, and expectational bias, potentially result from agents failing to 
anticipate the 2009 deflationary episode. Specifically, akin to the inflation 
experience arguments of Malmendier and Nagel (2009) and Ehrmann and 
Tzamourani (2012), due to agent expectations being “reasonably well-anchored” 
(Bemanke, 2010:17), attributable to relatively stable inflation throughout the 1990’s 
and 2000’s, and improvements in Federal Reserve credibility, agents are less 
convinced that high inflation and deflation are likely outcomes.
To analyse the degree of heterogeneity across demographic groups tests of equality 
of MFE’s and MSFE’s for each disaggregation shall be examined. The cross- 
sectional equality of MFE’s and MSFE’s are examined utilising the Welch F-test 
with the results presented in Appendix 4.9 and Appendix 4.10 respectively. In 
Appendix 4.9 it is evident that whilst age and region do not impact upon the average 
forecast error realised by households, significant differences are observed for the 
education, gender and income disaggregations. Nevertheless, for the volatile sub­
period, for each cross-sectional disaggregation, there is no evidence that MFE’s 
significantly differ across households. Moreover, across all four sample periods, 
there is no evidence for any disaggregation that MSFE’s significantly differ 
indicating that the average magnitude of forecast errors is equal across groups. 
Although the Welch F-tests indicate the general trends across household 
demographics, they are unable to identify whether individual groups realise
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significantly larger or smaller errors relative to their counterparts. To provide a more 
detailed analysis of differences in forecast errors, ANOVA F-tests are performed on 
both MFE’s and MSFE’s across individual groups for each disaggregation with the 
results presented in Appendix 4.11 through to Appendix 4.20.
Beginning with age disaggregated expectations, in accordance with Appendix 4.8, 
the results presented in Appendix 4.11 provide some limited evidence that the 
forecast errors of younger age groups differ to those of older respondents; however, 
the significance of differences is limited to a 10 percent level and for the whole 
sample period. Similarly, from Appendix 4.19, no evidence of significantly different 
MFE’s is evident for regionally disaggregated expectations, indicating that any 
difference in regional inflation rates is not reflected in expectations of the aggregate 
price level. Nevertheless, whereas the forecast errors of the two youngest age groups 
and all regions are not significantly different to those realised by the SPF for any 
sample period, for the whole sample period, the MFE’s of the two oldest age groups 
are significantly larger than those reported by professionals. Given that the 
expectations of those aged 55-64 and 65-97 whole sample period are not 
significantly different from zero for the whole sample period, this appears to indicate 
greater forecast accuracy on the part of older respondents relative to both 
professionals and younger counterparts.
Contrastingly, the forecast errors reported by those of the lowest education and 
income groups are significantly different to those realised by households with higher 
levels of education or income. In accordance with Pfajfar and Santoro (2008), taking 
these results in conjunction with those presented in Appendix 4.8, it is thus apparent 
that the least advantaged households within the Michigan Survey realise the largest 
forecast errors. There is however little evidence across the other education and 
income groups that forecast errors are significantly different from each other and 
with those realised by professionals. Nevertheless, for the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sample periods, significant differences in forecast errors are 
realised across genders, indicating that for periods of increased stability, men exhibit 
significantly greater forecast accuracy relative to women. However, the forecast 
errors of both men and women are not significantly different to those reported by 
professionals. These results indicate that whilst various groups appear to have
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similar levels of forecast accuracy, the expectations of the young, less advantaged 
and women appear to realise larger deviations from actual inflation relative to their 
counterparts.
Given these results, it may be considered useful to examine whether the forecasts of 
various agents are consistent with traditional theories of expectation formation as 
previously examined in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, given that the results in Appendix 
4.9 and 0, indicating that MFE’s are not robustly equal to zero, it would appear that 
the expectations of many household groups are not fully consistent with the 
predictions of the REH. As previously demonstrated, failure of the elementary 
unbiasedness property would be a clear indicator of the inconsistency of expectations 
with the rational expectations paradigm; to establish an elementary understanding of 
whether certain demographics are more rational than others, (3.2.1) shall be tested on 
disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts across the four sample periods with the 
results presented in Appendix 4.21 to Appendix 4.25.
In Chapter 3, aggregate Michigan Survey expectations for the whole sample period 
were observed to be consistent with the unbiasedness property; however, the results 
presented in Appendix 4.21 to Appendix 4.25 indicate that the unbiasedness of 
household inflation forecasts are instead dependent upon household demographics.
At a five percent level of significance, the Wald x 2 null hypothesis of unbiasedness 
cannot be rejected for the middle-aged, those with high school degree or some 
college education, both genders, the second income quartile, and the North-East and
OA
South regions . Notably, for age, education and income disaggregations, the 
inability to reject the unbiasedness property is observed for demographic groups 
roughly in the centre of the distribution; this could indicate that the rate of inflation 
experienced by these groups consistently corresponds with the official measure of 
CPI. For other groups, the failure of the unbiasedness property may be a 
consequence of demographic price experiences which do not accurately reflect the 
official market basket; similarly inflation differentials across regions may result in 
regional bias across expectations.
80 For the whole sample period, the error orthogonality condition, as represented by (3.2.9) cannot be 
rejected for any demographic group at a five percent level significance, and only for the least 
educated, the first income quartile and women at a 10 percent level. Therefore, other than the least 
advantaged demographic groups, household expectations appear to exhibit some degree o f rationality.
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For the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, analogous to the results for
aggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts presented in Chapter 3, the joint Wald
X2 test of a0 = 0, a ± = 1 consistent with a null hypothesis of unbiasedness cannot
be rejected at a five percent level of significance for any demographic group except
for those with less than high school education. Therefore, for periods of reduced
macroeconomic volatility, agents across demographics exhibit a degree of rationality
in the formation of inflation forecasts. Nevertheless, for both of these sample
periods, those households with less than high school education or in the first income
quartile report expectations which fail the error orthogonality condition at
81conventional significance levels . For periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility, 
the expectations of the least advantaged households can thus be deemed inconsistent 
with the properties of RE. This indicates that for periods of increased stability only 
households with sufficient cognitive ability or financial resources have the capability 
of forming economically efficient expectations; alternatively the dynamics of group- 
specific inflation for the least advantaged may substantially differ from those for 
aggregate CPI.
For the volatile sub-period, the results presented in Appendix 4.21 to Appendix 4.25 
are again generally consistent with those for aggregate Michigan Survey 
expectations, with the unbiasedness property rejected across demographics. 
Compared to the stable period, household expectations thus appear less consistent 
with the properties of rationality for periods of increased volatility; moreover, these 
results are again consistent with those presented by Mehra (2002) and Croushore
(2010) that the unbiasedness of expectations is time-variant and dependent upon 
macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, analogous with the stable sample period, 
only the least educated and the first income quartile fail the error orthogonality 
condition. Nevertheless, expectations reported by those with college degree or 
graduate school education, and those in the second income quartile (Y24), conform
o ?
with the unbiasedness condition . As highlighted by Cukierman and Meltzer (1982)
81 Additionally, for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the expectations reported by those with 
college degree or graduate school education, those in the fourth income quartile, and the North-East 
region fail the error orthogonality condition. As there is no evidence that these groups fail this 
property of the REH for either the stable or volatile periods, this feature of expectations is could be 
related to the stock market crash o f 1987 which more advantaged households fail to recognise.
82 The expectations of these agents also conform with the error orthogonality condition; moreover, 
tests o f weak-form efficiency reveal that only the least educated and the first income quartile fail this
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and Souleles (2004), and previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the short timespan 
associated with the volatile sub-period may however be insufficient for agents to 
distinguish between permanent and transitory innovations, contributing to short-run 
deviations from the predictions of the REH. Moreover, recalling from Chapter 3 that 
the REH makes various predictions concerning the properties of agent expectations, 
it would be premature to declare that demographic groups form expectations 
rationally, particularly as macroeconomic conditions across the most recent sub­
period have been characterised by high levels of uncertainty.
As previously highlighted by Keane and Runkle (1990), and Chapter 3, the failure of 
survey forecasts to invariably comply with the unbiasedness condition is only an 
indication that the expectations reported by these groups are inconsistent with RE; 
the evidence is however insufficient for a comprehensive rejection of the conformity 
of survey forecasts with the hypothesis. Similarly, additional testing would be 
required to make more rigorous conclusions regarding the rationality of these groups 
who comply with this elementary property, and would further allow for more 
informed judgments regarding the relationship between rationality and household 
demographics. Nevertheless, from the results presented above it is clearly evident 
that across demographics, household inflation forecasts are more consistent with the 
unbiasedness property for periods of increased macroeconomic stability, whilst 
deviations from this elementary property of the REH are more evident for the recent 
period of macroeconomic volatility. Unsurprisingly, these results are consistent with 
those for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations presented in Chapter 3.
In accordance with the studies of Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001a, 2001b) 
and Pfajfar and Santoro (2008), the results presented in this section evidently 
demonstrate the presence of heterogeneity amongst expectations across household 
demographics. Differences are particularly notable across gender, income and 
education groups, with women and less advantaged households reporting higher 
point forecasts and realising larger forecast errors relative to men and more 
advantaged groups. Nevertheless, not all demographic characteristics impact upon 
the forecast behaviour of households with the differences between age groups and 
between regions of residence generally not significant. In contrast to McGranahan
property o f the REH further indicating that the expectations o f the least advantaged exhibit greater 
deviations from rationality relative to other demographic groups.
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and Paulson (2006), Malmendier and Nagel (2009), Madeira and Zafar (2012), and 
Menz and Poppitz (2013), current market basket differences of the various age 
groups and historical price experiences appear to have limited effect upon the 
expectations of households; similarly, regional inflation differentials do not appear to 
impact on household heterogeneity. Interestingly, these relationships were found to 
be robust across the four sample periods, indicating that the level of heterogeneity 
across demographic groups is independent of macroeconomic conditions.
Despite these findings demonstrating that forecasting behaviour is not homogeneous 
across agents, the use of group consensus forecasts is still unable to account to 
account for the full extent of heterogeneity and forecast dispersion across 
households. In an attempt to address this issue, the next section considers the degree 
of forecast dispersion, analyses whether disagreement is group-specific, and 
investigates the determinants of disagreement.
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4.3. Forecast Dispersion and Disagreement
As previously highlighted, although the analysis of reported forecasts and forecast 
errors provide some insight regarding expectation differences between demographic 
groups, they are not particularly informative of intra-group differences amongst 
forecasters within a specific demographic category. The analysis of 
demographically disaggregated forecasts shall thus be extended by considering 
group-specific disagreement. Whereas analysis of forecasts and associated errors 
provide an indication of agent perceptions of future macroeconomic conditions, 
Bomberger (1996), Mankiw et al. (2003) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) note that 
disagreement provides an indication of the perceived level of uncertainty amongst 
forecasters83.
As highlighted by Lamia and Maag (2012), disagreement arises from agents utilising 
different information sets and employing different forecasting models. One can thus 
formally model disagreement by considering the expectations of individual agents 
Ei t [nt+fl] such that:
Ei,tfrt+h\ =  f i . t ik t} (4-3-1)
where Ii t is the information set and fi t is the forecasting model of agent i in period 
t. Following Patton and Timmermann (2010), one may alternatively consider 
differences in f i t to represent heterogeneity in agent priors whilst differences in Ii t 
represent heterogeneous signals. Disagreement across agents can thus be identified 
by the sample standard deviation in beliefs across all agents such that:
=
M
( « . 2)
N - i=l
The standard deviation at represents disagreement across agents whilst Eit [nt+h] 
represents the mean expectation. Some may question the use of the standard 
deviation acknowledging that this measure of dispersion is sensitive to the presence
83 Disagreement and uncertainty are however identified by Zamowitz and Lambros (1987) to be 
distinct concepts with the former indicating the degree o f consensus regarding point forecasts, whilst 
the latter refers to the distributions o f forecasts. Moreover, Zamowitz and Lambros (1987) 
demonstrate that both high and low levels o f disagreement can be associated with high or low levels 
of uncertainty.
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of outliers. Nevertheless, considering the expectation formation process for an 
extended sample period the standard deviation is able to consider the dispersion of 
beliefs.
A frequently employed measure of disagreement, as utilised by Mankiw et al. (2003) 
and Dovem et al. (2012), relates to the interquartile range (IQR); however, this 
measure of dispersion only considers the middle 50% of respondents, excluding 
those at either tail of the forecast distribution and thus fails to fully capture the extent 
of disagreement amongst agents. An alternative approach is adopted by Kolb and 
Stekler (1996), who prefer analysing whether the dispersion of forecasts is consistent 
with the properties of a uniform or normal distribution; specifically, consensus 
amongst forecasters is argued to arise when the former is rejected in favour of the 
latter. However, questioning this approach, Dopke and Fritsche (2006) suggest that 
forecasts may be too close together to be consistent with the properties of a normal 
distribution, and instead propose that where the distribution is not skewed and have a 
significant kurtosis greater than 3, a consensus amongst forecasters is established.
As the analysis in this section focuses on the degree of forecast dispersion amongst 
agents, and the response of disagreement to macroeconomic conditions, the standard 
deviation shall be employed for empirical examination. In 4.3.1, the level of forecast 
dispersion for individual groups is identified and compared across demographics 
whilst the macroeconomic determinants of disagreement, and the response of 
disagreement to the perceived level of news, are analysed in 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 
respectively.
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4.3.1. Disagreement and Household Demographics
As previously noted, in addition to publishing the reported forecasts of households, 
the Michigan Survey also reports the standard deviation for both aggregate and 
disaggregate forecasts. Continuing to focus upon inflation forecasts, these statistics 
shall be analysed by identify whether the level of disagreement amongst household 
forecasters is group-specific and time-variant. Elementary statistics regarding 
forecast dispersion amongst aggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts and the 
evolution of disagreement over the sample period, are presented in Table 4.3.1 and 
Figure 4.3.1 respectively.
Table 4.3.1: Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement -  Elementary Statistics
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
Mean 5.182 4.874 4.770 4.489
Maximum 8.500 8.100 8.100 6.000
Minimum 3.100 3.100 3.100 3.000
Std. Dev. 1.434 1.321 1.419 0.757
Figure 4.3.1: Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement
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For aggregate Michigan Survey expectations, the mean level of disagreement 
presented in Table 4.3.1 does not appear to vary greatly over the four sample 
periods; moreover, the maximum, minimum and standard deviation values for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods are very similar. 
Nevertheless, there is an apparent fall in disagreement over time with mean and 
maximum levels of disagreement for the stable and volatile sub-periods lower
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compared to the longer whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods; moreover, 
for the volatile sub-period, disagreement appears to be less variable relative to the 
earlier sample periods. For the recent period of increased macroeconomic volatility 
this is indicative of some trade-off between greater uncertainty regarding 
macroeconomic conditions and the opportunity costs arising from larger forecast 
errors associated with deviations from the consensus forecast. Additionally, Figure 
4.3.1 reveals that during the 1980’s and early to mid-1990’s, disagreement amongst 
aggregate Michigan Survey respondents was relatively high, whereas from the mid- 
to late 1900’s, disagreement is generally much lower; these results are consistent 
with those reported by Rich and Tracy (2010). Peaks in the level of disagreement 
are however observed following the early 2000’s recession and the more recent 
economic downturn in the late 2000’s. Nevertheless, disagreement over these 
periods remains lower relative to the general level observed for the early years of the 
sample period.
Also of interest is whether individual demographic groups exhibit greater forecast 
dispersion relative to others. In a similar manner to the analysis in 4.2 elementary 
statistics relating to disagreement across disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts for 
the four sample periods are presented in Appendix 4.26 and Appendix 4.27, whilst 
Welch F-test statistics are presented in Appendix 4.28 to analyse whether the mean 
level of disagreement across groups is statistically equal. Turning attention to 
dispersion across disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts, the general trends 
identified for aggregate forecasts are again observed with mean disagreement for 
individual groups approximately equal across the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sample periods, whilst disagreement for the volatile period is generally lower. 
Moreover, it is apparent that various demographic characteristics, namely, gender, 
education and income, impact upon the level of forecast disagreement.
In accordance with the analysis concerning inflation expectations in 4.2, a U-shaped 
relationship is observed between disagreement and age; again indicating that 
‘middle-aged’ respondents form their expectations differently to the young and the 
old; this could again indicate differences historical price experiences between age 
groups, or greater intra-group heterogeneity in consumption behaviour and current 
price experiences amongst middle-aged respondents. Nevertheless, the Welch F- 
tests presented in Appendix 4.28, and the ANOVA F-Tests for individual pairs of
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age groups in Appendix 4.29 do not generally reveal any statistically significant 
differences between age groups for each of the four sample periods . Similarly, 
although mean disagreement for the South region is invariably larger relative to the 
other three regions across the four sample periods, differences in disagreement 
across regionally disaggregated expectations are not statistically significant at the 5
o  c
percent level .
In contrast, for all four sample periods, highly significant differences in mean 
disagreement are observed in Appendix 4.28 for the education, gender and income 
disaggregations; the results presented in Appendix 4.26 and Appendix 4.27 clearly 
indicate that disagreement is lower amongst men and those households with higher 
levels of education or income. Moreover, asymmetric responses in disagreement to 
macroeconomic conditions are observed amongst these groups; for women and less 
advantaged households, disagreement for the stable period is higher relative to the 
volatile sample period, however, for men and more advantaged households, higher 
levels of disagreement are observed for the volatile sub-period. This is likely to 
indicate asymmetry amongst demographic groups regarding the utilisation of 
information across macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the ANOVA F-tests presented in Appendix 
4.30 and Appendix 4.32 clearly indicate that the null hypothesis of equal levels of 
forecast dispersion can be rejected for all pairs of education or income groups. 
Similar results are also reported for the volatile sub-period, however there is some 
evidence of equal disagreement between individual pairs of adjacent education or
o /:
income groups suggesting that whilst the overall relationship of higher levels of 
disagreement for less advantaged groups remains, differences in forecast dispersion 
are smaller.
Whilst analysis of mean disagreement across demographics provides an elementary 
indication of differences in forecast dispersion across households, they are not 
particularly informative for economists. In accordance with Mankiw et al. (2003),
84 For the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sub-periods, there is some evidence of significant 
differences in the forecast dispersion between the two oldest age groups.
85 At a 10 percent level o f significance, the Welch F-test rejects the equal means null hypothesis for 
region disagreement for the whole sample period.
86 The forecast dispersion for those households with less than high school education and those in the 
first income quartile remains significantly larger in comparison to other education or income groups 
respectively.
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this section highlights that measures of central tendency are unable to account for the 
full extent of expectational heterogeneity; instead, substantial levels of disagreement 
are observed across demographic groups. Nevertheless, those groups that report 
larger forecast errors, namely women and less advantaged households, also exhibit 
more dispersed expectations. To provide a better understanding of disagreement 
across demographics and time, the next section empirically examines the 
macroeconomic determinants of Michigan Survey disagreement, with particular 
attention to whether perceived news regarding both business conditions and prices 
have symmetric effects on forecast dispersion across demographic groups and 
macroeconomic conditions.
154
4.3.2. Macroeconomic Determinants of Forecast Disagreement
The analysis in 4.3.1 above identified that forecast disagreement amongst households 
is dependent on both agent demographics and macroeconomic conditions with higher 
levels of disagreement observed amongst those households whom on average realise 
larger forecast errors including those with lower levels of education or income, and 
women. Whereas the examination of the descriptive statistics of forecast dispersion 
provides an overview of expectational disagreement, and further establishes 
substantial forecast heterogeneity amongst individual demographic groups, it is not 
particularly informative to economists. Therefore, to establish a more thorough 
understanding of the properties of group-specific disagreement, this section shall 
empirically analyse the macroeconomic determinants of forecast dispersion amongst 
households akin to Mankiw et al. (2003), Lamia and Maag (2012) and Doven et al. 
(2012).
In accordance with the analysis presented by Mankiw et al. (2003) the empirical 
analysis of the macroeconomic determinants of forecast dispersion shall begin by 
considering the relationship between group-specific levels of disagreement t and 
macroeconomic variables, namely the inflation rate, 7rt , the four-period absolute 
change in inflation, \nt — 7Tt_4|, and the output gap, Gapt :
<*i,t = « o +  +  a 2 +  <*3 1n t ~  7rt_ 4 | + a4Gapt + et (4.3.3)
The inclusion of lagged disagreement controls for dispersion in prior beliefs as 
advocated by Patton and Timmermann (2010), whilst the absolute four period ahead 
change in inflation controls for inflation variability. The results for aggregate 
Michigan Survey expectations across all four sample periods are presented in 
Appendix 4.34.
Across all four sample periods, in accordance with the results presented by Lamia 
and Maag (2012), the one period lagged disagreement amongst aggregate households 
is highly significant indicating that forecast disagreement is highly persistent. 
Moreover, across all four sample periods, whereas a 2 is positive and highly 
significant, a 3 is insignificant. Therefore, in accordance with Mankiw et al. (2003), 
D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) and Dovem et al. (2012), higher rates of inflation 
are associated with higher levels of disagreement whereas the observation that
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inflation volatility has no impact upon household disagreement supports the 
findings of Lamia and Maag (2012) for both household and professional forecasters. 
For the stable period, disagreement appears to exhibit a larger response to inflation 
relative to the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods. In contrast, for the 
volatile sub-period, the value of a 1 is much smaller, thus whilst the rate of inflation 
remained a significant influence on household disagreement, uncertainty relating to 
the wider economy is likely to have had an increased contribution to forecast 
dispersion relative to periods of greater stability. In accordance with Dovem et al. 
(2012), a general negative relationship is observed between disagreement and the 
output gap suggesting that forecast dispersion rises during recessions; this 
corresponds with the observations from Figure 4.3.1 which showed higher levels of 
disagreement for the early 2000’s and late 2000’s recessions.
Equation (4.3.3) is further tested upon disaggregate Michigan Survey expectations 
with the results presented in Appendix 4.35 to Appendix 4.39. Across demographic 
groups and sample periods, disagreement is found to be generally positive and 
significant. For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, 
disagreement is more persistent for younger households, those with lower levels of 
education or income, women and the South region. For these three sample periods, 
a 2 is again positive and significant for all demographic groups further supporting the 
idea that disagreement increases as the inflation rate rises; moreover, larger values of 
a 2 are observed for households aged 45 or over, men, lower income groups and the 
North-East region whilst a U-shaped relationship is observed across education 
groups. In contrast, a3 associated with inflation volatility, is generally insignificant 
across demographics; nevertheless, for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample 
periods a significant positive relationship is observed for the two highest education 
groups, men, and the fourth income quartile. Therefore, disagreement amongst more 
advantaged demographics appears more sensitive to the volatility of inflation relative 
to lower advantaged groups which may indicate that consensus amongst these groups 
is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Finally in accordance with the 
results for aggregate expectations, a negative relationship is again observed between 
disagreement and the output gap; thus, in accordance with Dovem et al. (2012)
87 Replacing this measure of inflation volatility with the squared inflation rate yields the same 
conclusions.
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disagreement increases during recessions, further supporting the argument that as 
inflationary pressures decrease, disagreement increases supporting the argument of 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) that agents devote greater 
attention to expectation formation when inflation matters.
Recalling from Appendix 4.8, Appendix 4.26 and Appendix 4.27 that both forecast 
errors and forecast disagreement are generally larger for less advantaged groups and 
women, one may further hypothesise that larger forecast errors amongst a certain 
demographic are likely to result in greater levels of group-specific disagreement 
amongst subsequently formed expectations. Intra-group disagreement may thus arise 
as some agents within any given group adjust their forecasts in response to the 
realisation of forecast errors, whereas others continue to report expectations 
consistent with prior beliefs. This asymmetric behaviour may result from differences 
in interpretation of forecast errors as information regarding permanent or transitory 
shocks respectively. Moreover, in relation to professional expectations, Giordani 
and Soderlind (2003) report that SPF disagreement is positively correlated with the 
absolute value of the most recent forecast error. Similarly, in their analysis of 
information rigidities, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) utilise the squared forecast error 
to proxy for economic shocks, and again observe a positive and significant 
relationship between agent disagreement and forecast errors.
To establish whether any relationship between disagreement and forecast accuracy is 
exhibited by Michigan Survey expectations, the following model shall be examined:
Ou =  Yo +  Yi<Ti,t-i + Y2 (n t -  Et- h [nt])2 +  y3n t (4.3.4)
+  Y4l ^ t  “  rct —4 I +  YsGapt + et
The inclusion of lagged disagreement again controls for dispersion in prior beliefs as 
advocated by Patton and Timmermann (2010), whilst the absolute four period ahead 
change in inflation controls for inflation variability. The results for aggregate 
Michigan Survey expectations for the four sample periods are presented in Appendix 
4.40. Corresponding with the results presented by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), for 
the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods there is some evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between forecast errors and household disagreement. 
Utilising forecast errors as a proxy for economic shocks and the predictions of 
information rigidity as presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the positive
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relationship between forecast errors and disagreement can be considered consistent
88with sticky information theory . In contrast, for the volatile sub-period, y2 is 
insignificant; this is consistent with the predictions of noisy information models, 
with Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
highlighting that disagreement is invariant to shocks, arising instead from
89idiosyncratic noise which is constant across individuals and time .
Tests of (4.3.4) are also examined for disaggregate Michigan Survey expectations 
with the results presented in Appendix 4.41 to Appendix 4.45. For all four sample 
periods, disagreement remains highly persistent and positively related to the inflation 
rate, however, the value of y2 is generally insignificant across demographic groups. 
Nevertheless, where significant, the value of y2 is invariably positive indicating that 
larger forecast errors increase disagreement, again supporting the notion that agent 
inflation forecasts are subject to sticky information. Nevertheless, in accordance 
with the results for aggregate expectations presented in Appendix 4.40, y2 is almost 
invariably insignificant for the volatile sub-period90; this would support the argument 
that information rigidities embodied within household expectations for the recent 
period of macroeconomic uncertainty are more consistent with the predictions of 
noisy information theory.
An alternative approach to analyse heterogeneity in forecast dispersion across 
demographics is to examine the relationship between group-specific levels of 
disagreement and measures of aggregate uncertainty. As previously highlighted by 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) where uncertainty regarding macroeconomic 
conditions reduces the signal-to-noise ratio, disagreement amongst agents is likely to 
increase. Similarly, Dovem et al. (2012) report a positive relationship between agent 
disagreement and the volatility of the forecast variable.
Whilst economic uncertainty is an important concept for decision makers, it is 
difficult to quantify. A potential proxy for aggregate uncertainty concerns 
disagreement amongst professionals regarding the forecast variable under the 
assumption that greater disagreement amongst well informed agents relates to greater 
uncertainty regarding macroeconomic conditions. Alternatively, following recent
88 Models o f sticky information shall be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.
89 The predictions of information rigidity models shall be extensively examined in Chapter 6.
90 At a five percent level y2 is only significant for the first income quartile.
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studies, including Leduc and Liu (2014), Istrefi and Piloiu (2013) and Bachmann et 
al. (2013), the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
shall be employed91. Specifically, in accordance with Istrefi and Piloiu (2013), to 
avoid correlation with professional disagreement, only the news-coverage 
component of uncertainty shall be employed.
In a similar manner to (4.3.3) and (4.3.4), to establish the relationship between 
household disagreement and aggregate measures of uncertainty, the following model 
shall be analysed for both aggregate and group-specific Michigan Survey 
disagreement:
<*i,t = Yo +  Yi°i,t-i + Y2 °p,t + YsBloomt + y4n t + et (4.3.5)
Professional disagreement is denoted aP t whilst Bloom t denotes the news-coverage 
component of the Bloom uncertainty index; lagged household disagreement and the 
current inflation rate again control for the prior dispersion beliefs and current 
macroeconomic conditions. The results for aggregate expectations across the four 
sample periods are presented in Table 4.3.2 below:
Table 4.3.2: Aggregate Household Disagreement and Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty
Testing Equation: a ix =  y 0 +  Y i^ i . t - i  +  Y ^ p . t  +  Y^Bloorrit +  y47rt +  e t
Vo Y  l Y2 Y s y 4 R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MS 0.008 0.809*** -0.050 0.443** 0.172*** 0.797 0.787 2.663
(0.231) (0.042) (0.197) (0.185) (0.045)
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MS 0.023 0.805*** -0.047 0.446** 0.169*** 0.784 0.774 2.638
(0.249) (0.048) (0.226) (0.187) (0.050)
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS 0.099 0.754*** -0.980** 0.490* 0.386*** 0.791 0.776 2.554
(0.298) (0.062) (0.435) (0.248) (0.068)
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MS 0.611** 0.812*** -0.459 0.475*** 0.049*** 0.737 0.662 2.463
(0.257) (0.077) (0.286) (0.108) (0.012)
In accordance with tests of (4.3.3) and (4.3.4), the y1 and y4 coefficients are positive 
and significant across all four sample periods providing further evidence that the 
positive relationship between disagreement and both the prior dispersion of beliefs 
and the current inflation rate, are robust. From Table 4.3.2, it is evident that for all
91 The economics policy uncertainty index comprises o f newspaper coverage o f policy uncertainty 
and the disagreement among professional forecasters.
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four sample periods uncertainty measured by the Bloom uncertainty index has a 
significant and positive relationship with household disagreement. Greater 
uncertainty coverage by newspapers thus results in an increase in dispersion amongst 
aggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts. However, whilst the value of y3 is 
approximately equal across the four sample periods, a reduction in significance is 
observed for the stable sub-period which may be indicative of reduced news 
coverage of uncertainty during periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility. In 
accordance with this argument, the value of y3 is significant at the 1 percent level for 
the latest sample period associated with higher levels of uncertainty and volatility.
Contrastingly, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, 
professional disagreement is insignificant suggesting that the views of professionals 
have little impact upon the dispersion of household expectations, and may further 
indicate that professional disagreement is a poor proxy for wider economic 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, for the stable sub-period, y2 is negative and significant 
suggesting that an increase in professional disagreement results in a reduction in 
household disagreement. During periods of greater macroeconomic stability, 
households may thus seek to report expectations more consistent with the consensus 
where uncertainty rises, and thus further supports the argument that some trade-off 
exists between greater uncertainty regarding macroeconomic conditions and the 
opportunity costs arising from larger forecast errors associated with deviations from 
the consensus forecast.
Tests of (4.3.5) are also performed on demographically disaggregated Michigan 
Survey expectations with the results presented in Appendix 4.46 to Appendix 4.50.
In accordance with the results presented in Table 4.3.2 for aggregate Michigan 
Survey expectations, uncertainty represented by SPF disagreement for the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, is insignificant for all demographic groups at 
the conventional 5 percent level of significance. In contrast, the coefficient attached 
to the Bloom uncertainty index is generally larger, and is observed to be significant 
for various demographic groups; specifically, a positive and significant relationship 
between the Bloom index and disagreement is observed for higher education and 
income groups, the North East and South regions, both genders and all age groups, 
except those aged 65-97.
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For the stable period, disagreement amongst young respondents, men, all four 
regions and those with higher levels of education or income again exhibit a positive 
and significant response to the Bloom uncertainty index; as uncertainty rises, the 
inflation forecasts reported by these agents exhibit greater dispersion. In contrast, a 3 
for older respondents, women, those with lower levels of education or income is 
insignificant; instead for most of the groups a2 is significant and negative indicating 
that disagreement amongst those demographics falls as professional disagreement 
rises.
For the volatile sample period, whereas the coefficient associated with professional 
disagreement is again generally insignificant across demographic groups, an 
asymmetric response is observed regarding the Bloom index. Specifically, whilst a 3 
is significant for the middle aged, those with some college or college degree 
education, the third and fourth income quartiles, and the North-Central, North-East 
and South regions, disagreement amongst other demographic groups is insensitive to 
this measure of uncertainty.
These results indicate that the dispersion of expectaions amongst less advantaged 
households are insensitive to the Bloom newspaper index; these agents may lack the 
cognitive abaility and resources to process information regarding less predictable 
outcomes and thus exhibit greater inattention to uncertainty regarding 
macroeconomic conditions. Disagreement amongst those groups with lower 
sensitivity to the Bloom index instead appears to exhibit a larger response to the 
inflation rate; this indicates that at higher rates of inflation, the expectations of 
certain agents, including the less advantaged, are subject to greater dispersion 
relative to other groups. A potential explanation, as proposed by Bruine de Bruin et 
al. (201 lb) is that the expectations of a proportion of these agents are subject to 
extreme observations in specific prices resulting in greater deviations from the 
consensus median forecast.
The results presented in this section indicate that the macroeconomic determinants of 
disagreement are dependent upon the sample period and household demographics. 
Across the various specifications, the coefficients associated with lagged agent 
disagreement are relatively large and are generally highly significant for all 
disaggregations; in accordance with Lamia and Maag (2012) agent disagreement is
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highly persistent and dependent upon the prior dispersion of beliefs as indicated by 
Patton and Timmermann (2010). However, asymmetric responses are observed 
regarding various macroeconomic variables, for example, disagreement amongst less 
advantaged households exhibits a larger response to inflation relative to more 
advantaged counterparts. These asymmettric responses may be resulting from 
differences in information. To analyse the effect of the available information, the 
next section utilises Michigan Survey responses regarding the perceived level of 
news, to consider the manner which news volume and news tone impact upon 
household disagreement.
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4.3.3. Forecast Disagreement and Perceived News
In 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, in a manner akin to Mankiw et al. (2003), it has been established 
that forecasts reported by Michigan Survey respondents are subject to persistent 
levels of dispersion whilst disagreement is dependent upon demographic 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. In a similar manner to Lamia and 
Lein (2008) and Lamia and Maag (2012), the relationship between household 
disagreement and news shall be analysed; moreover, it shall further be examined 
whether any relationship is evident between household and professional 
disagreement, akin to the survey-updating hypothesis of Carroll (2003).
In accordance with Carroll (2003), Lamia and Lein (2008) and Lamia and Maag 
(2012), it is assumed that in forming their inflation forecasts, rather than individually 
observing data regarding all macroeconomic variables, agents obtain their views 
from media reports. Various commentators, including Mankiw et al. (2003), Carroll
(2003), Lamia and Lein (2008), Pfajfar and Santoro (2010, 2013) and Lamia and 
Maag (2012), hypothesise that a greater volume of news will result in greater 
expectational consensus amongst economic agents; it is thus appropriate to examine 
whether the quantity of news impacts upon the level of disagreement across 
household expectations. Additionally, Lamia and Lein (2008), Easaw and Ghoshray 
(2010), Lamia and Maag (2012), and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) highlight that 
expectations may respond asymmetrically in response to favourable and 
unfavourable news. The response of forecast disagreement to variable news reports 
shall also be examined to determine the impact of news tone on forecast consensus.
Assessing the rate of information diffusion, Carroll (2003) utilises an index of news 
intensity based upon newspaper reports regarding inflation, as obtained from the 
LexisNexis database; however, this is argued by Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) to not be 
particularly informative with regards to agent behaviour whilst Blinder and Krueger
(2004) argue that television is a more popular information source than newspapers. 
Instead, the analysis in this section follows the approach employed by Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2013), utilising the perceived level of news reported by Michigan Survey 
respondents as a proxy for the availability of news available to households in any 
given period. Specifically, the Michigan Survey asks respondents whether “During 
the last few  months, have you heard o f any favourable or unfavourable changes in
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business conditions? ” Upon a positive repose to the “any change ” question, the 
Michigan Survey subsequently asks respondents “What did you hear? " From these 
questions, the Michigan Survey reports data concerning the proportion of agents 
having heard any news, the proportions hearing any form of favourable or 
unfavourable news, and further disaggregates the favourable and unfavourable 
responses into various categories including news concerning prices, employment and 
the stock market.
Figure 4.3.2 reports the fraction of Michigan Survey respondents that have heard any 
news regarding business conditions together with the rate of inflation as measured by 
the CPI:
Figure 4.3.2: Michigan Survey Perceived News
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From Figure 4.3.2, there appears some correlation between the percentage of agents 
reporting that they have heard some news regarding business conditions and the rate 
of inflation. Namely throughout the early to mid-1980’s, the perceived level of news 
falls with the rate of inflation; similarly, for the early 1990’s where inflation peaks at 
over 6 percent, there is an increase in the perceived level of news. Furthermore, for 
the mid- to late-1990’s for increased levels of macroeconomic stability, agents have 
a lower probability of having heard any news regarding business conditions; 
moreover, high levels of perceived news are additionally observed for the recent 
period of increased macroeconomic uncertainty where inflation has been previously
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identified to be particularly volatile. This could indicate a greater volume of news 
for the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty, or alternatively, that agents are 
more attentive to the available information set.
To examine whether the perceived level of news impacts upon the level of 
disagreement amongst Michigan Survey inflation forecasts, (4.3.6) akin to Andrade 
and Le Bihan (2010), Bruine de Bruin et al. (201 la) and Lamia and Maag (2012) 
shall be evaluated:
<*i,t = a o + +  a 2Newsiit + a 3n t (4.3.6)
+ a A\nt -  7Tf_41 + a 5GAPt + et
Again, <Ji t defines the level of disagreement at time t for demographic group i, 
whilst N ew si t represents the group-specific proportion of agents having heard any
92form of news and GAPt is again the output gap; in accordance with Lamia and 
Maag (2012), the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is motivated by the 
dispersion of prior beliefs as further demonstrated by Patton and Timmermann 
(2010), whilst the inclusion of n t , and \nt — n t_4\ account for inflation and inflation 
variability. The results from testing (4.3.6) for aggregate Michigan Survey forecasts 
for the four sample periods are presented in Appendix 4.51.
Firstly, setting a4 = 0 and a 5 = 0, a significant negative relationship is observed 
between news intensity and disagreement for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and 
volatile sample periods; this indicates that as the volume of news regarding general 
business conditions rises, a greater consensus in aggregate Michigan Survey inflation 
forecasts is observed. This result corresponds with those presented by Lamia and 
Maag (2012) and Menz and Poppitz (2013) for EU and German survey data 
respectively. However, for the stable period, a2 is insignificant at the five percent 
level indicating that disagreement is less sensitive to news coverage during periods 
of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty. This suggests that agents are less attentive 
to the media, and given the larger value of a 3 for the stable period, supports the 
argument that disagreement is more dependent upon the level of inflation and may 
be the result of asymmetric inflation experiences across demographic groups. Whilst 
a3 is insignificant for the volatile period, the value of a 2 is more negative relative to
92 To calculate the proportion o f agents having heard any news we utilise the relative news index of 
recent changes in business conditions available from the Michigan Survey.
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the whole and volatile periods indicative of greater uncertainty amongst agents 
regarding general business conditions during the recent period of macroeconomic 
volatility. Removing the restrictions on a 4 and a 5, the news intensity variable is 
only significant for the Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sub-periods. News reports 
thus appear to have a particularly large impact on disagreement amongst forecasters 
for the most recent period of macroeconomic volatility.
Tests of (4.3.6) are also evaluated for disaggregate expectations with the results 
presented in Appendix 4.52 to Appendix 4.56. Across sample periods and 
demographics, disagreement is again found to be persistent and positively related to 
the inflation rate; whilst a general negative relationship is again observed with the 
output gap For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, a 2 is generally 
insignificant; however, for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, and to a lesser 
extent the stable sub-period, significant negative relationships between news and 
disagreement are observed, particularly for more advantaged households. This could 
indicate that only a proportion of households are attentive to news during periods of 
relative macroeconomic stability, and upon observing news, report expectations 
which exhibit greater consensus. For the volatile periods, a larger significant 
negative relationship is observed across demographic groups, indicating that for the 
recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty, an increased volume of news reduces 
the dispersion of agent forecasts.
Whilst (4.3.6) represents the baseline specification utilising the overall perceived 
level of news, Lamia and Lein (2008), Easaw and Ghoshray (2010), Lamia and 
Maag (2012), and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) further investigate whether the content, 
or tone, of perceived news impacts on the expectation formation process and
Q 'i
resulting disagreement . Specifically, Lamia and Lein (2012) highlight that the tone 
of media reports can induce some form of media bias, shifting forecasts away from 
the rational expectation, and may thus result in greater forecast heterogeneity and 
disagreement. Alternatively, one may argue that an increase in unfavourably toned 
news may raise the awareness of agents to macroeconomic issues, who thus 
incorporate the latest news in information sets and a reduction in forecast dispersion.
93 Similarly, Drager (2011) reports that the tone of media reports results in asymmetric effects upon 
both inflation expectations and perceptions in Sweden.
166
In a similar manner to the aforementioned studies, the impact of both favourable and 
unfavourable perceived news, as reported by Michigan Survey respondents, upon 
household disagreement shall be examined utilising (4.3.7):
°i,t = ffo +  a i^ U - i + oc2NewsFi>t + a 3NewsUit  (4.3.7)
+ a4n t + + a6\nt -  7rt_4| 4- et
The group-specific proportion of agents having heard favourable and unfavourable 
news is represented by NewsFi t and NewsUit  respectively. The results for 
aggregate expectations are presented in Appendix 4.57.
Firstly, akin to the preliminary analysis of (4.3.6) the restrictions a 5 =  0 and a6 = 0 
are imposed. From these tests, there is clear evidence that there is an asymmetric 
response in disagreement amongst aggregate Michigan Survey expectations to 
favourable and unfavourable news. Specifically, for a five percent level of 
significance, the coefficient associated with favourable news is insignificant whereas 
a highly significant positive relationship is observed between disagreement and 
unfavourable news. Therefore, whilst favourable news has limited impact, as the 
volume of news articles concerning unfavourable news increases, households report 
more widely dispersed inflation forecasts. This could indicate that in response to 
unfavourable news, a proportion of agents underreact, perhaps resulting from 
inattentiveness, whilst an additional proportion overreact indicative of some inherent 
pessimism. Utilising the expectation gap rather than disagreement per se, similar 
findings are reported by Lamia and Lein (2008), Drager (2011) and Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2013).
In contrast, for the unrestricted specification presented in Appendix 4.57, across all 
four sample periods, both a 2 and a 3 are insignificant thus indicating that both 
favourable and unfavourable news concerning business conditions have no impact 
upon the level of disagreement amongst aggregate Michigan Survey inflation 
expectations. Instead, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, a4 is 
positive and significant further supporting the argument that disagreement is highly 
dependent upon the rate of inflation94.
94 At a five percent level o f significance, inflation volatility and the output gap are also found to have 
no impact upon disagreement for any o f the four sample periods.
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Tests of (4.3.7) are also evaluated for disaggregate Michigan Survey expectations 
with the results presented in Appendix 4.58 to Appendix 4.62. In accordance with 
the results for aggregate expectations, across all disaggregations and sample periods 
both a2 and a 3 are generally insignificant; instead, for the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sample periods, a4 is positive and significant in nearly all cases. 
This again indicates that news tone has limited impact upon forecast disagreement, 
but further supports the existence of a robust relationship between disagreement and 
the rate of inflation. Nevertheless, in several cases, positive and significant 
responses in disagreement are observed, most notably for higher education and 
income groups. This suggests that disagreement amongst these groups exhibiting 
greater levels of forecast consensus is more sensitive to unfavourable news relative 
to less advantaged counterparts; this could be the result of greater attentiveness to 
news by these agents.
Whereas (4.3.6) and (4.3.7) refer to news regarding overall business conditions, this 
may be uninformative or irrelevant for the evolution of the price level and inflation. 
Therefore, the two previous specifications shall be re-examined replacing perceived 
news with the more specific measure regarding the perceived news on prices 
reported by Michigan Survey respondents. Specifically, (4.3.6) and (4.3.7) shall be 
respecified as follows:
&i,t = «o + + aiN ew sPit + a3n t (4.3.8)
+ a4\nt -  7 r t _ 4 | + a sGAPt + et
(Tit = a 0 + cc1(ji t_1 + a 2NewsPFit + a3NewsPUit  (4.3.9)
+ a4n t + a 5\nt -  n t_4\ + a eGAPt + et
The group-specific proportion of agents having heard any news regarding prices is 
defined as NewsPi t whilst NewsPFit  and NewsPUi t represent the group-specific 
perceived levels of favourable and unfavourable news regarding prices.
Tests of (4.3.8) for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations are presented in row (1) 
of each panel of Appendix 4.63. For all four sample periods, the relationship 
between aggregate disagreement and the perceived news intensity on prices is 
insignificant; instead, significant relationships between forecast disagreement and 
the inflation rate, inflation volatility and the output gap are observed. Akin to the 
results for news regarding general business conditions, the news intensity concerning
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prices appears to have little impact on forecast dispersion which instead depends 
more heavily upon general macroeconomic conditions. These results may however 
arise from some correlation between the perceived level of price news and the actual 
rate of inflation. Restricting (4.3.8) such that a3 = 0 the results presented in row (2) 
of Appendix 4.63 indicate that a positive relationship exists between aggregate 
Michigan Survey forecast disagreement and the perceived news on prices for all four 
sample periods. The positive relationship between disagreement and both forecast 
dispersion and the actual rate of inflation supports the argument that the proportion 
of agents hearing news on prices is related to the inflation rate.
The unrestricted specification of (4.3.8) is also tested on disaggregate Michigan 
Survey expectations with the results presented in Appendix 4.64 to Appendix 4.68. 
For various demographic groups, tests of (4.3.8) reveal similar results to those for 
aggregate Michigan Survey expectations; namely, for the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sample periods, a 2 is insignificant for the young and those 
households with higher levels of education or income. In contrast, a 2 for older age 
groups, the less educated, lower income quartiles and all four regions is generally 
negative and significant; disagreement amongst these agents thus falls as the 
proportion of agents hearing news on prices increases.
Across demographics, the effect of perceived news on prices on forecast 
disagreement for the stable sample period remains negative but is generally 
insignificant across demographic groups; nevertheless, a 2 is large and significant for 
both the lowest education and income groups suggesting that dispersion amongst the 
forecasts of the less advantaged agents is robustly dependent upon the volume of 
price news. Moreover, the forecasts of these agents may be more sensitive to news 
on prices relative to those of more advantaged households as inflation impacts upon 
their income or welfare more compared to other agent groups. Nevertheless, for all 
demographic groups, the proportion of agents hearing any news for any given period 
of the stable sub-period is much lower on average compared to either the 1980’s or 
the recent volatile sub-period. Insignificant values of a 2 across disaggregations may 
therefore result from agents being less able to recall hearing news on prices; 
consequently, the reported forecasts and resulting disagreement is likely to depend 
upon alternative economic variables.
169
In contrast to the three alternative sample periods, the value of a 2 for the volatile 
sub-period across demographic groups is invariably positive and generally 
significant. Larger values of a 2 are again observed for less advantaged households 
indicating that news has a larger impact on disagreement amongst these agents 
relative to their more advantaged counterparts. Contrary to periods of greater 
macroeconomic stability, as the proportion of agents hearing news on prices 
increases, forecast dispersion amongst agents rises. This indicates that in the 
presence of macroeconomic volatility, a greater volume of news generates 
uncertainty amongst agents regarding the future value of inflation, generating more 
widely dispersed expectations; this may result from heterogeneity in the 
interpretation of news amongst agents, or alternatively, from news reports portraying 
conflicting perceptions of inflation or wider macroeconomic conditions.
Tests of (4.3.9) for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations are presented in 
Appendix 4.69. Firstly, imposing a 5 = 0 and a 6 = 0 a significant negative 
relationship between disagreement and favourable news is observed for both the 
whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sub-periods; however, a3 associated with 
unfavourable news is insignificant. For the stable sub-period, the relationship 
between disagreement and both favourable and unfavourable news are insignificant 
yet for the volatile sub-period, whilst the coefficients associated with the two news 
tones are significant, disagreement falls in response to positive news, but increases in 
response to unfavourable price news.
Tests of (4.3.9) are also examined for disaggregate Michigan Survey expectations 
with the results presented in Appendix 4.70 to Appendix 4.74. For the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods the coefficient on positively toned 
news is generally insignificant95 whereas, for various demographic groups, a 
negative relationship between disagreement and negatively toned news is observed. 
Specifically, significant values of a3 are observed for those in the two older age 
groups, the less educated and those in the first, second and third income quartiles. In 
accordance with Menz and Poppitz (2013), disagreement amongst households who 
generally realise larger forecast errors, appears to react more to unfavourable news 
regarding prices relative to other demographic groups. For regionally disaggregated
95 A significant negative relationship is however observed between perceived price news and forecast 
disagreement amongst men.
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expectations, the values of a 3 are fairly homogenous yet the coefficient is significant 
for the North-Central, South and West regions for the whole sample period, whereas 
significance is observed in the stable period for the North-East region. These results 
suggest there is some asymmetry in the sensitivity of disagreement to news, perhaps 
reflecting regional inflation differentials, however, disagreement for all regions 
appears to fall in response to unfavourable news.
In accordance with Lamia and Maag (2012) and Menz and Poppitz (2013) forecast 
disagreement amongst agents is dependent upon various factors including the 
volume and tone of the available news. These effects appear dependent upon both 
household demographics and the sample period with disagreement amongst less 
advantaged households more dependent upon price news, whilst news regarding 
general macroeconomic conditions has a larger impact upon the forecast dispersion 
amongst more advantaged households. This could indicate differences in 
information processing capacities akin to Sims (2003) or different distributions of 
attentiveness in welfare maximisation. Nevertheless, disagreement remains highly 
persistent further indicating that the prior dispersion of beliefs, remains a key 
determinant of the degree of consensus amongst agent expectations as previously 
highlighted by Lamia and Maag (2012) and Patton and Timmermann (2010).
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4.4. Discussion
Recognising that the use of consensus measures of aggregate expectations fails to 
fully acknowledge the distribution of expectations amongst agents, this chapter has 
sought to establish the extent of disagreement and heterogeneity amongst the 
reported inflation forecasts across the various socioeconomic groups within the 
Michigan Survey. In accordance with the results presented by Pfajfar and Santoro 
(2008) and those in Chapter 2 for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations, all 
demographic groups tend to overestimate the future rate of inflation whilst forecast 
errors are larger for the recent period of macroeconomic volatility. Nevertheless, the 
reported expectations of women and those households with lower levels of education 
or income were found to realise larger forecast errors and exhibit higher levels of 
intra-group disagreement compared to men and more advantaged counterparts.
A potential issue with the analysis of disaggregated inflation expectations concerns 
agents experiencing different rates of inflation dependent upon their demographic 
characteristics. As previously noted by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010b) and Armantier 
et al. (2012), differential interpretations regarding the wording of the Michigan 
Survey makes this issue particularly noteworthy; whereas some agents may respond 
with an expectation concerning the general price level, others may respond with 
personal price experiences. Given that more advantaged households are likely to 
have greater levels of economic and financial literacy in the manner described by 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010), it is likely that those 
households with higher levels of education or income would be able to employ the 
necessary cognitive or financial resources required to report expectations more in 
line with official measures; however, it is not possible to distinguish from the 
reported forecasts in the Michigan Survey which measure of inflation households are 
targeting.
Despite disaggregating the Michigan Survey by demographic characteristics, the 
methodology employed in this chapter has been unable to fully exploit the full nature 
of heterogeneity across household expectations. Specifically, the median average 
employed for each demographic group can be considered an aggregate measure. 
Employing a percentile time-series in the manner demonstrated by Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2008, 2010) or the use of probability density functions akin to D’Amico
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and Orphanides (2008) and Boero et al. (2014) are viable alternatives to mitigate the 
aggregation issue.
As discussed throughout this chapter, and by previous studies including Michael 
(1979), Idson and Miller (1997), Hobijn and Lagakos (2005), McGranahan and 
Paulson (2006), Hobijn et al. (2009) and Menz and Poppitz (2013), household 
demographics impact upon consumption expenditure patterns; consequently, 
asymmetries arise in the inflation rates experienced by households. Despite 
recognising this asymmetry, the analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the 
aggregate measure of CPI inflation. This methodology is arguably most consistent 
with the ‘prices in general’ approach adopted by the Michigan Survey question; 
additionally, utilising the aggregate measure ensures comparability across 
households and with professional expectations. Consequently, the calculated 
forecast errors, associated with groups who form expectations based upon own 
circumstances and experiences, as opposed to the general price level, are likely to be 
considerably biased; this was evaluated in section 4.2 which demonstrated that 
across all demographic disaggregations, household forecasts fail the unbiasedness 
property required by the REH. An alternative approach would thus have been to 
construct group-specific price indices and analyse disaggregated expectations 
relative to both aggregate and group-specific measures in a manner akin to Menz and 
Poppitz (2013); this approach is however beyond the scope of this study.
This chapter has further established pervasive levels of disagreement amongst 
households, with the extent of forecast dispersion dependent upon household 
demographics and macroeconomic conditions. Namely, women and households 
with lower levels of income and education exhibit significantly higher levels of 
forecast dispersion compared to men and more advantaged counterparts; 
nevertheless, over the whole sample period, there appears some general trend of a 
fall in disagreement. However, utilising the standard deviation to measure the extent 
of forecast dispersion fails to acknowledge any change in the sample size, with the 
impact of outliers falling as the sample size increases. The empirical analysis of 
disagreement established the extent of forecast dispersion amongst households is 
highly persistent, whilst in accordance with Mankiw et al. (2003) a robust positive 
relationship across demographic groups was observed between the level of forecast
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dispersion and the inflation rate, indicating that higher rates of inflation are 
associated with higher levels of forecast disagreement amongst households. 
Moreover, in accordance with Dovem et al. (2012), a negative relationship between 
disagreement and the output gap is commonly observed indicating that forecast 
disagreement amongst households is higher during recessions.
Utilising the proportion of Michigan Survey respondents hearing news regarding 
both general business conditions and prices respectively, the empirical analysis also 
considers the impact of the volume and tone of news on forecast dispersion amongst 
households. Whilst the effect of news regarding general business conditions on 
aggregate disagreement is generally insignificant, stronger relationships are observed 
for individual demographic groups. These results indicate that whereas the volume 
of news does not impact upon the level of inter-demographic forecast disagreement, 
a greater dispersion of agents hearing news for any demographic reduces the level of 
intra-demographic disagreement.
Specifically, an increase in the volume of news concerning business conditions 
reduces forecast disagreement amongst households, most notably for men and those 
households with higher levels of income and education. In contrast, price news 
appears to have a larger effect on households with lower levels of education and 
income. Disagreement amongst more advantaged households is thus associated with 
general macroeconomic conditions; yet, forecast dispersion amongst less advantaged 
households is more influenced by price news suggesting that prices have a larger 
impact on the welfare of these agents. Alternatively, rather than assuming that all 
agents have access to a homogenous information set, a plethora of news sources, 
which attach different weights to specific news such as prices and general 
macroeconomic conditions, are likely to be available to agents; the effects identified 
in 4.3.3 may thus arise from demographic groups devoting asymmetric degrees of 
attention to individual news sources. For the volatile sub-period whereas the 
relationship between disagreement and general business conditions is negative for all 
demographic groups, the coefficient associated with price news is positive. This 
could indicate that whereas a greater volume of news concerning general 
macroeconomic conditions serves to inform agents regarding the future path of the
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economy, news concerning prices generates uncertainty regarding the effect of 
inflation on individual welfare.
In accordance with Menz and Poppitz (2013), asymmetric effects of news tone were 
also observed; specifically, whereas unfavourable news concerning both general 
business conditions and prices reduces the degree of forecast dispersion amongst 
households, positively toned news is generally insignificant. This supports the 
arguments of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) that agent 
expectations are more sensitive to information when the opportunity costs associated 
with inflation, and the resulting impact on decision making and agent welfare, are 
sufficiently high. Nevertheless, the impact of unfavourable news was observed to be 
asymmetric with disagreement amongst more advantaged households more sensitive 
to unfavourable news regarding general business conditions, whilst the dispersion of 
forecasts amongst less advantaged groups exhibits a stronger relationship with 
unfavourable price news. This further highlights that the decision profiles, and 
consequently economic welfare, of the various demographic groups are subject to 
asymmetric economic influences.
Rather than utilising data regarding actual news reports for a given period, the 
analysis has instead focused on the perceived volume and tone of news heard by 
Michigan Survey respondents; this measure of news may however not be a reliable 
indicator of forecast dispersion and agent disagreement. Firstly, the responses of 
Michigan Survey participants may be subject to some self-reporting bias or 
misinterpretation of the volume or content of available news; consequently, the news 
measure employed in 4.3 may not be a reliable indicator of news items in circulation 
for any given period. Secondly, the content of the news heard by Michigan Survey 
respondents may not relate to the associated forecast horizon, and is instead 
associated with current or past values of economic variables or macroeconomic 
conditions. Alternatives to the Michigan Survey perceived news indices employed 
in 4.3.3 include the LexisNexis database, as utilised by Carroll (2003); however, as 
highlighted in 4.3.3, any index constructed from this data may not encompass the 
full extent of news sources encountered by agents.
The observed levels of disagreement amongst households over time could be a 
consequence of information rigidities with forecast dispersion a key component in
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both the noisy information and sticky information hypotheses. As highlighted by 
Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) disagreement 
in these models arises from imperfect and differences in information sets amongst 
agents. The consistency of agent forecasts with the predictions of these models shall 
be extensively analysed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5: HOUSEHOLD FORECASTS, STICKY 
INFORMATION AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL UPDATING
HYPOTHESES
It is generally appreciated by economists that inflation reacts to macroeconomic 
disturbances with some lag. In recent years however, a key debate amongst 
macroeconomists has arisen concerning whether the predictions of sticky price or 
information rigidity models are best able to replicate observed inflation dynamics. 
Sticky price theory was introduced by New Keynesians including Taylor (1980) and 
Calvo (1983) and suggests that nominal prices are infrequently adjusted by firms. 
This contrasts with the notion of perfectly flexible prices and continuous adjustment 
advocated by Classical economists. Sticky price models are however often criticised 
for being unable to replicate the observed dynamic effects of macroeconomic 
variables. Indeed, within a staggered pricing framework, Ball (1994) observes that 
credible disinflations result in a ‘boom’, contrasting with post-war experiences; 
moreover, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argue that the overlapping wage contracting 
model of Taylor (1980) produces excessive inflation persistence. These issues are 
argued by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to arise due to inflation being more responsive to 
disturbances than predicted by sticky price models. These issues have thus prompted 
increasing interest in models of information rigidity.
In Chapter 3 models of information rigidity were briefly introduced, including the 
prominent sticky information hypothesis as advocated by Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
and Reis (2006a, 2006b). These models provide interesting departures from 
traditional theories and attempt to mitigate the issues and limitations concerning 
adaptive expectations and the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). This chapter 
seeks to appraise these models and assess whether survey forecasts are empirically 
consistent with the predictions of information rigidity theory. Sub-section 5.1 
reviews the development of information rigidity theory by previous studies. Next, 
the discussion focuses on a particular theory, epidemiological expectations as 
proposed by Carroll (2003, 2006), considers whether previous studies consider the 
model as a reasonable explanation of agent expectations, and examines several 
notable extensions. Empirical tests of the epidemiological hypothesis shall then be 
established with the results examined in sub-sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 across the 
previously identified sample periods for aggregate and disaggregate Michigan
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Survey inflation forecasts respectively. The final sub-section provides a discussion 
of the preceding analysis and provides a judgement regarding whether expectations 
are consistent with information rigidity theory and whether the degree of 
attentiveness amongst agent expectations is dependent upon household 
demographics and macroeconomic conditions.
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5.1. The Development of Information Rigidity Models: A
Literature Review
In 3.3 a number of approaches were identified which relax the information 
requirements associated with standard theories of expectation formation, including 
incomplete information and bounded rationality, adaptive learning, and information 
rigidities. Whilst incomplete information and adaptive learning have provided useful 
departures from standard expectation models, applying more realistic assumptions 
regarding information acquisition and agent foresight, models of information rigidity 
have provided interesting insights regarding the formation of agent expectations. 
Specifically, information rigidity is primarily concerned with two classes of models, 
namely noisy information and sticky information. Prior to analysing whether agent 
expectations are empirically consistent with information rigidity theory, the 
predictions of the various models shall first be identified and assessed.
Firstly, noisy information models, as proposed by Woodford (2003), Sims (2003) 
and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) assert that whilst information sets are 
continuously updated by agents, information is imperfect, with signals contaminated 
by noise. The Lucas (1972) assumption that aggregate disturbances are observable 
following a one-period lag is relaxed by Woodford (2003) and Sims (2003) who 
instead assume that such information is public, available to agents who are 
sufficiently attentive. Nevertheless, as noisy information models assume that agent 
forecasts are only able to partly absorb new information into expectations, forecast 
errors will contain a predictable component, thus violating the requirements of RE.
In response to nominal disturbances, Woodford (2003) demonstrates within a noisy 
information model that agent actions and aggregate outcomes react with inertia. 
Specifically, in the presence of strategic complementarity, Woodford (2003:30) 
proposes that agents receive news through some “noisy channel”. Following a 
monetary disturbance, Woodford (2003) highlights that in addition to individual 
forecast errors, agent actions are subject to uncertainty arising from higher-order 
beliefs. Consequently, whilst the real effects of the shock are demonstrated to die 
out quickly, noisy information results in agent actions responding slowly. Moreover, 
the degree of persistence is shown to increase the larger is the variance in individual 
errors relative to the innovation variance. However, despite imposing a substantial
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degree of noise within the model, Woodford demonstrates that individual actions 
respond fairly rapidly to innovations; however, higher-order beliefs are shown to 
respond with greater inertia. Moreover, Woodford (2003) shows that as the degree 
of strategic complementarity and the uncertainty regarding the actions of others 
increases, the greater is the inertia of the average response.
Similarly, Sims (2003) identifies that the behaviour of macroeconomic variables is 
inconsistent with the predictions of either Classical or Keynesian theory, specifically 
recognising that prices are excessively sticky to be compatible with these models.
To resolve this, Sims (2003) develops a model of rational inattention where agents 
possess limited information processing capacity and face an optimisation problem 
given a fixed probability distribution of information. The imposition of information 
capacity constraints is subsequently demonstrated by Sims (2003) to account for the 
smooth response of both real and nominal variances to idiosyncratic disturbances 
without the necessity of imposing some arbitrary mechanism such as the islands 
metaphor employed by Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972).
Assuming that agents face varying information acquisition and processing costs, 
inducing heterogeneous rational inattention, the full information set will be 
aggregately observed; however, as demonstrated by Woodford (2003) and 
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), agents are required to divide their attention to 
both aggregate and idiosyncratic conditions. Despite idiosyncratic information 
processing constraints, Sims (2003) however notes that agents are likely to respond 
to information in a similar manner; consequently, there is likely to be a common 
component to individual actions and forecast errors. Moreover, where information is 
noisy, Sims (2003) demonstrates that agents will be unable to make fully accurate 
inferences regarding the macroeconomic state, therefore, following some exogenous 
shock, sub-optimal responses arise.
As previously discussed, the Phelps-Lucas ‘islands’ model was one of the first 
attempts to accommodate imperfect information and expectation heterogeneity under 
a RE framework; however, as Clements (2012) demonstrates, the level of 
disagreement in the model is exogenously determined. To resolve this issue,
Mankiw and Reis (2002) present a ‘sticky information’ model where the level of 
disagreement is endogenously determined. Specifically, rather than agents
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continuously updating their information set, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose that a 
proportion of agents make optimal plans utilising the most recent information whilst 
the remainder formulate actions on outdated information acquired one or more 
periods previously. Importantly, whereas noisy information models assume that 
agents possess information capacity constraints and cannot incorporate the full 
spectrum of signals into decision profiles, Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky 
information hypothesis assumes that although agents are infrequently attentive, when 
updating occurs full information is obtained. Over the past decade, the implications 
of sticky information and inattentive expectations have prompted extensive 
theoretical and empirical research and debate amongst economists; notable 
contributions have been provided by Mankiw et al. (2003), Sims, (2003, 2006), Reis 
(2006a, 2006b), Pfajfar and Santoro (2008, 2010, 2013) and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) amongst others.
The sticky information hypothesis presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002) relies upon 
agents possessing the ability to form RE; as previously mentioned in Chapter 3, their 
model attempts to combine imperfect information akin to Lucas (1972) with 
elements of Calvo’s (1983) sticky price model. Specifically, in any given period, 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) conjecture that all firms undertake price adjustment; 
however, a proportion do not utilise the latest information in forming their decision. 
This behaviour is considered by Khan and Zhu (2006) to be rational providing their 
exists some positive cost in the acquisition and processing of information. More 
formally, for any given period, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose that a proportion X 
of firms are exogenously attentive, observing and noiselessly incorporating all new 
information into decision profiles; the remaining proportion of the population 1 — X 
are inattentive and continue to set prices subject to information acquired in previous 
periods.
In response to the empirical failings of sticky price models, Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
derive a sticky information Phillips Curve (SIPC) which serves to replace the 
conventional new Keynesian (NKPC) specification. Specifically, expressing all 
variables as logs, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose that a firm’s optimal price is 
dependent upon the overall price level pt and the output gap y t :
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P t  = P t  +  <*yt (5.1.1)
Real rigidities are represented by a which represent a firm’s sensitivity to the output 
gap. Where a < 1, Trabandt (2007) argues that pricing decisions amongst firms 
convey strategic complementarity, as previously documented by Woodford (2003), 
which consequently induces inflation inertia. As firms are frequently inattentive, 
sporadically absorbing information into decision profiles, Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
thus derive individual and aggregate prices as (5.1.2) and (5.1.3) respectively:
Ht.i = Ei,t-jVi,t (5-1-2)
A  (5.1.3)
Pt
1=0
Where j  represents the period in which a firm last updated their information. 
Combining (5.1.1) and (5.1.3), Mankiw and Reis (2002) identify the following 
equation for the SIPC:
aA v ’ (5-L4)
n t =  Y ^ x yt +  X/ J <1 ~ +  a^ yt)
7=0
The SIPC thus expresses inflation as a function of lagged expectations of 
macroeconomic conditions; as Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Trabandt (2007) 
highlight, this contrasts with sticky-price models which express inflation as a 
function of current expectations of future conditions.
For empirical analysis Mankiw and Reis (2002) impose coefficient values a = 0.1 
and A = 0.25 which respectively imply that a firm’s relative price is fairly 
insensitive to macroeconomic conditions96 whilst the average rate of updating is 
approximately once a year. Utilising these parameter values, Mankiw and Reis
(2002) evaluate whether the sticky information and sticky price models are able to 
generate the positive correlation between US inflation and output, commonly termed
96 Given that Mankiw and Reis (2002) model sticky information under the premise of RE, agents are 
aware that a proportion o f the population reset prices according to outdated information, thus 
exacerbating the degree o f real rigidity.
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97the acceleration phenomenon . Comparing the results for both sticky prices and 
sticky information, Mankiw and Reis (2002) observe that the former predicts a 
correlation coefficient o f —0.13 whilst the latter supports the empirical observation 
of a positive relationship with a correlation coefficient of 0.43. These results thus 
appear to favour the sticky information model over pre-existing sticky price theories.
Utilising bivariate VARs to construct out of sample forecast for inflation and the 
output gap, Khan and Zhu (2006) re-evaluate estimates of the sticky information 
Phillips Curve (SIPC) as previously updated by Mankiw and Reis (2002). For 
various forecasting horizons and inflation definitions, Khan and Zhu (2006) reject 
the null hypothesis of ‘no information stickiness’. Nevertheless, Khan and Zhu’s
(2006) estimates indicate that as the forecast horizon increases, A falls. Specifically, 
for short horizon forecasts, agents are found to update information approximately 
every three months whilst for longer horizon forecasts, the rate of updating increases
98to every seven months . Moreover, the degree of informational stickiness is found 
to be larger for CPI than for the GDP deflator.
As previously noted in Chapter 2, Mankiw et al. (2003) observe disagreement 
amongst the inflation forecasts of both households and professionals; specifically, 
Mankiw et al. (2003) identify the interquartile range (IQR) with disagreement.
Whilst there has been some interest in expectational disagreement amongst 
economists, with the Lucas-Phelps islands model being an important contribution, 
there is a general failure amongst macroeconomic theory in acknowledging any 
dispersion of opinion". Attempting to resolve this failure, disagreement is 
endogenously generated within the sticky information model. To evaluate whether 
the sticky information model can replicate the observed levels of disagreement 
amongst survey forecast, Mankiw et al. (2003) estimate a VAR on quarterly US data 
for both Livingston and Michigan Survey forecasts. Utilising A = 0.1, Mankiw et al. 
(2003) note that the correlation between the disagreement predicted by the sticky 
information model and Livingston Survey and Michigan Survey are 0.66 and 0.80
97 Mankiw and Reis consider US quarterly data between 1960 and 1999.
98 These estimates are considered by Khan and Zhu (2006) to be in line with those presented by 
Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mankiw et al. (2003) and Carroll (2003).
99 As discussed in Chapter 4, in recent years there has been increased interest in forecast 
disagreement, particularly in relation to models of information rigidity with notable contributions by 
Lahiri and Sheng (2008), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), Lamia and Maag (2012) Dovem et al. (2012) 
and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013).
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respectively. However, the level of disagreement exhibited by Michigan Survey 
expectations is observed to be approximately 4 percentage points higher than 
predicted, which Mankiw et al. (2003) attribute to idiosyncratic heterogeneity which 
the sticky information model fails to capture. Moreover, analysing the relationship 
between the dispersion generated by the sticky information model and 
macroeconomic conditions, Mankiw et al. (2003) find that the relationship between 
disagreement and the inflation rate is positive, whilst the output gap is found to be 
insignificant. These predictions are noted by Mankiw et al. (2003) to be consistent 
with those reported for both Michigan Survey and SPF inflation forecasts, indicating 
that the sticky information model is able to generate the nature of disagreement 
amongst agent forecasts.
Extending the analysis of information rigidity, Mankiw and Reis (2007) develop a 
general equilibrium model, examining the degree of informational stickiness across 
three distinct agent classes: consumers, firms and workers. Specifically, Mankiw 
and Reis (2007) assume that in each period, a fraction 8 of consumers, a fraction 
of workers, and a fraction A of firms obtain new information which is subsequently 
incorporated into decision profiles. Using maximum-likelihood and Bayesian 
methodologies, Mankiw and Reis (2007) estimate their model on US quarterly data 
between 1954Q3 and 2006Q1. Whilst firms are found to be relatively attentive, 
consumers and workers are found to exhibit greater inattention; specifically, the 
estimates presented by Mankiw and Reis (2007) indicate that firms update 
approximately every four months whilst both consumers and workers update their 
information every 16 months100.
Similarly, Dopke et al. (2008) evaluate the degree of information stickiness amongst 
firms across four different European countries, namely France, Germany, Italy, and 
the UK. Utilising Consensus Economics data between 1991Q4 and 2004Q4, Dopke 
et al. estimate (5.1.4), as presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002), employing both 
non-linear least squares and seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) techniques for 
each of the four countries, imposing a = 0.10,0.15,0.20 and truncating j  at 4 and 6 
lags respectively. For all a and j  Dopke et al. (2008) report that all estimates of A 
are highly significant under both estimation techniques. For France, Germany and
100 The null hypothesis that both workers and consumers update their information at the same rate 
cannot be rejected by Mankiw and Reis (2007).
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the UK, A is estimated by Dopke et al. (2008) to lie between 0.144 and 0.296101; 
meanwhile, for Italy, the rate of information updating is estimated to be 
approximately double which Dopke et al. (2008) attribute to greater inflation 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the results presented by Dopke et al. (2008) indicate a 
much lower frequency of information updating by firms than previously estimated 
by Mankiw and Reis (2007). These results thus indicate that the rate at which agents 
update their information is not homogeneous as assumed by Mankiw and Reis
(2002), but are instead dependent upon idiosyncratic macroeconomic conditions.
A potential explanation for the variable degrees of information stickiness amongst 
agents, as demonstrated by Mankiw and Reis (2007) and Dopke et al. (2008), 
concerns the opportunity costs of inattentiveness. Moreover, in some periods, the 
use of outdated information may be less costly in comparison to others, resulting in 
time-variant degrees of information stickiness. This concept is explicitly modelled 
by Brock and Hommes (1997), proposing that agents can switch between employing 
a sophisticated predictor available at some cost C > 0, and a simple predictor which 
is freely available C = 0. Where the alternative predictor yields a greater net benefit 
to the one currently employed by an agent, they will switch their predictor of choice.
In a similar manner to the framework proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997), 
Branch (2007) attempts to relax the static assumptions of sticky information imposed 
by Mankiw and Reis (2002), and instead allow the degree of information rigidity to 
vary with time under the premise that agent attentiveness varies according to 
macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, Branch (2007) utilises maximum- 
likelihood estimation to evaluate whether information stickiness across Michigan 
Survey forecasts exhibits dynamic properties, and analyse the distribution of agents 
and the relative cost of updating information at various frequencies. The predictor 
found by Branch (2007) to be the least costly, and thus utilised by the largest 
proportion of agents, concerns updating information every six months. The predictor 
updated every month, consistent with full information, is found by Branch (2007) to 
be more costly than updating every three months, but less costly than updating every 
nine months, suggesting that an agents optimal decision involves a limited degree of 
inattentiveness. However, at times of increased macroeconomic volatility, agents are
101 These estimates are indicated by Dopke et al. (2008) to represent firms in these countries updating 
their information every 3.4 to 6.9 quarters.
shown by Branch (2007) to employ a predictor which has a higher expected mean 
square forecast error. Additionally, during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty, 
the performance of all predictors is generally more volatile, therefore naive 
predictors may be considered less costly relative to more sophisticated alternatives.
Assuming that agents respond to the most recently available measure of predictor
accuracy, Branch (2007) indicates that during periods of increased volatility, a
102greater propensity to switch to less sophisticated predictors will prevail . This 
suggests that during periods of increased uncertainty, household expectations are 
likely to exhibit an increased degree of information stickiness. Moreover, Branch’s 
analysis dismisses the notion that the rate of information diffusion is constant over 
time as implicitly assumed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003, 2006). 
However, Branch’s (2007) results arise due to the limited reduced-form classes of 
models under consideration, therefore one must be careful in making general 
statements regarding the performance of dynamic sticky information models.
Despite this, Branch’s (2007) approach would appear to correspond with near- 
rational behaviour of households who update more frequently where the costs
103associated with macroeconomic conditions are sufficiently large .
As noted by Khan and Zhu (2006), unlike sticky-price models (e.g. Calvo (1983)), 
prices under sticky information are fully flexible, yet the decisions of a proportion of 
firms is based on past or outdated information. Moreover, utilising Sims’s (2003) 
methodology, Trabandt (2007) argues that the sticky information hypothesis implies 
that agents have either infinite or zero information processing capacity. Moreover, 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) do not formally model information processing costs, 
instead utilising a Poisson process to describe the arrival of new information such 
that firms randomly receive information updates. Should the arrival of new 
information deviate from the artificially imposed Poisson process, Carroll (2003) 
argues that the rate which agents update is likely to be significantly different.
The sticky information model presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002) assumes that 
despite exhibiting infrequent attention to news, when agents update they acquire and
102 The intensity o f choice parameter, as proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997), would be high.
103 The concept o f near-rationality is introduced by Akerlof et al. (2000) who present a model where 
firms only incorporate inflation into the decision making process where the costs o f exclusion are 
sufficient.
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process information costlessly to form optimal decisions. Maintaining the 
assumption that agents are rational, Reis (2006a) derives a model of inattention 
which formally introduces costs in the acquisition of information. Under full 
information, Reis (2006a) argues that all agents are fully attentive thus when new 
information is published, consumption decisions are adjusted fully and immediately. 
In contrast, where consumers are inattentive, Reis (2006a) proposes that 
consumption reacts according to the following equation:
Ct — Q - i  = c + (po^t + (piNt-i + — f (pjNt- j  (5.1.5)
Consumption growth is represented by Ct — Ct_1 whilst Nt_i represents news in 
period t — i and are assumed by Reis to be mutually uncorrelated and unpredictable. 
Meanwhile, the (pi coefficients correspond with the proportion of agents that last 
updated their information between t — i and t — i — 1, Reis (2006a) demonstrates 
that (pi is non-increasing in i.
Where (p0 = l,(pi = 0 for i > 1, consumption immediately responds to news, 
synonymous with full information. However, where agents are inattentive, (p0 < 1, 
consumption is shown by Reis (2006a) to act inattentively to news and instead 
identifies that the response is concave with (p0 > (p1 > ••• > (pj with more recent 
news weighted more heavily relative to past news. Furthermore, Reis (2006a) 
identifies that where (pi =£ 0 for some i > 0, then inattentiveness generates excess 
smoothness in consumption. To evaluate whether these propositions are supported 
empirically, Reis estimates a structural VAR on quarterly US data between 1953Q1 
and 2002Q4. In accordance with Reis’s (2006a) predictions, aggregate consumption 
adjusts in response to a shock following some delay; however, the adjustment is 
shown to be mostly completed within a year of the shock supporting Reis’s (2006a) 
prediction of a concave adjustment path. Moreover, the inattentiveness model is 
shown by Reis (2006a) to replicate the excess smoothness of consumption observed 
in US data. The results presented by Reis (2006a) thus demonstrate that sticky 
information and inattention theory is empirically applicable to various 
macroeconomic decisions faced by agents.
In a separate paper, Reis (2006b) introduces a model of inattentive producers who 
encounter a standard profit maximisation problem but are additional faced with non­
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negative costs K of acquiring, absorbing and processing information in order to 
formulate optimal plans. Where information costs are zero, Reis (2006b) recognises 
that firms will be fully attentive. Nevertheless, Reis (2006b) further identifies that 
inattentiveness is longer the larger are planning costs; however, inattentiveness is 
demonstrated to be reduced the larger are the losses from failing to update. 
Consequently, in the presence of increased shock volatility, Reis (2006b) illustrates 
that firms update more frequently as the costs of inattentiveness are higher; 
moreover, where the price elasticity of demand is small, Reis (2006b) further 
demonstrates that firms exhibit greater inattentiveness due to the losses resulting 
from deviations from full information optimal prices being small.
Utilising Zbaracki et al.’s (2004) planning costs estimate of 2.8 percent of total costs 
Reis estimates that the optimal inattentiveness of firms is approximately 8 quarters. 
Moreover, reducing planning costs to 0.1 percent of total costs, Reis (2006b) 
observes that the optimal length of firm inattentiveness remains substantial at 6 
months. Despite providing micro-foundations for the sticky information model 
proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), Reis (2006b) assumes that firms uniformly 
update and acquire asymmetric information; this behaviour is argued by Jinnai
(2007) to be inconsistent with the fundamental staggered updating premise inherent 
to sticky information theories. Rather than utilising planning costs as a percentage of 
total costs, Jinnai (2007) utilises a cost of planning of 4.6 percent of net margin, as 
also presented by Zbaracki et al. (2004), predicting an optimal length of 
inattentiveness of between 2.1 and 6.3 quarters. These estimates are more consistent 
with those reported by Mankiw et al. (2003) and Carroll (2003) for information 
stickiness amongst inflation expectations, without having to follow Reis (2006b) and 
impose a sufficiently small cost of planning. Nevertheless, these estimates appear 
inconsistent with the predictions of Mankiw and Reis (2007) that firms update up to 
four times as frequently as consumers.
Whilst the majority of studies, including Mankiw and Reis (2007, 2002), Mankiw et 
al. (2003) and Sims (2003) examine whether survey forecasts are consistent with a 
single model of economic friction, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) undertake an 
analysis of SPF, Livingston, Michigan Survey and FOMC forecasts to determine 
whether agent forecast are most consistent with the predictions of RE, sticky
188
information or various noisy information alternatives104. Although the econometric 
specification of these models shall be explicitly considered in Chapter 6, the results 
reported by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) are particularly noteworthy. As SPF 
and Michigan Survey forecast errors exhibit a non-zero response to various 
economic shocks, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) argue that information 
rigidities are embodied within the inflation forecasts of both households and 
professionals. Moreover, evaluating the response of forecast errors to lagged 
inflation, and the sensitivity of disagreement to shocks, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) consider the behaviour of inflation forecasts from all agent classes to be most 
consistent with the predictions of (baseline) noisy information assumptions in 
preference to those of sticky information theory or models of heterogeneous priors. 
These conclusions shall be re-evaluated in Chapter 6.
104 The noisy information models considered by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) are namely a 
baseline model akin to Woodford (2001) and Sims (2003), strategic interaction (Morris and Shin, 
2002), and heterogeneous priors (Patton and Timmermann, 2010) and heterogeneous signals 
(Capistran and Timmermann, 2009).
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5.1.1. Sticky Information vs. Sticky Prices -  A Review of Comparative Studies
Recalling that the sticky information hypothesis was initially proposed in response to 
the empirical failings of sticky price models, Mankiw and Reis (2002) evaluate 
whether sticky information is able to replicate inflation dynamics in response to 
various macroeconomic disturbances. Specifying a = 0.1, A = 0.25 Mankiw and 
Reis (2002) utilise (5.1.4) to analyse the response of both output and inflation to 
various macroeconomic disturbances. In response to a fall in aggregate demand, 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) document that these values cause a monotonic output 
recovery, moreover, as 0 < a < 1, firms gradually adjust prices in response to the 
shock, consequently, the response of inflation is shown to be delayed and gradual. 
Furthermore, in response to an unanticipated disinflation, the sticky information 
model is again demonstrated by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to induce a gradual and 
delayed response in both output and inflation as agents sporadically update their 
information to incorporate the shock.
The effects of an anticipated disinflationary shock are also considered by Mankiw 
and Reis (2002). Under sticky price assumptions, Mankiw and Reis (2002) indicate 
that as firms immediately adjust prices in response to the announcement, inflation 
falls prior to the shock causing a temporary period of output growth. In contrast, 
under sticky information Mankiw and Reis (2002) demonstrate that firms gradually 
observe the announcement yet do not adjust prices until the realisation of the shock. 
However, as some firms continue to utilise outdated information, a proportion of 
firms fail to anticipate the shock; this is shown by Mankiw and Reis (2002) to result 
in a small recessionary effect, approximately a fifth of that under the surprise 
disinflation scenario. This result arises from the exogenously determined and 
probabilistic nature of inattentiveness amongst firms. Amending the assumptions 
regarding the diffusion of information, such that a proportion of firms are inherently 
inattentive, is likely to result in the loss lying between the two disinflation scenarios 
considered by Mankiw and Reis (2002).
Moreover, in response to monetary policy shocks Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
document that whilst sticky information can replicate the delayed and gradual 
response of both output and inflation, sticky price theory can only replicate the 
former, with inflation instead responding to monetary disturbances immediately.
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Similarly, analysing sticky information in a DSGE framework, Trabandt (2007) 
demonstrated that inflation reacts with inertia to monetary policy shocks whilst 
Klenow and Willis (2007) further demonstrate that as the degree of informational 
stickiness increases, the larger the delayed response in both output and inflation 
becomes. These studies thus deem that sticky information is better able to replicate 
the delayed response of inflation to monetary policy shocks, as is generally accepted 
by many economists including Friedman (1972) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Evans (1999, 2005).
In addition to documenting whether sticky information is able to replicate inflation 
dynamics in response to macroeconomic disturbances, subsequent research, 
including studies by Kiley (2007), Korenok (2008), Coibion (2010) and Dupor et al. 
(2010) have attempted to compare the performance of both classes of rigidity. The 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information model is demonstrated by Dupor<»et al. 
(2010) to replicate inflation inertia extremely well, however, all four studies refute 
the suggestion of replacing sticky prices with sticky information.
Estimating both a baseline and a hybrid specification of the sticky price and sticky 
information models, Kiley (2007) examines which of the competing models are most 
consistent with US price data. The baseline sticky price model is shown by Kiley
(2007) to exhibit a larger Q-statistic and smaller R2 relative to the baseline sticky 
information model. These results thus support the sticky information approximation 
of inflation dynamics; however, both classes of rigidity perform relatively poorly 
relative to reduced form models, encouraging Kiley (2007) to examine the hybrid 
specifications. Whereas Kiley’s (2007) baseline model relates current inflation with 
expectations and real marginal costs, the hybrid sticky information model also 
includes a distributed lag specification of inflation which Kiley (2007) attributes to 
rule-of-thumb behaviour and dynamic indexation as demonstrated by Gall and 
Gertler (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) Providing that the lag 
length is sufficiently long, the sticky price hybrid model is shown by Kiley (2007) to 
outperform the reduced form models, and both the baseline and hybrid sticky
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information models105. Consequently, Kiley (2007) concludes that the hybrid sticky 
price model outperforms sticky information alternatives.
Similarly, Korenok (2008) examines the predictions of the sticky price and sticky 
information models utilising Bayesian full information techniques. The estimates of 
both the sticky price and sticky information parameters reported by Korenok (2008) 
indicate that both the perfectly flexible prices and perfectly flexible information null 
hypotheses are rejected. Instead, Korenok’s (2008) results indicate that both prices 
and information are infrequently updated with firms resetting prices, and acquiring 
new information, every 9 to 12 months on average. Nevertheless, in accordance with 
Kiley (2007), the sticky price model is found by Korenok (2008) to dominate the 
sticky information model, exhibiting higher R2 and log-likelihood statistics.
However Kiley (2007) recognises that neither sticky price nor sticky information 
models are able to adequately account for the importance of lagged inflation without 
introducing some ad hoc adjustment rule. The results of both Kiley (2007) and 
Korenok (2008) thus suggest that inflation dynamics may instead accommodate 
features of both real and informational rigidities.
To solve for both sticky price and sticky information, Korenok (2008) and Coibion 
(2010) present encompassing models, as illustrated by (5.1.6) below, where the two 
competing models, sticky prices and sticky information, are jointly examined:
7rt = colitP(y, k) +  (1 — nj)7rf7(A, a) +  vt (5.1.6)
The new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is represented by n^p(y, k ) where y is 
the sticky price parameter and k  is a function of real rigidity and price stickiness, 
whilst the sticky information Phillips curve (SIPC) is represented by n f l (A, a) where 
A represents the information stickiness parameter and a measures the degree of real 
rigidity, and 0 ) is a weighting parameter. The null hypothesis O) = 1 is shown by 
Coibion (2010) to favour the NKPC whilst 0 ) = 0 favours the SIPC; however 
Coibion (2010) further identifies that (5.1.6) can reject both or neither of the 
competing models. Utilising the GDP deflator and SPF forecasts, the encompassing 
model (5.1.6) is shown by Coibion (2010) to reject the SIPC yet not the NKPC.
105 The four-lag hybrid sticky information model is similarly found to be superior to the baseline 
specification, however, the improvements in the Q-statistic and R 2 are more modest
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Similar results are reported by Korenok (2008), estimating that sticky price firms 
constitute 70 percent of the population. Moreover, forecasts from the NKPC are 
shown by Coibion (2010) to account for approximately 80 percent of the variation in 
inflation whereas the SIPC can only account for 55 percent of the variation. 
Nevertheless, accounting for over 50 percent of inflation variance suggests that the 
SIPC may explain some elements of inflation dynamics. Nevertheless, Coibion 
(2010) suggests that although the SIPC is able to accommodate the inertial response 
of inflation, the weight on past information is too high, thus leading to excessive 
persistence and insufficient inflation volatility. Consequently, in accordance with 
Kiley (2007), Coibion (2010) favours sticky prices over sticky information.
Similar to the approach adopted by Korenok (2008) and Coibion (2010), Dupor et al. 
(2010) present a dual-stickiness model which incorporates both real and 
informational rigidities. Specifically, Dupor et al. (2010) consider a monopolistic 
firm which independently updates prices with probability 1 — y, and updates 
information with probability 1 — 0 106. Employing a two-step VAR estimation on 
quarterly US inflation data, Dupor et al. (2010) find that both y  and cp are significant. 
Namely, Dupor et al.(2010) estimate that between 9 and 19 percent of firms rest 
prices in each quarter, whilst 19 to 60 percent update information; point estimates of 
14 and 42 percent respectively are further demonstrated by Dupor et al. (2010) to 
indicate that in any given quarter, 5.9 percent of firms reset prices given the most up 
to date information. Moreover the R2 term for the dual stickiness model is larger 
relative to either the sticky information or sticky price model. Additionally, the 
dual-stickiness model is shown by Dupor et al. (2010) to outperform a hybrid New 
Keynesian model akin to Gall and Gertler (1999) where a fraction co of firms employ 
a simple backward-looking predictor. By extending the dual-stickiness model to 
allow for a fraction co of backward-looking firms, Dupor at al. (2010) analyse 
whether there is support for the hybrid model; the estimates presented by Dupor et 
al. (2010) indicate that co is insignificant suggesting the hybrid model fails to 
accurately accommodate US inflation dynamics. Therefore, in accordance with 
Korenok (2008) and Coibion (2010), Dupor et al (2010) conclude that both classes 
of rigidity are present.
106 The probability that a firm updates either its price or its information are emphasised by Dupor et 
al. (2010) to be uncorrelated with each other and with time.
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Although the sticky information approach advocated by Mankiw and Reis (2002) is 
demonstrated by Dupor et al. (2010) to replicate inflation inertia, whilst Korenok 
(2008) finds that the imposition of information rigidities improve upon perfectly 
flexible information assumptions, studies which take a comparative approach appear 
to favour pre-existing sticky-price theory. Although these studies thus cast doubt on 
the relevancy of sticky information theory as an appropriate hypothesis of inflation 
dynamics, Coibion (2010) acknowledges that neither real nor informational rigidities 
are able to adequately reconcile the response of inflation to a range of 
macroeconomic disturbances. Instead, Kiley (2007), Korenok (2008) and Coibion 
(2010) argue that agents are likely to be subject to multiple frictions or imperfections 
which simultaneously impact upon inflation dynamics thus advocating a dual- 
stickiness approach as proposed by Dupor et al. (2010).
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5.1.2. Evaluation of Previous Studies
The current evidence regarding sticky information seems balanced. Survey evidence 
appears to support the notion that agents update their information infrequently, 
whilst Mankiw et al. (2003) find that the sticky information model is able to generate 
central tendency and a level of disagreement consistent with those observed across 
survey forecasts. Nevertheless, the evidence presented by Branch (2007) and Pfajfar 
and Santoro (2010) suggests that sticky information assumptions appear to have 
increased relevance in the presence of expectational heterogeneity. Indeed, to 
assume that agents infrequently update their information but possess a homogeneous 
probability of updating, as proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), provides good 
tractability but fails to acknowledge capture the additional uncertainty and costs 
imposed upon agents across various stages of the business cycle.
Despite Mankiw et al. (2003), Reis (2006a, 2006b) and Khan and Zhu (2006) 
presenting empirical evidence consistent with the sticky information hypothesis, 
several studies report evidence to the contrary. A notable example is Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) who compare the predictions of various information rigidity 
models with the behaviour of inflation forecasts from various agent classes. For 
both professionals and households, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) argue that 
inflation forecasts reported by these agents are more consistent with the predictions 
of noisy information theory rather than sticky information.
Similarly, various studies have evaluated whether sticky price theory is better able to 
accommodate inflation dynamics relative to sticky information. Despite Dupor et al. 
(2010) reporting that sticky information theory is able to replicate inflation inertia 
well, various studies including Kiley (2007), Korenok (2008) and Coibion (2008) 
favour sticky prices. Nevertheless, there is some consensus amongst these studies 
that inflation dynamics cannot be perfectly accounted for solely by real rigidities, 
and are likely to depend upon a multiple sources of stickiness.
Despite the evidence regarding the relevancy of the sticky information hypothesis 
appearing balanced, there has been extensive research in recent years developing the 
understanding of information rigidities amongst agents. Of particular empirical 
interest has been the rate of information diffusion across agents. The next sub­
195
section considers a particular theory of sticky information, namely epidemiological 
expectations, as proposed by Carroll (2003, 2006) and further developed by Lanne, 
Luoma and Luoto (2009), Nunes (2009), Easaw and Ghoshray (2010) and Easaw and 
Golinelli (2010). These studies empirically analyse the rate of information diffusion 
across proportions of the population.
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5.2. Epidemiological Expectations
As identified in the literature review above, one of the first attempts to empirically 
test for the presence of information rigidities and the relevance of the sticky 
information hypothesis was undertaken by Carroll (2003). In an attempt to provide 
micro foundations for sticky information, Carroll (2003) employs an epidemiological 
model to analyse the formation of household expectations where information 
disseminates across agents in a manner analogous to that in which a disease spreads.
In the spirit of Brock and Hommes (1997), it is assumed that when forming inflation 
expectations, households face the decision of employing either a sophisticated 
predictor, obtainable at some cost, or a freely available simple predictor. The 
sophisticated predictor is assumed by Carroll (2003) to be derived from newspaper 
reports which reflect professional expectations. Households rationally choose which 
predictor to employ.
To examine the diffusion properties of information across agents, an epidemiological 
model as identified by (5.2.1) below, is presented by Carroll (2003, 2006)107:
Etfat+n] = M tbit+h]  +  (1 -  X)E?_j[nt+h-j] + et (5.2.1)
Current /i-period ahead household expectations are represented by E? [nt+h\ whilst 
the corresponding professional forecast is represented by E[[nt+tl\. Adopting the 
interpretations of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003), A represents the 
proportion of households who are attentive in any given period, absorbing the latest 
information into expectations; moreover, (1 — X) represents the remaining 
proportion who are inattentive and utilise own lagged forecasts to generate current 
expectations. Alternatively, the A coefficient can be interpreted as the rate at which 
households update their information and expectations; therefore, the larger is A the 
shorter is the average time-period between information updates.
107 The procedure employed by Carroll (2003) is similar to that o f Roberts (1998) who analyses 
whether expectations adjust towards a rational forecast. However, as the rational forecast is 
unobservable, Roberts employs actual inflation and utilises GMM estimation which requires the use 
o f instrumental variables. The epidemiological model avoids the requirement of instrumental 
variables.
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To ensure that all households exhibit expectations consistent with forward-looking 
behaviour, Carroll (2003) imposes the restriction that the inflation process is equal to
f
the fundamental rate n t plus some white noise transitory shock et ; moreover the 
fundamental rate is subject to permanent innovations rjt . The inflation process can 
thus be defined as:
n t = + ec
(5.2.2)
n t+1 = n t +  f/t+i
Consequently, Carroll (2003) argues that future changes in the fundamental rate of 
inflation are unforecastable beyond the next period and is consistent with the near­
unit root process of inflation documented by Barsky (1987) and Ball (2000).
The model presented by (5.2.1) can be considered an extension of adaptive 
expectations theory; similar to these models, one may thus argue that the fixed- 
horizon specification is inappropriate. Instead, one may wish to respecify the 
epidemiological hypothesis considering forecast revisions and the manner which 
news diffuses across fixed-event expectations, namely:
Et[^t+h\ = yEti^t+hi + (1 -  Y )E ^j[n t+h] + et (5.2.3)
The fixed-event specification (5.2.3) thus analyses the manner which households 
adapt their expectations for period t + h given the arrival of new information 
between periods t — j  and t. However, due to the manner which inflation is defined, 
as illustrated by (5.2.2), Carroll (2003) obtains EjLj[nt+h] = E^_j[nt_j+h] and thus 
prefers the fixed-horizon specification (5.2.1)108.
Besides, in the event that households are pre-informed of some structural change that 
influences the future path of inflation from period t + h onwards, specification 
(5.2.3) is able to effectively incorporate this information into lagged expectations. 
Consequently, the coefficient on professional expectations in (5.2.3) is able to 
evaluate household attentiveness to new information more effectively in comparison 
to (5.2.1). However, as previously documented in Chapter 2, the preferred
108 The four-period ahead structure of Michigan Survey inflation forecasts further dictates the use of 
the fixed-horizon specification (5.2.1) for empirical analysis.
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specification (5.2.3) is unable to be employed for empirical evaluation as the 
Michigan Survey does not report multi-horizon inflation forecasts.
To empirically examine the baseline epidemiological model Carroll restates (5.2.1), 
as follows:
E t b t t+hl = a 0 + <*i Etfat+h] + ^ t - j l ^ t + h - j ]  +  et (5.2.4)
Specifically, Carroll (2003) estimates (5.2.4) utilising aggregate Michigan Survey 
and SPF inflation forecasts for 1981Q3 -  2000Q2. Firstly, setting a 0 =  0, Carroll 
(2003) reports a 1 = 0.36, a 2 = 0.66 and cannot reject a 1 + a 2 = 1 implying that 
household forecasts represent a weighted average of current professional and own 
lagged forecasts. For a similar test utilising a 2 = 1 — a 1 Carroll (2003) reports 
a 1 = 0.27, a 2 = 0.73109 and is unable to reject the null hypothesis a ± = 0.25, the 
estimate of the sticky information parameter reported by Mankiw and Reis (2002). 
This estimate is shown by Carroll (2003) to imply that approximately 25 percent of 
households update their information in any given quarter, whilst (1 — 0.25)4 = 31.6 
percent of households report expectations formulated on information acquired more 
than one year ago.
The baseline specification (5.2.1) is also examined by Carroll (2003) without 
imposing a restriction on the constant term with empirical tests finding a 0 to be 
positive and highly significant. However, Carroll (2003) rejects the inclusion of the 
constant due to only modest improvements in /?2; furthermore, Carroll (2003) 
acknowledges that where professional expectations and actual inflation are zero, a 
positive constant implies that households will continue to expect a positive rate of 
inflation. Instead, Carroll (2003) argues that the significance of the constant term 
implies that the epidemiological model is misspecified and could indicate the 
presence of social interaction in the diffusion of information as proposed by Carroll 
(2006).
The baseline epidemiological model assumes that all information regarding 
macroeconomic conditions absorbed by households is embodied within the forecast
109 Re-evaluating the epidemiological hypothesis for an updated sample period comprising 1981Q3 -  
2007Q2, Nunes (2009) reports a similar value for a x.
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of professionals. This is however an over-simplification; instead households are 
likely to update their information from a variety of sources which may include 
professional or newspaper forecasts, but also includes social interaction and 
observations of realised macroeconomic variables. Recognising this notion, Carroll
(2003) further modifies the epidemiological model to include the possibility of 
households updating their information in relation to past inflation110, empirically 
examining the following model111:
E t l n t+h\ = a o + +  a 2E ^ j[ n t+h- j \  (5.2.5)
+  3 n t - k  +  e t
Utilising h = 4,j = 1, k = 1 and again imposing a 0 = 0, Carroll (2003) reports a
negative value for a3; however, including the constant term, the value of a 3 is found
112to be positive yet insignificant . The lagged inflation rate is thus deemed by 
Carroll (2003) to lack explanatory power for Michigan Survey inflation forecasts. 
Nevertheless, utilising k = 0 and annualised monthly inflation data rather than 
annual data, Luoma and Luoto (2009) report a significant value for a 3. The 
appropriateness of using lagged or current inflation is however debatable. Whereas 
Carroll (2003) recognises that the one-period lagged inflation rate is the most 
recently published rate of inflation available to agents in period t, there appears to be 
an inconsistency in methodology that households are able to absorb the current 
professional forecast but not current inflation. Whilst the professional forecast could 
be argued to proxy for all current news relating to macroeconomic conditions, it is 
perhaps unreasonable to assume that households are unable to accommodate current 
inflation into information sets given that they encounter the current changes in 
prices, although not necessarily aggregate inflation, through day-to-day purchasing 
behaviour.
Appraising the epidemiological model, Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) highlight that the 
properties of household attentiveness assumed by Carroll (2006, 2003) fail to fully 
accommodate key components of information diffusion. Firstly, Pfajfar and Santoro
(2008) argue that the slow diffusion of information is likely to be heterogeneous and
110 This is akin to Lanne et al.’s (2009) nai've sticky information model.
111 Carroll (2003) again employs h — 4 J  — 1.
112 Setting both a 0 =  0 and a 1 =  0, Carroll (2003) further reports that the coefficient on lagged 
inflation remains insignificant.
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dependent upon the socio-demographic characteristics of households. Employing a 
percentile time-series approach Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) examine the degree of 
information stickiness and, utilising demographically disaggregated Michigan 
Survey data determine whether the rate of information diffusion is heterogeneous. 
Whilst less advantaged households are found to formulate expectations utilising 
individual consumption as a reference point, Pfajfar and Santoro (2008) observe 
greater attentiveness to inflation dynamics by more advantaged counterparts. 
Similarly, when Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) employ the percentile time-series 
approach to aggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts, varying rates of 
information updating is again observed. Specifically, Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) 
report a U-shaped pattern; for the 50th percentile an updating period of 7 months is 
observed, yet outside of the 40th-90th percentile range, the updating frequency 
exhibited by households is greater than 24 months.
Another failure of Carroll’s (2003) epidemiological approach, as acknowledged by 
Pfajfar and Santoro (2010), concerns the time-varying properties of information 
updating. Specifically, the respondents between the 59th and 79th percentile113 are 
identified by Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) to exhibit varying rates of inattentiveness 
dependent upon the rate of inflation as indicated above; when inflation is high, these 
agents update more frequently, attributable to greater opportunity costs associated 
with inattentiveness relative to periods of lower inflation. Moreover, utilising 
maximum-likelihood methodology, Branch (2007) demonstrates that a dynamic 
specification of sticky information that allows the rate of information updating to 
vary, provides a better fit to Michigan Survey inflation forecasts relative to the static 
approach advocated by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003).
The structure of the epidemiological model presented by Carroll (2003) asserts that 
information flows are unidirectional from professionals to households.
Consequently, professional forecasts must Granger-cause household forecasts but 
not in the opposite direction. For 1981Q3 -  2000Q2, the results presented by Carroll
(2003) indeed suggest that whilst SPF mean inflation forecasts Granger-cause mean 
Michigan Survey forecasts, there is no evidence of bidirectional causality.
113 Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) identify agents between the 59th and 79th percentile to be those most 
consistent with inattentive behaviour.
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The assumption that households update their expectations upon media reports, as 
proposed by Carroll (2003, 2006), suggests that the rate of information diffusion is 
positively correlated with the intensity of news coverage. Constructing a news 
intensity index utilising inflation reports from the New York Times and Washington 
Post, Carroll (2003) establishes that greater news coverage is observed the higher the 
rate of inflation. Moreover, Carroll (2003) defends the epidemiological hypothesis 
observing that the difference between the mean Michigan Survey and SPF inflation 
forecasts is lowest during periods of high inflation, and is negatively correlated with 
the news intensity index. Similarly, for German inflation expectations, Lamia and 
Lein (2008) report a negative relationship between the absolute difference between 
consumer and professional expectations and news intensity. The volume of news 
regarding inflation thus appears to increase the rate which households update their 
information resulting in greater alignment with the ‘benchmark’ forecast reported by 
professionals.
Furthermore, dividing the sample period by mean news coverage, Carroll (2003) 
observes that the absorption rate, denoted a 1 in (5.2.1), is significantly larger when 
the news intensity index is higher than average. These results are supported by 
Lamia and Sarferaz (2012) who report that the propensity with which agents update 
information is greater in the presence of a larger quantity of news. Similarly, Pfajfar 
and Santoro (2010, 2013) observe that during periods of higher inflation, a greater 
proportion of Michigan Survey participants report expectations consistent with RE 
and a greater degree of information attentiveness. This could however be a result of 
greater media coverage of rising inflation relative to falling inflation, as identified by 
Lamia and Lein (2008). Alternatively, one may consider the opportunity costs of 
inattentiveness to be larger during highly inflationary periods relative to those where 
inflation is more stable.
In contrast, comparing the frequency of news reports with actual inflation in 
Germany, Lamia and Lein (2008:11) highlight that “the amount of reporting does not 
necessarily match the magnitude of price changes”. Specifically, Lamia and Lein
(2008) identify that whilst the growth rate of the harmonized index of consumer 
prices (HICP) exceeded 2 percent in both 2002 and 2004, the media reporting in 
2002 was approximately double the 2004 figure. However, Lamia and Lein (2008)
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highlight that certain macroeconomic events may have influenced the intensity of 
news coverage, crediting the high frequency of inflation reporting between 2001 and 
2002 with the ‘euro cash changeover’ and ‘Teuro effect’114. Consequently, whilst 
the degree of attentiveness may be related to current inflation circumstances, wider 
macroeconomic conditions are also likely to impact upon the rate which agents 
update their information.
The news intensity index employed by Carroll (2003) is however limited in scope; 
despite utilising two national newspapers with wide circulation, it fails to 
acknowledge the extent of media sources available to agents, which include 
alternative newspapers, television network news and, for more recent years, the 
internet and online sources. Moreover, Carroll (2003) fails to acknowledge falling 
newspaper readership across over the sample period as documented by Ahlers (2006) 
and George (2008)115. Rather than just relying on the quantity of news, several 
studies including Lamia and Lein (2008), Easaw and Ghoshray (2010), Lamia and 
Maag (2012), and Lamia and Sarferaz (2012) consider a second channel of media 
influence on agent forecasts and information diffusion concerning the tone or quality 
of news coverage.
Analysing whether the tone of information has an impact upon the alignment of 
consumer forecast with those reported by professionals Lamia and Lein (2008) find 
that news regarding rising inflation increases the expectations gap between 
consumers and professionals, whereas news regarding falling inflation decreases the 
expectation gap. Consequently, Lamia and Lein (2008) deem that news regarding 
rising inflation has a more pronounced impact, with the media inducing a bias 
amongst consumer forecasts, exaggerating the expectational gap. Nevertheless, 
utilising a Bayesian learning model, Lamia and Maag (2012) find that the tone of 
media reports regarding inflation does not have any impact upon the disagreement of 
EU consumer forecasts. Similarly, utilising Michigan Survey data on consumer 
perception of news, Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) analyse whether households respond 
asymmetrically to favourable and unfavourable news concerning inflation. 
Considering the updating behaviour of households, Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) find
114 Teuro is identified by Lamia and Lein (2008) as a term derived from the German equivalent o f 
expensive, teuer  and euro.
115 US daily newspaper circulation is shown by George (2008) to have fallen from 1.2 newspapers per 
household in 1950 to less than 0.5 by 2005.
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no evidence of asymmetry in the response of favourable and unfavourable news. 
Nevertheless, Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) further report that whilst favourable news 
has an insignificant effect on the expectation gap, unfavourable news exerts a 
positive and significant effect; therefore, in the presence of rising inflation, where 
households are generally appreciated to exhibit greater levels of attention (Carroll, 
2003, Pfajfar and Santoro, 2008), the difference between household and professional 
forecasts increases.
Similarly, Lamia and Sarferaz (2012) argue that the rate at which agents update their 
information increases as the quality of the available signals improves. This 
argument is akin to the predictions of noisy information models, as presented by 
Sims (2003), Woodford (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), where the 
behaviour of agent forecasts is dependent upon the signal-to-noise ratio. As the 
epidemiological model imposes a single signal upon the formation of household 
expectations, namely professional forecasts, Lamia and Sarferaz’s (2009) argument 
implies that where the forecast errors realised by professionals are small, the 
frequency which households update increases. Recalling the forecast error statistic 
reported in Chapter 2, Lamia and Sarferaz (2009) would thus predict that households 
update more frequently for the stable and Greenspan-Bemanke sub-periods. If 
instead household attentiveness is related to the relative quality of professional 
forecasts relative to own forecasts, the frequency of information updates would be 
expected to be greater for the volatile sub-period.
As previously recognised, despite Carroll’s (2003) epidemiological hypothesis 
proposing that agents are infrequently attentive, the model does not distinguish 
between different sources or varying content of information. An agent’s response to 
news may however vary depending upon the perceive tone of the absorbed 
information. Utilising Michigan Survey responses to perceived and expected 
business conditions, Easaw and Ghoshray (2010) reconsider the epidemiology of 
information, decomposing the rate of absorption to attentiveness towards good news 
and to bad news. Specifically, agents are assumed to form their expectations upon 
news Nt = N f  — /VtB where N f  and represent ‘good’ (or favourable) and ‘bad’ 
(or unfavourable) news respectively:
204
Et,tfrt+iJ = a [N ?  -  N tB] (5.2.6)
Specifically, Easaw and Ghoshray (2010) utilise Michigan Survey data regarding the 
perceived level of favourable and unfavourable news regarding business conditions 
in a similar manner to the empirical analysis in 4.3. Noting that a > 0, Easaw and 
Ghoshray (2010) recognise that the a coefficient implies that agents devote equal 
importance to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news, analogous to Carroll’s (2003) assumptions. 
Replacing this with the assumption that agents attach a weight 8 > 0 to ‘good’ news, 
and a weight y > 0 to ‘bad’ news, Easaw and Ghoshray respecify (5.2.6) as:
Eu [nt+h] = [SNcG - Y N tB] (5.2.7)
Where 8 < y, bad news is deemed to assert a greater influence on agent expectations 
relative to ‘good’ news. Applying some information capacity constraint, akin to 
Sims (2003), resulting in positive information acquisition and processing costs, 
Easaw and Ghoshray examine the inertial response of expectations to news shocks 
by incorporating (5.2.7) into the Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information and 
Carroll (2003) epidemiological frameworks:
=  m u f  -  y N ? ] }  + (1 -  X)Eu . j [ n t . j+ll] (5.2.8)
In the short-run, Easaw and Ghoshray (2010) report that both good news and bad 
news have a similar effect upon household expectations with 8 = 0.66 and y = 0.60 
respectively; nevertheless, the impact of bad news is demonstrated to decay much 
quicker than good news. These results are in accordance with those reported by 
Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) who find no evidence of asymmetry in updating 
behaviour amongst households in response to favourable and unfavourable news 
regarding inflation. Nevertheless, in the long-run Easaw and Ghoshray (2010) 
demonstrate that bad news has an insignificant impact on expectations whilst good 
news is considered more important. These observations could indicate that in the 
short-run households have a tendency to overreact to bad news.
Despite Carroll (2003) preferring the baseline epidemiological model, assuming that 
households update their expectations with respect to those reported by professionals, 
recalling Atkeson and Ohanian’s (2001) findings that professional forecasts are no
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better than a simple naive forecast, Lanne et al. (2009) question whether households 
would devote the resources required to acquire and process the sophisticated 
forecast. Instead, Lanne et al. (2009) propose replacing the professional forecast in 
(5.2.1) with the one-period lagged inflation rate n t_1, presenting a naive sticky 
information model:
E t f a t + h ]  =  t o t - i  +  (1 -  A)Et" ; [jrt+h_J-] +  e t (5.2.9)
This competing model is thus akin to adaptive expectations with household forecasts 
a weighted average of past inflation and lagged expectations. This naive 
specification is however nested by Lanne et al. (2009) within CarrolTs (2003) 
epidemiological framework, estimating the following regression:
E t[ n t+h\ = A(<u7Tt- i  + (1 -  o))E[[nt+h\) (5.2.10)
+ (1 -  X)Et_j[nt+h_j\ + et
The extreme vales co = 0 and co = 1 thus relate to the baseline epidemiological 
model (5.2.1) and the naive sticky information model (5.2.9) respectively. For the 
unrestricted specification, and for the two extreme scenarios, Lanne et al. (2009) 
estimate (5.2.10) utilising quarterly Michigan Survey and SPF inflation expectations 
for the sample period ranging from 1981Q3 to 2001Q4. For the epidemiological 
specification, Lanne et al. (2009) estimate A =  0.35, whilst for the naive sticky 
information specification they estimate A = 0.18. These estimates are consistent 
with those reported by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003). For the 
unrestricted specification, Lanne et al. (2009) estimate A = 0.24, co = 0.65; these 
estimates indicate that over half of the agents who update their information during 
any given period exhibit backward-looking behaviour, rather than absorbing the 
information content of the sophisticated forecast. Specifically, Lanne et al.’s (2009) 
estimates imply that approximately 15.6 percent of Michigan Survey respondents 
update their information with respect to past inflation whilst only 8.4 percent absorb 
current professional forecasts. Nevertheless, the posterior model estimates of the 
naive sticky information and nested models are approximately equal, Lanne et al.
(2009) argue that the inclusion of professional forecasts fails to sufficiently increase 
the fit; they thus conclude that the naive sticky information model is consistent with 
the expectations of a significant proportion of Michigan Survey respondents.
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Despite Carroll’s (2003, 2006) epidemiological model providing an interesting 
application of the sticky information hypothesis and a simple application to 
determine the degree of attentiveness exhibited by agent expectations, several studies 
have identified issues with the methodology and suggest modifications to the 
approach undertaken. Whereas Carroll (2003) proposes that professional forecasts 
published by media sources can reasonably proxy for RE, Lein and Maag (2011) 
acknowledge that there is not a single professional forecast, with a degree of 
disagreement instead prevalent. Moreover, in accordance with Ehrbeck and 
Waldmann (1996) and Laster et al. (1999)116, the presence of strategic incentives 
may result in professionals reporting forecasts which deviate from the consensus or 
conditional expected value. Consequently, Lein and Maag (2011) argue that the 
forecast absorbed into household information sets, as reported by the media, may not 
correspond with professional consensus and may further induce greater uncertainty 
upon household expectations.
The initial sticky information model presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002) assumed 
that agents update their expectations according to RE; therefore departures from RE 
by the SPF are argued by Nunes (2009) to invalidate the microfoundations 
developed by Carroll (2003). Recalling the results from Chapter 3, SPF forecasts 
were not found to be unambiguously consistent with the predictions of RE. These 
results are in accordance with Nunes (2009) who indicates that the SPF mean 
forecast fails the elementary unbiasedness property required under RE.
Consequently, Nunes (2009) questions the appropriateness of Carroll’s (2003) 
assumptions of updating towards the professional forecast, arguing that the model 
reflects sticky information under imperfect information and learning rather than RE 
as proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002).-
In response to criticisms of Carroll’s (2003) assumptions, Nunes (2009) adapts the 
survey-updating model (5.2.1) with a rational-updating specification. Whereas 
Carroll’s (2003) model assumes that household expectations are updated to 
incorporate the latest SPF forecast, Nunes (2009) proposes that updating occurs 
towards the current ‘rational’ expectation Et RE[nt+h], as expressed by (5.2.11) 
below:
116 Laster et al. (1999) present a model where professionals are remunerated on media attention in 
addition to accuracy.
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Et,H[n t+h] — Yo + Yl^t,REln t+hi + K2^t-l,//[7rt-l+/l] 9
+ Vt
Estimating both the survey- and rational- updating specifications (5.2.1) and
(5.2.11), Nunes (2009) estimates y± = 0.224 and y± = 0.157 respectively117
suggesting that the probability that an individual household updates in any given
period is lower for the rational-updating model relative to the survey-updating
specification. Specifically, whilst Nunes notes that the survey-updating model
predicts that households update their information every 13 months, the rational-
updating model predicts that information is updated every 19 months. Moreover,
whilst the survey-updating model implies that approximately 36 percent of
households form expectations on information which is a year or more out of date, the
y± estimate reported by Nunes (2009) implies that over 50 percent of households fail
118to update in any given year .
Analysing whether the survey- or rational-updating model is most suitable for 
Michigan Survey expectations, Nunes (2009) nests the two specifications within an 
alternative model where households update their expectations to either the SPF or 
RE, namely:
Et,H[n t+h\ = Yo + Yl^t,REln t+hi + y 2 ^t-l,H[n t-l+h]
+ Y3EtA n t+h] + v t
Estimating (5.2.12) Nunes (2009) finds that the null hypothesis y3 = 0 cannot be 
rejected at conventional significance levels and thus concludes that the empirical 
evidence supports the rational-updating model whilst the survey-updating model 
produces “excessive stickiness” (2009:644).
In response to the studies by Nunes (2009) and Coibion (2010) which question the 
relevance of the sticky information and epidemiological hypotheses, Easaw and 
Golinelli (2010) attempt to extend the micro foundations of expectation formation 
proposing a model where agents have varying information absorption rates.
117 Nunes (2009) notes that whilst (5.2.1)can be estimated using OLS, identifying the ‘rational’ 
expectation with the actual realisation o f inflation, (5.2.11) is estimated by GMM with an instrument 
set composed o f four lags of inflation, two lags of the Michigan Survey forecast, the SPF mean, 
marginal cost, output gap and wage inflation.
118 Following Carroll (2003), the percentage of those failing to update in any given year is calculated 
by (1 — 0.224)4 =  36.3 percent and (1 — 0.157)4 =  50.5 percent respectively.
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Specifically, utilising UK survey data from Barclays Basix, Easaw and Golinelli
(2010) classify agents as either ‘active’ (.4) or ‘passive’ (P), both of which form 
their expectations using the professional forecast as an ‘anchor’ or reference point. 
Expectations of both agent classes i = A, P are thus assumed to be formed as a ratio 
of the professional forecast, namely:
where f t  > 0. The ratio is subsequently employed by Easaw and Golinelli (2010) as 
a weight on the professional forecast within an epidemiological framework akin to 
Carroll (2003, 2006) as demonstrated by below:
Analysing disaggregated professional forecasts from the Barclays Basix survey, 
Easaw and Golinelli (2010) identify that the inflation forecasts of business 
economists evolve independently to those of other disaggregations and do not 
depend upon past inflation. In contrast, other professionals, namely academic 
economists, financial directors and trade unionists, absorb the forecasts of other 
professionals in forming their own expectations; moreover those of the general 
public are found by Easaw and Golinelli (2010) to respond to the forecasts of all 
classes of professionals. Furthermore, Easaw and Golinelli (2010) highlight that the 
rate at which agents update their expectations is heterogeneous, distinguishing 
financial directors and trade unionists as ‘active’ agents with an absorption rate of 
approximately 0.650, whilst academic economists and the general public are deemed 
‘passive’ with a lower absorption rate of approximately 0.420. The results presented 
by Easaw and Golinelli (2010) further demonstrate that the rate at which agents 
update their information for expectation formation is heterogeneous and dependent 
on individual circumstances and experiences.
Models of information rigidity have received considerable attention in the 
macroeconomic literature in recent years. Whilst 5.1 considered various theories of
Et.H.i&t+hl _  „ 
Et,p[n t+hi
Et,H,i — Aft,P
(5.2.13)
“b (1 — [TTt+ft]
(5.2.14)
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information frictions, including noisy information and sticky information, this sub­
section has considered the existing theory and empirical evidence concerning 
epidemiological expectations. Initially proposed by Carroll (2003, 2006), and 
further developed by Pfajfar and Santoro (2008, 2010, 2013), Lanne et al (2009). and 
Nunes (2009), epidemiological expectations assume that agents infrequently absorb 
information embedded in rational forecasts transmitted by the news media and 
professional forecasters, and provide microfoundations for the sticky information 
hypothesis presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002).
Empirically examining Michigan Survey inflation forecasts, Carroll (2003) predicts 
that approximately a quarter of households update their information in any given 
period119; these estimates were noted to be consistent with those of the sticky 
information parameter reported by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Khan and Zhu 
(2006). Nevertheless, the baseline epidemiological approach fails to acknowledge 
that the rate of information diffusion may not be homogeneous; instead the rate at 
which households update their information may be dependent upon demographic 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, Lamia and Lein (2008) 
and Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) highlight that attentive behaviour exhibited by 
household forecast may be sensitive to the tone as well as the volume of news, 
reporting that the expectation gap increases in the presence of rising inflation, 
indicating increased inattentiveness. In contrast, favourable news regarding inflation 
is generally considered to be insignificant.
In the next section, models of epidemiological expectations shall be reassessed on 
the previously employed survey forecasts to determine whether the rate of 
information diffusion and attentiveness of households. Moreover, the investigations 
shall consider whether households update more frequently during periods of 
increased macroeconomic stability or uncertainty, whilst disaggregate Michigan 
Survey data shall be employed to determine whether demographic characteristics 
influence attentiveness.
119 Nunes (2009) reported a similar rate of information diffusion for an extended sample period.
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5.3. Empirical Investigations on Sticky Information
Compared to the static approach to sticky information implicitly proposed by 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003), Branch (2007) highlights that where the 
distribution of information flows are allowed to vary models of sticky information fit 
survey data better. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) acknowledge that 
the properties of information diffusion are time-dependent, proposing that 
information will be less ‘sticky’ following large and visible shocks to the 
macroeconomic system. Rather than employing a dynamic model of information 
diffusion, the empirical strategy employed in this section instead proposes to re­
evaluate Carroll’s (2003, 2006) epidemiological hypothesis, and various extensions, 
across the four previously identified sample periods to determine whether household 
attentiveness is time-variant and distinguish whether models of sticky information 
are more appropriate under certain macroeconomic conditions.
Recalling that the Michigan Survey solely reports four-quarter ahead inflation 
forecasts, the fixed-horizon specification (5.2.1), as employed by Carroll (2003), 
shall be examined, employing h = 4, and is appropriately restated by (5.3.1) below:
E t f r t + t ]  =  «o +  « if tP[^t+4] +  C5-3-1)
Equation (5.3.1) shall be estimated utilising OLS procedures over the four previously 
identified sample periods with Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
corrected standard errors.
Furthermore, to examine whether the baseline epidemiological model can be 
considered as a plausible account of the manner which households form their 
inflation forecasts, modifications to the baseline model (5.3.1) shall also be 
considered. Specifically, in accordance with Carroll (2003) and Luoma and Luoto 
(2009), the baseline model shall be modified to include the possibility of households 
updating their information in response to realised values of inflation as previously 
demonstrated by (5.2.5). Additionally, tests of the naive sticky information and 
rational updating models, as proposed by Lanne et al. (2009) and Nunes (2009) shall 
be empirically examined to determine whether the information updating behaviour of 
households is more backward or forward looking than assumed by Carroll’s survey- 
updating hypothesis. Furthermore, a nested specification, simultaneously featuring
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elements of the survey-updating, na'ive sticky information and rational-updating 
models shall be evaluated to establish the relative updating behaviour across agents.
To determine whether the frequency which households update their information is 
time variant and dependent upon macroeconomic conditions, the next sub-section 
conducts various tests of the epidemiological hypothesis upon aggregate Michigan 
Survey forecasts across the four sample periods. In 5.3.2, the survey-updating, naive 
sticky information, rational-updating and heterogeneous updating specifications shall 
then be re-examined utilising disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts to assess the 
degree of heterogeneity in information diffusion across demographic groups, and 
establish the heterogeneity in updating behaviour across groups.
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5.3.1. Epidemiology of Aggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
In accordance with Carroll (2003), the examination of the sticky information and 
epidemiological hypotheses commences with analysing aggregate Michigan Survey 
inflation forecasts. Specifically, empirical testing shall be conducted across the four 
previously identified sample periods to determine whether the rate of information 
diffusion is time-specific and dependent upon macroeconomic conditions.
5.3.1.1.A ggrega te  Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Survey Updating 
Hypothesis
As noted in 5.1, the presence of unidirectional Granger-causality is integral to 
Carroll’s (2003, 2006) epidemiological approach, indicating that information flows 
from professionals to households. To determine whether Carroll’s (2003) results 
regarding mean expectations hold for median SPF and aggregate Michigan Survey 
forecasts, Granger-causality between the two surveys shall be examined for the 
updated sample periods with the results presented in Table 5.3.1 below:
Table 5.3.1: Granger-Causality
2
PANEL A 
SPF MS
1 4 1 8
PANELB  
MS -*  SPF
2 1 4 8
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
4.246** 2.040* | 1.665 | 5.321*** | 3.260**  
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
3.182***
3.896** | 2.447* 1.871* | 5.126*** | 3.780*** 
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
2 9 i7***
3.802** | 1.777 | 0.890 | 1.302 | 1.560 
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
1.206
0.273 | 0.406 | 0.713 2.389 | 2.878* 0.768
Whereas Carroll (2003) observes that Granger-causality is unidirectional, Table 5.3.1 
indicates that for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods Granger-
1 90causality is bidirectional . Moreover, for the more recent stable and volatile sub­
periods, there is little evidence to indicate that either survey Granger-causes the 
other.
These results thus appear to question the relevancy of the Carroll’s (2003, 2006) 
epidemiological hypothesis. However, it is highlighted by Luoma and Luoto (2009)
120 Table 5.3.1 further illustrates a greater significance o f household forecasts Granger-causing 
professional forecasts in comparison to the opposite direction.
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that professional information sets are likely to incorporate previous expectations of 
households and consumers. Furthermore, the lack of Granger-causality for the stable 
and volatile sub-periods may alternatively be an indication that households exhibit a 
high degree of inattentiveness to news. Therefore, the epidemiological model 
remains a useful strategy to examine the diffusion properties of information.
For the whole sample period, tests of Carroll’s (2003) baseline survey-updating
121model (5.3.1), where a 0 = 0, are presented in Table 5.3.2 below :
Table 5.3.2: Baseline Survey-Updating Model -  Whole Sample Period 1982Q3 
-2011Q1
Testing Equation:
E H , A n t + h \  ~  a Q +  a l E P i t [ n t + h \ +  <*2 £H ,t-l[7rt+/i-l] +  € t
a Q (*i «2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.128***
(0.049)
0.852***
(0.058)
+ a 2 = 1 
2.053
0.328 0.322 2.109
(2) 0.119**
(0.052)
0.881***
(0.052)
=  0.25 
6.260**
0.317 0.317 2.138
Whereas, for a sample period consisting of 1981Q3 to 2000Q2, Carroll (2003) 
reports estimates of a 1 = 0.36 and a2 = 0.66, the estimate reported in row (1) 
above is substantially lower, representative of a lower degree of attentiveness 
amongst households than previously reported. Nevertheless, the Wald x 2 test is 
unable to reject the null hypothesis a 1 + a 2 = 1, supporting the proposition that 
household forecasts are a weighted average of own lagged and professional 
forecasts, whilst the Durbin-Watson statistic provides little evidence of serially 
correlated residuals. These statistics suggest that Carroll’s (2003) model is able to 
accommodate the behaviour of household forecasts well. However, the R2 from the 
unrestricted model is less than half the value reported by Carroll (2003) and may 
indicate that conclusions regarding the epidemiological hypothesis are sensitive to 
either the series or the sample period employed.
Similarly, imposing the restriction a 1 + a 2 = 1 on the estimation of the baseline 
model, as reported by row (2), yields a much lower estimate of relative to the 
value reported by Carroll (2003). Whereas Carroll’s (2003) estimates indicate that in
121 For all empirical tests o f the epidemiological hypothesis, Newey-West corrected standard errors 
shall be employed to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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any given quarter approximately one-quarter of households have up-to-date 
information, the estimates for the whole sample period in Table 5.3.2 indicate that
199 oapproximately 12 percent of agents are attentive each period . As the Wald x  test 
in row (2) rejects the null hypothesis that a x = 0.25, the proportion of agents that 
update their information can be considered to be significantly lower relative to 
Carroll’s estimate. Moreover, for the whole sample period, the estimate of a ± = 
0.119 in row (2) indicates that approximately 60 percent (=(1 — 0.119)4) of 
households report inflation forecasts formed on information acquired more than one 
year previously.
The results presented in Table 5.3.2 are evidently substantially different from those 
presented by Carroll (2003) and suggest that the level of inattentiveness amongst 
household inflation forecasts has been substantially underestimated by previous 
studies. Some may claim that information stickiness has risen in recent years, 
attributable to greater costs regarding the acquisition and processing of information 
during recent years of increased macroeconomic uncertainty; others may attribute the 
difference to the use of median survey forecasts instead of the mean average as
1 90
preferred by Carroll (2003) . To establish the cause of the apparent increased level
of inattentiveness amongst households, the baseline model shall again be re­
evaluated utilising mean Michigan Survey forecasts for the whole sample period, and 
median Michigan Survey forecasts for the sample period employed by Carroll, 
namely 1981Q3-2000Q2, with the results reported in Table 5.3.3 Panel A and Panel 
B respectively:
122 The null hypothesis a^ =  0.25 is rejected by the Wald chi-square test at a 5 percent level o f 
significance.
123 The motivation for employing the mean was discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to elementary 
forecast and forecast error statistics.
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Table 5.3.3: Baseline Survey Updating Model -  Alternative Sampling
Testing Equation:
d o  + u ^ E p t n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H , t - l [ n t + h - l \  +  € t
« o a  i « 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
PANEL A: Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1 
Mean Michigan Survey Forecasts
(1) 0 .205***
(0.065)
0.819***
(0.059)
ax +  a2 = 1  
3.760*
0.521 0.516 2.049
(2) 0.144**
(0.055)
0.856***
(0.055)
a1 =  0.25 
3.671*
0.513 0.513 2.095
PANEL B: Period: Carroll 1981Q3 -  2000Q2 
Median Michigan Survey Forecasts
(1) 0.307***
(0.091)
0.603***
(0.120)
a1 + a2 = 1 
7.759***
0.697 0.693 1.968
(2) 0.077***
(0.029)
0.923***
(0.029)
a x =  0.25 
36.531***
0.608 0.608 2.275
Estimating the baseline model (5.3.1), utilising Michigan Survey mean forecasts, 
across the whole sample period, yields a higher value of relative to the results 
reported in Table 5.3.2; compared to the median, inattentiveness appears less 
pronounced amongst mean household forecasts. This could indicate that the 
distribution of household forecasts is skewed towards the proportion of agents who 
exhibit inattentive behaviour. Nevertheless, the value of a 1 is again much lower 
than the value reported by Carroll (2003), supporting the notion that inattentiveness 
amongst household inflation forecasts has increased in recent years. The results in 
Panel A row (2) support this claim indicating that approximately 14 percent of 
households update their information in any given period; moreover, the Wald x 2 null 
hypothesis a 1 = 0.25 is only marginally not rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance124. The evidence again appears to suggest that Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
and Carroll (2003) overestimate the rate of information stickiness.
The estimates presented in Panel B row (1), for median household forecasts 
estimated for the sample period considered by Carroll (2003), appear to confirm this 
hypothesis, with a 1 larger in comparison with the whole sample period. Despite the 
estimates in row (1) being much closer to those reported by Carroll (2003), the value 
of a x in row (2), suggesting an average frequency of updating of every three years,
195appears particularly low . These results thus suggest that Carroll’s (2003) results 
are sensitive to both the composition of household forecasts and the sample period
124 The p-value relating to the Wald chi-square test o f a 1 =  0.25 is p =  0.0554
125 The Wald chi-square test unsurprisingly rejects that a t =  0.25
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employed. Moreover, the results further indicate that the degree of information 
stickiness is not homogeneous, as previously assumed by both Mankiw and Reis
(2002) and Carroll (2003); instead, the rate of information diffusion may be 
heterogeneous across households and dependent upon underlying macroeconomic 
conditions.
To examine the extent which the rate of information diffusion is dependent upon 
macroeconomic conditions, the baseline and restricted baseline specifications of 
(5.3.1) shall be re-estimated for the three sub-sample periods previously identified, 
with the results presented in Table 5.3.4 below:
Table 5.3.4: Baseline Survey Updating Model -  Sub-Sample Periods
Testing Equation:
^ H , d n t+ h \  =  a O +  a i E p . t b t t + h ]  +  a 2 ^ H , t - l ^ n t + h - l ]  +  e t
a 0 « i a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
PANEL A: Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -2011Q 1
(1) 0.167**
(0.066)
0.832***
(0.072)
a l  +  a 2 =  1 
0.008
0.390 0.383 1.945
(2) 0.168**
(0.070)
0.832***
(0.070)
<xx =  0.25 
1.364
0.390 0.390 1.945
PANEL B: Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
(1) 0.269*
(0.152)
0 727*** 
(0.159)
a l  +  a 2 ~  1
0.083
0.404 0.395 2.042
(2) 0.272*
(0.151)
0.728***
(0.151)
a x =  0.25 
0.020
0.403 0.403 2.043
PANEL C: Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.876***
(0.154)
0.412***
(0.119)
a x +  a 2 =  1  
23.163***
0.380 0.344 1.315
(2) 0.131
(0.170)
0.869***
(0.170)
a x =  0.25 
0.492
0.173 0.173 1.442
From Table 5.3.4, estimates of the baseline epidemiological model presented in 
Panel A and Panel B for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sub-periods show an 
increase in a 1 relative to the whole sample period. Therefore, excluding periods of 
excessive macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the Volcker disinflation and 
the recent financial crisis thus appear to have resulted in increases in household 
attentiveness. Specifically, the result from the restricted specification, presented in 
row (2) of Panel A and B indicate that approximately 17 percent of households 
update in each period for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, increasing to 27 
percent for the stable sub-period. Moreover, for both the Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sample periods it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that a quarter of
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households are attentive to news; the estimates of = 0.25 reported by Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003) may thus be appropriate for periods of reduced 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Nevertheless, for the stable sub-period, both the 
restricted and unrestricted specifications, presented in Table 5.3.4 Panel B, cc1 is only 
significant at the 10 percent level; this could indicate that despite households 
updating their information more frequently, their forecasts do not necessarily tend 
towards those reported by professionals.
For the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period the increase in attentiveness could also be 
attributable to greater credibility amongst professionals following Federal Reserve 
policy of lowering inflationary pressures (Pfajfar and Santoro, 2008). Alternatively, 
recalling the reduction in SPF MFE and MSFE between the whole and Greenspan- 
Bemanke sub-periods presented in Chapter 2, paying greater attention to 
professional forecasts is thus consistent with the analysis presented by Brock and 
Hommes (1997) where agents switch to a sophisticated predictor should the net gain 
exceed the gain from employing a naive predictor. Estimating the baseline model for 
the stable sub-sample period, the value of a 1 is higher relative to both the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods; moreover, these values are much closer to 
those reported by Carroll (2003) and Khan and Zhu (2006). The larger value of a x 
indicates that households update more frequently during periods characterised by 
reduced levels of macroeconomic volatility and uncertainty.
For the volatile sub-period, the value of from the baseline specification remains 
significant yet is much larger relative to either the Greenspan-Bemanke or stable 
sample periods. Nevertheless, the rejection of the Wald x 2 test that a 1 -I- a 2 = 1 
suggests that household expectations for the recent period of macroeconomic 
uncertainty are not formed as a weighted average of current professional and own 
lagged expectations; this thus questions the relevance of Carroll’s (2003, 2006) 
epidemiological hypothesis. In row (2), where the weighted average restriction is 
imposed on expectations, the value of a ± is observed to be smaller in comparison to 
the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, and insignificant, thus implying that 
households exhibit greater levels of inattention during the volatile sub-period.
The results presented in Table 5.3.4 thus appear consistent with the argument that the 
frequency which households update their information is time-variant and dependent
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upon macroeconomic conditions; more specifically, households are more attentive to 
the professional forecast during periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty 
where the information acquisition and processing costs are reduced. Furthermore, 
recalling from Chapter 2 that the MFE and MSFE associated with aggregate 
Michigan Survey forecasts are much larger for the whole and volatile periods 
relative to periods of increased macroeconomic stability, the results presented in 
Table 5.3.4 thus appear to reject the hypothesis that agents update more frequently 
where the opportunity costs of remaining attentive are higher.
The baseline epidemiological model provides an approximation of information 
diffusion across household forecasts; however, the R2 values observed in Table 5.3.2 
and Table 5.3.4 are much lower than those reported by Carroll (2003). A simple 
modification which may improve the fit is to include a constant a 0 with the results 
from respective empirical tests on aggregate Michigan Survey forecasts presented 
below:
Table 5.3.5: Survey Updating Model (including Constant) -  Aggregate 
Michigan Survey Forecasts
Testing Equation:
E H , t [ n t+ h \  ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H , t - A n t + h - \ \  +  € t
«0 a t a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
PANEL A: Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
1 091*** 0.113** 0.529*** 0.451 0.442 1.863
(0.176) (0.048) (0.090)
PANEL B: Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
0 0.128** 0.580*** 0.472 0.460 1.761
(0.114) (0.058) (0.083)
PANEL C: Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
0.873*** 0.217 0.488*** 0.488 0.471 1.852
(0.254) (0.161) (0.140)
PANEL D: Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
-0.140 0.939 0.413* 0.381 0.303 1.313
(1.317) (0.813) (0.227)
The inclusion of the constant term within the epidemiological framework is however 
rejected by Carroll (2003) due to modest improvements in fit; similarly, the results 
presented in Table 5.3.5 provide fairly small improvements in R2. Moreover,
Carroll (2003:285) argues that should inflation be zero for extended time periods, the 
inclusion of the constant would imply that households would continue to expect a 
positive rate of inflation, and thus be perpetually biased. The significance of the
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constant may instead indicate that households employ some form of level anchoring 
to the Federal Reserve implicit inflation target or some arbitrary value based upon 
either recent or historical inflation experiences. Alternatively, the constant may be 
representative of agents forming expectations from previous inflation experiences; as 
the CPI has been invariably positive since 1955Q4, agent inflation forecasts may be 
positively biased. Consequently, should households form expectations in accordance 
with theories of adaptive learning, the presence of significant constant terms is 
deemed by Luoma and Luoto (2009) to be inconsequential for the epidemiological 
hypothesis.
As previously discussed, a further modification of the epidemiological model as 
proposed by Carroll (2003), and reassessed by Luoma and Luoto (2009) concerns 
including realised inflation values as detailed by (5.2.5). The analysis in 5.1 also 
recognised the debate regarding whether current or lagged inflation was most 
appropriate, identifying that both could be considered to be economically reasonable. 
The results from testing (5.2.5), imposing a0 = 0 for both k = 1 and k = 0 are 
presented in rows (1) and (2) of Appendix 5.1 respectively, rows (2) and (4) present 
the associated models where the weighted average restriction a± + a 2 + cc3 = 1 is 
imposed.
Consistent with Carroll’s (2003) results, the results in rows (1) and (2) indicate that
a3 is generally insignificant and suggests that the inclusion of past inflation is
] 26spurious . The value of a 3 is also negative and suggests that households expect a 
lower inflation rate when lagged inflation is higher. Nevertheless, for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods a3 in rows (3) and (4) is significant 
at the 5 percent level; consistent with the results for Luoma and Luoto (2009), a 
significant proportion of households are attentive to current inflation and suggests 
that agents do not employ excessively backward-looking behaviour in expectation 
formation. Moreover, the R2 and R2 statistics are invariably larger for k = 0, whilst 
Durbin-Watson statistics between the two specifications are similar and close to 2. 
The data thus appears to favour the current inflation specification presented by
126 The insignificance of a 3 may further arise from high correlation between the Michigan Survey and 
inflation, estimated to be 0.712 for the whole sample period, as previously indicated by Luoma and 
Luoto (2009).
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Luoma and Luoto (2009), in preference to lagged inflation as examined by Carroll
(2003).
For the whole sample period, it is however observed in row (4) that a 3 is larger than 
a i suggesting that a greater proportion update their information in response to 
current inflation than to the professional forecast. Moreover, is insignificant for 
all four sample periods thus it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of households that update their information relative to the professional
127forecast is zero . These results suggest that households display some degree of 
attention to current conditions but are generally inattentive to forward-looking 
information. Moreover, the rate of information diffusion again appears to increase in 
the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods with a 2 falling relative to the whole 
sample period consistent with agents exhibiting greater attentive behaviour where the 
costs associated with information acquisition and processing are lower. Recalling 
that Carroll (2003) estimates that approximately a quarter of households update in 
any given period, the restricted specification is examined to determine whether the 
proportion of households utilising updated information significantly differs from 25 
percent. The Wald x 2 statistics presented in rows (2) and (4) of Appendix 5.1 
generally indicate that the null hypothesis a1 + a3 = 0.25 cannot be rejected; 
nevertheless, for the whole sample period, the restriction is rejected where the one- 
period lagged inflation rate is employed, and further suggests that agents are more 
forward-looking than the Carroll (2003) specification assumes.
Consistent with the results for the baseline model, the results for the restricted 
specifications presented in Appendix 5.1 Panel D for the volatile sub-period again 
indicate that households exhibit greater inattention to news than for periods of 
reduced macroeconomic uncertainty, and instead resort to naive backward-looking 
rules. The estimates of a 2 indicate that 80-90 percent of households are inattentive 
in any given period; this is considerably higher than the estimate reported by 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003), and further supports the notion that the 
degree of information stickiness is dependent upon macroeconomic conditions. 
Nevertheless, under the unrestricted specification, the restriction a 1 + a2 + a3 = 1
127 As a ! is significant at the 10 percent level for the whole and stable sample periods. This may 
proxy for agents updating their information in response to observations on other macroeconomic 
variables which the professional forecast accommodates.
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is again rejected, whilst Durbin-Watson statistics are low, further highlighting that 
the epidemiological model does not appear to be an appropriate hypothesis for 
evaluating household expectations for periods of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty.
Despite tests of Carroll’s (2006, 2003) epidemiology hypothesis indicating that 
households are inattentive, section 5.1 introduced a number of issues with Carroll’s 
assumptions and identified several models which attempt to mitigate these concerns. 
These included the naive sticky information model as presented by Lanne et al. 
(2009), and the rational updating model presented by Nunes (2009). The remainder 
of this sub-section shall thus empirically consider these models and determine 
whether they improve upon the results presented for the various specifications of the 
epidemiological hypothesis.
Recalling from Chapter 2 that the expectations and inflation data does not invariably 
satisfy the properties of stationarity, it is appropriate to consider tests of partial 
adjustment models which account for the observed persistence amongst the series. 
Guidance in this respect is provided by Lein and Maag (2011) who respecify a na'ive 
sticky information model akin to Lanne et al. (2009) in first differences. Applying 
this approach to Carroll’s survey-updating model yields the following specification:
bEH,t [nt+h] = Yo + YihEPX[nt+h\ (5.3.2)
+ KzAEH.t-ybt+h-j] +  y3A n t + et
The first difference regarding the expectations of agent class i in period t is defined 
as AEi t [nt+h] = Ei t [7Tt+h] — Et^-ll^ t+ h-i]128 whilst the first difference of 
inflation is defined as Ant = n t — n t_1. Appendix 5.2 reports the estimation results 
of various specifications of (5.3.2) over the four sample periods.
In accordance with Lamia and Maag (2012), the coefficients on the lagged change in 
expectations are negative for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods; 
however, for the volatile period y2 is positive and significant. Nevertheless, the 
coefficients on both the current change in professional expectations and the current
128 The y-period lagged first difference in the expectations o f agent class i is defined as
^H,t-j\nt+h-j\-
222
change in inflation are invariably positive and significant indicating that a large 
proportion of households absorb changes in current macroeconomic conditions. 
Moreover, the R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics suggest that the model including 
lagged inflation, but without a constant outperforms the three alternative 
specifications. Furthermore, the Wald x 2 test is unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that the y lt y2 and y3 coefficients sum to one indicating that the change in household 
forecasts across all four sample periods is consistent with a weighted average model 
of the three variables.
5.3.1.2. Aggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Naive Sticky 
Inform ation Hypothesis
In 5.1, both a naive version of the sticky information and epidemiological 
hypotheses, and nested specification, as presented by Lanne et al. (2009), were 
identified by (5.2.9) and (5.2.10) where, rather than absorbing the information 
content of professional forecasts, agents adapt their forecasts in response to lagged 
inflation. To re-examine Lanne et al.’s (2009) results, and to determine whether the 
naive sticky information model is superior to Carroll’s (2003) epidemiological 
model the following models shall be empirically examined, utilising Michigan 
Survey and SPF inflation expectations, across the four previously identified sample 
periods:
E t f a t + h l  = Po  +  P i ^ t - i  + P i E t - j i ^ t + h - j ]  + €t (5.3.3)
E t f r t + h ]  =  Po  + P i i P i ^ t - i  + (1 -  p 2 ) E t b t t + hD  (53.4)
+  (1  — P l ) E t - j [ n t + h - j ]  +  e t
The results for the whole sample period relating to tests of (5.3.3) and (5.3.4), for 
h = 4,y = 1, are presented in Table 5.3.6 for both current and the one period lagged 
inflation rate.
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Table 5.3.6: Naive Sticky Information and Nested Epidemiological Model -  
Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( i ) - E ? [ n t+h\ =  p 0 +  P i i t t_k +  p 2E ? - j [ n t+h- j ] +  et 
(2 ) - E t H [7it+h] =  p 0 +  P ^ t ^ k  +  (1 — P i ) E t _j  H [ n t + h _ j ]  +  e t 
(3). E t [ n t+h] =  p 0 +  P i ( p 2 n t - i  +  (1 _  P i ) E t  [^t+h]) +  (1 — P i ) E t - j [ n t+h-j] +  e t
Po P i a - P i ) p 2 a - P i ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 
k  = 1
-0.004
(0.032)
0.990***
(0.034)
Pi + P2 -  1
1.374
0.287 0.281 2.302
(1) 
k  = 0
0.153**
(0.059)
0.836***
(0.063)
Pi + P2 -  1
1.071
0.357 0.352 2.090
(2) 
k  =  1
-0.004
(0.027)
1.004***
(0.027)
p1 = 0.35 
170.411***
0.281 0.281 2.314
(2) 
k  = 0
0.155***
(0.042)
0.845***
(0.042)
P i =  0.35 
21.204***
0.353 0.353 2.098
(3) 
k  =  1
0.087*
(0.050)
0.913***
(0.050)
-0.581
(0.539)
1.581***
(0.539)
0.323 0.317 2.174
(3) 
k  = 0
0 197***
(0.036)
0.803***
(0.036)
0.671***
(0.183)
0.329*
(0.182)
P i =  0.25 
2.134 
/ ? i * ( 1 - / ? 2)=0.25 
23.406***
0.363 0.357 2.027
In accordance with the extension to the survey-updating model, for all three 
specifications of the naive sticky information model, /?x is larger where current 
inflation (k = 0) is employed rather than lagged inflation (k = 1); moreover, the R2 
values is larger for k = 0 relative to k = 1, whilst the Durbin-Watson statistic for 
the current inflation specification is closer to the optimum of 2.000. In accordance 
with Lanne et al. (2009), the value of p ± is smaller than Carroll’s estimates for 
updating associated with the survey-updating model. Nevertheless, for k = 0, p 1 is 
larger than the value of a 1 estimated for both the unrestricted and restricted 
specifications of the epidemiological model presented in Table 5.3.2; however, the 
Wald x 2 test rejects the null hypothesis that px =  0.35, indicating that the rate of 
updating in the nai've sticky information model is lower compared to the estimate 
presented by Lanne et al. (2009).
Furthermore, for both the unrestricted and restricted specifications of the naive sticky 
information model where k = 0, the R2 values are higher relative to tests the survey- 
updating, whilst the Durbin-Watson statistics are closer to the optimum of two 
indicating that the hypothesis presented by Lanne et al. (2009) is better suited to
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Michigan Survey data. These results indicate that a significant proportion of 
aggregate Michigan Survey respondents report expectations consistent with the naive 
sticky information model. Moreover, the restricted specifications of the survey 
updating and naive sticky information models indicate that a larger proportion of 
households are attentive to the current rate of inflation relative to the professional 
expectations; namely the proportion of attentive agents is estimated at 15.5 percent 
by the naive sticky information model whereas the epidemiological model estimates 
that only 12 percent of agents are attentive.
The nested specification (5.3.4) is presented in the last two rows of Table 5.3.6 for 
k = 1 and k = 0 respectively; again, the R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics favour the 
current inflation specification. For k = 0, the nested specification indicates that
i
approximately 20% of households update each period, with only -  of those who are
2
attentive absorbing the current professional forecast whilst the remaining -  update in
response to current inflation. These estimates are roughly consistent with those 
reported by Lanne et al. (2009) and indicate that a larger proportion of agents 
employ backward-looking updating rules as opposed to forward-looking behaviour 
as proposed by Carroll (2006, 2003).
To determine whether the backward-looking updating behaviour employed by 
households is time-variant, the unrestricted and restricted specifications of (5.3.3), 
and the nested specification (5.3.4), shall be examined for aggregate Michigan 
Survey forecasts over the three shorter sub-sample periods. As the naive sticky 
information model was demonstrated to perform better for k =  0 only the results
] 29relating to current inflation shall be reported . From Appendix 5.3, tests of both 
the unrestricted and restricted specifications (5.3.3) provide some evidence that the 
degree of agent attentiveness is time-variant, however differences are relatively 
small. For the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period /?! is marginally smaller relative to 
the whole sample period, whilst for the stable sub-period p1 is fractionally larger; 
specifically, the proportion of attentive households for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub­
period is estimated at 14 percent, yet for the stable sub-period 18 percent of 
households update in each period. Nevertheless, for the volatile sub-period, whilst
129 The results for k  =  1 for all three specifications across the three sub-sample periods are generally 
analogous to those reported in Table 5.3.6
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/?! from the unrestricted specification indicates that the rate which households update 
their expectations utilising naive backward-looking rules is significant, the 
proportion estimated by the unrestricted specification of 12 percent is not significant. 
Moreover, the Wald x 2 test indicates that the rate of updating reported by the 
restricted specification is again lower than the estimate of 0.35 presented by Lanne et 
al. (2009).
Differences are also observed for the nested specification (5.3.4) across the three 
sub-periods. Firstly, for both the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the values 
of f t  are larger relative to both Lanne et al.’s (2009) estimates and those for the 
whole sample period as presented in Table 5.3.6, whereas the values of /?2 are 
smaller. For these periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility and uncertainty, not 
only does the rate which households update their information increase relative to the 
whole sample period, but also, the relative degree of attentiveness to the professional 
forecast also increases. Specifically, for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period 
approximately 20 percent of agents update their information in any given period, of 
which 50 percent absorb the professional forecast; moreover, for the stable sub­
period, approximately 40 percent of households update their information, of which 
over 60 percent absorb the professional forecast. Unlike for the survey-updating 
model, the rate of updating presented for the nested naive sticky information model 
for the volatile sub-period is significant. Namely, the estimates indicate that 
approximately 15% of agents update their information in any given quarter during 
the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty; however, the coefficients associated 
with the two information sources are insignificant at conventional levels. Therefore, 
during periods of increased macroeconomic volatility, the naive sticky information 
indicates that the frequency of information updating amongst households falls; 
moreover, there is an increased likelihood that upon updating their information an 
agent absorbs the naive predictor. These results correspond with the hypothesis that 
households report more sophisticated expectations during periods of greater 
macroeconomic stability.
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5.3.1.3. A ggregate  Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Rational 
Updating Hypothesis
A further extension to the epidemiology hypothesis identified in section 5.1 relates to 
the rational-updating model presented by Nunes (2009) which proposes that 
households update towards the ‘rational’ expectation as opposed to the SPF; the 
rational-updating model can thus be tested for both household and professional 
forecasts. To re-examine the results presented by Nunes (2009), (5.2.11) and 
(5.2.12) shall be examined for 4-period ahead Michigan Survey and SPF forecasts 
(h = 4) over the four-previously identified sample periods, with the results 
presented in Table 5.3.7.
As highlighted in 5.1, the inclusion of the current rational expectations requires tests 
of (5.2.12) to be conducted using GMM estimation rather than OLS, and thus 
requires the use of instrumental variables. The instrument set employed is based on 
those utilised by Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and 
Nunes (2009), consisting of four lags of CPI, two lags of own inflation forecasts, the 
current inflation forecast of the other agent class, the output gap130, and wage
I o i
inflation . For the whole sample period, Table 5.3.7 presents the results from 
testing Nunes’s (2009) rational updating model on both SPF and Michigan Survey
122forecasts :
130 The output gap is defined as real GDP less real potential GDP, and calculated from data accessed 
from FRED, published by the Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis.
131 Following the second measure presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013), wage inflation 
shall be measured as the compensation per hour in the non-farm business sector, with data accessed 
from FRED.
132 In accordance with Nunes (2009), and the previous empirical investigations, standard errors are 
corrected utilising the four lag Newey-West covariance matrix.
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Table 5.3.7: Rational Updating Model -  Whole Sample Period 1982Q3 -  
2011Q1
Testing Equation:
EiX[ n t+h\  =  Yo +  Y i E RE.t[^t+h] +  X z^ .t-ifrt+ ft-i] +
Yo Y l Y  2 Wald x Z R 2 R 2 D.W. J-Stat
Test Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 0.189***
(0.046)
0.807***
(0.044)
Yi +  Vi =  1 
0.524
0.218 0.211 1.974 9.666
(2) q 147***
(0.037)
0.853***
(0.037)
y t =  0 .16  
0.129
0.265 0.265 2.121 8.501
(3) 1.005***
(0.108)
0.025
(0.060)
0.650***
(0.055)
0.418 0.407 2.042 19.555***
(4) 0.009
(0.016)
0.202***
(0.050)
0.798***
(0.050)
y x =  0.16 
0.723
0.200 0.193 1.937 8.950
The results for the baseline specification of (5.2.11), where y0 = 0, are presented in 
row (1), whilst row (2) imposes the restriction y1 + y2 = 1, whilst rows (3) and (4) 
estimate the two specifications respectively with the inclusion of the constant term.
In contrast with the results presented by Nunes (2009), the value of yx for the 
Michigan Survey is larger than the rate of updating presented in Table 5.3.2 for the 
survey updating model. Examining the restriction + a 2 = 1 in row (1), the Wald 
X 2 test cannot reject the null hypothesis indicating that the rational updating model is 
an appropriate explanation of aggregate Michigan Survey expectations. Similarly, 
row (2) estimates that approximately 15 percent of agents update each quarter which 
is again larger than the prediction presented in Table 5.3.2 for the survey updating 
model; moreover, it is not possible to reject the Wald x 2 null hypothesis that 
approximately 16 percent of agents rationally update their expectations each quarter, 
in line with the estimate presented by Nunes (2009). It therefore appears that 
Carroll’s (2003, 2006) hypothesis fails to appreciate the extent of rational behaviour 
amongst households. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the constant to the baseline 
model in row (3) results in insignificance of y ± suggesting that the significance of 
rational updating is spurious; in contrast, under the restricted specification in row (4), 
the constant is insignificant whilst the Wald x 2 test again indicates that the estimate 
of y ± is statistically equal to the estimate of 0.16 presented by Nunes (2009).
The rational updating model is also estimated for aggregate Michigan Survey 
expectations across the Greenspan-Bemanke, stable and volatile sub-periods to 
determine whether agent attentiveness to the information embodied within rational 
expectations is time-variant. The results for both the restricted and unrestricted
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specifications are presented in Appendix 5.4. Considering the baseline model in row 
(1), it is evident that compared to the whole sample period, the rate of updating 
predicted by the rational updating model is lower for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub­
period, whereas for the stable sub-period, the rate of updating increases. 
Nevertheless, whilst the proportion of updating agents estimated by the restricted 
specification in row (2), is significant, albeit low at 9 percent, for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke sample period, it is insignificant for the stable sub-period. Moreover, the 
inclusion of the constant in rows (3) and (4) result in insignificance of y1 for the 
Greenspan-Bemanke period indicating that the significance of rational-updating for 
this ample period is proxying for some alternative manner of expectation formation.
Furthermore, for the restricted specification, whereas the rejection of the Wald x 2 
test for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period indicates that the rate of updating is less 
than that predicted by Nunes (2009), the null hypothesis that y± = 0.16 cannot be 
rejected for the stable sub-period. Nevertheless, these results are likely to be 
dependent upon the instruments employed; whereas the J-statistic is unable to reject 
the validity of instruments for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sample 
periods, for the stable sub-period the instruments appear weak, indicative of 
estimation bias affecting the inference from the testing procedure.
For the volatile sub-period, the rate of updating remains significant; however, the 
value of y± for both the baseline and restricted specifications is lower than 
previously observed for the naive sticky information model and for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke sample periods. Moreover, evaluation of the Wald x 2 test reveals that the 
rate of updating for the volatile period is again statistically lower than the estimate 
presented by Nunes (2009). These results again indicate that the rate at which agents 
update their information is time-variant with a lower degree of attentiveness 
exhibited during the most recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty. As 
previously highlighted, this thus questions the relevance of the sticky information 
hypothesis of Mankiw and Reis (2002) which implicitly proposes that the degree of 
information friction is constant.
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5.3.1.4. A ggregate  Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Rational 
Updating Hypothesis
The analysis in this section has thus far highlighted that agents update their 
expectations from various information sources with significant coefficients attached 
to professional expectations, current or lagged inflation values and rational 
expectations. Consequently, one may argue that neither the survey updating 
hypothesis, the naive sticky information model, nor the rational updating 
specification, are able to adequately accommodate the varied nature of information 
attentiveness exhibited by agents. An alternative model is thus required which nests 
the previous three specifications. In accordance with Carroll (2003), Lanne et al. 
(2009), and Nunes (2009), it is assumed that only a proportion of households update 
their expectations in each period; however, updating may occur towards the 
professional forecast, the current or lagged inflation value, or towards RE. The 
model can thus be described by (5.3.5):
^t,H^t+h\ ~  0o T 0i^t,p[7rt+h] "f 0 2 ( 5 . 3 . 5 )
+ (Ps^t.RE^t+h] + 04 \.^t+h—l\ + €t
In accordance with Nunes (2009), and the estimation of the rational updating model, 
the rational expectation is proxied with the actual realisation of future inflation; 
consequently, (5.3.5) shall also be estimated utilising both OLS and GMM 
methodologies with the results for aggregate Michigan Survey expectations across 
the whole period presented in Appendix 5.5133.
For both the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, the baseline OLS and 
GMM models predict that a high proportion of agents are inattentive, with X greater 
than 0.7; however, the degree of inattentiveness is lower in comparison to the three 
individual updating hypotheses.. Nevertheless, for both these sample periods a is 
insignificant at the conventional five percent level under both estimation procedures; 
therefore, survey-updating, as proposed by Carroll (2003) appears to play little role 
in the formation of household expectations. Instead, the OLS estimation indicates 
that agents only update their information in response to current inflation according to 
the naive sticky information hypothesis of Lanne et al. (2009); the significance of /3
133 OLS estimations for each sample period are presented in rows (1) and (3) whilst the GMM 
estimation is presented in rows (2) and (4).
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for these two sample periods under OLS is robust to the inclusion of the constant in 
row (3). In contrast, the GMM procedure prefers rational-updating akin to Nunes 
(2009) for the whole sample period, but for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, 
0 1# (f)2 and 0 3  are all insignificant at the five percent level suggesting that agents are 
inattentive to all information sources. Nevertheless, for both these sample periods, 
upon inclusion of the constant in row (4), all three coefficients are significant 
indicating that agents update their information in response to various sources 
information sources; however, whist 0 1and 0 2 are both positive, with the former 
associated with survey-updating the larger, 0 3 is negative suggesting some 
cancelling out effect in updating behaviour.
For the stable sub-period, the OLS estimation indicates that households update in 
response to all three sources of information with the values of a, p  and y 
approximately equal. However, in row (3), the coefficients associated with survey 
and rational updating are both insignificant indicating that their significance under 
the baseline specification proxies for the omitted constant. In contrast, under the 
GMM estimation, after controlling for the previously identified instrument set, only 
rational updating coefficient is found to be significant; moreover, in accordance with 
the observation in Chapter 3 that household expectations are more consistent with 
the predictions of the REH for periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility, the 
value of y  is larger relative to the whole sample period further indicating greater 
rational behaviour on the part of households. The significance of y  and rational- 
updating is found in row (4) to again be robust to the inclusion of the constant.
Akin to the analysis of the naive sticky information and rational updating model, it is 
also possible to determine the proportion of agents updating to each of the 
information sources utilising the following model:
EtlHln t+hi =  ^ ( 0 i  E t A n t+hi +  0 2 ^ t - i  (5-3*6)
+ (1 “ 01 + <p2)EtlRE[nt+ni)
+ (1 -  A)EtH[nt+h_1] + et
The proportion of updating agents is again represented by A, whilst 0j represent the 
proportion of the updating agents attentive to the individual information sources.
The results from testing the restricted specification on aggregate Michigan Survey 
expectations across the four sample periods are presented in Appendix 5.6.
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In accordance with the results presented in Appendix 5.5, both the OLS and GMM 
specifications predict a higher rate of updating for the stable sub-period relative to 
the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods further supporting the argument 
that agents are more attentive where the costs associated with information processing 
and acquisition are lower. Comparing the rate of updating across the two 
specifications for the whole sample period, the OLS procedure predicts that 
approximately 22 percent of agents update their information each period, 
approximately double the estimate under GMM. Furthermore, for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, whilst the Wald x 2 test again cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that a quarter of the population update each period, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for the GMM estimation.
As previously noted, for the stable sub-period, both OLS and GMM specifications 
estimate an increase in the rate of updating relative to the longer whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods. Nevertheless, whilst the OLS procedure 
predicts that approximately a third of updating agents absorb each type of 
information, the GMM suggests that whilst 35 percent form expectations consistent 
with survey updating, the remaining 65 percent undertake rational updating 
behaviour. Contrastingly, for the volatile sub-period, the rate of information 
updating under both procedures is found to be insignificant, with none of the three 
forms of updating significant at a five percent level. These results thus support the 
argument that agents are more attentive when information acquisition and processing 
costs are lower; moreover, for periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty, agents 
appear to refer to a more diverse information set.
5.3.1.5. Evaluation of Epidemiological Models
This section has re-evaluated the literature regarding epidemiological expectations 
for aggregate household expectations across a variety of macroeconomic conditions. 
The results indicate that whilst agents update information relatively frequently 
during periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty, for periods of greater 
volatility, agents are more inattentive. Moreover, it is evident that Carroll’s (2003, 
2006) survey updating model, Lanne et al.’s (2009) naive sticky information model 
nor Nunes’s (2009) rational updating model are not able to adequately accommodate 
the formation of Michigan Survey inflation expectations. Instead, it is proposed that
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agents utilise a range of information sources to formulate their expectations. As 
macroeconomic volatility increases, there appears to be a greater propensity for 
agents to utilise naive forecasting procedures, whilst agents absorb more varied 
information during periods of reduced uncertainty. The dependence of updating 
behaviour on the sample period and macroeconomic conditions however questions 
the relevance of the sticky information hypothesis proposed by Mankiw and Reis
(2002) which proposes a constant rate of updating; instead these results may be 
considered to be more in line with predictions of noisy information as proposed by 
Woodford (2001), Sims (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). The next 
sub-section further evaluates these models of information diffusion for disaggregate 
Michigan Survey forecasts to determine whether the updating behaviour of agents is 
dependent upon household demographics.
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5.3.2. Epidemiology of Disaggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
The analysis of the epidemiological model presented by Carroll (2003, 2006) focuses 
solely on aggregate expectations, implicitly assuming that all agents have the same 
probability of encountering news concerning inflation. Nevertheless, the results 
presented in 4.2 and 4.3 clearly indicate that household expectations are 
heterogeneous with forecast errors dependent upon demographic characteristics. To 
proxy for the various economic explanations identified in Chapter 4 regarding the 
occurrence of expectational heterogeneity, it is proposed that households with 
contrasting demographic characteristics update their information sets at different 
rates. Moreover, those demographics which realise small forecast errors relative to 
alternative groups, as detailed in 4.2, are hypothesised to update their information 
more frequently. Nevertheless, due to the construction of the Michigan Survey, it is 
further hypothesised that the diffusion across disaggregated household expectations 
is likely to be similar to the results for aggregate expectations observed in 5.3.1, with 
a lower frequency of information updating for periods of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty. This chapter further seeks to identify whether the epidemiological 
hypothesis can be deemed a more appropriate characterisation of the expectations of 
certain demographic groups in comparison to others.
The rate of information diffusion across disaggregated Michigan Survey inflation 
forecasts can thus be analysed utilising the various specifications of the 
epidemiological model. Assuming that greater information attentiveness leads to 
increased forecast accuracy and lower levels of forecast disagreement, the results 
presented in Chapter 4 advocate the hypothesis that households with higher levels of 
education or income, and men, exhibit the highest degree of attentiveness whilst 
limited difference would be expected to be observed across age and region 
disaggregations. As noted in 5.1, previous research has observed heterogeneous 
rates of attentiveness across demographics, with Pfajfar and Santoro’s (2008) 
percentile time-series identifying that more socio-advantaged groups update their 
information more frequently relative to less advantaged groups.
As highlighted in 5.1, there may be conflicting forces acting upon the rate at which 
different demographic groups update their information. For example, those 
households with relatively large forecast errors, including those with low levels of
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educational attainment or income, have arguably greater incentives to update their 
information more frequently; however, these households are found by Bruine de 
Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) to have the lowest levels of 
financial and economic literacy. These groups are thus likely to incur greater costs 
in the acquisition and processing of information, which consequently reduces their 
frequency of information updating to more advantaged households. Similarly, 
whereas Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) and Malmendier and Nagel (2009) argue 
that older respondents rely more heavily on past inflation experiences when 
reporting their forecasts, and may thus be less attentive to news, Fishe and Idson 
(1990) indicate that older respondents are likely to possess greater asset levels which 
can be employed to acquire and process wider sources of information.
5.3.2.1. Disaggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Survey 
Updating Hypothesis
To examine whether the rate of information diffusion is dependent upon 
demographic characteristics, the epidemiological model (5.2.9) shall be further tested 
on disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts across the four sample periods. As a 
preliminary check of the relevance of the epidemiological model, Appendix 5.7 to 
Appendix 5.11 analyses bi-directional Granger-causality between the SPF and 
Michigan Survey forecasts. Whereas SPF forecasts were deemed to Granger-cause 
aggregate Michigan Survey forecasts over the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable periods, the evidence in favour of causality from professionals to disaggregate 
households is more limited, and again restricted to the three longer sample periods. 
Namely, Granger-causality is observed for younger households, those with higher 
levels of education and income, and males; there is also weak evidence of causality 
across all regions. These results indicate that the epidemiological model may be an 
inappropriate description of the manner which middle aged and older respondents, 
those with low levels of education and income, and women form their inflation 
expectations. One may thus expect the epidemiological model to report low values 
of attentiveness for these agents.
The results from testing the unrestricted baseline epidemiological model, where 
a0 = 0, on disaggregate Michigan Survey forecasts are presented in row (1) of 
Appendix 5.12 through to Appendix 5.31, whilst row (2) imposes the restriction
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a i + a 2 = 1- For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, Carroll’s
(2003) assumption that household expectations are formed as a weighted average of 
the current professional and own one-period lagged forecasts is generally accepted 
by the data, indicating that the epidemiological hypothesis can be deemed 
appropriate for the formation of household inflation forecasts. Moreover, for both 
the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, a 1 in row (1) is significant at 
the five percent level for all groups indicating that where the sample period is 
sufficiently long, a degree of attentiveness is exhibited by all agents. Nevertheless, 
several interesting relationships between the degree of attentiveness and agent 
expectations are observed.
Firstly, in Appendix 5.12 and Appendix 5.13, the value of a 1 generally falls as age 
rises; however, in accordance with the previous analysis of age disaggregated 
expectations in 4.2 and 4.3, there is some evidence of a U-shaped relationship. 
Specifically, for both the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods a 1 is larger 
for the elderly, aged 65-97, compared to the next oldest group aged 55-64; moreover, 
for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the lowest degree of attentiveness is 
exhibited by the “middle-aged” group, aged 45-54. Similar results are reported for 
the unrestricted specification presented in row (2) indicating that a larger proportion 
of younger agents update their information in any given period compared to middle- 
aged and older respondents.
In accordance with the earlier analysis of disaggregated expectations in 4.2, and the 
hypothesis stated above, the value of a 1 is generally higher as either education or 
income increases. Considering the unrestricted version of (5.3.1) over the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, there is some evidence that a 1 is 
larger for the least advantaged households compared with those with modest levels 
of education or income. Recalling from 4.2 that these agents realise the largest 
forecast errors, there could be larger incentives for the least advantaged to update 
their information more frequently relative to those with modest levels of education or 
income whose marginal cost of inattentiveness is lower.
In a similar manner to education and income disaggregations, row (1) of Appendix 
5.20 and Appendix 5.21 present lower values of a1 for women relative to men for 
both the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods. Nevertheless, the results
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for the restricted specification for the whole sample period suggest that the 
proportion of agents who updated in any given period is approximately 13 percent 
for both genders. For the Greenspan-Bemanke period, the proportion of men who 
exhibit attentiveness is however much larger relative to women, with 22 percent 
updating For the stable period, consistent with aggregate expectations where 
significance of a ± is only observed at the 10 percent level, a x is insignificant for 
both genders; for this extended period of reduced macroeconomic volatility, neither 
gender frequently updates their information.
Whereas the MFE and MSFE results indicate little difference across regionally 
disaggregated expectations, there appear substantial differences in the rate of 
information diffusion. Specifically, the a t values associated with the baseline model 
for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods are larger for agents from the 
North-Eastern and Western regions relative to those from the North-Central and 
Southern regions. Considering the restricted model for the whole period, in row (2), 
approximately 11 percent of those from the North-Central and Southern regions 
update their information in any given period, the proportion rises to over 20 percent 
for the North-Eastern and Southern regions.
In accordance with aggregate Michigan Survey expectations, the value of a ± for the 
baseline model is generally larger for all disaggregations relative to the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods indicative of a greater rate of information 
diffusion for periods of reduced macroeconomic volatility. Nevertheless, the results 
from the restrictive specification indicate that the frequency of updating remains 
heterogeneous. Some demographics, including the youngest and oldest age groups, 
those with graduate school education and in the uppermost income quartile having 
approximately 40 percent of agents updating in each period. In contrast, the 
proportion of other groups is as low as 20%, including for the middle-aged, women, 
the first income quartile (Y14) and those from the Southern region. Nevertheless, 
for both the unrestricted and restricted specifications, a 1 is not invariantly significant 
across demographic groups; specifically, at a five percent level, a 1 is not significant 
for those with less than high school or with college degree education, middle income 
groups, the North-Eastern and Southern regions, and both genders. These 
demographics may thus employ more backward-looking behaviour in the formation
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of inflation forecast relative to other groups and to periods of increased 
macroeconomic volatility.
For the volatile sub-period, consistent with the results for aggregate Michigan 
Survey expectations, the value of is much larger, generally around 1.000 or 
larger, for all demographic groups. Whilst for the baseline specification, a± is 
significant for all disaggregations, the restriction a 1 + a 2 = 1 is rejected across 
groups134; moreover, the relevance of the epidemiological hypotheses for the most 
recent period of macroeconomic volatility is questionable as compared to the three 
longer sample periods, the Durbin-Watson statistic for all groups is much lower, 
commonly around 1.500 or lower. Nevertheless, testing the restricted specification 
across demographics a 1 is almost invariably observed to be small and
I ^  Sinsignificant , indicative of a much lower rate of updating across groups in 
response to the forward-looking professional forecast relative to the Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sample periods. Additionally, reductions in R2 statistics across 
disaggregations relative to those for the stable sample period, and Durbin-Watson 
statistics roughly ranging between 1.2 and 1.8, again indicate that the survey- 
updating model is unable to adequately accommodate the formation of household 
expectations.
Recalling that Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Carroll (2003) estimate that a quarter of 
agents update their information in any given period, Wald x 2 tests of a 1 = 0.25 are 
examined for the restricted specification for each demographic group. For the whole 
sample period, the restriction is rejected for middle-aged and older respondents, 
lower education and income groups, women, and the North-Central and South 
regions. Given that the value of reported for the whole sample period for each of 
these groups is lower than 0.25, this further supports the premise that more 
advantaged households and women update their information more frequently than 
lesser advantaged counterparts, whilst there are asymmetries in the rate of updating 
across regions. For the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the Wald x 2 null
134 For the volatile sub-period, the restriction a 1 + a 2 =  1 is rejected at a 5 percent level except for 
highest income quartile (Y14), where the restriction is rejected at a 10 percent level o f significance.
135 The fourth income quartile is the only group for which significant value o f a 1 is observed for the 
restricted specification of the survey-updating model for the volatile sample period further supporting 
the notion that information updates during the most recent period of macroeconomic volatility are 
sufficiently costly to prevent households from obtaining the latest information.
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hypothesis of a x =  0.25 can only be rejected at a five percent level of significance 
for those households in the first income quartile; similarly, Mankiw and Reis’s
(2002) and Carroll’s (2003) estimate that a quarter of households update their 
information in any given quarter of the stable sample period cannot be rejected for 
any demographic group. In addition to the previously acknowledged increased rate 
of information diffusion across households, for periods of reduced macroeconomic 
uncertainty, there is also an apparent increased homogeneity in the updating 
frequency across the various demographic groups.
For the volatile sub-period, the Wald x 2 test is again unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that a x = 0.25 across demographics; however, as previously noted, the 
value of a 1 estimated by the restricted specification of the survey-updating model is 
almost invariably insignificant, with relatively large forecast errors. Therefore, it is 
deduced that agents across most demographic groups fail to update their information 
in response to the professional forecast during the most recent period of 
macroeconomic volatility. Nevertheless, the value of a 1 for the fourth income 
quartile is observed to be significant; moreover, the Wald x 2 test cannot reject that a 
quarter of these household update each quarter across the volatile period. This thus 
indicates that the costs associated with information acquisition and processing are 
sufficiently large during the volatile sub-period, that only those with the highest 
levels of income are willing to incur the necessary expenses.
Following Carroll (2003), and the analysis in 5.3.1 for aggregate Michigan Survey
1 ^expectations, both a constant and inflation are introduced to the baseline survey- 
updating specification, as represented by (5.2.5), to establish whether there are 
further differences which households across demographic groups update 
information. The results for the modified specifications of the survey-updating 
model are presented in rows (3) to (5) respectively of Appendix 5.12 through to 
Appendix 5.31.
Across all demographic disaggregations, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sample periods,, the value of a0 is generally around 1.000 or greater and 
highly significant; these results correspond with those presented by Carroll (2003)
136 Only the results for current inflation ( k  =  0) are presented. In accordance with the results for 
aggregate Michigan Survey forecasts, tests utilising k =  — 1 indicate that a3 and lagged inflation are 
insignificant across demographics.
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and Luoma and Luoto (2009). As highlighted in reference to aggregate expectations 
in 5.3.1, the significance of the constant could indicate some level anchoring 
behaviour on the part of all demographic groups, or may represent updating on other 
information sources which the professional forecast is unable to accommodate. For 
the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the value of a0 is generally 
larger for older respondents, the less educated, and lower income quartiles137. 
However, in accordance with the results for aggregate expectations, across 
demographics the inclusion of the constant results in relatively modest 
improvements in R2; this is particularly notable for the stable sample period, and for 
the young, more educated and women. Recalling that Hobijn and Lagakos (2005), 
McGranahan and Paulson (2006) and Hobijn et al. (2009) observe higher group-
138specific rates of inflation for these demographics , this could indicate that these 
households include some additional premium on their expectations to account for 
price experiences.
In accordance with the results presented by Luoma and Luoto (2009), current 
inflation in row (4) is generally significant across demographics and sample periods. 
Nevertheless, for the whole sample period, the value of a ± associated with the 
middle-aged and older households, those with lower levels of education or income, 
women, and the North-East and South regions is insignificant; similar results are also 
observed for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods indicting that these 
households utilise more naive updating rules than assumed by Carroll’s (2003) 
survey-updating hypothesis, and other demographic groups. Additionally, whereas 
Carroll (2003) observes that the inclusion of the constant term, along with lagged 
inflation, results in insignificance for the latter, a3 in row (5) remains generally 
insignificant across demographic groups and sample periods. The significance of the 
current inflation rate can thus not be dismissed as spurious. Instead, in the presence 
of both the constant and inflation, there is much greater insignificance associated 
with the professional forecast with a 1 generally insignificant across demographics 
for all four sample periods. These results thus question the relevancy of the survey- 
updating hypothesis for demographically disaggregated inflation expectations and
137 For gender and regionally disaggregated expectations, there is no discernible relationship between 
the value o f a 0 and household demographics.
138 Michael (1979) was also noted to observe higher rates of inflation for older respondents 
attributable to higher health care expenditure which is deemed to experience higher levels o f inflation 
relative to other commodities.
240
therefore necessitates further investigation regarding the updating behaviour of 
households, which the Lanne et al. (2009) naive sticky information hypothesis and 
Nunes (2009) rational-updating models are obvious candidates.
5.3.2.2. Disaggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Naive Sticky 
Information Hypothesis
Although the results concerning Carroll’s (2003) survey-updating model indicate 
that the rate which households update their information is heterogeneous and 
dependent upon both demographics and macroeconomic conditions, upon inclusion, 
the current rate of inflation was observed to be significant across both sample 
periods and demographic groups. These results thus indicate that a proportion of 
updating agents do not absorb forward-looking information, and instead update their 
expectations naively in response to news. Moreover, the observation of 
insignificance of a 1 across demographics may additionally indicate that agents 
update their information in response to a range of news sources utilising a 
combination of forward-looking and backward-looking information.
To establish the extent of heterogeneity in information updating behaviour across the 
various demographic groups, the unrestricted, restricted and nested specifications of 
Lanne et al.’s (2009) naive sticky information model, as presented in (5.3.3) and
(5.3.4), shall be examined across disaggregated Michigan Survey inflation forecasts 
for each of the four sample periods. Recalling that tests of both the survey-updating 
and naive sticky information models for aggregate expectations indicate that the use 
of current inflation is better suited to Michigan Survey inflation forecasts relative to
1 O Q
lagged inflation, only the results of k = 0 shall be presented . The results of these 
tests are presented in Appendix 5.32 through to Appendix 5.51.
Across all disaggregations the baseline and restricted specifications of the naive 
sticky information model, presented in rows (1) and (2) of each panel respectively, 
indicate that the rate of information updating on current inflation is time-dependent; 
namely, the value of /?! is generally largest for the stable sub-period, whilst for the 
volatile sub-period, /?x is smaller, further supporting the previous findings that
139 In accordance with the results for aggregate expectations and those for the survey-updating model, 
coefficient associated with lagged inflation ( k  =  1) are generally insignificant across demographics 
and the four sample periods.
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information diffuses more rapidly for periods of reduced macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Moreover, in accordance with the results for models of survey- 
updating, the value of /?x is generally larger for those with higher levels of education 
or income, men, and the North-East and West regions; an approximate U-shaped 
relationship is again observed between the rate of information updating and age.
For the whole sample period, the unrestricted and restricted specifications presented 
in rows (1) and (2) of Appendix 5.32 to Appendix 5.51 indicate generally higher 
rates of updating for households with high levels of education140 or income, men, 
and the North-East and West regions; an approximate U-shaped relationship is 
observed between household age and information attentiveness indicating that young 
and old respondents update their information more frequently than middle-aged 
households141. The restricted specification estimates that as few as 12 percent of the 
least advantaged agents update their information in each quarter, ranging up to 35 
percent for those with higher levels of income or education. These values are 
however lower than those presented for the survey-updating model indicating that 
agents devote greater attention to forward-looking news than the values of current 
macroeconomic variables when reporting expectations. Nevertheless, consistent 
with Lanne et al.’s (2009) estimate for aggregate expectations, for all demographic 
groups except those with college degree or graduate school education, the Wald x 2 
test is unable to reject the null hypothesis that 18 percent of agents update their 
information in response to current inflation in each period. These results are thus in 
accordance with those for the survey-updating model, indicating that the proportion 
of highly educated households updating in each period is higher relative to other 
demographic groups. This supports the idea that more advantaged households have 
greater resources available, either cognitive or financial, to employ in the processing 
and acquisition of information.
Similar relationships are again observed for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable 
periods. Nevertheless, for the Greenspan-Bemanke period, a small reduction in is
140 In accordance with the results for the survey-updating model, those with less than high school 
education (ELHS) have a higher rate o f updating relative to those with high school degree education. 
Given that in Chapter 4, the least educated were observed to realise larger forecast errors, they may 
experience higher opportunity costs o f inattentiveness relative to other lower education groups.
141 The estimates for the restricted specification indicate that for the whole sample period, 21-24 
percent o f those aged 18-45 update their expectations each period compared to approximately 18 
percent o f those over 45.
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generally observed across demographic groups, thus indicative of a reduced rate of 
information attentiveness across households upon exclusion of the Volcker era. In 
contrast, for the stable sample period, /?x is generally larger with the restricted 
specification indicating that approximately 20 percent or more agents across most 
demographic groups update in each quarter. At a five percent level of significance, 
the Wald x 2 test can only reject the null hypothesis of /?x =  0.18 for those with 
graduate school education for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, but cannot 
reject the null hypothesis for any demographic for the stable sample period. This is 
thus indicative of a strong degree of homogeneity in the rate of updating across 
households, particularly for periods of greater macroeconomic stability.
Nevertheless, for the volatile sub-period, the /?x coefficients across demographics are 
generally smaller; moreover considering the restricted specification in row (2) of 
each panel, the proportion of agents updating across demographics is generally found 
to be insignificant. These results thus conform with the results for aggregate 
expectations presented in Appendix 5.3 indicating that the rate of attentiveness to 
current macroeconomic conditions falls during the recent period of macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the two groups with the highest levels of education 
continue to report significant levels of information updating indicating that the 
degree of attentiveness exhibited by these agents is insensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions.
Similar relationships across demographics and sample periods are again observed for 
the nested specification presented in row (3) of each panel. Additionally, there is a 
higher propensity for households with higher levels of education or income to update 
in response to the forward-looking professional forecast whilst less advantaged 
households are more likely to absorb the current inflation rate into their information 
set when updating. Moreover, compared to the whole sample period, /?2 is generally 
smaller for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, indicating that 
households are more likely to absorb the forward-looking professional forecast, in 
preference to the current rate of inflation, during periods of reduced macroeconomic 
uncertainty.
For the whole sample period, the nested specification indicates that younger 
households, those with higher educational attainment or income, men and those from 
the North-East and Western regions report a higher rate of updating to any
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information than other disaggregations. Differences are particularly notable across 
education disaggregations. Namely, whereas only 15-20 percent of those households 
with some college education or less update in each period, the updating proportion of 
those with college degree or graduate level education is estimated by the nested 
specification at 51 and 62 percent respectively. Similarly, whereas only 14 percent 
of the first income quartile are attentive each period, 46 percent of those in the fourth 
income quartile update each period. To examine whether the differences between 
demographic groups, and with respect to the estimate reported by Lanne et al. (2009) 
are significant, the Wald x 2 test examines whether f t  = 0.25.
At a five percent level of significance, the null hypothesis that a quarter of 
households update each quarter, as proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll 
(2003) and Lanne et al. (2009), cannot be rejected by the Wald x 2 test for all age 
groups, those with less than high school, or some college, education, both genders, 
the top three income quartiles, and the West region; this is also consistent with the 
results presented by Lanne et al. (2009). There is thus some degree of homogeneity 
in the rate of updating amongst demographic groups. Nevertheless, the Wald x 2 test 
indicates that under 25 percent of high school degree educated, the first income 
quartile, and the North-Central and South regions update each quarter; in contrast, 
the proportion of the college degree or graduate school educated, and those from the 
North-East and South regions that update each period is found by the Wald x 2 test to 
be over 25 percent. In accordance with tests of the survey-updating model, the 
frequency which agents update information is not homogeneous across demographic 
groups, thus further questioning the constant rate of updating proposal embodied 
within Mankiw and Reis’s (2002) sticky information hypothesis.
Additionally, the coefficient attached to the professional forecast is insignificant for 
low education and low income groups, whereas both f t  and 1 — f t  are significant 
for more advantaged demographics. Therefore, not only do more advantaged groups 
update more frequently than the less advantaged, upon updating, they exhibit a 
greater probability of absorbing the forward-looking forecast. Similarly, whereas the 
young, and the North-East and West regions update in response to both information 
sources, the coefficient attached associated with forward-looking updating is 
insignificant for the two oldest age groups, and the North-Central and South regions.
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For the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, the rate of updating is again increasing in 
education and income, whilst men, and the North-East and West regions, exhibit 
more frequent information updating than women and the North-Central and South 
regions. Nevertheless, for age disaggregations the U-shaped relationship is once 
more evident for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period. Similar relationships are 
also observed for the stable sample period across age, education and income 
disaggregations; however, the value of is roughly equal for men and women, 
whilst the South region has a lower frequency of information updating relative to the 
three other regions. Moreover, consistent with Lanne et al.’s (2009) estimate, the 
Wald x 2 null hypothesis of 25 percent of each group updating each quarter again 
cannot be rejected for most demographics. However, for the Greenspan-Bemanke 
sample period those with high school degree or some college education, women, the 
first income quartile and the south region update less frequently, whilst those with 
college degree or graduate school education, update more frequently. Consistent 
with a greater degree of homogeneity in the rate of updating, the Wald x 2 test that 
/?! =  0.25, in accordance with Lanne et al.’s estimate, cannot generally be rejected 
across demographics. Nevertheless, the updating proportion of both college degree 
and graduate school educated households is again significantly greater than a quarter, 
with the nested specification estimating that over 60 percent of those with higher 
levels of education update to either the naive or forward-looking predictor in any 
given period.
In accordance with the baseline naive sticky information specifications, the rate of 
information diffusion from the nested specification for the volatile sub-period is 
again lower across demographic groups142; additionally there appears greater 
heterogeneity in the degree of information updating relative to periods of reduced 
macroeconomic uncertainty. Whereas over the three larger sample periods, a 
significant proportion of each demographic group update their information each 
quarter, for the volatile sub-period, at a five percent level p1 is statistically 
insignificant for those aged 65-97, the three lowest education groups, women , the 
first income quartiles and the North-Central and North-East regions. Moreover, the 
coefficients attached to the distinct information sources are only significant for the
142 The results for the nested naive sticky information specification for the volatile sub-period for age, 
education, gender, income and regional disaggregations are presented in row (3) o f each panel in 
Appendix 5.35, Appendix 5.39, Appendix 5.43, Appendix 5.47 and Appendix 5.51 respectively.
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two highest education groups, the fourth income quartile and men, with greater 
weight attached to the professional forecast. Therefore, not only do more 
advantaged groups, and men, maintain higher rates of updating during periods of 
increase volatility, they also continue to utilise forward-looking updating behaviour; 
furthermore, for those with graduate school education, the Wald test continues to 
indicate that the proportion updating each quarter is in excess of 25 percent. This 
contrasts to the less advantaged, and women, who resort to backward-looking 
expectation formation.
5.3.2.3. Disaggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the Rational 
Updating Hypothesis
Whilst Lanne et al.’s (2009) naive sticky information hypothesis advocates that 
agents are more backward-looking in their updating behaviour relative to Carroll’s 
(2003) survey updating model, Nunes (2009) proposes that agents are more forward- 
looking when updating their information, absorbing the rational forecast. In 
accordance with the analysis for aggregate expectations in 5.3.1, (5.2.12) shall be 
examined across disaggregate Michigan Survey expectations over the four sample 
periods; again, as the rational forecast is proxied by the actual four-period ahead 
realisation of inflation, GMM estimation is required to account for endogeniety143. 
The results for the baseline and restricted specifications of the rational-updating 
model are presented in rows (1) and (2) of each panel in Appendix 5.52 to Appendix 
5.71. Across all disaggregations, the baseline and restricted specifications of 
(5.2.12) clearly indicate that the rate of rational updating is time-variant with the 
value of y± particularly large for the stable sub-period; this correspond with the 
results from Chapter 3 that household expectations are more consistent with the 
predictions of RE during periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty. In 
contrast, despite the assumption of greater opportunity cost associated with 
inattentiveness, for the volatile sub-period, the value of y1 is generally insignificant 
across demographic groups supporting the argument that due to increased costs 
associated with the acquisition and processing of information, agents exhibit greater 
inattentive behaviour during periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty.
143 The instrument set is identical to that employed for aggregate expectations, and is based on those 
utilised by Gali and Gertler (1999), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and Nunes (2009).
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In accordance with the analysis of the survey updating and naive sticky information 
models, significant differences are observed in the rate of updating across 
demographic groups, with higher rates of updating observed for men, those with 
higher levels of education and income, and the North-East and West regions. 
However, in contrast to alternative models of information diffusion which predict 
approximate U-shaped relationships between attentiveness and age, younger 
households generally appear to update more frequently in response to the rational 
forecast relative to older counterparts. Specifically, for the whole sample period, the 
restricted specification estimates that over 30 percent of those aged 18-34 update 
each period, whilst approximately 17 percent of those aged 55 or over incorporate 
the most recent ‘rational’ information into expectations. Furthermore, whilst the 
Wald x 2 test cannot reject that the proportion of updating agents for those aged 34 or 
older is equal to Nunes’s (2009) estimate of 18 percent, the null hypothesis rejected 
at a high level of significance for the youngest age group indicating a significantly 
higher rate of updating amongst these agents. Nevertheless, a reasonable degree of 
homogeneity is evident in the rate of updating for the whole sample period across 
groups as the Wald x 2 null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any education level, 
either gender, any region and the second and third income quartiles. However, the 
Wald x 2 null hypothesis of y1 = 0.18 is rejected for both the first and fourth income 
quartiles; for the former, a lower rate of attentiveness is observed with approximately 
9 percent updating each quarter, whilst for the latter, the rate of attentiveness is much 
higher with in excess of 30 percent updating in response to the rational forecast.
This adds to the evidence that higher income groups are more willing to incur the 
costs associated with information acquisition and processing.
For the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, tests of the baseline and restricted 
specifications of (5.2.12) yield lower estimates of y1 across all demographic groups 
relative to the whole sample period. This appears to indicate that following the 
Volker era when inflation was particularly high, the rational updating behaviour of 
all agents falls, consistent with agents utilising more backward-looking behaviour 
during periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty. Nevertheless, similar 
relationships regarding the frequency of rational updating and demographics are 
observed with larger values of y1 presented for the young, those with higher levels of 
education and income, and the North-East and West regions.
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As highlighted above, for the stable period, much larger values of y1 are observed 
across all demographic groups relative to the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample 
periods indicating that agent attentiveness is more forward-looking during periods of 
reduced macroeconomic uncertainty. Nevertheless, lower values of y±, compared to 
other groups, are observed for the least educated, the first income quartile and 
women. Furthermore, whilst the Wald x 2 null hypothesis for the restricted 
specification of y± = 0.18, in accordance with Nunes’s (2009) estimate cannot be 
rejected for these groups, the percentage of agents updating from all other groups is 
found to be significantly greater. Therefore, during periods of greater stability there 
is again some evidence of heterogeneity in updating behaviour with the least 
advantaged, and women, more inattentive to the rational forecast.
In contrast, the results for the baseline specification for the volatile period, indicates 
strong degree of homogeneity in the rate of updating relative to rational information; 
specifically, the value of y1 is generally insignificant from zero, with only the North- 
East region exhibiting a significant, albeit low value of y±. Nevertheless, the Wald 
X2 null hypothesis y x = 0.18 is invariably rejected indicating that the proportion of 
agents rationally updating, across all demographic groups is much lower for the 
recent volatile period than predicted by Nunes (2009).
Results from testing the nested rational updating model for each disaggregation, 
where agents update towards either the professional forecast or RE are presented in 
row (3) of each panel of Appendix 5.52 to Appendix 5.71. As previously observed, 
across disaggregations the proportion of agents receiving information updates is 
time-variant; a lower rate of updating is observed for the Greenspan-Bemanke 
sample period in comparison to the whole sample period, whilst for the stable and 
volatile sub-periods, a much larger rate of updating is observed across demographics 
for the former relative to the latter. Moreover, for the whole and stable periods 
households across demographic groups appear more likely to update towards RE 
than towards the professional forecast with y2 commonly observed in excess of 
0.700; these results are in the same direction as those presented by Nunes (2009) 
whose results for aggregate expectations find a larger weight upon RE than the SPF 
forecast. In contrast, for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the coefficient 
associated with either information source is generally insignificant, resulting from
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the smaller proportion of agents updating in each period. Nevertheless, for the 
volatile sub-period, despite observing relatively small values of y1? the coefficient on 
the professional forecast is generally large and significant, indicating that for the 
recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty, where households are attentive, they 
are less likely to update their information rationally, instead relying on the 
professional forecast as published by the media. These results support the argument 
from Chapter 3 that household expectations exhibit larger deviations from rationality 
during periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty.
Additionally, in accordance with the results in rows (1) and (2) and those presented 
for the survey-updating and naive sticky information models, the rate of updating 
across demographic groups is heterogeneous. Specifically, for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, higher rates of updating are again 
observed for those households with higher levels of education or income. Indeed, 
for the whole sample period, Wald x 2 tests of the null hypothesis y1 =  0.25 indicate 
that less than a quarter of lower education and income groups update each quarter 
whilst more advantaged households update more frequently144.
For the volatile sub-period, the proportion of households updating to any information 
source is much lower relative to the stable sample period; however, y± is only 
insignificant for women and the high school educated. Moreover, the rate of 
updating again appears dependent upon household demographics with higher 
proportion of agents updating observed for younger households, men, those with 
higher levels of education or income, and the West region. Nevertheless, 
examination of the Wald x 2 test null hypothesis that a quarter of agents update each 
quarter reveal the extent of differences across demographic groups. At a five percent 
level of significance the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any age group except 
those aged 65-97, the second and third income quartiles and the North-East and West 
regions. In contrast, the Wald null hypothesis is rejected for all other demographic 
groups; however, whilst women, the oldest age group, those with some college 
education or less, the first income quartile and the North-Central and South regions 
update less frequently, men and higher education or income groups update more 
frequently. Whilst there is some homogeneity in the rate of updating amongst age
144 For the whole sample period, the Wald x 2 null hypothesis y t =  0.25 cannot be rejected for those 
households with some college education, and those in the second and third income quartiles.
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groups, these results support the argument that ‘more advantaged’ households update 
more frequently, whilst greater heterogeneity in the rate of updating is observed 
across all other disaggregations for the recent period of macroeconomic volatility.
In accordance with the results from the nested specification, there is further 
heterogeneity across demographics in the information absorbed by agents upon 
updating. For the whole sample period, a significant proportion of agents update to 
RE, whilst the coefficient associated with the SPF is insignificant; these results 
support those presented by Nunes (2009). Nevertheless, groups where a high 
proportion of agents update each period, namely those aged 18-34, with graduate 
school education, or from the North-East or West regions exhibit significant values 
of updating towards both RE and the professional forecast; in contrast, groups with 
lower rates of updating, including the two older age groups, women and the first 
income quartile, do not significantly update to either information source. These 
results may indicate that as agents update with increasing frequency, they are more 
likely to encounter and absorb different sources of information whilst those with 
lower levels of attentiveness update to more backward-looking information which 
the rational updating model fails to accommodate.
For the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period, the lower rates of updating, as 
previously observed, generally result in insignificance for the coefficients attached to 
both rational updating and survey updating. Greater heterogeneity is observed for 
the stable with higher rates of updating observed for the young and the old, and the 
more educated; nevertheless, across all disaggregations, agents appear to update 
more towards RE than towards the SPF. In contrast, for the volatile sub-period, the 
coefficient associated with rational updating is generally insignificant, with agents 
attaching much greater weight to updating towards the professional forecast 
indicative of a reduction in forward-looking behaviour; moreover, the results support 
the observations in Chapter 3 that agents report inflation forecasts less consistent 
with the predictions of the REH for the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The results presented in this section evidently indicate that the manner which agents 
update their information is not homogeneous as suggested by the sticky information 
hypothesis presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002). Instead, the frequency of 
information updates is both time-variant and group-specific. In accordance with the
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results for aggregate expectations presented in 5.3.1, the frequency of information 
updating increases across demographics for periods of reduced macroeconomic 
uncertainty, yet are substantially lower for periods of greater volatility. Additionally, 
the results presented in this section indicate that those demographic groups who were 
found in 4.2 and 4.3 to realise lower forecast errors, and report lower levels of 
forecast disagreement, update their information more frequently.
For the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sub-periods, a negative relationship is 
evident between the proportion of agents updating each period and the age of 
respondents; however, in accordance with the results for the naive sticky information 
model and the baseline specification of the rational-updating model, an approximate 
U-shaped relationship is observed for the stable sub-period. Nevertheless, for the 
whole sample period, the invariant non-rejection of the Wald x 2 test null hypothesis 
y1 = 0.25 at a five percent level of significance supports the notion that for a 
reasonable degree of homogeneity exists in the rate of information updating amongst 
age groups. In contrast, for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable period, significant 
differences in the rate of updating are observed. Specifically, for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke period Wald x 2 tests indicate that older households update less frequently 
than younger counterparts whilst for the stable sub-period, those aged 45-54 have a 
lower rate of updating relative to all other age groups.
S.3.2.4. Disaggregate Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts and the 
Heterogeneous Updating Hypothesis
From the analysis in this section, it is evident that the information updating 
behaviour amongst households is not homogeneous; instead attentiveness to various 
information sources appears time-variant and dependent upon demographics. To 
analyse the relative frequency which each demographic group updates to the three 
distinct sources of information, the multiple updating model, as presented by (5.3.5) 
and (5.3.6) in section 5.3.1 shall be analysed with the results presented in Appendix 
5.72 to Appendix 5.91; row (1) presents the baseline specification (5.3.5) with row 
(2) imposing the restriction </>4 = 1 — (p± + (f)2 — 03, whilst row (3) presents the 
results for the nested specification (5.3.6).
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Again, the results for the baseline and restricted specifications of (5.3.5) are 
presented in rows (1) and (2) of each panel respectively, clearly indicate that the 
updating behaviour of agents is time-dependent and varies across demographic 
groups. In accordance with the results for the rational-updating across 
demographics, the value of 0 4 is generally smaller for the stable sub-period relative 
to either the whole or Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods; these results support the 
previous observations that agents update information more frequently during periods 
of reduced macroeconomic volatility.
For the whole sample period, the baseline and restricted specifications indicate that 
younger households, those with higher levels of education and income, men and 
those households resident in the North-East or West regions update more frequently 
relative to other groups. Whilst all demographics predominantly update in 
accordance with the rational updating hypotheses, amongst the aforementioned 
groups, differences in updating behaviour are observed. Specifically, updating to a 
combination of the professional forecast and the rational updating predictor is 
exhibited by those households aged 18-34 or with graduate school education, whilst 
male and the third income group update in response to a combination of the naive 
sticky information and rational updating predictors. In contrast, those aged 35-44 or 
with college degree education update to solely the naive sticky information predictor 
yet the fourth income quartile update in accordance with all three of the survey 
updating, naive sticky information and rational updating hypotheses. These results 
appear to indicate that the youngest and most advantaged agents are most likely to 
update towards the professional forecast; moreover, the attentiveness of the highest 
education and income groups further supports the argument that only these agents 
possess the necessary financial or cognitive resources to acquire and process the 
information in the professional forecast.
In contrast, for the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, the baseline and restricted 
specifications indicate that across the various disaggregations, the rate of updating to 
the distinct information sources is generally insignificant. Nevertheless, groups with 
high levels of education exhibit significant rates of attentiveness to some 
combination of the forward-looking professional forecast, and the naive sticky 
information predictor. In addition, consistent with the rate of updating presented by 
Carroll (2003) for those households with some college education or greater, it is not
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possible to reject the Wald x 2 null hypothesis that 25 percent of agents absorb the 
professional forecast each period. Similarly, whilst the coefficient attached to the 
naive sticky information predictor for these groups is smaller, it is again not possible 
to reject the Wald x 2 null hypothesis that 25 percent of those with graduate school 
education absorb the information content of current inflation each period.
As highlighted above, the results for the stable sample period indicate that 
households across disaggregations update more frequently relative to the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods. Moreover, across disaggregations and 
demographic groups, households appear to generally update more frequently in 
accordance with the rational-updating hypothesis rather than the survey-updating or 
naive sticky information hypotheses suggesting that, in general, households are more 
forward looking during periods of reduced macroeconomic uncertainty. Moreover, 
for the baseline specification of the heterogeneous updating model, the Wald x 2 nuU 
hypothesis (p1 + </>2 + $ 3  + 0 4  = 1 cannot generally be rejected across 
disaggregations145, Nevertheless, there is also evidence showing that younger age 
groups, those with higher levels of education or income, and the North-East region 
exhibit greater attention to the professional forecast or naive sticky information 
predictor for the stable period relative to other demographic groups. These groups 
have previously been observed in 5.3.2.1 and 5.3.2.2 to be amongst those with higher 
rates of updating for the individual updating hypotheses suggesting that as agents 
update more frequently, there is an increased probability that they will encounter and 
absorb the content of various sources of information.
Examinations of the Wald statistics for the unrestricted specification over the stable 
sample period further demonstrate differences in the rate which agents update 
information. Despite the value of (f)1 for the stable period being generally 
insignificant, Wald tests of =  0.25 cannot be rejected for various demographic 
groups including all five age groups, both genders and those with some college, 
college degree and graduate school education. Therefore, for the period associated 
with reduced macroeconomic volatility, some support is gain observed for Carroll’s 
(2003) prediction that a quarter of agents update towards the professional forecast
145 The null hypothesis is however rejected for the high school degree educated, the first income 
quartile and women, suggesting that fir less advantaged households, expectations are formed 
inconsistently with the predictions of the heterogeneous updating model.
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each quarter. Nevertheless, due to the general insignificance and relatively large 
standard errors associated with (f)1, broad conclusions regarding survey updating 
within the heterogeneous updating model must be avoided.
Moreover, at a five percent level of significance it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that a quarter of graduate school educated respondents, or those resident 
in the North-East region update in response to the naive sticky information predictor 
each quarter146. There is thus no evidence that less advantaged households are more 
attentive to na'ive information relative to more advantaged counterparts or to 
updating in response to the forward-looking predictors.
In accordance with the results presented for the survey-updating hypothesis, tests of 
the baseline heterogeneous updating model for the volatile sub-period reveal large 
significant values of 0 1} often in excess of 1.000, whilst the coefficients associated 
with the naive sticky information and rational updating hypotheses are generally 
insignificant. These results suggest that for the recent period associated with greater 
macroeconomic uncertainty, agents across demographic groups exhibit a high degree 
of attentiveness to the forward-looking professional forecast; however, as previously 
observed for the survey updating model, these results are not robust to the imposition 
of the weighted average restriction. Instead, the results indicate that a large 
proportion, commonly in excess of 80 percent, is inattentive to any information, 
forming expectations consistent with outdated plans. Nevertheless, lower levels of 
inattentiveness are again observed for men, the two highest education categories, and 
the fourth income quartile with (j)1 significant for the top education and income 
groups147. Moreover, for all these groups, it is not possible to reject that (p1 =  0.25, 
corresponding with Carroll’s (2003) prediction that a quarter of agents update each 
period. Additionally, in accordance with Lanne et al.’s (2009) prediction for the 
naive sticky information model, the Wald x 2 null hypothesis (p2 = 0.25 cannot be 
rejected for the top education or income groups further supporting the argument that 
highly advantaged agents remain highly attentive to multiple sources of information 
regardless of macroeconomic conditions.
146 At a 10 percent level o f significance, the Wald x 2 null hypothesis 0 2 =  0.25 can also not be 
rejected for those respondents aged 35-44 or those resident in the West region.
147 In accordance with the results for other the majority o f other demographics groups, the values of 
02  and 0 3  are insignificant.
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As for aggregate expectations, and in a similar manner to the analysis of the naive 
sticky information and rational updating models in 5.3.2.2 and 5.3.2.3, the nested 
specification of the heterogeneous updating model (5.3.6) shall be examined for 
disaggregate Michigan Survey inflation forecasts to determine the proportion of 
agents from each demographic updating to the distinct sources of information. The 
results from tests of (5.3.6) are presented in row (3) of Appendix 5.72 to Appendix 
5.91. Firstly, considering the values of A, representing the proportion of agents 
updating to any information in any given quarter, it is again evident that the rate of 
information diffusion is dependent upon both the sample period and household 
demographics. Consistent with the previous analysis for the individual updating 
hypotheses, and those for aggregate expectations presented in Appendix 5.6, the 
value of A is generally large for the stable sample period, whilst a smaller proportion 
update each quarter during the recent volatile sub-period.
For the whole sample period the value of A ranges widely across demographics; 
specifically, significant values of approximately 0.400 or above are observed for 
those households aged 18-34, with college degree or graduate school education, and 
the fourth income quartile, whilst the rate of updating for those aged 65-97, women 
and the North-Central and North-East regions is insignificant. Moreover, the 
demographic trends in updating previously observed across the various models is 
again evident with the updating proportion of agents larger for men, younger age 
groups, and those with higher levels of education or income. Despite these 
observations, for the whole sample period, the Wald x 2 tests suggests that the rate of 
updating is relatively homogeneous across demographic groups with the null 
hypothesis A = 0.25 only rejected for those with graduate school education and the 
first income quartile, with the former updating more frequently and the latter 
exhibiting greater attention. These results thus support the predictions of Mankiw 
and Reis (2002) of Carroll (2003) and Lanne et al. (2009) that a quarter of agents 
update each period, whilst additionally suggesting some role for demographic 
characteristics for the rate of information diffusion amongst households in a similar 
manner to Pfajfar and Santoro (2008).
In accordance with the results for the baseline specifications and the rational 
updating model presented in 5.3.2.3, the value of A associated with the Greenspan-
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Bemanke sample period is generally much smaller relative to the whole sample 
period, suggesting that the rate of updating amongst households falls upon exclusion 
of the Volcker era. Nevertheless, the general trends observed for the whole sample 
period are again found for the Greenspan-Bemanke sample period with higher rates 
of updating for men, younger households, and those with higher levels of education 
and income; indeed, whilst the Wald x 2 test null hypothesis A = 0.25 cannot
148generally be rejected for these groups , a lower rate of updating is apparent for 
other demographics.
As highlighted above, the rate of updating estimated by the nested heterogeneous 
updating model for the stable sub-period is generally a lot higher relative to the 
whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods and significant across demographics. 
Comparing demographic groups, higher rates of updating are again observed for 
men, higher education and income groups, and the North-East and West regions, 
whilst an approximate U-shaped relationship is observed across age groups. 
Nevertheless, examination of the Wald x 2 statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis 
A = 0.25 for various groups including those with lower levels of education and 
income, and those in the 35-44 and 45-54 age groups; these results support those of 
Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll (2003) and Lanne et al. (2009) that a quarter of 
agents update each period. The Wald null hypothesis A = 0.25 is however rejected 
for various other groups including older age groups, those with college degree 
education, higher income groups and the North-East region; the larger value of A 
observed for these groups, indicates that these households update more frequently 
than once a year. Whilst the (1 — (f>1 — (p2) coefficient on rational updating is 
generally significant across demographics, with particularly large values observed 
for older age groups, the more educated and higher income groups, only those with 
high rates of updating, including those with college degree education or the third and 
fourth income quartiles significantly update towards a combination of information 
sources.
Although the Wald null hypothesis of A = 0.25 is rejected for both men and women 
for the stable sub-period, significant differences are observed in the rate of updating
148 The Wald x 2 nuU hypothesis X =  0.25 is rejected for both men and those with graduate school 
education with the former updating information less frequently, whilst over a quarter o f the latter 
group update each period.
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between the two genders. Specifically, the rejection of the Wald null hypothesis, 
along with the values of A presented in Appendix 5.82 indicate that whereas 
significantly more than 25 percent of men update each period, women are more 
inattentive with less than a quarter updating their information each period.
Moreover, upon updating whereas women significantly absorb the forward-looking 
professional forecast, men update towards the rational forecast.
For the volatile sample period, the nested heterogeneous updating model again 
reveals distinct differences in the rate of updating between demographic groups. The 
Whereas the value of A for those groups with low levels of updating for the three 
alternative sample periods is generally insignificant, higher rates of updating to any 
information source are again observed for men and more advantaged households. 
Specifically, whereas around 50 percent or above of men, those with graduate school 
education or in the fourth income quartile update each period, over 90 percent of 
women, those aged 65-97, or the first and second income quartiles are inattentive. 
Furthermore, Wald coefficient tests generally reject the null hypothesis that a quarter 
of respondents from these demographic groups update in response to any 
information source for any given quarter of the volatile sub-period, further 
supporting the argument that agents exhibit greater inattentive behaviour during 
periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty. Upon updating, the coefficients on 
the three updating hypotheses are generally insignificant; nevertheless, (p± is 
significant for both those with graduate school education or in the fourth income 
quartile, indicating that even during periods of greater volatility, the most 
advantaged agents remain able to devote the necessary resources to absorbing 
forward-looking information.
The results for the heterogeneous updating model further emphasises the results 
presented for the individual hypotheses in 5.3.2.1,5.3.2.2, and 5.3.2.3 that the 
information updating behaviour amongst agents is dependent upon both agent 
demographics and macroeconomic conditions for the analysed sample period. To 
summarise the findings from this sub-section, higher rates of updating are again 
observed for the stable sample period where macroeconomic volatility is generally 
reduced further supporting the argument that agents update more frequently where 
the costs of information processing and acquisition are lower. Additionally, higher 
rates of updating are observed for men and more advantaged agents; these household
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are likely to be able to employ greater resources, both financial and cognitive in 
information updating activities whilst these groups are additionally identified by 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) to generally possess 
greater economic and financial literacy and interest further enhancing their 
attentiveness. Furthermore, upon updating, those agents who exhibit greater levels 
of attentiveness are more likely to absorb a combination of information content; 
however, rather than updating towards the naive sticky information predictor, those 
groups who update more infrequently continue to update towards the forward- 
looking rational forecast.
5.3.2.5. Evaluation o f Epidemiological Models for Disaggregate Expectations
As for aggregate household expectations, several epidemiological style models akin 
to Carroll (2003) have been examined in this sub-section, with households updating 
their information to survey forecasts, naive information and rational expectations 
respectively. The results presented in this section suggest that information updating 
behaviour across, and within, demographic groups is not homogeneous; instead 
agents update their information in response to a variety, or combination, of 
information sources. Across the various models, higher rates of updating are 
observed for men and those with higher levels of education and income; In contrast, 
a U-shaped relationship is generally observed for age disaggregated expectations, 
whilst only limited differences in the rate of updating were observed across regions. 
There is however no substantial evidence that less advantaged agents substitute 
attentiveness to forward-looking information to updating towards naive predictors.
The analysis in this section clearly indicates that agents do not solely update to a 
single information source, and instead absorb some combination of both current 
information regarding current macroeconomic events, and forward-looking 
information as embodied in professional forecasts and rational expectations. To 
accommodate agents simultaneously updating to various information sources, the 
heterogeneous updating model is empirically examined across disaggregations. The 
rate of updating to the various sources for older respondents, women, and less 
advantaged groups is generally insignificant. This supports the hypothesis as 
presented by Malmendier and Nagel (2009) and Madeira and Zafar (2012) that these 
groups are more likely to form their expectations relying upon previous inflation
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experiences. Additionally, the lower attentiveness exhibited by these groups is 
indicative of incurring higher information acquisition and processing costs, which 
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) attribute to lower levels 
of financial economic and financial literacy, and a generally reduced level of interest 
regarding these issues.
The asymmetric information updating behaviour across demographic groups 
identified in this section is likely to be a key contributor to the extent of expectation 
heterogeneity and differences in forecast errors observed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, 
the results for disaggregate Michigan Survey inflation expectations further 
emphasises the existence of an inverse relationship between the rate of updating and 
forecast accuracy across both sample periods and household demographics. 
Consequently, the optimal communication strategy employed by policymakers may 
thus be multi-tiered as previously emphasised by Sims (2009) and Menz and Poppitz 
(2013).
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5.4. Discussion of Epidemiological Updating Hypotheses
The sticky information and epidemiology models of Mankiw and Reis (2002) and 
Carroll (2003) respectively have provided various interesting insights regarding 
agent behaviour and expectation behaviour; however, several studies have 
questioned the relevance of the models predictions. Comparing epidemiological 
models to those of rational-updating, Nunes (2009) favours the latter arguing that 
within a nested specification, Michigan Survey expectations fail to respond to 
professional forecasts; in contrast, Coibion (2010) argues that models inspired by the 
Calvo (1983) notion of sticky prices better accommodate the actual response of 
expectations and inflation to monetary and non-monetary shocks.
Re-examining Carroll’s (2003) epidemiological model, the results presented in this 
chapter indicate that for extended sample periods, the rate of information diffusion is 
generally over-estimated by previous studies. This conforms with the results from 
Table 5.3.1 which presented weaker evidence of Granger causality between the 
inflation forecasts of the SPF and Michigan Survey than previously observed by 
Carroll (2003). Nevertheless, extensions to the survey-updating model, namely the 
naive sticky information and rational-updating hypotheses, indicate that Carroll’s 
(2003, 2006) epidemiological approach fails to fully accommodate the updating 
behaviour of households. Whilst Lanne et al. (2009) and Nunes (2009) incorporate 
backward-looking behaviour and rational expectations into epidemiological 
expectations models, this chapter has additionally introduced a nested specification 
featuring aspects of all three updating hypotheses.
Tests of the three individual epidemiological hypotheses on aggregate Michigan 
Survey inflation expectations reveal that households are only infrequently attentive 
to information embodied in either professional expectations, realised inflation 
values, or the rational forecast. For the whole sample period, the rate of updating 
estimated by the survey updating and naive sticky information models is lower 
compared to the predictions of Carroll (2003) and Lanne et al. (2009) respectively; in 
contrast, the estimates for the rational updating model are more consistent with those 
presented by Nunes (2009). Nevertheless, for the stable sub-period, associated with 
reduced levels of macroeconomic volatility, across the three models, households 
appear more attentive with a larger proportion of agents updating each period.
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For the volatile sub-sample period, the survey-updating, naive sticky information, 
and rational updating models all indicate that the frequency of information updating 
exhibited by households falls relative to the whole sample period and the stable sub­
period. These results thus cast doubt upon the proposed hypothesis that households 
update more frequently in response to the realisation of larger forecast errors or 
where macroeconomic conditions are less favourable; this thus questions the 
suggestion proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) that 
the attentiveness of household expectations increases when inflation matters.
Instead, a greater rate of information updating is observed for periods of increased 
macroeconomic stability, consistent with the notion that agent attentiveness increases 
where the information acquisition and processing costs are lower.
The epidemiological hypotheses were also examined for demographically 
disaggregated Michigan Survey inflation forecasts. Whilst the direction of the 
results for disaggregated expectations across the four sample periods are generally 
consistent with those for aggregate expectations, across the various specifications, 
heterogeneity in the updating frequency of households was observed; specifically, 
those with higher levels of education and income, and men, exhibiting higher levels 
of attentiveness across the various sample periods relative to their less advantaged, 
or female, counterparts. Those with higher levels of education or income are likely 
to be able to devote greater resources, either cognitive or financial, in acquiring and 
processing information, whereas the opportunity cost of information updating for 
less advantaged households are likely to be higher despite their larger forecast errors 
as reported in 4.2. Moreover, men, and those with higher levels of education and 
income, are reported by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) 
are likely to have increased levels of interest and literacy in finance and economics, 
and thus exhibit greater attentiveness to news regarding aggregate inflation. 
Contrastingly, less frequent updating, and larger forecast errors, exhibited by those 
with lower levels of education and income may be representative of agents forming 
expectations in relation to specific prices as proposed by Bates and Gabor (1986), 
Ranyard et al. (2008), Bruine de Bruin et al. (201 lb) and Georganas et al. (2014) or 
inflation experiences in the manner identified by Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) 
and Malmendier and Nagel (2009).
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In contrast, the manner which agents update appears to be less dependent upon 
households age or region of residence. These results appear to indicate that inflation 
inequality across age groups, as reported by Michael (1979) and McGranahan and 
Paulson (2006) does not impact upon household attentiveness to news; similarly, 
regional inflation differentials have little effect on the updating frequency across 
regions. Nevertheless, some evidence of higher rates of updating was observed for 
younger households, whilst both negative and U-shaped relationships were reported 
between age and information attentiveness. Similarly, the North-East and West 
regions were found in several instances to exhibit a higher degree of attentiveness 
relative to the North-Central and South regions; however a greater degree of 
homogeneity in the rate of updating was reported for regionally disaggregated 
expectations compared to other disaggregation of the Michigan Survey dataset.
The results presented in 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 thus question the relevance of Mankiw and 
Reis’s (2002) sticky information hypothesis which implicitly proposes that agents 
face a constant probability of receiving information updates. Nevertheless, 
deviations from RE and the presence of information rigidities, across both aggregate 
expectations and those reported by individual demographic groups, with greater 
information frictions observed during periods of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Instead, expectations may be more consistent with the predictions of 
noisy information; recalling the summary of information rigidity models presented 
by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), various theories of noisy information predict 
that forecast errors may differ in response to shocks, consistent with varying rates of 
information friction across sample periods and demographics.
The heterogeneous updating model examined in 5.3.1.4 and 5.3.2.4 proposes 
combining the survey updating, naive sticky information and rational updating 
hypotheses to accommodate agents updating in response to a multitude of 
information. The results for the nested specification further emphasise differences in 
updating behaviour, including the degree of attentiveness, across sample periods and 
households. Whilst for aggregate expectations across the whole sample period it is 
not possible to reject the estimate presented by Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll
(2003) and Lanne et al. (2009) that a quarter of agents update each period, the 
proposition is rejected for various demographic groups across the four sample
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periods. Moreover, households appear to predominantly update in accordance with 
Nunes’s (2009) rational updating hypothesis, particularly for the stable sub-period, 
however, those households who update most frequently, are deemed to have a 
greater probability of encountering and absorbing multiple sources of information. It 
can thus be concluded that agents face asymmetric probabilities of receiving 
information updates; this finding further questions the relevance of Mankiw and 
Reis’s (2002) sticky information hypothesis.
The results presented in this chapter thus appear to indicate that where attentive, 
households appear to update more frequently in response to the rational forecast in 
preference to the professional expectation or current values of macroeconomic 
variables. However, these results may be influenced by the estimation procedure 
with GMM used to estimate the rational and heterogeneous updating models, 
controlling for instrumental variables, as opposed to OLS for the survey updating 
and naive sticky information hypotheses. Whilst the J-statistics cannot generally 
reject the validity of the instrument set across household groups or sample periods 
the results for the rational and heterogeneous updating models are likely to be 
subject to the instrument employed.
The sample period employed by this study considers approximately 30 years of data 
obtained from the SPF and Michigan Survey. Furthermore, for examination of the 
survey updating hypothesis, this chapter has adopted Carroll’s (2003) assumption 
that households update their information sets by infrequently absorbing the 
information content of newspaper published forecasts, which reflect professional 
expectations. This concept however fails to acknowledge any heterogeneity in 
information reporting, implicitly assuming that there exists a single forecast 
published by all newspapers. Instead, maintaining the assumption that all 
newspapers report a professional forecast, heterogeneity may arise with newspapers 
reporting a variety of the mean and median professional expectation149.
In addition, since the early 1980’s, household access to information has undergone 
substantial changes with greater availability and choice of television news
149 One may further assume that whilst some agents obtain information regarding future inflation from 
national newspapers, others read local newspapers whose reports may concern regional inflation 
levels.
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broadcasts150, and the proliferation of the internet. Moreover, the Pew Research 
Center (2011) report that in 2002 over 80 percent of agents report television as one 
of their two main sources for national and international news whilst, for the same 
year, only 42 percent report newspapers as one of their main news sources151. Data 
from the Newspaper Association of America (NAA) shows that this is accompanied 
with a fall in aggregate daily newspaper readerships which have fallen from in 
excess of 70 percent of adults in 1979 to less than 40 percent by 2010. Interestingly, 
this fall appears independent of recent economic conditions with readership
152uniformly falling during the recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty . In 
contrast, between 2007 and 2009, Curtin (2009) documents a rise from 42 percent to 
48 percent of agents obtaining information from internet sources.
Given the greater availability of information, in recent years the rate of information 
diffusion across agents may thus be significantly greater and less costly, thus 
information rigidity studies, including Mankiw and Reis (2002), Carroll (2003) and 
Lanne et al. (2009), may overestimate the degree of information frictions across 
agents. Alternatively, one may argue that the internet provides scope for a wide 
range of potentially contradictory commentary regarding the economy, providing a 
forum for extreme views which publications, such as newspapers, would likely filter
153out . Consequently, the increased quantity of information may further complicate 
the decision making process as agents must decide which information sources to 
absorb whilst remaining inattentive to others, thus increasing the information 
acquisition and processing costs thus resulting in greater information frictions.
These issues provide interesting opportunities for future research.
150 Including 24-hour ‘rolling news’ channels such as CNN, Fox News Channel and ABC News Now, 
launched in 1980, 1996 and 2004 respectively.
151 Similar figures regarding the manner which households obtain information regarding the economy 
are presented by Curtin (2009)
152 Data obtained from the NAA indicate that average weekday readerships were 49.9 percent o f 
adults in 2006, 48.4 percent in 2007, 45.1 percent in 2008, 44.4 percent in 2009 and 39.6 percent in 
2010. Data accessed from http://www.naa.org/Trends-and-Numbers/Readership/Age-and- 
Gender.aspx (last accessed 08/05/2014).
153 Furthermore, it is argued by Lein and Maag (2011) that households would likely have greater 
recollections of extreme viewpoints that they have encountered which thus may exaggerate biases in 
reported expectations.
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CHAPTER 6: PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS AND 
INFORMATION RIGIDITIES
Tests of the epidemiological model, as proposed by Carroll (2003, 2006), were found 
in Chapter 5 to indicate that household inflation forecasts are subject to information 
rigidities due to the infrequent absorption of professional forecasts reported by the 
news media. The model relies on the proposition that professional forecasters are 
more economically rational than those of households. Tests of the REH in Chapter 3 
were unable to conclude that the US SPF is fully consistent with the properties 
required for rationality. Recent research has attempted to investigate whether 
departures from rationality amongst professional forecasters arise due to information 
rigidity. If professional forecasts are characterised by some form of informational 
rigidity, the epidemiological model (Carroll, 2003, 2006) will be unable to capture 
the full degree of outdated information embodied within household forecasts.
Both Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Clements (2012) recognise that some 
economists may openly dismiss the hypothesis that professional forecasts are 
characterised by information rigidities. Given their available resources, it is unlikely 
that professionals would consider systematic inattentiveness appropriate in the 
formation of optimal forecasts. Instead the presence of information rigidity in 
professional forecasters is argued by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) to be more 
plausible where professionals are assumed unwilling to incur the processing costs 
required to form appropriately revised or updated forecasts. Moreover, given the 
current direction regarding empirical predictions, Clements (2012) argues in favour 
of information rigidity in the absence of any superior alternative.
Two prominent approaches to informational rigidities have been applied to the 
analysis of professional forecasts. Firstly, noisy information models (Woodford, 
2003, Sims, 2003, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) propose that disagreement 
amongst professional forecasts arises from the interpretation of noisy signals 
concerning inflation. Secondly, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) and Clements (2012) consider models of sticky 
information where agents have a distinct probability of updating information to 
incorporate macroeconomic news. Other approaches have also been proposed which 
consider inherent heterogeneity amongst agent priors and signals (Patton and
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Timmermann, 2010), and asymmetric loss (Capistran and Timmermann, 2009). 
Although these models vary considerably in their construction and predictions, 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) observe that all these models make a common 
prediction: that is, forecasts respond more gradually to a shock than the forecasted 
variable. Consequently, in violation of the properties of rational expectations, 
serially correlated forecast errors will be observed.
The empirical analysis of informational rigidity amongst household forecasts was 
constrained by the four period ahead outlook of the Michigan Survey. Information 
rigidity could thus only be examined across period to period forecast updates rather 
than revisions across multiple horizons for a single period. The composition of the 
SPF includes multi-horizon forecasts154 thus the degree of information rigidity can 
be established under both forecast updating and forecast revision. Furthermore, 
advancing on the analysis by Dovem et al. (2013), it shall be possible to determine 
whether the degree of information rigidity varies as the forecast horizon shortens.
The objective of this chapter is to reassess the properties of professional forecasts 
and determine whether they are consistent with the predictions of information 
rigidity models. Firstly, the existing literature will be reviewed, with the properties 
of information rigidity models identified and an assessment on the current debate 
regarding which model is most appropriate for professional inflation forecasts. The 
following section re-introduces the SPF, examines the multi-horizon structure of 
forecasts within the survey and analyses the difference between revisions to fixed- 
event forecasts and updates to fixed-horizon forecasts. Next, attention is devoted to 
empirical analysis of these forecast revision and forecast update series and whether 
they are consistent with the properties of information rigidity models as detailed in 
the literature review. Further empirical investigations follow, with disagreement 
amongst professional inflation forecasts again being analysed in relation to the 
predictions of information rigidity models. The final section shall summarise the 
empirical findings of the previous sections and shall provide a conclusion regarding 
the consistency of SPF inflation forecasts with the predictions of information rigidity 
models and determine which of the competing models best capture the evolution of 
professional expectations.
154 The SPF requests participants to report inflation forecasts for the previous, current and next four 
quarters.
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6.1. Literature Review
The rational expectations hypothesis has been a key component of contemporary 
macroeconomic modelling. The empirical analysis in 3.2 was unable to confirm that 
SPF inflation forecasts are fully consistent with the properties of the REH. 
Nevertheless, the literature has emphasised that agents are commonly faced with 
restraints in forming expectations. Models of incomplete information, including the 
Lucas-Phelps islands model, and adaptive learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) 
were previously introduced in section 3.3.3. An interesting development in recent 
years has concerned whether professional forecasts are characterised by information 
frictions. In recent years, economists including Mankiw et al. (2003), Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Dovem et al. (2012, 
2013), have employed various approaches in evaluating whether professional 
forecasts are consistent with information rigidity theory with empirical analysis 
considering forecast revisions, forecast updates and disagreement.
In accordance with the efficiency property analysed in relation to Rational 
Expectations in Chapter 3, Nordhaus (1987) acknowledges the requirement for 
forecast revisions to be independent of past forecast errors and past revisions; 
forecast revisions therefore solely arise to accommodate the arrival of news. The 
correlation of revisions with own lags and past errors indicates that the forecaster has 
not been able to efficiently incorporate available information into forecasts. 
Establishing a novel approach to examining informational frictions amongst 
professional forecasts, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) consider the relationship 
between forecast revisions and forecast errors, relating rejections of the null of full 
information rational expectations as supporting evidence of information rigidities. 
The Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information model requires that agents are either 
attentive or inattentive with respective probabilities of (1 — A) and A. The average 
duration between information updates is thus 1 /(1  — A). Utilising Mankiw and 
Reis’s framework with Reis’ (2006b) time dependent updating, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010) denote the average period t forecast as:
Etfrt+hi = (1 “  *) E t[n t+h] + AEt_1[7rt+/l] (6.1.1)
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Specifically, the average forecast Et [nt+h] is the weighted average of the one period 
lagged average forecast and current rational expectations. As noted in previous 
chapters, the RE error is uncorrelated with information at time t thus:
Et [jrt+ft] = nt+h + et+Kt (6.1.2)
Combining (6.1.1) and (6.1.2) Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) provide a 
relationship between forecast errors and forecast revisions, specifically:
H-t+h ~  — \  \  "f ^ t+h,t
Where the coefficient on the forecast revision, AEt [nt+h] = Et [nt+h] —Et_1[nt+h], 
is demonstrated to be solely dependent on the degree of information rigidity. 
Specifically the following model is examined:
n t+h ~  Et [nt+h] = c + P(Et [nt+h] -  £’t_1[7rt+h]) + et (6.1.4)
Where p  =£ 0, the null of full information RE is rejected as forecast errors are 
predictable from forecast revisions. Moreover, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) 
propose that where /? > 0, expectations are characterised by information rigidities. 
The exact level of rigidity within the model is determined byA = /? / ( l+ /? ) .  
Utilising SPF expectations of the GDP price index, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) report coefficient values p  = 1.23, A = 0.55 consistent with professionals 
updating their information every six to seven months.
The analysis of information rigidities is extended by Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) by decomposing the forecast revision into its two distinct elements. This 
allows for individual analysis of the contemporaneous and lagged forecasts to 
determine whether their respective coefficients are consistent with the underlying 
information rigidity theory. Therefore, (6.1.4) can be restated as:
nt+h ~ Et[nt+hi = c + + ftEt-ifrt+h] + et f6-1-5)
Where information rigidities are present Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) indicate 
that /?-l > 0, p2 < 0 and Pi + Pi = 1- F°r SPF three period ahead forecasts of the 
GDP price index, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) again report coefficient values 
consistent with information rigidities.
268
The information rigidity model (6.1.4) proposed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) can also be applied to household inflation forecasts. However, as Michigan 
Survey inflation forecasts are only available for a four-quarter ahead forecast horizon
(6.1.4) requires appropriate modification as demonstrated by Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010). Specifically, the forecast revision is replaced by the one- 
period forecast update to yield:
n t + 4  ~  Et [nt+4] = c + p(Et [nt+4] -  F f if r t+ s ] )  + et (6.1.6)
As this specification uses fixed-horizon rather than fixed-event forecasts, OLS 
estimation is noted by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) to be inappropriate. 
Instead, GMM estimation is employed utilising oil price innovations as 
instruments155. Testing (6.1.6), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) observe that /? is 
significant for both SPF and Michigan Survey forecasts. The coefficient associated 
with professional forecasts is however larger than that of household forecasts. Given
that /? directly maps to the degree of information rigidity A, such that A = the
coefficient values imply that households and professionals update their information 
infrequently. Specifically, whilst professionals update their information every 6 to 7 
months, households update their information sets every 5 months on average156.
The original sticky information framework proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) 
assumed that the degree of information rigidity to be exogenous and constant.
Recent studies have questioned this assumption with Dovem et al. (2013) proposing 
that information rigidities are determined by the forecast horizon. Similarly, 
considering whether multi-horizon quarterly forecasts from the SPF are consistent 
with the annual forecast and most recent data releases, Clements (2012) observes 
significant discrepancies for several macroeconomic variables, indicative of 
inattentiveness. Specifically, Dovem et al. (2013) note that at longer forecasting 
horizons, agents may encounter noisier signals or be unable to effectively 
incorporate news into contemporaneous forecast revisions.
155 Oil price innovations are shown by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) to be uncorrelated with 
both past information and the rational expectations error, and are also significant predictors of 
changes in agent inflation forecasts.
156 Market-based The /? coefficient observed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) for these 
forecasts
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To test for information frictions across the forecast horizon, Dovem et al. (2013) 
regress the contemporaneous one-period forecast revision on lagged revisions. 
Utilising average Consensus Economics fixed-event GDP growth forecasts, the 
correlation between the current revision and the one-month lagged revisions is found 
by Dovem et al. (2013) to be highly significant; information rigidities are thus 
deemed to be present at very short horizons. The revisions at forecast horizons of 
approximately one year are also significant157 whilst at alternative horizons there is 
no evidence of informational rigidities. Two suggestions for this result are provided 
by Dovem et al. (2013). Firstly, they suggest that some link exists between the 
expectations of four-quarter ahead growth rates and those for annual growth rates; 
and secondly, they suggest some transformation in agent attentiveness from current 
year forecasts to those for the subsequent year.
A novel approach to examining information rigidities in professional forecasts is 
proposed by Clements (2012). Exploiting the multi-horizon structure of the SPF, 
Clements (2012) examines whether annual forecasts are consistent with a sum of 
quarterly forecasts and recent data releases, with significant discrepancies deemed 
indicative of inattentiveness. The framework is based around the assumption that 
annual forecasts158 should equal the average of the corresponding quarterly forecasts 
and published estimates of realised values. For 2000Q4 to 2002Q1, illustrates the 
forecasts formed by SPF professionals at each survey date:
Table 6.1.1: Forecast Horizons Available from the SPF
Survey Backdated Current Period h-Step Ahead Forecasts Annual
Date Forecast Forecast h  =  1 h  = 2 h  = 3 h  =  4 Forecasts
2000:Q4 2000:Q3 2000:Q4 2001 :Q1 2001:Q2 2001:Q3 2001:Q4 2000 2001
2001:Q1 2000:Q4 2001 :Q 1 2001:Q2 2001:Q3 2001:Q4 2002:Q1 2001 2002
2001:Q2 2001:Q1 2001:Q2 2001 :Q3 2001:Q4 2002:Q1 2002:Q2 2001 2002
2001:Q3 2001:Q2 2001 :Q3 2001 :Q4 2002:Q1 2002:Q2 2002:Q3 2001 2002
2001:Q4 2001:Q3 2001:Q4 2002:Q1 2002:Q2 2002:Q3 2002:Q4 2001 2002
2002:Q1 2001 :Q4 2002:Q1 2002 :Q2 2002.-Q3 2002:Q4 2003:Q1 2002 2003
In the first two quarters of a calendar year, professionals provide forecasts for some 
variable for each of the four quarters in the calendar year. This is not the case for the
157 The revision at the 10 month horizon is significant for emerging economies whilst for advanced 
economies significant revision is observed for the 13 month horizon.
158 The SPF requests participants to provide annual forecasts o f many macroeconomic variables for 
the current calendar year and the next calendar year.
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third and fourth quarters; in 2001Q3 professionals report forecasts for 2001Q2 
through to 2002Q3 whilst for 2001Q3 forecasts for 2001Q3 to 2002Q4 are provided.
The proposition of Clements (2012) implies that the difference between annual and 
quarterly forecasts for the first two quarters of a calendar year is zero:
1
^Q l . t  =  ^ Q l , t [ n A, t]  ~ ~ ^ ( E Q l , t [ n Q l , t ]  +  ^ Q l)t [ 7rQ 2 ,t ]+ ^ Q l,t [7rQ3,t] + ^ Q l , t [ n Q4 , t ] )  (6.1.7)
!  (6 .1.8)
6 Q2,t =  ^ Q 2 , t [ n A, t]  _  4 (^ Q 2 ,t [7rQ l,t] +  ^ Q 2 ,t[7rQ 2 ,t ]+ ^ Q 2 ,t [7rQ3,t] +  ^ Q 2 , t [ n QA,t\')
Where EQi t [nQjt] is the forecast in quarter i of the calendar year t for quarter j  in 
the same calendar year tand EQi t [nAt\ is the forecast of annual inflation for the 
calendar year t produced in quarter i. The difference 6qi t will only differ from zero 
in the event of random errors. Little evidence is found by Clements (2012) that 
discrepancies SQl t and SQ2t are large. Regressing SQl t and SQ2t upon a constant c, 
Clements (2012) is unable to reject that the quarterly forecasts add up to the annual 
forecast.
As the SPF requests a single back-dated forecast for the immediately preceding 
quarter, the SPF annual forecast in the third and fourth quarters of a calendar year 
will be composed of a combination of quarterly expectations and estimates of the 
realised value of the target variable. It is assumed that information regarding the 
target variable will be available with a single period lag. Maintaining Clements 
(2012) proposition that the annual forecast is consistent with beliefs concerning the 
four quarters of the calendar year, 6q3 and SQ4 can be presented as:
6 q 3 ,s  =  EQ3, s [ n A,s] ~  t (^ s ,Q 1 ,Q 3  +  ^ Q 3 ,s[7rQ 2 ,s ]+ ^ Q 3 ,s [7rQ3,s] +  ^ Q 3, s [n Q 4 , s ] )   ^ ^
6 q 4 , s  —  ^ Q 4 , s [7i A,s ] ~  ^ ( j C s , Q l , Q 4  +  ^ s <Q 2 , Q 4  +  F Q 4 ) S [ 7 r s Q 4 ]  +  E s q 4 \ u s q 4 \ )  ^  ^
Where s denotes the calendar year Tts ,Qj ,Qi  is the quarter i estimate of realised 
inflation in quarter j  in calendar year s. If the forecaster is attentive in the third and 
fourth quarters then nS Qj Qi = tis qj with the estimate equalling realised inflation159.
159 This detracts from the argument put forward by Clements (2012) as the CPI inflation data 
employed by this study is not systematically revised following publication.
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Should instead forecasters be inattentive to releases in the inflation rate then 
^ s ,Qj ,Qi  =  n s , Q j - k  where j  — k denotes the most recent period in which an agent 
updated their information. The values of Ss q3 and Ss Q4, are again found by 
Clements (2012) to be small.
The framework proposed by Clements (2012) can be related to information rigidities. 
In the third and fourth quarters of a calendar year, rather than utilising the most 
recently available published estimate of the forecasted variable in forming annual 
forecasts, Clements (2012) recognises that professionals may use earlier vintages 
instead. To determine whether the discrepancies are characterised by significant 
professional inattentiveness, Clements (2012) regresses SsQ3 and 5s q4 upon the 
most recent data revision; specifically the following formal hypothesis test is 
employed:
8 s ,Q3 ~  c  +  / ? ( $ s , Q l  ~  Q s - l . Q * )  +  e s,Q3 ^
^s,Q 4 =  c  +  / ? ( 0 s ,Q 2  — 0 s ,  Q l )  +  e s,Q4  ^
Where /? = 0, discrepancies can be classified as independent of the data revision, 
consistent with attentive forecasters. Evidence across various macroeconomic 
variables is found by Clements (2012) to be mixed. For four out of eight 
macroeconomic variables, including the GDP price index, third quarter forecasts are 
found to be consistent with attentive forecasters. In contrast, only for fourth quarter 
forecasts of real personal consumption forecasts can the null hypothesis of 
attentiveness be rejected. The alternative hypothesis of inattentiveness is not 
however dismissed for fourth quarter forecasts by Clements (2012). Instead, it is 
argued that (6.1.11) has low power. Large revisions are observed for all eight 
macroeconomic variables in 1993Q4 and 1999Q4. Due to the nature of these 
revisions, it is highly likely that a large proportion of professionals are attentive to 
this news, distorting the value of /?. Consequently, the degree of information rigidity 
embodied within fourth quarter forecasts is understated. Removing those revisions 
is argued by Clements (2012) to increase the degree of attentiveness across 
professional forecasts. The attentiveness model presented by Clements (2012) 
provides mixed evidence as to whether professional forecasts are subject to
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information rigidities. There is however little evidence that professionals are 
inattentive to data releases concerning inflation.
The empirical results presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), Clements 
(2012), and Dovem et al. (2012) indicate that information rigidities are present 
amongst inflation forecasts. However, a variety of imperfect information models 
where agents are faced with distinct frictions in the acquisition and processing of 
information have been established by economists, including sticky information 
(Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw et al., 2003), noisy information (Sims, 2003; 
Woodford, 2003; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), strategic interaction (Morris 
and Shin, 2002) and heterogeneity amongst agent priors and signals (Capistran and 
Timmermann, 2009; Patton and Timmermann, 2010). Interestingly, across these 
models Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) observe a common inference: “the 
average forecast across agents should respond more gradually to a shock to 
fundamentals than the variable being forecasted” (2012:118). Consequently, 
forecast errors have the same sign as, that is they are serially correlated with the 
shock to the forecast variable.
To establish the most appropriate model of information rigidity consistent with 
professional inflation forecasts Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) empirically 
investigate the properties of SPF GDP deflator forecasts. To determine the response 
of mean forecast errors to shocks the following model is examined:
* '  (6-1.13)
nt+h ~  Et [nc+h] = c + 2_, Pk(.n t+h-k ~  E t-kbrt-m -k])  +  +  ec
k = 1 j = 0
Specifically, the current forecast error is regressed upon previous forecast errors and 
past shocks Ht_; with K and J selected by the Bayesian information criteria. For 
technology, news, oil price and unidentified shocks Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) reject the RE null hypothesis of no response of forecast errors to shocks; 
instead the direction of forecast errors is consistent with that predicted by 
information rigidity models.
As previously acknowledged, the competing models of information rigidity make 
distinct predictions regarding the properties of agent forecasts. To distinguish 
between models of information rigidities Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) further
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investigate the response of forecast errors to lagged inflation. The previous 
specification (6.1.13) is modified to:
7Tt+4 -  Et [nt+4] = c + P(nt+3 -  £’t_1[7rt+3]) + rfct-i]  + 6t (6.1.14)
It is noted by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) that whilst both the sticky 
information and (baseline) noisy information models predict that y = 0, 
representative of the independence of forecast errors to inflation, models which 
incorporate inherent heterogeneity in priors or signals predict that forecast errors are 
correlated with past conditions. Considering tests akin to (6.1.14), Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) are unable to reject the null hypothesis of y  = 0 for 
professional forecasts; thus they adjudge information rigidities within professional 
forecasts to be incompatible with models with inherent heterogeneity in agent priors 
or signals, and instead advocate in favour of sticky information and (baseline) noisy 
information models160.
In addition to determining whether updates and revisions to consensus forecasts are 
consistent with frictions in acquiring and processing information, recent 
contributions by Patton and Timmermann (2010), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), 
Badarinza and Gross (2012), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), and Dovem et al. 
(2012) have identified relationships between the cross-sectional distribution of agent 
expectations and information rigidities. As previously highlighted, disagreement has 
been a key component of many macroeconomic theories under imperfect information 
including the islands model of Lucas (1973) which generates disagreement amongst 
producers of a single good who can only observe own island prices. Following some 
shock, producers must determine the impact upon the general price level and the 
idiosyncratic effect on own island prices. Moreover, subsequent changes in own 
island prices need to be interpreted as changes in relative prices as well as in 
response to the general price level. As individual islands have different information, 
forecasts of prices and inflation will exhibit some degree of disagreement. More 
recently, utilising the Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information framework,
Mankiw et al. (2003) generate dispersion in inflation expectations which matches the 
level of dispersion observed in Livingston Survey and Michigan Survey forecasts. 
Furthermore, they observe that greater variation in the inflation rate results in an
160 Similar results are obtained by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) for various other agent classes.
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increase in disagreement; this is deemed by Mankiw et al. (2003) to be consistent 
with informational rigidity.
As highlighted above, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) provide a comparison 
between the predictions of several variants of information rigidity including the 
properties of disagreement under each competing theory. Specifically, whereas a 
positive shock to disagreement following some shock is deemed consistent with 
sticky information, noisy information models are demonstrated to predict 
disagreement as independent of shocks161. Consistent with the latter, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) present baseline results indicating that disagreement does not 
respond to a range of macroeconomic shocks162, disputing the empirical findings of 
Mankiw et al. (2003)
Using a fixed-effects panel estimator, Dovem et al. (2012) also establish the manner 
which average disagreement across G7 countries evolves overtime. Whilst the 
average level of disagreement regarding inflation is found to be 0.311, the level of 
disagreement for several G7 countries, including the US, is strongly counter-cyclical,
1 63rising 30 percent during recessions . Similarly, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) find 
high values of disagreement for the 2008-2009 recession. The positive response to 
recessionary shocks may be considered consistent with Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions for disagreement under sticky information 
models. Similarly, for one-year ahead HICP inflation forecasts from the ECB-SPF, 
Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) report an average disagreement at = 0.26; which is 
equal to 42% of the underlying standard deviation in inflation. Furthermore, for the 
sample period 2000-2010, it is observed by Dovem et al. (2012) that disagreement 
falls by 16% compared to the 1989-2010 sample period. Nevertheless, utilising both 
SPF and Livingston Survey expectations, Mankiw et al. (2003) report that the 
relationship between professional disagreement and the state of the economy is less 
pronounced compared to disagreement amongst consumer expectations. 
Consequently, the appropriate model of information rigidity may differ between 
agent classes.
161 Under noisy information where there is heterogeneity in signal-to-noise ratios, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) report a positive response in disagreement to shocks.
162 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) evaluate the response of disagreement to news, technology, oil 
price and unexplained shocks.
163 Specifically, Dovem et al. (2012) report higher levels o f disagreement are reported during the 
1990-1991 and 2007-2009 recessions.
275
The disagreement amongst professional expectations has also been related to 
information rigidities by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010). Utilising individual 
responses from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECB-SPF), the standard 
deviation at of inflation forecasts is calculated as a measure of cross-sectional 
disagreement. As observed by Coibion and Gorodonichenko (2010, 2012) and 
Dovem et al. (2012), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) find professional forecasts of 
inflation, unemployment and real GDP to be characterised by some degree of 
information rigidity. In a sticky information environment, ot captures the 
disagreement in forecasts which arises from only a proportion of individuals 
updating their information in any given period. The greater the size of any given 
shock, the greater is the difference between the forecasts of those agents who 
recently updated their information and those using outdated information. Thus, 
under sticky information the degree of disagreement at is demonstrated by Andrade 
and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) to vary according to 
the size of the shock. In contrast, under noisy information ot is dependent upon 
idiosyncratic noise which arises from observation of the signal following some 
shock. It is assumed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) that the variance of the signal is equal across individuals and 
independent of inflation. Within a simple noisy information framework it is thus 
argued that the magnitude of macroeconomic shocks does not impact upon ot .
The results presented by Dovem et al. (2012) indicate that the level of disagreement, 
measured as the cross-sectional IQR164, is dependent upon both the sample period 
and macroeconomic conditions. Whilst the IQR is more robust to outliers relative to 
using the standard deviation, it fails to fully capture the level of disagreement across 
forecasters. Furthermore, the disagreement amongst professional inflation forecasts 
for the US was found to be one of the highest for G7 countries. The evolution of 
professional disagreement in the US may thus be misrepresented by the aggregate 
G7 results reported by Dovem et al. (2012). Consequently, despite the limitations, 
the analysis of disagreement in this chapter shall focus upon the standard deviation 
of SPF inflation forecasts.
164 The IQR is also utilised by Mankiw et al. (2003).
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To empirically examine the relationship between disagreement and information 
rigidities Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Badarinza and Gross (2012) propose 
formal models which assess the impact of news shocks on the level of disagreement. 
Regressing disagreement within the inflation forecasts of European professionals on 
the last absolute change in inflation, the most recent squared forecast error and the 
current absolute forecast error, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) find only limited 
evidence that macroeconomic shocks impact upon the level of disagreement. 
Although Badarinza and Gross (2012) find that the effect of news intensity on 
disagreement to be negative and significant, an insignificant relationship is observed 
with inflation volatility. There is thus limited evidence that macroeconomic shocks 
impact upon professional disagreement. Consequently, professional disagreement 
appears most consistent with the predictions of noisy information.
Information rigidity is analysed by Patton and Timmermann (2010) who identify 
disagreement amongst professional GDP and inflation forecasts, measured by the 
cross-sectional dispersion, does not result from differences in private information 
signals. Instead, disagreement is argued to result from heterogeneous priors. Using 
a Bayesian learning model, Lahiri and Sheng (2008) similarly report that 
disagreement amongst Consensus Economics annual GDP growth forecasts arises 
due to specific prior beliefs. Furthermore, due to uncertainty regarding public 
information, Lahiri and Sheng (2008) note that disagreement persists over the 
longer-run. However, where agents observe the same public signal, forecast 
disagreement results solely from initial prior beliefs; therefore, there will be no 
response in disagreement following some macroeconomic shock, as demonstrated by 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
Between the 24- and 12- month ahead horizons, the disagreement observed by Lahiri 
and Sheng (2008) amongst US GDP growth forecasts is persistently high. For longer 
horizon inflation forecasts of 24 months ahead Patton and Timmermann (2010) also 
observe individual forecasts to be widely dispersed around the mean. Both studies 
observe that disagreement reduces substantially with the forecast horizon from the 
12-month ahead horizon. The fall in disagreement is noted by Andrade and Le 
Bihan (2010) to arise due to a reduction in uncertainty concerning the forecasted 
event. Furthermore, ranking individual forecasters into bottom, middle and top 
terciles, Patton and Timmermann (2010) find that the probability that a forecaster
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remains within a given tercile is greater than 33% which would be expected in the 
absence of persistent views. These results are argued by Patton and Timmermann 
(2010) to be indicative of differences in prior beliefs and inconsistent with different 
private information signals and information rigidities.
Utilising a selection of forecast revisions, forecast updates and disagreement, 
exisiting studies find some general consensus that professional forecasts are 
consistent with the presence of information rigidities. The weight of evidence 
suggests that either the sticky information or noisy information hypotheses are 
preferable to the various alternatives with Badarinza and Gross (2012) favouring the 
former and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012) and Andrade and Le Bihan 
(2010) presenting evidence concerning the latter. The remainder of this chapter 
reconsiders the nature and degree of information rigidities amongst professional 
forecasts for the previously identified sample periods, with three main objectives. 
Firstly, we seek to confirm whether professional forecasts are consistent with the 
predictions of information rigidity models; secondly, tests will be conducted over the 
previously identified sample periods to determine whether information rigidities are 
larger during periods characterised by greater macroeconomic stability or volatility; 
and thirdly, attempt to establish whether professional forecasts are consistent with 
the predictions of a single model of information rigidity. In 6.2, the properties of 
professional forecast revisions, forecast updates and forecast dispersion are analysed 
whilst 6.3 empirically examines the consistency of SPF forecasts with the 
predicitions of information rigidity theory.
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6.2. Forecast Revisions, Forecast Updates and Forecast 
Dispersion: A Re-examination of the Properties of 
Professional Expectations
Prior to estimating the degree of information rigidity embodied within professional 
inflation forecasts, a distinction between fixed-horizon and fixed-event forecasts and 
subsequently between forecast revision and forecast updating is required. In addition 
to the analysis of consensus forecasts, the literature review identified that the level of 
cross-sectional disagreement could indicate the furthermore, a reassessment of the 
dispersion of professional forecasts is also required.
As previously identified, in period t, SPF respondents report expectations of 
inflation for periods t — 1 through to t + 4. Therefore, the SPF can be analysed in 
terms of fixed-horizon and fixed-event forecasts. Fixed-horizon forecasts can be 
defined as forecasts reported n-periods apart which estimate inflation for specific 
periods which are also n-periods apart. Alternatively, fixed-event forecasts can be 
defined as forecasts reported n-periods apart which estimate inflation for the same 
specific period; the forecast horizon is thus variable. Much of the literature, 
including Carroll (2003) and Mankiw et al. (2003), focuses on fixed-horizon 
forecasts which are argued by Dovem et al. (2012) to be preferable in determining 
disagreement as the uncertainty and cross-sectional dispersion of fixed-event 
forecasts varies across forecasts for different horizons. Nevertheless, both fixed- 
horizon and fixed-event forecasts are useful in determining expectation formation 
and the class and degree of information rigidity which best characterises professional 
inflation forecasts.
Whereas attention has generally been limited to the analysis of consensus forecasts, 
advocating in favour of the presence of information rigidities implies that whilst a 
fraction of agents formulate expectations which incorporate recent news, the remaind 
utilise outdated information. Consequently, the slow diffusion of information leads 
to professionals possessing different expectations regarding inflation. In accordance 
with these predictions, Mankiw et al. (2003) recognise that professional inflation 
forecasts are characterised by substantial levels of disagreement, as was previously 
observed for household expectations in Chapter 4. Recent contributions by Patton 
and Timmermann (2010), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), Dovem et al. (2012) and
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Badarinza and Gross (2012) have examined the cross-sectional distribution of 
forecasts. This has provided an intriguing extension to the previous analysis 
concerning information rigidity. An analysis of the disagreement amongst SPF 
forecasts shall thus be presented to provide further insight to the manner which 
professional inflation expectations are formed. It shall be specifically considered 
whether periods of increased macroeconomic stability and volatility impact upon the 
degree of disagreement and whether the dispersion of forecasts evolves over the 
forecast horizon.
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6.2.1. Differences between Forecast Updates and Forecast Revisions
As highlighted above, the multi-horizon structure of the SPF allows for the analysis 
of both updates to fixed horizon forecasts and revisions to fixed-event forecasts.
This section seeks to define these concepts and examines the statistical evolution of 
forecasts over the forecast horizon and across macroeconomic conditions.
Suppose that Et [nt+i] is used to represent the i-step ahead forecast of inflation in 
period t + i; for example Et [nt+4\ would denote the four-step ahead forecast of 
period t + 4 inflation using information available in t. A forecast update can be 
defined as the adjustment made to fixed-horizon forecasts. The update can thus be 
illustrated as:
Ut,h =  E tfr t+ i] -  E t-h l^ t+ i-h ]  (6.2.1)
It is recognised that Et [nt+i] and Et_h[nt+i_h] are forecasts of the inflation rate 
expected to occur in two different periods. Equation (6.2.1) further explains how 
forecasts evolve over time with the expected evolution in inflation. The 
epidemiological model presented by Carroll (2003) attempts to characterise the 
updating of expectations for household inflation forecasts.
Information rigidity embodied in agent expectations can also be captured by forecast 
revisions. These are defined as the adjustments made to fixed-event forecasts. 
Forecast revisions can thus be illustrated as:
Rt,h = Et [nt+i] -  i t - h f r t + i ]  (6.2.2)
It is recognised that Et [nt+i\ and Et_h[nt+i] are forecasts of the inflation rate 
expected to arise for a given period t + i formed h periods apart. Equation (6.2.2) 
explains how forecasts for inflation in period t + i evolve with changes in the 
information set across various forecast horizons. Tests of information rigidities of 
this form are employed by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) whilst utilising 
Consensus Economics growth forecasts, Dovem et al. (2013) document that the 
magnitude of forecast revisions is not monotonic and is instead dependent upon both 
the forecast horizon and whether the economy is advanced or emerging. The focus 
here reconsiders the nature of revisions over various forecast horizons and
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determines whether periods of increased macroeconomic stability and volatility 
significantly impact upon the manner which agents revise their inflation forecasts.
Difficulty arises in empirically testing forecast revisions for Michigan Survey 
household inflation forecasts as only forecasts for a single horizon (four quarters 
ahead) are provided. This technique can however be employed upon professional 
forecasts from the SPF which requests inflation forecasts for various horizons. The 
focus shall mainly consider the manner which forecasts of future inflation are 
revised, namely the forecasts formed 1- to 4- periods ahead. Forecasts of current 
period inflation will occasionally be employed, mainly in establishing the latest
• ■ 165revision .
Applying (6.2.1) and (6.2.2) to the median forecast data available from the SPF 
provides a series of forecast updates and forecast revisions for empirical analysis. 
Table 6.2.1 below presents the forecasts formed by participants of the SPF in periods 
t — 4 to t with examples of a forecast update and a forecast revision:
Table 6.2.1: Forecast Horizons Available from the SPF
t - 4 t -  3 t — 2 t -  1 t
0-Step Ahead Ft—4 [7^ —4 ] F f _ 3  [TTt—3 ] Et-2[nt-2\ F f - i t ^ t - i ] Et [nt]
1 -Step Ahead Ff—4 [^t—3 ] Et-3\.n t-2\ U t-2^t-2 F t - i D f r ] F t  b f r + i ]
2-Step Ahead Ff—4 [^t—2 ] Et-3in t - 1] F t - z f r t ] F f - i t ^ t + i ] F t  [7^ + 2 ]
3-Step Ahead Ft- 4[^t-i] Ut- 3 F t- s M Rt-2, Et-2in t+l\ Ft-ibfr+z] F t t ^ t + 3 ]
4-Step Ahead F t —4 [ ^ t ] Ft-st^t+i] __ l  ^  Ft_2[7rt+2] Ff-it^t+s] Etint+4 ]
Specifically, forecast updates relate to moving across columns along a given row, 
meanwhile forecast revisions concern moving diagonally up m  rows and along m  
columns. The empirical examination of forecast revision and updates for SPF data 
commences with an analysis of forecast updates for the five separate forecast
165 Given the quarterly structure of the SPF data employed throughout this study, these horizons 
would generally be considered by economists as short-run forecasts; however, to distinguish 
differences in the forecasting process as the event horizon shortens, h  < 2  shall be termed short 
horizon forecasts, whereas h  > 2 shall be termed longer horizon forecasts.
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horizons. Elementary statistics are presented in Appendix 6.1 and Appendix 6.2166 
for single period updates and revisions.
Appendix 6.1 Panel A indicates that the mean update of professional forecasts is 
negative for each of the forecast horizons across all four sample periods. Therefore, 
on average professionals downwardly update their expectations over a single period 
horizon. Nevertheless, the mean revision value is not statistically significant from 
zero at the 5% level for any forecast horizon or sample period. Moreover, the mean 
update values are not heavily influenced by the forecast horizon. The Welch F-test, 
which permits unequal variances across forecast horizons, is unable to reject the null 
of equal mean updates across all forecast horizons and for all sample periods whilst 
the Kruskal-Wallis test is also unable to reject the equality of medians. These results 
are, however, influenced by positive and negative updates cancelling out. Panel B 
presents more robust statistics concerning mean absolute updates which remove the 
cancelling out effect.
In contrast to simple mean updates, all mean absolute updates are found to be highly 
significant and influenced by the forecast horizon. For updates concerning shorter 
forecast horizons, the mean absolute update is ubiquitously greater in value for a 
given sample period to those for longer forecast horizons. This is particularly 
evident in comparing 1 -period ahead to 0-period ahead forecast updates.
Considering all forecast horizons, the Welch F-test and Kruskal-Wallis test 
respectively reject the equality of means and medians for all four sample periods. 
Removing the 0-period ahead forecasts from the analysis does not affect the non­
rejection of equality of means for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile 
sample periods. For the stable sub-period, however, removal of the 0-period ahead 
forecast updates, rejection of equality of means is only observed at a 10% 
significance level rather than the conventional 5% level. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
the removal of 0-step ahead forecast updates results in the non-rejection of equality 
of medians for both the stable and volatile sub-periods. Therefore, for forecasts of 
future inflation over certain sample periods there is some evidence that the
166 Updates and revisions are only analysed across forecasts formed one period apart. It would be 
expected that the results hold for revisions and updates where the forecasts are formed more than one 
period apart.
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magnitude of updates to professional forecasts does not depend upon the forecast 
horizon.
It is evident from Appendix 6.2 that the significance of forecast revisions is 
dependent upon the forecast horizon. For short horizon forecasts, the mean and
167median of Rt and Rt- i  are generally insignificant whilst for longer horizon 
forecasts, the mean and median of Rt- 2 and Rt- 3 are generally significant. 
Nevertheless, for the volatile sub-period, both mean and median revisions are 
insignificant for all forecast horizons. This suggests that during the most recent 
period of uncertainty, professionals are less inclined to revise their forecasts and 
indicates either a lack of information concerning n t arriving between periods 
t — h — 1 and t — h or information acquisition and processing constraints. As 
previously observed for actual forecast updates, it is not possible to reject the 
equality of means or the equality of median null hypotheses for any sample period 
using the Welch F-test and Kruskal-Wallis tests respectively. The manner which 
professionals revise their forecasts is apparently independent of the forecast horizon 
and suggests that forecasts are revised in the same manner between periods t — 1 
and t as it is between periods t — 4 and t — 3. However, as previously noted for 
forecast updates, utilising actual revisions fails to accommodate for positive and 
negative revisions, thus the cancelling out effect reduces the magnitude of revisions.
Using absolute revisions instead, it is evident from Appendix 6.2 that forecast 
revisions are in fact larger for shorter forecast horizons contrasting with the results 
presented in Panel A. This suggests that information regarding period t inflation is 
absorbed by professionals at a higher frequency as the forecast horizon falls. It may 
also suggest the information relevant to period t inflation becomes increasing 
available as t nears. Furthermore, the Welch F-test and Kruskal-Wallis test reject 
the equality of absolute mean and median revisions across all forecast horizons for 
all four sample periods at the 1% significance level. Whilst the smallest mean 
absolute revisions for all forecast horizons occurs during the stable sub-period 
consistent with reduced levels of inflation uncertainty, large mean absolute revisions 
are observed during the volatile period. Nevertheless, for Rt_2 ai*d Rt_3 the mean
167 Both mean and median values of R t _ 1 are significant for the whole sample period, however, they 
are insignificant for the three sub-periods.
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absolute revision is smaller for the volatile period in comparison to the whole period. 
Revisions of professional forecasts are thus dependent not only on the forecast 
horizon but also on the underlying macroeconomic conditions.
The distribution of forecast revisions and forecast updates are illustrated in Appendix 
6.3 and Appendix 6.4 respectively for SPF forecasts formed 4- to 0 periods ahead. 
The distributions are generally bell-shaped and unimodal as previously observed by 
Dovem et al. (2013) for revisions to professional growth forecasts for both advanced 
and emerging economies. The distributions show that consensus inflation forecasts 
for all horizons are frequently updated and revised. Nevertheless, the highest 
densities are observed around zero indicating that updates and revisions are generally 
small in magnitude. Nevertheless, the tails of the latest revision and shortest horizon 
forecast updates (h = 0) are considerably longer than those for earlier revisions and 
longer horizon forecast updates. This indicates that short horizon professional 
inflation forecasts are frequently subject to large revisions and updates, perhaps in 
response to surprise inflation shocks. Whilst longer horizon forecasts evolve much 
more smoothly in response to permanent macroeconomic innovations, shorter 
horizon forecasts have greater sensitivity to transitory shocks, a feature that shall be 
returned to later.
The fixed-event structure of SPF inflation forecasts allows the determination of 
whether forecast revisions are consistent with full information RE. Following 
Dovem et al. (2013) the contemporaneous forecast revision can be regressed upon 
past forecast revisions for some fixed-event inflation rate:
Rt-h = c + PRt-h-i  + €t (6.2.3)
The null hypothesis of efficiency requires /? = 0; alternatively, forecast revisions are 
significantly correlated. The results presented in Appendix 6.5 Panel A indicate that 
forecast efficiency cannot be rejected for any set of horizons for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods at the conventional 5% level. Nevertheless, 
the null hypothesis is rejected for h = 1 and h = 2 for the volatile sub-period 
indicating that for horizons greater than one period ahead, forecast revisions during 
periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty are significantly correlated and 
dependent upon lagged revisions. This is inconsistent with the predictions of RE.
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Given that the coefficient on lagged revisions is also positive, the results indicate that 
the forecasts formed four, three and two periods ahead for some inflation event are 
revised in the same direction.
The analysis in this section demonstrates that SPF inflation forecasts are subject to 
significant absolute revisions and updates over various forecast horizons and 
macroeconomic conditions. It is thus apparent that professional forecasts are 
inconsistent with underlying assumptions of full information. Imperfect information 
assumptions have been extensively utilised by economists for several decades with 
several recent contributions to expectations theory most notably the models of 
information rigidity of sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002) and noisy 
information (Sims, 2003; Woodford, 2003; Mackowiak and Wiederholt 2009). 
Section 6.3 shall empirically re-examine several key models of information rigidity 
to explore the manner in which available information is employed by professionals 
in forming inflation forecasts.
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6.2.2. Properties of Professional Forecast Disagreement
In addition to the analysis of forecast revisions and forecast updates to consensus 
forecasts, the literature review identified that the cross-sectional dispersion of 
forecasts provides a further indicator regarding the presence of information rigidities. 
Prior to examining formal empirical tests of the determinants of disagreement and 
the relationship with informational rigidities, the properties of the dispersion of 
professional forecasts shall be re-assessed. The evolution of disagreement across the 
five forecast horizons and four sample periods is of particular interest. In accordance 
with Lahiri and Sheng (2008) and Patton and Timmermann (2010), it is hypothesised 
that as the forecast horizon falls, disagreement will increase. In addition, it is also 
expected that disagreement will be particularly high during the volatile sub-period, 
as previously observed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), due to the increase of 
uncertainty concerning macroeconomic variables.
As mentioned in 6.1, the disagreement amongst professional forecasters shall be 
measured as the standard deviation of individual inflation forecasts from the US 
SPF168. For forecasts formed in period t for period t + h inflation, the level of 
disagreement can be denoted as:
where Ei t [nt+h] and Et [nt+h] denote individual and mean forecasts of t +  h 
inflation respectively. The level of disagreement for horizons h = 0,... ,4 is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2.1 whilst Appendix 6.1 presents the associated descriptive 
statistics.
1 /2 (6.2.4)
i=1
168 This methodology is further consistent with the analysis o f household disagreement in Chapter 4.
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Figure 6.2.1: SPF Multi Horizon Forecast Disagreement
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In accordance with Lahiri and Sheng (2008), Patton and Timmermann (2010) and 
Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), Appendix 6.1 and Figure 6.2.1 illustrate that the level 
of disagreement across the inflation forecasts of individual professionals is not 
constant across the five forecast horizons nor for the four sample periods169. 
Additionally, from Figure 6.2.1 it is observed that the level of disagreement across 
all five horizons is larger at the beginning and end of the sample period compared to 
the mid- to late-1990’s and early 2000’s when macroeconomic conditions were less 
uncertain. This is emphasised in Appendix 6.1 with lower mean and median 
disagreement across all forecast horizons during the stable sub-period in comparison 
to either the whole or volatile sample periods, with disagreement particularly large in 
the latter. Furthermore, the evolution of disagreement over the volatile sub-period 
closely matches that presented by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) for ECB-SPF 
forecasts during the 2008-2009 recession. The average disagreement reported in 
Appendix 6.1 is however larger than that reported by Dovem et al. (2012); this is 
unsurprising however, as the measure of disagreement preferred here considers the 
full sample of SPF inflation forecasts rather than the IQR.
169 Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) further note that the disagreement amongst professional inflation 
expectations is strongly correlated with respective expectations for unemployment and real GDP.
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Interestingly, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable period, the mean and 
median level of disagreement appears U-shaped with the forecast horizon. 
Disagreement is lowest for h = 2 and greater for both shorter and longer horizons. 
Nevertheless, for these sample periods, the Welch F-test and Kruskal-Wallis test are 
unable to reject their respective hypothesis that the mean and median are equal 
across forecast horizons. In contrast, for the volatile sub-period, mean and median 
disagreement generally increases as the forecast horizon shortens. Furthermore, the 
Welch F-test rejects the equality of means at a 10% significance level whilst the 
Kruskal-Wallis test rejects equality of medians at the 5% level. Nevertheless, 
excluding the disagreement concerning forecasts of current period inflation h = 0, it
1 70is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of equal means or medians . The 
results thus indicate that whilst there may be higher levels of disagreement amongst 
professional forecasts at the shortest available horizon, particularly during periods of 
increased macroeconomic uncertainty, it is otherwise possible to deduce that for each 
sample period, the level of disagreement is equal across forecasting horizons.
The standard deviation is also examined in Appendix 6.1 to determine the variability 
of disagreement across the four sample periods. It is observed that at longer 
forecasting horizons disagreement is generally less dispersed than for shorter 
horizons. Moreover, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the 
Brown-Forsythe test rejects the null hypothesis of equal variances. Similarly to the 
Welch and Kruskal-Wallis tests detailed above, by excluding h = 0 from the Brown- 
Forsythe tests, the rejection of the equal variances null hypothesis is not possible at 
conventional significance levels for these three sample periods. Nevertheless, for the 
volatile period, the Brown-Forsythe test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of 
equal variances across forecasting horizons with or without the inclusion of forecasts 
for current period inflation. The results therefore indicate that for each sample 
period there is no significant difference in the dispersion of disagreement across 
forecast horizons, particularly if forecasts for current period inflation are excluded.
As noted in 6.1, Patton and Timmermann (2010) observe a general positive 
relationship between the consensus forecast and disagreement. From Appendix 6.1 
Panel E the correlation between the SPF median forecast and ot t+h is observed to
170 For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods, the exclusion o f disagreement for h  =  0 
results in the Welch F-test and Kruskal Wallis test reporting even higher p-values.
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depend upon both the forecast horizon and sample period. Whilst for the stable sub­
period, the correlation is positive for all h, correlation between the median forecast 
and disagreement for all forecast horizons in the volatile sub-period is negative. 
Furthermore, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods whilst the 
correlation is generally positive for longer forecast horizons, it becomes smaller and 
occasionally negative as the forecast horizon shortens. This suggests that for shorter 
forecast horizons, disagreement amongst professional forecasters falls as the 
expected rate of inflation increases.
Consistent with existing empirical studies, SPF inflation forecasts have been shown 
to exhibit substantial disagreement. The degree of forecast dispersion persists 
across the forecast horizon; however, greater disagreement is observed for shorter 
forecast horizons and the most recent period of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, unlike the results presented by Lahiri and Sheng (2008) 
and Patton and Timmermann (2010), for any given sample period, formal tests 
indicate that the level and variability of disagreement is generally equal across 
forecast horizons. Nevertheless, whilst the two aforementioned studies evaluate 
disagreement across 24 monthly horizons, the choice of SPF data limits the analysis 
to five quarterly horizons. Should inflation forecasts of five or more quarters ahead 
have been available, the results may have indicated that disagreement is significantly 
larger for longer forecast horizons than those nearer the event. The next sub-chapter 
considers whether the disagreement identified in this sub-chapter can be considered 
consistent with informational rigidities.
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6.3. Empirical Evaluation of the Presence of Information 
Rigidities in Professional Forecasts
The analysis in the previous section established that although mean forecast updates 
and mean forecast revisions are in general statistically insignificant, the absolute 
values are significant. Furthermore, the results presented in 6.2.1 illustrated that the 
magnitude of forecast updates and revisions were dependent upon both the forecast 
horizon and sample period. Additionally, SPF inflation forecasts were observed in 
6.2.2 to exhibit substantial levels of disagreement, with the magnitude varying across 
forecast horizons and macroeconomic conditions. Utilising updates to fixed-horizon 
forecasts, revisions to fixed-event forecast, and the cross-sectional dispersion, formal 
empirical testing shall examine whether SPF inflation forecasts are subject to 
information rigidities and attempt to determine whether the predictions are aligned to 
those of the sticky information or noisy information models as presented by Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2012).
Section 6.1 established that some general consensus exists across previous studies 
that professional forecasts, like those of households, are subject to informational 
rigidities. Recent studies have provided several alternative frameworks to better 
understand the information frictions encountered by professionals; whilst the sticky 
information hypothesis is preferred by Mankiw et al. (2003), the results of Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2012) are consistent with noisy information models. The 
empirical investigations in this section seek to exploit updates and revisions to SPF 
forecasts, and the resultant disagreement amongst forecasters to address the 
following issues: are professional inflation forecasts consistent with the predictions 
of information rigidity models and secondly, which of the competing models of 
information restraints best characterises the expectations formation process of 
professionals.
The analysis begins by considering revisions to fixed-event forecasts; specifically, 
the Clements (2012) framework which considers consistency between annual and 
quarterly forecasts shall be examined. Next, attention shall be devoted to the 
relationship between forecast errors and revisions akin to Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010). In 6.3.2, the analysis focuses on fixed horizon forecasts and 
associated errors and updates. Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012),
291
impulse response functions are presented to analyse the common prediction of 
models with information constraints that forecast errors respond to shocks but 
asymptotically decline as information is acquired and processed by agents. 
Furthermore, analysing whether the response of forecast errors are independent of 
past inflation, it is possible to hypothesise which model of information constraint 
best characterises professional forecasts. Next, 6.3.3 empirically assesses the 
determinants of disagreement to determine whether the cross-sectional dispersion of 
SPF inflation forecasts are consistent with predicitions of information rigidity 
models. The final section provides a discussion regarding the presence of 
information rigidities amongst professional inflation forecasts and considers whether 
the evidence is consistent with the predictions of a specific model as presented by 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
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6.3.1. Professional Forecast Revisions and Information Rigidities
In 6.2.1, despite actual revisions realised at the shortest horizons and for the volatile 
sub-period not being statistically significant, the absolute revisions to SPF inflation 
forecasts, across all sample periods and available horizons reported in Appendix 6.2, 
were found to be significant. Furthermore, revisions were found to be inconsistent 
with the properties of RE. In accordance with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) 
and Clements (2012) forecast revisions from the SPF shall now be examined using 
formal empirical tests to determine whether the expectations formation process 
employed by professional forecasters is consistent with the properties of information 
rigidity models.
The model proposed by Clements (2012), as identified in the literature review, 
analyses whether multi-horizon forecasts are consistent with the annual forecast 
following the publication of new information through data releases. Any 
discrepancies are indicative of the presence of informational rigidities. Exploiting 
the availability of multi-horizon forecasts from the SPF for t + h, h = — 1,... ,4, the 
discrepancy series for CPI inflation forecasts can be formulated in a similar manner 
to equations (6.1.7) to (6.1.10)171. Whereas the discrepancies from Q1 and Q2 
forecasts will only differ from zero in the event of random errors, for Q3 and Q4 
discrepancies, where f t s ,Qj,Qi =  n s ,Qj  such that the estimate of Q1 and Q2 inflation is
equal to the realised value, the forecaster can be considered attentive172. Instead, 
should forecasters be inattentive to releases in the inflation rate then ftS Qj Qi = 
n s , Q j - k  where k  denotes the number of periods which have passed since the agent 
last updated their information.
Descriptive statistics for the discrepancy series generated from (6.1.7) to (6.1.10) are 
presented in Appendix 6.8. Considering the discrepancies for all quarters i = 1,... ,4 
it is not possible to reject the null hypotheses at a 5% significance level that the mean 
or median discrepancy is significantly different from zero for any sample period173.
In accordance with Clements (2012), there thus appears little evidence against the
171 Appendix 6.7 formally examines the calculation o f the discrepancy series between annual and 
quarterly SPF inflation forecasts for each of the four quarters o f a calendar year.
172 This detracts from the argument put forward by Clements (2012) as the CPI inflation data 
employed by this study is not systematically revised following publication.
173 The zero mean null hypothesis is however rejected at a 10% level for the stable sub-period.
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adding up of quarterly beliefs to the annual forecast. There is however limited 
evidence that beliefs for specific quarters do not add up. The zero mean null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 5% level for first quarter forecasts formed during the 
volatile period meanwhile the zero median null hypotheses is rejected for second 
quarter forecasts formed during the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke periods174.
The discrepancies for the third and fourth quarters can however be further analysed, 
as identified by Clements (2012) to determine whether professional forecasts are 
characterised by significant inattentiveness to the most recently available 
information. It was previously noted that a potential advantage of utilising the CPI 
measure of inflation is the absence of systematic revision subsequent to publication; 
agents are therefore not required to be attentive to revisions of realised values, in 
addition to updates, to remain informed. The model proposed by Clements (2012) is 
founded upon attentiveness to these revisions, thus (6.1.11) and (6.1.12) require 
appropriate modification to capture inattentiveness to inflation updates, as shown by 
(6.3.1) and (6.3.2):
Ss,Q3 ~  c  +  P ( n s,Ql ~  n s - l , Q * )  +  e s,Q3 (6.3.1)
3s,Q4 =  C +  P ( n SlQ2 ~  n s , Q l )  +  6 s,Q4 ^  ^ ^
Specifically, the discrepancies in the third and fourth quarters of a calendar year are 
regressed upon the difference in the actual rate of CPI published two and three 
quarters previously. Where /? is significant, it can be deduced that the discrepancies 
in the median SPF forecast are correlated with changes in the inflation rate, 
indicative of inattentiveness.
Appendix 6.9 presents the results for (6.3.1) and (6.3.2) for SPF forecasts for all four 
sample periods. For the third quarter forecasts the results indicate that /? is 
ubiquitously small and positive. Moreover, /? is insignificant thus there is no 
evidence in favour of the inattentiveness hypothesis for third quarter forecasts which 
corresponds with the results presented by Clements (2012) for GDP price index 
forecasts. In contrast to Clements (2012), who again finds /3 to be small and
174 The zero median null hypothesis is also rejected by the Wilcoxon signed rank test at a 10% level 
for first quarter forecasts formed in the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sub-periods and for second 
quarter forecasts formed during the stable sub-period.
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insignificant, the values of /? associated with fourth quarter CPI forecasts for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable period are large and significant. For 
forecasts to be characterised by inattentiveness, Clements (2012) highlights that a 
negative correlation between the discrepancy and the change in inflation is required. 
However, as the values of /? presented in Appendix 6.9 are positive for all four 
sample periods, it is not possible to attribute discrepancies to inattentiveness. The 
difference to the results presented by Clements (2012) may arise due to the 
methodology employed; whilst the results above are from tests conducted upon 
median expectations from the SPF and changes to the realised value of CPI,
Clements (2012) utilises individual expectations and the difference between data 
revisions.
Prior to determining whether forecast revisions are consistent with the predictions of 
informational rigidities, it shall first be determined whether forecast revisions are 
inconsistent with the efficiency property required under RE. Following Nordhaus 
(1987) and Dovem et al. (2013) the contemporaneous forecast revision at various 
forecast horizons is regressed on the one-period lagged revision:
Rt- h = c + ARt-n-i + u t (6.3.3)
where Rt-h is the one period revision to median SPF inflation forecasts for target 
period t  formed at horizon h as previously defined in 6.2.1. The null hypothesis of 
efficiency requires /? = 0; otherwise, forecast revisions are significantly correlated. 
Although rejection of the null hypothesis cannot be considered as direct evidence of 
information rigidities, it does indicate that available information could have been 
used to improve forecast efficiency.
The results from tests of (6.3.3) are presented in Appendix 6.5 Panel A. As 
previously noted, for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that A = 0 for horizons h = 0,1,2175; there is 
thus no evidence that forecast revisions are correlated. This contrasts with the results 
of Dovem et al. (2013) who observe significant correlation between the 
contemporaneous revision and the one-month lag; nevertheless, the four month lag is
175 The null hypothesis o f efficiency can be rejected for h  =  0, which relates to the forecast revision 
between 1- and 0- period ahead forecasts, at the 10% significance level for the Greenspan-Bemanke 
sub-period.
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insignificant for both advanced and emerging countries. For the volatile sub-period, 
the null hypothesis X — 0 can be rejected for h = 0,1,2. Therefore, professional 
forecasts are less efficient during the most recent period of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty; this supports the efficiency results presented in Chapter 3 in relation to 
RE. To summarise, the results in Appendix 6.5 Panel A suggest that forecast 
revisions during the volatile sub-period are most likely to be consistent with 
informational rigidities.
To examine whether forecast inefficiency is indicative of informational rigidities, 
and furthermore whether informational rigidities vary across the forecast horizon,
(6.3.3) is extended, akin to Dovem et al. (2013), to consider the sum of lagged 
revisions:
Whereas Dovem et al. (2013) solely consider the one-period ahead forecast and its 
relationship with lagged forecasts formed up to 16 months previously, here the value 
of h is varied to determine whether forecasts for longer horizons exhibit larger 
rigidities than those for shorter horizons. The composition of the SPF determines 
that for h = 0, k < 3 can be utilised whilst for h = 2, just a single lagged revision 
3 is available176.
Results from testing (6.3.4) are presented in Appendix 6.5 Panel B. Whereas Dovem 
et al. (2013) observe significant positive correlation for both advanced and emerging 
economies between the contemporaneous revision and the first lag, /? and X1 are 
generally insignificant for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods. This 
suggests that information rigidities are not pronounced within professional inflation 
forecasts during periods of greater macroeconomic stability; forecast revisions 
instead conform to the predictions of rational expectations. This corresponds with 
the efficiency results presented in Panel A.
176 Despite the availability of 7?t_3, it is not possible to analyse the revision and consequently 
information rigidities that arise in forming four-step forecasts from the SPF as data concerning five- 
step ahead and longer forecasting horizons is not requested by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia.
k (6.3.4)
k = 1
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Nevertheless, in Panel B, the contemporaneous revision h = 0, exhibits significant 
positive correlation with the one-period lagged revision for the whole sample period 
and significant negative correlation with the two quarter lagged revision for the 
Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period. The positive correlation indicates the presence of 
information rigidities and, consistent with the results for GDP forecasts presented by 
Dovem et al (2013), suggest that for the whole sample period, professional 
forecasters update their information approximately every six months. The negative 
correlation implies that revisions are in opposite directions. Rather than indicating 
information rigidities, this result is most likely to arise from professionals devoting 
greater capacity to the processing of relevant information at shorter forecasting 
horizons. As the forecast horizon falls, signals may also become less noisy. The 
negative correlation may indicate overshooting behaviour on the part of professional 
forecast revisions. As the forecast horizon shortens, professional revisions attempt 
to rectify this behaviour which seems particularly apparent for the volatile sub­
period. Positive A± and negative A2 coefficients, both of which are significant for 
h =  0 and h = 1, further supports the notion that short-run forecasts are highly 
subject to transitory shocks during the recent period of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty.
For advanced economies, Dovem et al. (2013) observe significant correlation 
between the contemporaneous revision and the 13 month lagged revision177. They 
explain this occurrence by indicating that annual and quarterly forecasts are 
intrinsically linked. This could however indicate some seasonality effect within 
forecast revisions. Meanwhile it is further suggested by Dovem et al. (2013) that 
agents attentiveness switches from current year to new year forecasts at horizons of 
approximately one year. Due to the construction of survey forecasts, it is not 
possible to assess Dovem et al.’s (2013) observation of large information rigidities at
1 78approximately one-year ahead horizons . Nevertheless, the A3 coefficients, 
associated with the revision at the longest available horizon, are not significantly 
correlated with the contemporaneous revision Rt for any of the four sample periods.
177 For emerging economies, significant correlation between the contemporaneous and 10 month 
lagged revision is observed. For comparison with US SPF inflation forecasts, the results concerning 
advanced economies are considered most relevant.
178 The revision with the longest horizon available from the SPF concerns the three-period lagged 
value. Specifically, this revision R t_ 3 concerns that which arises between the four quarter ahead and 
three quarter ahead forecasts.
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The results indicate that information rigidities are not prominent in professional 
inflation forecasts. The addition of further Ak terms to (6.3.4), for larger k, could 
alter this result. Although Dovem et al. (2013) do not observe significant 
correlation between the contemporaneous and 10-month lagged revision for 
advanced economies, their coefficient value is positive. The A3 coefficients reported 
in Appendix 6.5 for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile periods are instead 
negative.
As identified in 6.1, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) present a novel approach to 
determining whether professional forecasts are embodied by information rigidity; 
specifically, ex-post forecast errors are reconciled with ex-ante forecast revisions. 
Their model, identified by (6.1.4) shall be reconsidered utilising multi horizon SPF 
forecasts of CPI inflation. This shall yield an indirect comparison with the results 
presented in Chapter 5 concerning the degree of information rigidity within 
household inflation forecasts as identified by Carroll’s (2003, 2006) epidemiological 
model. In the earlier examination of the model, it was established that where /? =£ 0 
the null hypothesis of full information RE is rejected; instead, should /? > 0, 
information rigidities are present.
For the previously identified sample periods, tests of (6.1.4) are examined for 
horizons h = 0,... ,3 with the results presented in Appendix 6.10. In comparison to 
the results presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), the values of /? are 
generally much smaller; this indicates that CPI forecasts are subject to smaller 
information constraints than those for the GDP price deflator. Nevertheless, across 
horizons h = 1,2,3 for the whole sample period, /? is both positive and significant 
implying a rejection of the full information RE null hypothesis in favour of the 
presence of information rigidities. In contrast, for the Greenspan-Bemanke and 
stable sub-periods, (3 is not statistically significant at the 5% level for h = 1,2,3. 
Even though (3 is positive for these forecasts, the results indicate that during periods 
of increased macroeconomic stability, professional forecasts are not subject to 
information constraints.
Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010), column (5) maps the degree of 
information rigidity, (3 to the frequency of updating A estimated by sticky 
information models. For the whole sample period the value of A implies that
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professionals update their information every four to six months on average, with 
information being updated most frequently for one-period ahead forecasts. This is 
more frequent than the rate of updating of six to seven months reported by Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2010) for SPF GDP deflator forecasts. For the Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable sub-periods, the degree of information rigidity is generally not
1 70significant, consistent with a higher frequency of information updating . 
Information rigidities are however present for one-step ahead forecasts formed 
during the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period; significance is observed at a 10% level 
for /?, whilst X is significant at a 1% level and implies that information is updated 
every three to four months180.
For the volatile sub-period, whilst /? is significant for h =  1 and h = 2181, /? is not 
significant for h =  3. Furthermore, the corresponding X values for h = 1 and h = 2 
is also observed to be highly significant. Nevertheless, the frequency of information 
updates is lowest for this sub-period. For one-period ahead forecasts the value of X 
implies that information is updated approximately every five to six months, whilst 
for two-period ahead forecasts, information is updated every eight to nine months.
In contrast to h = 1,2,3 the value of /? associated with h = 0 is negative for all four 
sample periods; professional 0-step ahead forecasts are thus not consistent with the
i g2
presence of information rigidities . Nevertheless, for the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable periods, /? is observed to be statistically significant at the 5% 
level, which is demonstrated by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) to indicate the 
rejection of the full information RE hypothesis. In contrast, it is not possible to 
reject the null of full information RE for 0-step ahead professional forecasts formed 
in the volatile sub-period as /? is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
This suggests that professionals are more efficient at collecting and processing 
information for imminent forecast horizons during periods of greater macroeconomic
179 For the Greenspan-Bemanke period the X values in column (5) indicates that professionals update 
their information at least every four months, whilst for the stable sub-period, information is updated at 
least every three months.
180 Although (3 and X are larger for the corresponding two-period ahead forecasts formed in the 
Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period, implying that information is updated every four to five months, the 
degree o f information rigidity exhibits a t-statistic with associated p-value o f 0.105 and thus is not 
found to be statistically significant at conventional levels.
181 Whilst (3 is significant at the 1% level for h  =  1, for h =  2 (3 is significant at the 10% level.
182 /? <  0 is also observed for h  =  3 for the volatile period.
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uncertainty. However, as p  is significant for h = 1 and h = 2, it is not currently 
possible to provide comprehensive conclusions regarding information rigidities for 
the volatile period.
In the literature discussion, (6.1.5) identified an additional test presented by Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2010) which decomposes the forecast revision into two 
component forecasts. Employing this specification, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
present results which provide additional evidence that professional GDP price 
deflator forecasts are subject to informational rigidities. To determine whether the 
conclusions regarding informational rigidity from tests of (6.1.4) are robust, (6.1.5) 
shall be applied to SPF CPI forecasts with the results presented in Appendix 6.11.
As previously observed for the baseline model, the values of p1 and /?2 for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods are much lower than those reported 
by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010); this again suggests that professional CPI 
forecasts are less subject to information constraints than for the GDP price deflator. 
Whilst the signs on the /? coefficients associated with one, two and three period 
ahead forecasts formed in the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods are 
consistent with the presence of information rigidities, the p  coefficients are generally 
insignificant; these results contrast with those presented by Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010), and are in conflict with the predictions of information 
rigidity models. This is particularly evident across forecasts for all future horizons 
during the stable sub-period and longer forecasting horizons in the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke periods. These results are consistent with those presented in 
Appendix 6.10. Nevertheless, for one-period ahead forecasts formed in the whole 
and Greenspan-Bemanke periods, the x 2 null hypothesis that p  coefficients sum to 
zero cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level. The absolute values of 
the coefficients upon the two most recent forecasts is thus equal, which Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010) argue to be consistent with information rigidities.
The results for the volatile period are substantially distinct to those for the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods. Although for h = 0 both p coefficients are 
significant, indicating the rejection of full information RE, they exhibit the incorrect 
sign to be consistent with information rigidities as previously observed for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods. The positive values observed for p2
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for h = 1 and h = 3 further indicate that models of information rigidity are 
inappropriate for periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast, 
despite large absolute coefficient values, the signs on px and /?2 f°r two-step ahead 
forecasts in the volatile sub-periods are appropriate with the presence of information 
rigidities. Furthermore, the x 2 tests cannot reject that the absolute values of the /? 
coefficients are equal. However, neither c, nor /?2 are significant at the 5% level, 
thus there is no evidence to reject the full information RE null hypothesis for these 
forecasts.
The evidence thus far indicates that the presence of information rigidities within 
professional forecasts is dependent upon both the forecast horizon and the sample 
period. The results presented in Appendix 6.10 and Appendix 6.11 indicate that the 
correlation between forecast errors and past revisions is larger for shorter forecast 
horizons. Information rigidity thus appears to be decreasing with the forecast 
horizon. This is in direct conflict with Dovem et al. (2013) who argue that 
information rigidities are likely to be monotonically increasing with the forecast 
horizon as relevant signals are noisier at longer horizons. Additionally, in 
accordance with the results for household forecasts presented in relation to the 
epidemiological model, information rigidities amongst professional forecasts appear 
less pronounced during periods of greater macroeconomic stability and appear more 
consistent with the predictions of full information RE. This is economically 
reasonable as periods of greater stability are often associated with reduced costs 
regarding the acquisition and processing of information. The evidence does however 
refute the notion that the degree of information rigidity is determined by an 
exogenously given constant as proposed by Mankiw et al. (2003). Further analysis 
shall thus be conducted utilising forecast updates and trhe cross-sectional dispersion 
to attempt to confirm the observed relationships regarding information rigidity and 
establish some firmer conclusions.
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6.3.2. Professional Forecast Updates and Information Rigidities
In 6.3.1, the examination of forecast revisions indicated that the presence of 
information rigidities amongst SPF inflation forecasts are not constant; instead, they 
are dependent upon both the forecast horizon and sample period. As previously 
acknowledged, in addition to analysing revisions to fixed-event forecasts, the multi­
horizon structure of forecasts from the SPF also allows for the analysis of updates to 
fixed-horizon forecasts. Utilising these forecasts and associated forecast errors, the 
this section determines the consistency of forecast updates with the predictions of 
information rigidity models and attempts to verify the observations concerning 
professional forecast revisions detailed in the previous section.
A key set of predictions considered by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) of 
information rigidity models relates to the response of forecast errors to shocks: the 
sticky information and baseline noisy information models both predict that forecast 
errors respond in the same direction as the forecasted variable, and asymptotically 
decline (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). This contrasts to the predictions of RE 
which involve a complete and instantaneous response in agent forecasts following 
any shock; consequently, the response of forecast errors to any macroeconomic 
disturbance or shock would be zero.
In accordance with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the analysis shall focus upon 
technology, oil price, news and unidentified shocks with the last of these generated 
from the residuals v t from the following regression:
A  v  ^  (6.3.5)Tfr = C + 2^PkKt-k + 2, / _ , yj £t-j + Vt
k = l  sEO,N,T y'=0
183The category of shock is denoted seO, N, T for oil price, news innovation and 
technology shocks184 respectively.
183 To generate the shock series we follow Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010). Oil price shocks are 
defined as the residuals from running an AR(2) on the first difference of the log of oil prices. 
Similarly, to generate news shocks an AR(2) is run on the news intensity index.
184 Technology shocks are generated in the same manner as Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). 
Namely, a VAR(4) is estimated on the percentage in labour productivity, the percentage change in 
hours worked and the CPI inflation rate. Quarterly data for labour productivity and hours worked are 
obtained from the BLS. The estimation sample employed is 1980Q1-2012Q4.
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Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), impulse responses for GDP deflator
unexplained shocks; these are constructed by estimating the following VAR:
The category of shock is denoted 5 G 0 ,N ,T ,U  for oil price, news innovation, 
technology and unidentified shocks respectively; whilst J and K are selected using 
the Akaike criterion up to a maximum of 8 lags. The impulse response results to one 
standard deviation shocks from testing (6.3.6) across the four sample periods, with 
respective two standard deviation confidence intervals, are presented in Appendix
For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, the mean response of 
inflation to technology and oil price shocks is positive and significant whilst the 
response to news intensity and unexplained shocks are generally insignificant. 
Furthermore, after roughly four periods, the response of inflation across these three 
sample periods converges approximately monotonically to zero. Whilst the direction 
of the response to oil shocks, and the associated convergence, is consistent with the 
results presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), they contrastingly predict a 
significant and positive response to unidentified shocks and significant and negative 
response to technology and news shocks. The contrasting responses may indicate 
that such tests regarding information rigidity may be highly dependent upon the 
shock specification and the sample period187. Reconsidering the results utilising CPI 
inflation rather than the GDP deflator, similar results to the aforementioned figures
185 The quarterly implicit price deflator is obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The inflation rate is measured as the percentage increase in the GDP deflator over a period of four 
quarters.
186 The impulse response functions impose a one standard deviation oil price, news innovation or 
technology shock upon the GDP deflator inflation measure.
1 8 7 Presenting a variance decomposition by structural shocks, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
report that news shocks account for approximately 10% of inflation volatility. In the analysis 
presented here, news intensity shocks account for no more than approximately 5% o f inflation 
volatility. In comparison, oil price shocks generally account for over 20% of inflation volatility in the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods. Consequently, oil price shocks are able to provide 
stronger predictions regarding the prevalence o f information rigidities however news intensity shocks 
are less reliable.
1 o c
inflation shall first be considered for oil price, news intensity, technology and
K J (6.3.6)
6 . 12186.
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are obtained, although the response to technology shocks are generally insignificant 
whilst the responses to unidentified shocks are significant.
For the volatile sub-period the response of inflation in Appendix 6.12 to all four 
shocks is insignificant. Furthermore, rather than converging to zero, the functions 
appear to ‘explode’ indicating that large responses in inflation are observed 
following lags of 10 periods or more188. Nevertheless, the shortened sample 
specification likely makes these results unreliable.
As highlighted by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), to be consistent with the 
properties of RE, professional forecast need to respond to shocks in the same manner 
as future inflation. Consequently, under RE forecast errors are required to exhibit a 
zero response to shocks. A non-zero response, which possesses the same sign as the 
response of the forecasted variable to the shock is shown by Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko to be consistent with the predictions of information rigidity models.
To assess whether fixed-horizon SPF inflation forecasts conform to the competing 
predictions of these models, the following VAR as presented by Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) shall be estimated for the four shocks, s , as previously 
specified in relation to (6.3.6):
nt+h -  Et [nt+h] (6.3.7)
K J
— C ^  ' PkiTTt+h-k ~ Ff-fc [TTf+zi-k]) + ^  ’ Yj^t-j T 
k = l  7=1
In accordance with (6.3.6), lag lengths K and J are selected using the AIC up to a 
maximum of 8 periods. To determine the response of forecast errors to the four 
shocks the IRF’s relating to h = 0,... ,4 are presented in Appendix 6.13, Appendix 
6.14, Appendix 6.15, Appendix 6.16 and Appendix 6.17 for each of the four sample 
periods.
Firstly, the response of forecast errors to news intensity shocks is in general 
insignificant across both forecast horizons and sample periods; significance is only 
observed in the stable sub-sample period for 0- and 1-period ahead forecast errors.
188 Utilising the Akaike criteria with a maximum lag length of 4 periods, the impulse response 
functions from the VAR simulations indicate that although the response o f inflation to shocks 
generally remains insignificant, convergence to zero is observed.
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Therefore, consistent with the RE null hypothesis, a zero response of forecast errors 
to news intensity shocks is generally observed. Nevertheless, limited evidence is 
observed which favours models of information rigidity. Despite providing 
conflicting results to those presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
concerning news shocks, this observation is not surprising as the variance 
decomposition found that news intensity shocks, across all four sample periods, only 
accounted for a small proportion of inflation volatility.
In contrast to news intensity shocks, the response of forecast errors to oil price 
shocks is positive and significant for all h across the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke 
sample periods and h = 3 and h = 4 for the stable sub-period. Moreover, in 
accordance with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions for information 
rigidity models, the responses of forecast errors are positive, converging 
approximately asymptotically to zero, attributable to professionals incorporating 
news into information sets following some lag. Additionally, consistent with 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions of sticky information and noisy 
information models, the response of forecast errors to oil price shocks matches the 
direction of the reponse of inflation to this class of shock. Nonetheless, for h =
0,1,2 across the stable sub-period and all h for the volatile sub-period, the response 
of forecast errors to shocks is not significant suggesting that the associated forecasts 
are better characterised by the REH than models of information rigidity.
It is thus becoming evident that the response of forecast errors, and consequently 
inferences regarding information rigidity, are dependent upon the forecast horizon 
and sample period. This is again emphasised by the IRF’s concerning technology 
shocks. For the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods, the 
significance of forecast error responses to technology shocks is mixed. Therefore, 
for these sample periods, technology shocks are unable to provide any conclusive 
evidence in favour, or against, information rigidity models. Nevertheless, as 
previously observed for news intensity and oil price shocks, across the volatile sub­
period, the forecast error response to technology shocks is insignificant for all h ; this 
further suggests that professional inflation forecasts published during the most recent 
period of macroeconomic uncertainty are not consistent with the predictions of 
information rigidity presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
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Finally, the forecast error response to unidentified shocks are, in general, significant 
for shorter horizon forecasts across the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable 
sample periods, yet the response across errors for longer horizons is insignificant. 
Consequently, whilst the former are consistent with models of information rigidity, 
the latter conform to the REH. Moreover, for all h , the response of forecast errors to 
unidentified shocks across the volatile sub-period is again insignificant, further 
indicating that professional inflation forecasts are not characterised by models of 
information rigidity during the most recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty.
The results presented in Appendix 6.13 to Appendix 6.17 clearly indicate that the 
response of forecast errors to shocks is not constant; instead the responses, and 
consequently inferences concerning models of information rigidity, are dependent 
upon the macroeconomic disturbance, the forecast horizon and the sample period.
To summarise, fairly strong evidence of information rigidities is observed from the 
IRF’s for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, however, the evidence 
is more mixed for the stable sub-period. Moreover, for the volatile sub-period, the 
IRF’s do not provide any evidence consistent with the predictions of information 
rigidity models. Furthermore, whilst forecast errors exhibit significant responses to 
oil price, technology and unidentified shocks in a manner consistent with 
information rigidity models, the response of forecast to news intensity shocks across 
forecast horizons and sample periods is generally zero, consistent with the properties 
of REH.
Despite a significant response in forecast errors to shocks being consistent with 
information rigidity models, Capistran and Timmermann (2009) and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) also identify heterogeneous loss aversion as consistent with 
this property. Nevertheless, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) also note that under 
heterogeneous loss aversion, forecast errors are ubiquitously positive or negative to 
any shock and thus re-examine (6.3.7), replacing lagged shocks with lagged absolute 
shocks, as follows:
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As previously, s £ 0, N, T, U denote oil price, news innovation, technology and 
unidentified shocks and K and J are selected by the Akaike criterion.
From Appendix 6.18 to Appendix 6.22, it is not evident than an invariably positive 
or negative shock is observed across shocks; whilst a positive response to absolute 
technology shocks is generally observed across forecast horizons and sample 
periods, a negative response is generally observed to absolute news intensity shocks. 
Moreover, the response to absolute oil price and unidentified shocks are neither
1 RQuniformly positive nor negative . Furthermore, responses across all four shocks are 
frequently insignificant. Therefore, the responses of forecast errors to absolute 
shocks do not provide any evidence that professional inflation forecasts are 
consistent with the properties of heterogeneous loss aversion in the manner proposed 
by Capistran and Timmermann (2009). Instead, the response of forecast errors to 
shocks appears more aligned to the predictions of sticky information or noisy 
information models; this is consistent with the analysis of Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012). However, the evidence thus far remains inconclusive and 
dependent upon the nature of the shock imposed upon forecasts. It shall thus be 
worthwhile to pursue further tests which seek to determine whether the properties of 
professional forecasts are consistent with these competing models.
In addition to determining whether agent expectations are subject to information 
rigidities, it is also possible to distinguish between the various hypotheses from 
analysing fixed horizon forecasts. In 6.1, equation (6.1.14) identified the model 
presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) which empirically assesses whether 
forecast errors are correlated with lagged inflation. Prior to formal testing (6.1.14) 
shall be restated to accommodate the multi-horizon structure of the SPF employed in 
our analysis:
189 Additionally, for all four sample periods, forecast error responses are not uniformly positive or 
negative across forecast horizons or shocks.
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where h represents the forecast horizon. Forecast errors are independent of past 
inflation where y = 0 which Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) illustrate to be 
consistent with models of heterogeneous priors or signals but incompatible with 
either the sticky information or noisy information hypotheses. Tests of (6.3.9) for 
GDP deflator and CPI inflation measures are presented in Appendix 6.23 and 
Appendix 6.24 respectively.
Firstly, considering tests of (6.3.9) for GDP deflator forecasts, the value of y  for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable period is generally small and insignificant 
which is consistent with both the sticky information and noisy information models. 
Nevertheless, y  is positive and significant for h = 3 in the stable sub-period and 
h = 4 in the Greenspan-Bemanke sub-period indicating that longer horizon forecasts 
formulated during periods generally characterised by reduced levels of 
macroeconomic uncertainty may be more consistent with models with inherent 
heterogeneity in agent priors or signals. In accordance with Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012), similar results are obtained for these three sample periods 
where a more general lag specification of forecast errors and inflation is employed.
Moreover, for the volatile sub-period, the lower panel of Appendix 6.23 shows that y 
is positive and significant for all h. Thus, tests of (6.3.9) indicate that during the 
recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty, professional GDP deflator forecasts are 
consistent with the predictions of models with inherent heterogeneous priors or 
signals. Nevertheless, the relevancy of these results is questionable as recalling the 
results from Appendix 6.13 to Appendix 6.17, which analysed the response of 
forecast errors to a range of shocks, professional forecasts for all h were deemed to 
be inconsistent with models of information rigidity. Moreover, utilising a more 
general lag specification of forecast errors and inflation for the volatile sub-period, 
neither y1 nor y2 are significant for any h190. Unlike the initial specification, this 
indicates that professional forecast formulated for the most recent period of 
macroeconomic uncertainty are inconsistent with models of heterogeneous priors
190 Wald t-tests generally find that the restriction y 1 + y 2 =  0 cannot be rejected although tests for 
h =  3 are an exception.
308
and signals; instead, sticky information and noisy information models are more 
compatible with these predictions. Therefore, the ambiguity regarding the degree 
and class of information rigidities amongst professional inflation forecasts for the 
volatile sub-period remains unresolved.
Tests of (6.3.9) are also considered for SPF CPI forecasts, with the results presented 
in Appendix 6.24. For h =  0, the null hypothesis that y  =  0 is rejected for all 
sample periods. Furthermore, y  > 0 for all sample periods; following Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s (2012) these results for professional ‘nowcasts’ are incompatible 
with the predictions of either the sticky information or noisy information hypotheses. 
Instead, models of heterogeneous priors or signals are more likely to be important 
factors in the formation of these forecasts. In contrast, across h = 1,... ,4 for each of 
the four sample periods y  is small and either negative or not significant. This 
corresponds with the results presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) for 
four-period ahead forecasts from a variety of agent classes.
For h = 1,... ,4 across the whole sample period, y  is invariably negative and 
generally highly significant191. This is inconsistent with Coibion and
1 09Gorodnichenko’s predictions for any model of information rigidity . Nevertheless, 
for the Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sub-periods y  = 0 cannot be rejected for 
h > 1, whilst for the volatile sub-period , the null hypothesis y = 0 cannot be 
rejected for h = 2,... ,4. There are thus apparent information rigidities embodied in 
fixed-horizon SPF CPI forecasts for these sample periods; moreover, in accordance 
with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the predictions from Appendix 6.24 
suggest that SPF CPI forecasts are inconsistent with the properties of noisy 
information models with inherent heterogeneity in signals or priors.
The analysis in this section has empirically examined the properties of professional 
forecast errors and forecast updates, and furthermore investigated whether their 
responses to various macroeconomic shocks are consistent with the predictions of 
information rigidity models as presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012).
The evidence suggests that professional inflation forecasts for certain forecast
191 For h  =  1, y  is marginally insignificant at the 10% level o f significance.
192 Similar findings are obtained utilising an additional inflation lag, with the sum o f coefficients 
remaining negative and significant. Observing y  <  0 for FOMC forecasts, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) suggest that these results may be driven by time aggregation.
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horizons and sample periods are characterised by substantial information rigidities; 
moreover, the degree and appropriate model of information rigidity is dependent 
upon various assumptions and conditions. This evidently dismisses Mankiw et al.’s 
(2003) proposal that information rigidities are determined by an exogenously given 
constant. The IRF’s from Appendix 6.13 to Appendix 6.22 indicate that professional 
forecasts are characterised by large information rigidities for the whole and 
Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, yet the evidence for the stable and volatile sub­
periods is less conclusive. Furthermore, the results appear sensitive to the 
classification and specification of the macroeconomic shocks imposed on forecast 
errors. Moreover, tests of (6.3.9) indicate that there is sufficient evidence to dismiss 
models of inherent heterogeneity amongst agent signals, priors or loss aversion as 
proposed by Capistran and Timmermann (2009) and Patton and Timmermann 
(2010). Instead information rigidities amongst professionals appear more consistent 
with the sticky information or (baseline) noisy information models. The following 
section empirically examines whether disagreement amongst professional inflation 
forecasts are consistent with the various models of information rigidity.
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6.3.3. Professional Disagreement and Information Rigidities
From Appendix 6.1 it was observed that SPF inflation forecasts are characterised by 
substantial disagreement. Furthermore, the magnitude of disagreement was 
established to vary across the forecast horizon and macroeconomic conditions. This 
section considers formal empirical tests to determine whether the disagreement 
amongst professionals is consistent with information rigidity models.
It was noted in 6.1 that whilst Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) find no evidence 
that professional disagreement significantly responds to a range of macroeconomic 
shocks, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) observe a positive relationship between 
disagreement and the magnitude of macroeconomic disturbances. Consequently, the 
former deem expectations to be consistent with noisy information models whilst the 
latter propose that the sticky information hypothesis is more appropriate. These 
conclusions shall be re-evaluated utilising the disagreement amongst SPF inflation 
forecasts.
Following Dovem et al. (2012) a fixed-effects estimator is used to understand the 
general trend of disagreement for various forecast horizons across the whole sample 
period. Table 6.3.2 presents results from testing (6.3.10) which considers the 
manner which disagreement evolves over time, to NBER recessions as presented in 
Table 6.3.1, and the volatile sub-period:
°t,t+h = c + & [Rect\ + fi2 [post98] + p3[Volt] + ut (6.3.10)
where Rect denotes the dummy associated with recessions, post98  represents the 
post-1998 sub-sample dummy, and Volt the volatile sub-period dummy.
Table 6.3.1: NBER Recessions193
PEAK TROUGH Months Quarters
January 1980 Q l July 1980 Q3 6 2
July 1981 Q3 November 1982 Q4 16 5
July 1990 Q3 March 1991 Qi 8 2
March 2001 Q l November 2001 Q4 8 3
December 2007 Q4 June 2009 Q2 18 6
193 For the sample period within this study, the table below presents the dates of recessions published 
by the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee in both months and quarters. Recessions commence 
at the peak of the business cycle whilst troughs denote the end. US Business Cycle Expansions and 
Contractions are available from the NBER at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last accessed 
17/05/2013).
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Table 6.3.2: Professional Disagreement Across Time
Sample: Whole 1982:3 2011:1 
&t,t+h =  Po  +  P i *  r e c t +  P i *  p o s t 9 8  +  p 3 * v o l  +  u t
Po P i P i P  3 R 2 R 2
°t , t 0.836***
(0.084)
0.000 0.000
0.712***
(0.082)
0.510***
(0.187)
-0.053
(0.119)
0.461***
(0.166)
0.316 0.298
a t,t+1 0.763***
(0.090)
0.000 0.000
0.681***
(0.074)
0.341**
(0.149)
-0.045
(0.119)
0.328**
(0.135)
0.264 0.244
a t,t+1 0.720***
(0.079)
0.000 0.000
0.679***
(0.084)
0.295***
(0.110)
-0.108
(0.108)
0.283**
(0.117)
0.208 0.187
< h , t + 3 0.731***
(0.074)
0.000 0.000
q 792***
(0.093)
0.212**
(0.091)
-0.155
(0.118)
0.276**
(0.101)
0.155 0.133
^ t . t + 4 0.755***
(0.082)
0.000 0.000
0.790***
(0.111)
0.104**
(0.046)
-0.233*
(0.132)
0.298**
(0.117)
0.139 0.116
In accordance with Dovem et al.’s (2012) results for the US, p 2 is invariably 
insignificant; for all forecast horizons, the level of disagreement is constant both pre- 
1999 and post-1998. This result is robust to alternative dummy years; examining 
post-1995 and post-2000 sub-samples, it is not possible to conclude that the level of 
disagreement across either sub-sample is significantly different to earlier years194. In 
contrast, the coefficients associated with both recessions and the volatile sub-period 
are positive and significant across all forecast horizons and sample periods. The 
observation that disagreement rises during recessions is consistent with the results 
presented by Patton and Timmermann (2010) for US CPI and Dovem et al. (2012) 
for both G7 and US Consensus Economics forecasts. Table 6.3.2 also indicates that 
disagreement has increased during the most recent period of increased 
macroeconomic uncertainty. This conforms to Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) 
prediction that under sticky information the response of disagreement to any shock is 
positive.
Furthermore, from Table 6.3.2 the values of both p± and /?3 indicate that the increase 
in disagreement is larger for shorter forecast horizons. During recessions the
194 These results are not presented in Table 6.3.2
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increase in disagreement is estimated at = 61% for current-period forecasts and
0.836
0 341— = 45% for one-period ahead forecasts. This compares to 29% and 14% for
three- and four-period ahead forecasts respectively. The increase in disagreement 
associated with the onset of the volatile sub-period is also found to be largest for 
shorter forecast horizons, estimated at 55% for h = 0 and 43% for h = 1. The 
increase in disagreement associated with the volatile period at longer forecasting 
horizons is however approximately equal across h = 2,3,4. Moreover, for h = 3 
and h = 4, the increase in disagreement associated with the volatile sub-period is 
larger than that associated with recessions.
These results support the earlier argument that disagreement, and thus associated 
forecasts, formed for shorter horizons are more sensitive to transitory shocks whilst 
the response across longer horizons is primarily dependent upon permanent 
macroeconomic innovations. Furthermore, that disagreement rises during recessions 
and the volatile sub-period is most consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s 
(2012) predictions for sticky information that the response of disagreement to any 
shock is positive. Interestingly, whilst the response is greater for short-horizon 
forecasts, there is no evidence from Table 6.3.2 that the most appropriate model of 
information rigidity is dependent upon the sample period or forecast horizon. The 
remainder of this section shall analyse more specific shocks to determine whether 
this conclusion is indeed most appropriate for disagreement amongst professional 
forecasters.
An important determinant in the degree of disagreement amongst agents as 
highlighted by Carroll (2003) and Badarinza and Gross (2012) is the intensity of 
news coverage regarding inflation. Where inflation news coverage is high, Carroll 
(2003) reports that the difference between SPF and Michigan forecasts falls, whilst 
Badarinza and Gross (2012) report a negative relationship between household 
disagreement and news intensity. The news coverage concerning inflation shall be 
evaluated to determine the relationship between information rigidities amongst 
professionals and the measure of news intensity.
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The degree of news intensity195 is presented in Figure 6.3.1 and Appendix 6.25 along 
with the rate of inflation and the level of SPF disagreement, measured as the 
standard deviation of professional inflation forecasts, at various forecast horizons 
respectively, whilst Table 6.3.3 presents descriptive statistics for the level of news 
intensity:
Figure 6.3.1: News Intensity and CPI
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Table 6.3.3: News Intensity Descriptive Statistics
n t
Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min.
WHOLE
1982:3-2011:1
0.432 0.427 0.175 0.865 0.088
GREENSPAN-BERNANKE
1987:2-2011:1
0.401 0.389 0.167 0.865 0.088
STABLE
1990:1-2006:2
0.399 0.377 0.148 0.778 0.164
VOLATILE
2006:3-2011:1
0.288 0.287 0.122 0.520 0.088
195 The index o f news intensity is defined in a manner similar to Carroll (2003). Using the LexisNexis 
database, for each quarter between 1982Q1 and 2011Q1 a search was performed on the New York 
Times and Washington Post newspapers for stories containing the root ‘inflation’ in the headline or at 
the start. The results were filtered to remove duplicates and to consider reports concerned with the 
United States only. The number of reports in any given quarter t  was then converted to an index by 
dividing by the maximum number of inflation reports which occurred in 1982Q1 and then taking the 
mean for t  — 3, ..., t.
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A key feature of Figure 6.3.1 is that the intensity of inflation news tracks the level of 
inflation. This is particularly evident for the mid-1980’s through to the early 1990’s 
and for the mid-2000’s through to the end of the sample period. This could indicate 
a reporting bias by the media towards high or rising inflation as reported by 
Badarinza and Gross (2012).
A further feature observed from Figure 6.3.1 and Table 6.3.3 is that the level of news 
intensity is highest during the earliest years in the sample196. In contrast, more recent 
years are associated with relatively low levels of inflation news coverage. It is 
possible to speculate several reasons for this. Firstly, inflation may not have been 
considered as newsworthy with regards to macroeconomic conditions during the 
volatile sub-period in comparison with other indicators such as growth and 
unemployment. Secondly, lower news intensity in recent years may reflect more 
general trends in the media with the advent of television and online reporting rather 
than traditional printed newspapers. The measure of news intensity could therefore 
be considered outdated or inappropriate for more recent years.
Persevering with the Carroll (2003) type measure of news intensity; from Appendix 
6.25, no clear relationship can be observed between inflation news intensity and 
professional disagreement at any forecast horizon. As professionals are well 
informed, their information set is likely to consist of wider sources than those 
available in publicly distributed newspapers. As a result, it is not unreasonable to 
hypothesise that professional expectations and associated disagreement is 
independent of news intensity. Nevertheless, to firmly establish the relationship 
between professional disagreement and inflation news intensity and the resulting 
implications regarding information rigidity, formal empirical testing is required.
As previously mentioned in 6.1, in their assessment of information rigidities amongst 
professional forecasters, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) do not find any 
evidence that disagreement responds to news shocks. This was deemed consistent 
with the predictions of noisy information models. To re-examine the impact of news 
intensity upon the disagreement amongst professional forecasters (6.3.11), as 
presented by Badarinza and Gross (2012), shall be employed upon SPF inflation 
forecasts for h = 0,... ,4.
196 Considering the period 1982Q3 to 1989Q4, mean news intensity is measured at 0.597.
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^t.t+h ~ c + Plfft-l,t-l+h + PiVt + Ps nt + / W  + Ps (ATTt ) 2 + ut (6.3.11)
As Badarinza and Gross (2012) stress, the inflation level, the square inflation level 
and the square of the first difference in inflation are included as control measures for 
short term volatility and any reporting bias embodied within the measure of news 
intensity. Results from testing (6.3.11) are presented in Appendix 6.26 and 
Appendix 6.27.
Firstly, Appendix 6.26 presents the results for the unrestricted model. In accordance 
with Badarinza and Gross’s (2012) results concerning public news, news intensity 
does not have a significant impact upon professional disagreement for any forecast 
horizon for the whole sample period. Following the predictions of information 
rigidity models as identified by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), these results 
would indicate that professional disagreement is consistent with the predictions of 
noisy information rather than those of sticky information. Instead, the coefficient
197associated with lagged disagreement is highly significant . Moreover, the 
exclusion of the lag as presented in Appendix 6.27 decreases the model’s R2 value 
for these sample periods without affecting the general conclusions observed for the 
unrestricted model. This is again consistent with the results presented by Badarinza 
and Gross (2012). However, the results concerning the Greenspan-Bemanke, stable 
and volatile sub-periods suggest a greater role for the forecasting horizon in 
determining the appropriate model of information rigidity.
For longer forecasting horizons, p2 remains insignificant, however, for shorter 
forecasting horizons, p 2 is found to be significant. Nevertheless, Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) document that for disagreement to be consistent with the 
predictions of sticky information, a positive response to shocks is required. The 
correlation between news intensity and disagreement is negative for the Greenspan- 
Bemanke and stable periods. Therefore, for periods of greater macroeconomic 
stability, an increase in news is associated with a fall in disagreement. In contrast, 
for the recent period of increased macroeconomic volatility, p2 is generally found to 
be positive; an increase in news intensity thus generates greater disagreement. 
Consequently, only short horizon disagreement in the volatile sub-period can be
197 Replacing contemporaneous news r]t with one-period lagged news r]t_1 does not generally alter 
the conclusions inferred from Appendix 6.26 and Appendix 6.27. The values of R 2 are broadly 
similar under both specifications too.
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deemed consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions concerning 
sticky information. For the whole sample period and longer horizon forecasts in the 
three sub-periods the evidence is more in favour of noisy information models.
Unlike Mankiw et al. (2003) who report disagreement to be increasing in inflation,
/?3 values are generally negative. This corresponds with Badarinza and Gross’s 
(2012) post-2000 results and indicates greater agreement amongst professionals at 
higher levels of inflation. Moreover, for the stable sub-period, where inflation is 
generally low, /?3 is insignificant for all h suggesting that disagreement is 
independent of inflation during periods of greater macroeconomic certainty. In 
addition, the coefficients concerning squared inflation and the squared first- 
difference are generally small and positive. Both /?4 and /?5 are generally significant 
for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sub-periods yet both coefficients are 
insignificant across all forecast horizons for the stable sub-period. This suggests that 
disagreement amongst professionals is dependent upon the magnitude and volatility 
of inflation during periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty.
These results are consistent with those presented by Badarinza and Gross (2012) and 
unsurprisingly indicate that disagreement falls during periods of reduced 
macroeconomic uncertainty. This feature, albeit a weak one, has been previously 
noted to be consistent with the predictions of sticky information as highlighted by 
Mankiw et al. (2003) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). It is nonetheless 
recognised that as (6.3.11) includes three coefficients associated with inflation, the 
results presented in Appendix 6.26 may be influenced by multi-collinearity issues.
Of particular interest is the stable sub-period where /?3, /?4 and /?5 are collectively 
insignificant across all h. To firmly establish the impact of the level and magnitude 
of inflation independently from one another, (6.3.11) is re-examined, separately 
imposing the conditions /?4 = 0 and /?3 = 0, with the results presented in Appendix
1 OR6.28 and Appendix 6.29 respectively.
1 9 8 Under both specifications, the results concerning news intensity are analogous to those from the 
unrestricted model. Specifically, whilst sticky information is evident amongst short-horizon 
professional forecasts formed in the volatile sub-period, professional disagreement conforms to the 
predictions of noisy information models, as identified by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) for the 
whole sample period and longer forecasting horizons across the three sub-periods. These results are 
unsurprising and indicate that the relationship between disagreement and news intensity, and its 
corresponding predictions for models of information rigidity are not dependent upon the control 
measures imposed.
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Firstly, from Appendix 6.28, /?3 is observed to be positive for all h across the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample periods; this is in contrast to the results 
presented in Appendix 6.26 where /?3 values were generally negative. These results 
now correspond with Mankiw et al. (2003) who observe a positive relationship 
between inflation and disagreement. Nevertheless, for the most recent period of 
macroeconomic volatility, whereas a significant negative relationship between 
disagreement and inflation was observed from Appendix 6.26, the value of /?3 in 
Appendix 6.28 is insignificant for h > 1; forecast disagreement can thus be deemed 
independent of inflation for the most recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Similar results are observed, particularly for the stable and volatile sub-periods from 
imposing /?3 = 0. From Appendix 6.29, whilst /?4 is positive and significant for 
short horizon forecasts in the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke periods, and for all h 
in the stable sub-period, during the volatile sub-period, the relationship between 
inflation and disagreement is observed to be insignificant. From 6.1 it is recalled 
that Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
demonstrate that noisy information models predict that disagreement is independent 
of macroeconomic conditions, whilst sticky information predicts the reverse. 
Consequently, the sticky information hypothesis appears more appropriate for 
periods of greater macroeconomic stability, but the relationship between 
disagreement and inflation during the most recent period of macroeconomic 
volatility conforms to the predictions of noisy information199.
Furthermore, under the unrestricted and both restricted model specifications, /?5 is 
positive and significant for short horizon forecasts in the whole, Greenspan- 
Bemanke and volatile sub-periods. For these forecasts, disagreement and inflation 
volatility thus possess a positive relationship which Mankiw et al. (2003) indicate to 
be consistent with staggered expectation adjustment. Moreover, this evidence 
suggests that information rigidities are more pronounced for short horizon forecasts 
in periods associated with greater macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast, for 
longer forecast horizons and the stable sub-period, /?5 is generally insignificant.
199 Long horizon forecasts in the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke periods are also consistent with the 
predictions o f noisy information.
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Although the SPF fixed-event and fixed horizon inflation and GDP forecasts have 
received widespread attention in the literature200, probability forecasts contained in
901 90 9the ‘Anxious Index ’ have often been ignored . This series, which refers to the 
probability of a decline in real GDP, as reported by SPF respondents, provides an 
interesting approach in determining the manner which forecasters disagree. 
Furthermore, these probability forecasts are likely to embody information additional 
to those of point forecasts and provide an indication to the uncertainty encountered 
by professionals in producing appropriate forecasts. Anxiety shall be examined 
along with news intensity and disagreement to determine whether the relationships 
conform to the predictions of information rigidity models.
To examine the impact of anxiety the Badarinza and Gross model (6.3.11) shall be 
re-formulated. Firstly, disagreement ot and its associated lagged value shall be 
replaced with the respective measure of anxiety 0 t203:
+ PiVt + Pznt + / W  + /?5 CAtt t)2 + ut (6.3.12)
Results from testing (6.3.12) are presented in Appendix 6.30. The relationship 
between news intensity and anxiety appears dependent upon the forecast horizon. 
Specifically, whereas at short forecast horizons the relationship across all four 
sample sample periods is insignificant, at longer forecast horizons, namely h = 3 
and h = 4, the relationship is positive and significant. Therefore, as inflation news 
intensity rises, anxiety concerning declines in real GDP at longer forecast horizons 
increases. Similar to tests of (6.3.11), excluding lagged anxiety does not alter these 
conclusions, the only difference is the fall in R 2.
Rather than replacing disagreement with anxiety, the Badarinza and Gross (2012) 
model (6.3.11) can also be adapted by replacing news intensity with anxiety as 
demonstrated by (6.3.13) below:
200 Examples include Zamowitz (1985), Keane and Runkle (1990) and Clements (2012).
201 The term ‘Anxious Index’ was introduced by David Leonhardt in an article in the New York 
Times on September 1st, 2002 and refers to the probability o f a decline in real GDP as reported by 
SPF respondents.
202 Notable exceptions include Zamowitz and Lambros (1987) Giordani and Soderlind (2003) and 
Clements (2008).
203 The measure o f news intensity employed refers to the Carroll measure as detailed earlier in this 
sub-chapter. Utilising the baseline measure o f news intensity yields quantitatively similar results.
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°t,t+h = c + fo°t-i,t-i+h + fo<Pt,t+h + font + font + fo(&nt)2 + ut (6.3.13)
The results from tests (6.3.13) are presented in Appendix 6.31. For the whole, 
Greenspan-Bemanke and stable periods there is no significant correlation between 
anxiety and disagreement204. Assuming anxiety proxies for economic shocks, the 
lack of any response is consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) 
predictions of noisy information models. In contrast, for h = 0,... ,3 in the volatile 
period, the relationship between disagreement and anxiety is both positive and 
significant. Following Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), this is consistent with 
the predictions of sticky information. Similar to tests of (6.3.11) and (6.3.12), the 
impact of excluding lagged disagreement only results in a reduction in R2.
Regressing disagreement on shocks, akin to Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), the 
relationship between disagreement and macroeconomic shocks shall be re-evaluated. 
Specifically, disagreement amongst h-period ahead forecast is regressed upon Ant_1,
the most recent change in the inflation rate, (et-i,t-h-i) -> the most recent squared 
forecast error, \Et[nt+h] -  Et- i[nt+h-i] \ the current absolute change in the forecast 
and 16t -  Qt_i|, the most recent absolute change in oil prices:
°t,t+h = c + /^ e t-u -A -i)2 (6.3.14)
+ Y\Et [nt+h\ ~  F t - i k m - i l l  +  M 9 t ~  e t- l l  +
Tests of (6.3.14) for forecast horizons h = 0,... ,4 across all four sample periods are 
presented in Appendix 6.32. It is evident that the response of disagreement is 
dependent upon the shock, the forecast horizon and the sample period. The 
specification employed in (6.3.14) can be considered a compromise between the 
models employed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2012); whilst Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) analyse the impact of specific 
disturbances, Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) analyse key determinants of 
disagreement to a wide range of shocks. This specification shall look at the response 
of disagreement to both general and specific shocks.
For the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke sample periods, whilst a is insignificant,
13, y and A are generally positive and significant. These results are therefore
204 fi2 is however significant for h  =  1 in the stable sub-period.
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analogous with those presented by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010); although the 
dispersion of inflation forecasts is generally independent of changes in the inflation 
rate, disagreement increases in response to all other shocks. Nevertheless, for longer 
forecast horizons, particularly h = 4, the coefficients are less significant. For the 
whole and Greenspan-Bemanke periods, the response of disagreement across short 
horizon forecasts is thus most consistent with the predictions of sticky information 
models as presented by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). Contrastingly, the 
insignificance of /?, y  and A, most notably for h = 4 in the Greenspan-Bemanke sub­
period, suggests that noisy information may be a more appropriate hypothesis for 
longer horizon forecasts in these sample periods205.
For the stable and volatile sub-periods, the conclusions are more ambiguous. There 
is some evidence that disagreement responds to shocks; for example, A is significant 
for h = 1, ...,4 in the stable sub-period and h = 0,1,2 in the volatile sub-period. 
Additionally, y  is significant at the 5% level in the volatile sub-period for h = 0,3,4. 
However, /? is generally insignificant for all h across both the stable and volatile 
sub-periods and a is insignificant in the stable sub-period for longer forecast 
horizons and for h = 0,1,3,4 in the volatile sub-period. Therefore, whilst there is 
some evidence in favour of a positive response to certain shocks, disagreement is 
independent of other disturbances.
Nevertheless, excluding oil price shocks from (6.3.14), establishing the model 
employed by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), clearer conclusions emerge for the 
stable sub-period. From Appendix 6.33, there is evidence of a significant response 
to shocks in accordance with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions 
concerning sticky information for h = 0 and h = 1. In contrast, for longer 
forecasting horizons, professional disagreement does not respond to shocks, 
indicating that models of noisy information are most appropriate.
To determine the sensitivity of these results to the selection of shock, (6.3.14) is re- 
estimated, replacing oil price shocks with news shocks \rft — T]t-i\ with the results 
presented in Appendix 6.34. The response of disagreement to inflation, forecast 
errors and forecast fluctuations are unsurprisingly similar to that presented in
205 Excluding A and the effect o f oil prices, disagreement appears to be an increasing function o f non­
specific shocks at all horizons for the whole and Greenspan-Bemanke periods. This suggests that 
professional forecasts at all horizons are most consistent with the sticky information hypothesis.
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Appendix 6.33. For the Greenspan-Bemanke and sub-periods, news intensity is 
generally insignificant. For the volatile sub-period and h = 2,3 for the whole period, 
the response of disagreement to news intensity shocks is positive and significant. 
Following the predictions of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), this adds to the 
evidence that professional disagreement is more consistent with sticky information 
models during periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast, noisy 
information models appear to better characterise the dispersion of professional 
inflation forecasts during periods of relative stability. Meanwhile, analysing the 
effects to professional disagreement of replacing oil price shocks with news shocks 
for the volatile sub-period is unable to provide precise conclusions regarding the 
most appropriate model of information rigidity; whilst a  and /? are not significant for 
any forecasting horizon, y is significant for all h. Alternative tests of information 
rigidity will thus need to be considered in an attempt to determine which model of 
information rigidity best characterises professional forecasters for the most recent 
period of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Information rigidities which generate disagreement amongst agents have been of 
increasing interest for macroeconomic modelling with the sticky information and 
noisy information hypotheses prominently cited. Whilst Mankiw et al. (2003) argue 
that the sticky information hypothesis is able to explain the dispersion amongst 
Livingston Survey expectations, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) do not find any 
evidence that professional disagreement responds to shocks in accordance with noisy 
information. Re-examining formal empirical models concerning information 
rigidities,, the results presented in this section indicate that there is some ambiguity 
regarding which model of information rigidity is most consistent with disagreement 
amongst SPF inflation forecasts; instead the relationship is dependent upon the 
sample period, forecast horizon and the properties of the shock imposed on the 
economy. Evaluating the predictions of sticky information and noisy information 
models, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) indicate that a positive response of 
disagreement to any shock would be consistent with the former. Although there is 
more evidence in favour of sticky information, any conclusions appear dependent 
upon the nature of the shock, the sample period and the forecast horizon. Notably, 
noisy information appears more appropriate for longer forecasting horizons and the 
most recent period of macroeconomic uncertainty.
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6.4. Discussion
A primary objective of this study is to ascertain the manner which agents formulate 
expectations regarding key macroeconomic variables and whether they conform to 
previously established models and theories. Exploiting the multi-horizon structure of 
the SPF, this chapter evaluates the properties of fixed-horizon, fixed-event and the 
cross-sectional dispersion of professional forecasts. In Chapter 3, empirical testing 
was unable to confirm that professional inflation forecasts are fully consistent with 
the properties of rational expectations, nor were they adequately characterised by 
traditional models with inherent backward-looking rules. Moreover, in the previous 
chapter, tests of Carroll’s (2003) epidemiological model concluded that household 
forecasts were subject to frictions in the acquisition and processing of information.
In accordance with recent research, including notable contributions by Mankiw et al. 
(2003), Andrade and Le Bihan (2010) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010,
2012), this chapter has confirmed that professional inflation forecasts are 
inconsistent with underlying assumptions of full information and has reconsidered 
the presence of rigidities constraining the acquisition and processing of information. 
As professionals are generally considered as informed agents, the acknowledgement 
that their expectations exhibit some degree of informational inattentiveness may 
have uncomfortable implications for a variety of macroeconomic models and thus be 
dismissed by some economists. Nevertheless, this study emphasises that not only 
are professional forecasts subject to some degree of information friction, the most 
applicable model is dependent upon the forecasting horizon and the macroeconomic 
conditions characterising the sample period.
Preliminary tests concerning the adding up of quarterly forecasts to the annual 
forecast akin to Clements (2012) suggested that professional inflation forecasting 
process is not subject to attentiveness. For periods of relative macroeconomic 
stability, formal empirical models concerning forecast revisions generally support 
this view through the rejection of the information rigidity null hypothesis or 
incompatibility with the predictions of the respective models.
Contrastingly, for periods of increased macroeconomic uncertainty, the prevalence 
of information rigidities appears stronger although the appropriate model is unclear.
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Utilising the Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) framework, significant information 
rigidities were observed across the whole sample period across forecast updates for 
h = 1,... ,3; furthermore, under the sticky information hypothesis, these forecasts 
were associated with professionals updating their information every four to six 
months. However, tests of (6.3.9) for the whole sample period deemed forecast 
revisions at any horizon to be inconsistent with any model of information rigidity. 
Moreover, for the volatile sub-period the Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) model 
found evidence of information rigidities for shorter forecast horizons only whilst for 
h = 1,... ,4 forecast revisions are consistent with the predictions of both noisy and 
sticky information models.
The examination of fixed-horizon forecasts suggests that the degree and most 
appropriate model of information rigidity is ambiguous and may be conditional on 
the shock imposed on the economy. Conforming to the predictions of information 
rigidity models, the response of forecast errors to oil price shocks was positive and 
significant; however, in accordance to the REH, the response of forecast errors to 
news intensity shocks is insignificant. The results concerning news intensity may 
however be unreliable, with this class of shock accounting for no more than 5 
percent of inflation volatility in the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and stable sample
90 f\periods ; in comparison, oil price shocks for these three sample periods generally 
account for over 20 percent of inflation volatility and are thus able to provide 
stronger and more reliable predictions regarding the prevalence of information 
rigidities. Moreover, that Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) report contrasting 
results emphasises that the manner which shocks are specified is critical in 
ascertaining whether professional forecasts conform with the predictions of 
information rigidity models.
Despite being recognised as some of the most informed agents, 6.2.2, in accordance 
with Mankiw et al. (2003) and Dovem et al. (2013) identified substantial 
disagreement amongst professional disagreement. Specifically, whilst disagreement 
was observed for all forecast horizons, reduced levels of forecast consensus arise for 
periods of recession and greater macroeconomic volatility. Re-examining formal
206 Results concerning news intensity shocks for the volatile period may be considered more reliable 
as the associated variance decomposition attributes up to 30% of the inflation volatility to these 
shocks.
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empirical models, there is some ambiguity regarding the relationship between 
professional disagreement and information rigidities. From (6.3.10) an invariably 
positive response in disagreement was observed for both recession and the volatile 
sub-period; this was deemed to be consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s 
(2012) predictions for sticky information. Nevertheless, the introduction of more 
specific shocks in (6.3.11), (6.3.12) and (6.3.9) was unable to provide similarly 
unambiguous conclusions regarding the most appropriate model of information 
rigidity. Whilst professional disagreement across short horizon forecasts appears 
most consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions for sticky 
information, particularly for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile periods, 
disagreement across longer horizon forecasts generally conform to the predictions of 
noisy information. Furthermore, whilst evidence of sticky information is found for 
short horizon forecasts in the volatile sub-period, noisy information appears more 
prevalent for periods of increased macroeconomic stability.
Re-examining formal empirical models, there has been no overwhelming evidence to 
classify professional inflation forecasts as consistent with a single model of 
information rigidity. Whilst these tests have found mixed evidence, appearing to be 
most consistent with Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) predictions concerning 
either sticky information or (baseline) noisy information models, tests concerning 
absolute shocks were able to dismiss models of heterogeneous agent signals, priors 
and loss aversion as proposed by Capistran and Timmermann (2009) and Patton and 
Timmermann (2010). Moreover, several broad features of information rigidities 
have emerged. Firstly, information rigidities generally appear to be greater for 
shorter forecast horizons and during periods of increased macroeconomic 
uncertainty; for periods of increased stability, formal empirical testing generally 
dismisses the presence of information frictions. Furthermore, whilst short-horizon 
forecast are consistent with the predictions of sticky information, particularly for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile periods, the properties of longer horizon 
forecasts are more consistent with noisy information. This appears to refute Mankiw 
et al.’s (2003) proposal that information rigidities are determined by an exogenously 
given constant and Dovem et al.’s (2013) analysis that information rigidities are 
monotonically increasing with the forecast horizon. That noisy information better 
characterises longer horizon forecasts accords with economic reasoning. As
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professionals are considered to be well informed, they recognise that updating of 
information and expectations is required as the forecastable event approaches due to 
unanticipated news. This is incompatible with sticky information. Instead, it is 
more economically reasonable that at longer horizons, professionals recognise that 
information is imperfect but adjust their forecasts to news which corresponds with 
noisy information.
It is unsurprising that the forecasting behaviour of professionals changes under 
various macroeconomic circumstances. For example, as the forecast horizon 
shortens, not only would additional information have been revealed and/or 
incorporated into forecasts, there is also less scope for the onset of a surprise shock 
to influence the path of the forecasted variable. Furthermore, it is documented that 
disagreement and information rigidities are larger during the volatile period and 
recessions, which can be attributed to an increase in general macroeconomic 
uncertainty. During periods of relative stability, where inflation volatility is much 
reduced, not only will the behaviour of macroeconomic variables be more 
predictable, but information acquisition and processing costs are likely to be 
reduced. Therefore, that empirical testing revealed that information frictions are less 
pronounced amongst professional forecasts during the stable period adheres to 
macroeconomic theory and conventional wisdom.
An unresolved issue beyond the scope of this study concerns determining the most 
appropriate measure of disagreement for professional forecasts and whether the use 
of alternative measure has implications for models of information frictions and more 
general theories of macroeconomic expectations. Whilst both the IQR and standard 
deviation have limitations, the former was dismissed on the grounds that despite 
being more robust to outliers, the IQR fails to capture the full extent of belief 
heterogeneity amongst forecasters.
The empirical analysis in 6.3.2 considered the response of forecast properties to a 
range of structural shocks and considered whether they conformed to the predictions 
of information rigidity theory. Whilst Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) observe 
that technology, news, oil price an unidentified shocks result in a significant 
response in forecast errors, the results in 6.3.2 suggest that forecast errors do not 
respond to these shocks over certain periods. The conflicting results were attributed
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to differences in the sample period and sensitivity to the specification and 
assumptions associated with the various shocks. This suggests that the evidence in 
favour of information rigidities, or otherwise, is not robust. Future studies may wish 
to explore the extent which the conclusions concerning the response of professional 
forecast errors to shocks and the relationship with information rigidities is sensitive 
to various specification alterations.
Further research may also wish to examine the impact of different measures of 
disagreement amongst macroeconomic expectations and extend the analysis across 
forecasts for alternative variables. Besides, as more data is contributed and released 
over time, further insights into professional forecast behaviour shall be revealed. In 
the meantime, future studies could consider whether there is substantial 
heterogeneity between professionals from different sectors and compare FOMC 
forecasts to those of economists with academic and commercial backgrounds. 
Moreover, the integration of inattentive professional forecasts and those of 
households, akin to Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2010) may provide further insights 
into information rigidities and interesting implications for wider macroeconomic 
analysis.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Expectations are keystone economic variables, allowing for appropriate decision 
making in the presence of uncertainty regarding the future. The manner in which 
economic agents formulate their perceptions of future events has been long debated, 
with expectations of critical importance for numerous macroeconomic relationships, 
and to date remains a keen topic of interest for economists. Utilising aggregate data 
from the SPF and both aggregate and disaggregate data from the Michigan Survey of 
Consumers, this thesis has empirically analysed and evaluated the manner which 
agents formulate their inflation expectations, employing a range of methodologies 
and econometric techniques including OLS, GMM and VAR estimation.
The evaluation of how the expectation formation process evolves over time 
commences in Chapter 2 with the identification of the properties of survey forecasts. 
Analysing forecast error statistics from both the SPF and Michigan Survey there is 
insufficient evidence to declare that the expectations of either professionals or 
households consistently outperform the other, with conclusions dependent upon the 
specific measure employed and the sample period under consideration. Specifically, 
compared to the whole sample period, smaller forecast errors are observed for both 
agent classes for the stable sub-period yet are much larger for the most recent 
volatile sub-period; forecast accuracy is thus deemed to be dependent upon 
macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, empirical tests were generally unable to 
reject the equality of MFE’s and MSFE’s between the two agent classes. 
Nevertheless, the utilisation of consensus forecasts are likely to conceal individual 
inaccuracies, thus in accordance with Zamowitz and Braun (1993) and Thomas 
(1999) as they are considered better informed, the typical professional is likely to 
report superior expectations in comparison to the typical household.
The analysis of survey forecasts in Chapter 2 identified time-variant properties 
amongst agent perceptions of the future rate of inflation, however, this was argued to 
not be particularly informative to economists regarding the expectation formation 
process undertaken by either agent class. Considering the compatibility of survey 
forecasts to various model predictions, Chapter 3 extensively investigates whether 
traditional theories of expectation formation are able to embody the evolution of 
aggregate professional and household inflation forecasts. Whereas backward-
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looking theories including the static and adaptive expectations hypotheses are 
concluded to assume excessive myopia on the part of agent forecasting behaviour, 
survey forecasts are also not fully consistent with the predictions of the rational 
expectations hypothesis. Nevertheless, the relevance of traditional theories of 
expectation formation is concluded to be agent specific and time-dependent.
Whereas for the whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sample periods, household 
expectations are more consistent with the predictions of the REH, for periods of 
greater macroeconomic stability, professionals appear to utilise increased levels of 
backward-looking behaviour in formulating their inflation forecasts. Nevertheless, 
for the volatile sub-period, expectations reported by both agent classes exhibit 
significant deviations from the properties required under rationality.
In accordance with the approach adopted by various models, which make 
assumptions regarding a representative agent, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyse the 
expectation formation process for aggregate expectations; despite simplifying the 
complex process of expectation formation and ensuring greater tractability, 
economists have long recognised that such assumptions bypass the reality of 
expectational heterogeneity amongst agents. In a similar manner to Bryan and 
Venkatu (2001a, 2001b), Souleles (2004) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2008), utilising 
disaggregate inflation forecasts reported by the Michigan Survey, Chapter 4 analyses 
expectational heterogeneity across demographic groups. In accordance with the 
results for aggregate expectations presented in Chapter 2, all demographic groups 
tend to overestimate the future rate of inflation whilst larger forecast errors were 
again observed for the volatile sub-period. Nevertheless significant differences 
between demographic groups were established with higher education and income 
groups and men realising lower forecast errors relative to less advantaged 
counterparts and women. These households are thus deemed to be sufficiently well 
informed, and utilise more sophisticated forecasting techniques. Other demographic 
characteristics, such as region of residence, were found to have a much smaller 
impact upon the expectations of households as the null hypotheses of equality of 
both reported forecasts and realised forecast errors generally unable to be rejected at 
conventional significance levels.
Whereas the majority of studies concerning expectations tend to solely focus upon 
the reported expectations and forecast errors, measures of central tendency are
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unable to reveal the full extent of expectational differences of typical agents across 
demographic groups. Extending the analysis presented by Mankiw, Reis and 
Wolfers (2003), Chapter 4 further identifies that those groups reporting larger 
forecast errors, including women and those with lower levels of education or income, 
exhibit higher levels of forecast dispersion and disagreement relative to men and 
more advantaged households. These findings were attributed to heterogeneous 
information acquisition and processing costs across demographics, however, the 
properties of disagreement were found to be fairly time-insensitive with similar 
levels of forecast dispersion observed for both the stable and volatile period across 
demographics. Furthermore, whilst over the sample period a negative trend in 
disagreement amongst individual demographic groups was observed, a robust 
negative relationship across all agent classes is observed between the level of 
forecast dispersion and the output gap; in accordance with Dovem et al. (2012) the 
level of expectational disagreement amongst agents is thus deemed to increase in 
response to recessionary macroeconomic conditions.
In accordance with Lamia and Maag (2012) and Menz and Poppitz (2013) the 
analysis of the determinants of household forecast disagreement in Chapter 4 reveal 
a significant negative relationship between the perceived level of news and forecast 
dispersion. This suggests that the volume of news has some role in achieving 
expectational consensus amongst households, and may further suggest some role for 
greater communication by policymakers in reducing forecast dispersion. 
Nevertheless, whilst the impact of favourable news on household disagreement is 
found to be generally insignificant, greater expectational consensus is observed in 
response to unfavourable news. This appears to correspond with the argument 
proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) that agents are 
more attentive when inflation matters or when the opportunity costs associated with 
inattentiveness are sufficiently high. Similarly, the analysis in Chapter 6 revealed 
that professional disagreement is consistent with the predictions of information 
rigidity models. However, the appropriate model of information rigidity is 
ambiguous: professional disagreement over longer forecast horizons, and for the 
whole, Greenspan-Bemanke and volatile sample periods appears most consistent 
with the sticky information model, whilst the properties of noisy information appear
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consistent with disagreement over shorter forecast horizons and the stable sub­
period.
Various explanations for the occurrence of differences in expectations amongst 
demographic groups have been proposed by economists. Whereas Hobijn and 
Lagakos (2005), McGranahan and Paulson (2006), and Hobijn et al. (2009) consider 
the effect of inflation differentials across demographic groups, Bruine de Bruin et al. 
(2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) propose that expectational heterogeneity results 
from differences in economic and financial literacy amongst groups. Whereas the 
former may be more relevant for age and regional expectational differences, the 
latter may be more appropriate for asymmetries between education, income and 
gender disaggregations. Additionally, there may be further biasing effects embodied 
in the reported expectations of individual demographic groups arising from specific 
prices (Bruine de Bruin et al., 201 lb), the frequency which various commodities are 
purchased (Ranyard et al., 2008, Georganas et al., 2014) or by the procedure or 
wording employed by surveys in collating price or inflation expectations (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2010b, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010). Further research regarding 
differences in inflation expectations between demographic groups is thus required to 
fully establish the relative impact of the various underlying influences upon 
expectation asymmetries across varying macroeconomic conditions.
In response to the failures of traditional expectation theories to fully accommodate 
the manner which agents formulate their expectations, economists have devoted 
attention to developing alternate theories which mitigate the limitations of standard 
approaches. Section 3.3 identifies several alternatives including incomplete 
information RE, bounded rationality and adaptive learning; whilst not explicitly 
examined within this study, future research may wish to consider whether survey 
forecasts are consistent with the predictions of these theories, and the extent to which 
heterogeneity prevails across demographics and macroeconomic conditions. Instead, 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 consider a prominent alternative, namely models of 
information rigidities, specifically focusing on theories of sticky information and 
noisy information in the manner proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Sims 
(2003, 2006), Woodford (2003) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) respectively.
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An interesting application of the sticky information theory concerns the 
epidemiological, or survey-updating, model presented by Carroll (2003, 2006) which 
advocates that households update their information upon infrequently encountering 
and absorbing media reports on inflation which are synonymous with the 
expectations of professionals. Empirical tests in Chapter 5 re-examine Carroll’s 
epidemiological survey-updating model and two prominent alternatives, namely the 
naive sticky information and rational updating models of Lanne et al. (2009) and 
Nunes (2009) respectively. Whereas the sticky information hypothesis presented by 
Mankiw and Reis (2002) implicitly proposes that the rate of information updating is 
constant, the results from the three epidemiological models across the four sample 
periods evidently show that the frequency that agents update their information is 
time-variant. Specifically, a higher frequency of information updating is observed 
for the stable sub-period, deemed to be indicative of agents being unwilling to incur 
the larger costs associated with the acquisition and processing of information during 
periods of increased macroeconomic volatility.
Additionally, analysis of the three epidemiological frameworks for disaggregated 
expectations revealed that household demographics impact upon the frequency of 
information updates. Specifically, higher rates of updating across the various models 
were generally observed for men and those households with higher levels of 
education or income; in contrast, a U-shaped relationship was generally observed 
between the frequency of information updates and age whilst, in general, no 
discernible relationship was observed for regionally disaggregated expectations. 
Whereas higher rates of attentiveness amongst higher education and income groups 
were again attributed to lower information acquisition and processing costs 
compared to less advantaged counterparts, lower rates of attentiveness exhibited by 
the middle-aged were assigned to a greater reliance on both current and historical 
price experiences in the formation of inflation expectations.
Proposing a model of heterogeneous updating, including elements of the survey 
updating, naive sticky information and rational updating theories, Chapter 5 further 
highlights that agents update their information heterogeneously, utilising a range of 
news sources. Moreover, it is observed that households are more likely to update in 
accordance to the forward-looking rational updating framework during periods of 
greater stability, resorting to more backward looking updating behaviour where
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macroeconomic conditions are more volatile. The conclusion that households across 
demographic groups infrequently update their information associated with inflation 
expectations, whilst the rate of information diffusion is heterogeneous, will likely 
effect the conduct of policymaking. As previously emphasised by Sims (2009), the 
optimal communication strategy employed by policymakers may not be 
homogeneous across agents and instead feature multi-tiered characteristics, 
accommodating heterogeneity in agent priors and the expectation formation process, 
the rate of information diffusion, and the degree of attentiveness to individual 
information sources. Akin to the analysis presented by Brock and Hommes (1997) 
and Branch (2007), future research may thus wish to consider the rate at which 
households switch between the various updating behaviours, and whether such 
differences are dependent upon the sample period and household demographics.
Whereas Chapter 5 investigates whether the inconsistency of household expectations 
with the properties of traditional theories results from infrequent information 
updates, Chapter 6 extensively analyse the informational properties of the 
expectation formation process of professionals. Exploiting the multi-horizon 
structure of the SPF, professional expectations were established to be subject to 
significant forecast updates and forecast revisions, violating the underlying 
assumptions of full information. Moreover, despite being recognised as some of the 
most informed agents, in accordance with Mankiw et al. (2003) and Dovem et al. 
(2013), professional expectations are subject to persistent levels of disagreement. 
Following recent contributions by Andrade and Le Bihan (2010), Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2010, 2012), Clements (2012), and Dovem et al. (2012, 2013) 
forecast updates, forecast revisions and disagreement from the SPF are found to be 
be consistent with the predictions of information rigidity models. As for household 
expectations, information rigidities were found to be stronger for periods of 
increased macroeconomic volatility. In contrast, for periods of greater 
macroeconomic stability, where information acquisition and processing costs are 
lower, the presence of information rigidities is dismissed. Furthermore, whilst long- 
horizon forecasts were found to be more consistent with the predictions of noisy 
information, as the event horizon nears professional expectations exhibit greater 
consistency with sticky information theory.
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This study has analysed the manner in which agents form their inflation expectations 
and their empirical consistency with various theories. Agent expectations regarding 
future macroeconomic events are however generally considered unobservable with 
various theories endogenously deriving expectations under specific assumptions.
The empirical analysis of expectation theory in this study has instead employed 
quantitative inflation forecasts available from prominent surveys in the United 
States. Despite this approach having been widely adopted by expectation formation 
studies, these direct measures of agent expectations were however noted to suffer 
from a number of limitations as highlighted in 2.1.3. These include the absence of 
appropriate incentives as highlighted by Keane and Runkle (1990), Roberts (1998) 
and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006), and differential interpretations of survey 
questions (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2010b, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010). The 
observation that agent inflation forecasts are not frilly consistent with the predictions 
of traditional expectation theory, and are instead characterised by models of 
information rigidities may thus be a consequence of inappropriate procedures 
employed in the collation of inflation or price expectations. As previously 
highlighted, these issues are evidently more prominent for the Michigan Survey.
An elementary amendment to the Michigan Survey would be to amend the wording 
of the inflation and prices question to specifically request agents to provide a 
forecast for some prominent measure of inflation such as CPI or RPI. Some may 
argue that a proportion of agents will lack the required economic or financial literacy 
in the manner detailed by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010c) and Burke and Manz (2010) 
to be able to provide an informed forecast of these measures. Nevertheless, 
following the current procedure of the Michigan Survey to estimate price 
expectations, it would be advised to include a secondary question which clarifies the 
construction of the respective price indices. To resolve the incentives issue, surveys 
may wish to impose some rule that future participation is dependent upon past 
performance. For example, should forecast errors of an individual respondent over a 
fixed time period exceed some threshold relative to either the forecast variable or the 
consensus forecast, their future participation may be temporarily suspended or 
withdrawn indefinitely. A rule akin to this example could be applicable to the SPF, 
yet cannot be applied to the Michigan Survey where respondents partake in a single 
re-interview. The imposition of some accuracy rule would however introduce their
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own issues as the relative uncertainty and unpredictability of the future value of the 
forecast variable and general macroeconomic conditions would need to be taken into 
consideration whilst it may also introduce some bias upon the reported forecasts of 
agents. Furthermore, smaller deviations from the consensus forecast may not 
necessarily be indicative of greater forecast accuracy, whilst those with extreme 
views may occasionally be correct. Another alternative to the incentives issue is the 
provision of monetary rewards; however, these also require appropriate 
implementation to be effective. The issue of the procedure to collate inflation or 
price expectations, including appropriate wording of survey questioning and the 
resulting impact upon the accuracy of expectations across agents, is thus of interest 
to economists; these issues warrant further research to determine whether the current 
approaches employed by the SPF, Michigan Survey and other sources of agent 
expectations are appropriate, or whether they have the capacity to be improved.
In recent years there has been growing interest in deviations from the traditional 
theories of expectation formation with models across a variety of macroeconomic 
issues considering the impact of imperfect information. The availability of agent 
forecasts, as published in prominent surveys has enabled the assessment of the 
expectation process for several key hypotheses. Specifically, this study has 
identified that information rigidities are embodied within the forecasts of various 
agent classes. Incorporating the implications of these findings to policy making and 
decisions on consumption, wage-setting and price-setting may further assist in the 
understanding of agent behaviour over time and macroeconomic conditions.
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 2 
Appendix 2.1. Survey Questions
In this section the questions posed by the SPF and Michigan Survey regarding 
inflation are extensively analysed.
Section 3 of the 2011 :Q1 SPF questionnaire, the latest date employed in this study, 
includes the following table regarding four alternative measures of inflation which 
respondents are required to complete:
Quarterly Data (Q/Q) Annual Data (Q4/Q4)
2010:Q4 2011 :Q1 2011:Q2 2011 :Q3 2011:Q4 2012:Q1 2010 2011 2012 2013
CPI Inflation 
Rate
2.6 1.2
Core CPI 
Inflation 
Rate
0.4 0.6
PCE
Inflation
Rate
1.8 1.2
Core PCE 
Inflation 
Rate
0.4 0.8
Section 1 of the 2011Q1 SPF questionnaire requests respondents to provide forecasts 
for the GDP Price Index (Chain) in a similar manner.
The Michigan Survey utilises the following procedure in section A12 to record the 
inflation forecasts of respondents:
A 12. During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, or 
go down, or stay where they are now?
1. Go Up 4. Stay the Same 5. Go Down 8. D on’t Know
If a stay the same response is given, the interviewer asks the following question:
A 12a. Do you mean that prices will go up at the same rate as now, or that prices in 
general will not go up during the next 12 months?
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Where the participant has responded with “Go Up” (either A 12. or A 12a.) or “Go 
Down” the interviewer asks the following to quantify the agents forecast:
A 12b. By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, 
during the next 12 months (use probe i f  answer is greater than 5%)
If respondent gives an answer that is greater than 5%, the interviewer is asked to 
probe the respondent with the following:
“Let me make sure that I  have that correct. You said that you expect prices to go 
(up/down) during the next 12 months by (X) percent. Is that correct? ”
In the event that the respondent provides a “don’t know” response to question A 12b. 
the interviewer is asked to probe the respondent with the following:
A 12c. How many cents on the dollar do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the 
average, during the next 12 months?
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Appendix 2.2. Alternative Surveys of Inflation Expectations
Professional inflation forecasts from the US can be obtained from several reliable 
sources with empirical studies frequently employing data from the Livingston 
Survey of Professional Economists, Consensus Economics and the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF).
Founded in June 1946 by the columnist Joseph Livingston, and having been 
conducted semi-annually in June and December since, the Livingston Survey of 
Professional Economists (Livingston Survey henceforth) is the oldest compilation of 
US inflation expectations (Thomas, 1999). Upon the death of Livingston, in 1989 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has compiled the survey. A number of 
issues concerning the survey have, however, been identified. Firstly, prior to 
December 2004 respondents were requested to provide an expectation for the 
consumer price index rather than inflation per se, thus prior assumptions regarding 
its current level were required before inflation rates could be derived. Moreover, due 
to a one month lag between the responses being made and publication, Livingston 
often made adjustments to account for the arrival of new information (Thomas,
1999). Therefore, some caution is required when analysing Livingston Survey data. 
An alternative is the Consensus Economics forecast. Established in 1989, Consensus 
Economics compiles economic forecasts from private sector forecasters for 
numerous economies around the world.
The SPF was first conducted in 1968Q4 and until 1990Q1 was conducted by the 
American Statistical Association (ASA) in conjunction with the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). Since 1990Q2, the SPF has been conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. In 1981Q3, the survey was expanded with 
new variables added including four-quarter ahead expectations concerning the CPI
207 208rate of inflation ’ . The scale of the SPF has varied over time. In the early years
participant numbers exceeded 50 yet over the 1970’s and 1980’s the number of 
participants steadily declined to fewer than ten in 1990 (Croushore, 1993,
D'Agostino et al., 2012). Since the survey has been conducted by the Philadelphia 
Fed, participant numbers have increased, generally ranging between 30 and 50
207 Longer term forecasts o f inflation for horizons o f 5 and 10 years were added to the SPF in 2005Q3 
and 1991Q4 respectively.
208 Forecasts for core CPI inflation, PCE inflation and core PCE inflation were added to the SPF in 
2007Q1.
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(Croushore, 1993, D'Agostino et al., 2012), providing a wider distribution of 
professional opinion thus increasing the inherent reliability of the survey209. The 
appeal of the SPF is highlighted by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) identifying 
that predictions of well-defined economic indicators such as CPI and the GDP 
deflator are available at a quarterly frequency ,allowing researchers to analyse the 
predictive performance of the survey across time.
An often employed series of consumer sentiment and attitudes by the economic 
literature for the United States is the Thompson Reuters/University of Michigan 
Survey of Consumers (Michigan Survey henceforth). The Michigan Survey, 
founded in 1946 by George Katona, conducts a minimum of 500 telephone 
interviews a month across 48 US states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) with
procedures designed to provide a representative and independent cross-section of the
210 211 US population . Respondents are subsequently re-interviewed six months later ;
therefore, the Michigan Survey is often referred to as a rotating or pseudo-panel with
approximately 60% of survey responses from new respondents and 40% from those
being re-interviewed. This methodology allows for changes in the aggregate
composition of US households whilst retaining the ability to monitor evolutions in
the expectations of individual agents (Curtin, 1982). Unlike the SPF, however, it
does not permit analysis of the expectations formed by individual agents over an
212extended period of time and across various macroeconomic environments . This 
limitation implies that the utilisation of aggregate Michigan Survey data is the most 
suitable for empirical analysis.
209 For 1990Q2 due to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia recently assuming responsibility for 
the SPF, the survey was distributed late leading to a reduced number of responses. For completeness 
1990Q2 expectations remain in the sample period employed throughout this study.
210 The selection procedure provides every household with an equal chance of being selected.
211 The Michigan Survey previously conducted a third and fourth interview of respondents yet due to 
falling response rates for third interviews the rotation of the sample was restricted to a single re­
interview (Curtin, 1982).
212 A single follow-up interview after six-months is also unlikely to be sufficient to establish whether 
individual agents significantly adjust their 5-year ahead inflation expectations in response to new 
information and experiences.
372
Appendix 2.3. Correlation Functions for CPI Inflation -  Sub-Sample Periods 
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period: 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
i
i
„ . . j i
i
------------ 1
i
1
?
0.839
0.622
0.839
-0.280
69.792
108.54
0.000
0.000
i ------1 i 3 0.433 -0.004 127.47 0.000
i Z3 i E i 4 0.272 -0.066 135.02 0.000
i Z3 i 1 5 0.276 0.464 142.91 0.000
i ZD r ~ i 6 0.281 -0.292 151.15 0.000
i O i i 7 0.239 -0.022 157.18 0.000
i 13 i I i 8 0.211 0.030 161.93 0.000
i □i i 3 9 0.159 0.172 164.68 0.000
i 3i El i 10 0.107 -0.243 165.94 0.000
] i i I i 11 0.084 0.050 166.71 0.000
i 1 i i i 12 0.055 0.001 167.05 0.000
Stable Sample Period: 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
1 0.854 0.854 50.398 0.000i I i
i . .3 i [ i 2 0.705 -0.093 85.230 0.000
i .......i C i 3 0.518 -0.226 104.35 0.000
i ZD EZ i 4 0.292 -0.278 110.52 0.000
i □  i i ZD 5 0.180 0.307 112.92 0.000
i ] i i i 6 0.085 0.010 113.47 0.000
i i i E i 7 0.016 -0.111 113.48 0.000
i i i E i 8 -0.023 -0.136 113.53 0.000
i I i i 3 i 9 -0.055 0.107 113.76 0.000
i I i i 3 i 10 -0.058 0.110 114.03 0.000
i I i i C i 11 -0.060 -0.084 114.32 0.000
i | i i i 12 -0.038 -0.004 114.44 0.000
Volatile Sample Period: 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q-Stat Prob
i .....■"1 i 1 0.671 0.671 9.9718 0.002
i Z1 i i d 1 2 0.275 -0.318 11.749 0.003
i I i i C 1 3 -0.060 -0.182 11.838 0.008
i ez: i i C 1 4 -0.301 -0.181 14.248 0.007
i El i i 11 5 -0.178 0.389 15.152 0.010
i C i ii 1 6 -0.128 -0.381 15.652 0.016
i C i i | 1 7 -0.115 -0.026 16.095 0.024
t I i i 1 1 8 -0.061 0.027 16.231 0.039
t c i i C 1 9 -0.151 -0.096 17.141 0.047
1 c i 1 c 1 10 -0.139 -0.093 18.000 0.055
1 E i 1 [ 1 11 -0.123 -0.082 18.749 0.066
i E i 1 ] 1 12 -0.112 0.086 19.469 0.078
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Appendix 2.4. Unit Root and Stationarity Tests for CPI, and SPF and
Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
ADF TESTS PHILLIPS-PERRON KPSS
Y a a  (t-stat) k Y a a  (t-stat) k LM-Stat
WHOLE SAMPLE PERIOD I982Q3 -  2011Q1
CPI q 47]*** 
(0.142)
-0.163***
(0.043)
-3.816*** 9 0.530***
(0.163)
-0.188***
(0.049)
-3 796*** 16 0 .6 6 8 **
SPF 0.109
(0.067)
-0.044**
(0.019)
-2.254 0 0.109
(0.067)
-0.044**
(0.019)
-2.367 12 ] ]9]***
MS 1.128***
(0.223)
-0.365***
(0.070)
-5.185*** 0 1.128***
(0.223)
-0.365***
(0.070)
-5.066*** 4 0.401*
GREENSPAN-BERNANKE SUB SAMPLE PERIOD 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
CPI 0.469**
(0.187)
-0.160***
(0.060)
-2.650* 5 0 4 7 7 *** 
(0.181)
-0.164***
(0.057)
-3.168** 1 0.660**
SPF -0.022
(0 .02 1 )
0.044
(0.064)
-1.047 0 -0.022
(0 .02 1 )
0.044
(0.065)
-1.047 0 1.092***
MS 1.014***
(0.241)
-0.329***
(0.077)
-4.235*** 0 1 014*** 
(0.241)
-0.329***
(0.077)
-4.235*** 0 0.326
STABLE SUB-SAMPLE PERIOD 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
CPI 0.274*
(0.164)
-0.097*
(0.053)
-1.836 4 0.309*
(0.165)
-0.109**
(0.053)
-2.289 3 0.356*
SPF -0.240**
(0.116)
-0.063**
(0.031)
-2.044 1 0.148
(0.095)
-0.061**
(0.032)
-1.968 5 0.970***
MS 0 9 9 9 *** 
(0.093)
-0 341***
(0.093)
-3.647*** 0 0 9 9 9 *** 
(0.278)
-0.341***
(0.093)
-3.465** 2 0.431*
VOLATILE SUB-SAMPLE PERIOD 2006Q3 - 2011Q1
CPI 0.900*
(0.482)
-0.437**
(0.173)
-2.520 1 0.615
(0.476)
-0.328
(0.170)
-2.079 1 0.246
SPF 0.509
(0.355)
-0.240
(0.162)
-1.479 0 0.509
(0.355)
-0.240
(0.162)
-1.351 3 0.540**
MS 2 107*** 
(0.673)
-0.653***
(0.207)
-3.152** 1 1.411*
(0.670)
-0.436**
(0.206)
-2.095 3 0.169
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Appendix 3.1. Static Expectations Hypothesis 
PANEL A: Contemporaneous Inflation
Testing Equation; E i t . h [ n t] =  a Q +  a 1n t . h +  e t
«0 «1 Wald x 2 ' R 2 R 2
a o II © a ii
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 1.715***
(0.339)
0.511***
(0.109)
27.608*** 0.375 0.370
MS 2 144*** 
(0 .2 0 2 )
0.320***
(0.049)
281.908*** 0.507 0.502
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF 1.677***
(0.283)
0.436***
(0.131)
38.704*** 0.434 0.428
MS 2.157***
(0.227)
0.311***
(0.053)
248.021*** 0.503 0.498
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF 1 730*** 
(0.250)
0.399***
(0.134)
49.034*** 0.404 0.394
MS 1.781***
(0.119)
0.395***
(0.036)
288.892*** 0.670 0.665
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 2 .0 0 1 ***
(0.069)
0.079***
(0.015)
3806.720*** 0.360 0.320
MS 2.587***
(0.203)
0.301***
(0 .102)
218.288*** 0.559 0.533
PANEL B: One Period Lagged Inflation
Testing Equation: E i t ^h [ n t \ =  a 0 +  +  e t
«o « i Wald x 2 - R 2 R 2
a o II o a h* II l-k
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 1 7i9***  
(0.262)
0.506***
(0.094)
45.643*** 0.393 0.388
MS 2.332***
(0.184)
0.254***
(0.055)
184.781*** 0.341 0.336
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF 1.715***
(0.224)
0.423***
(0.107)
60.952*** 0.408 0.402
MS 2.356***
(0.204)
0.242
(0.057)
177.463*** 0.306 0.298
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF 1.663***
(0.223)
0.421***
(0.067)
96.580*** 0.460 0.451
MS 2.041***
(0.072)
0.305***
(0 .022 )
1056.458*** 0.410 0.401
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 1.964*** 
(0.083)
0.093***
(0.018)
2515.204*** 0.523 0.495
MS 2.758***
(0 .120)
0.208**
(0.079)
536.802*** 0.285 0.208
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 3.2. Regressive Expectations Models
Testing Equation:
_________________ E i.t [n t +h] =  +  a 2 [ n t -  n t_h] +  e t
a 0 a t  a 2 R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
Unrestricted
1.118***
(0.304)
0.687***
(0.084)
-0.293***
(0.058)
0.560 0.552
a t  = 1
0.155
(0.187)
-0.394***
(0.054)
0.446 0.441
MS
Unrestricted
2.019***
(0.538)
0.357***
(0.135)
-0.061*
(0.034)
0.535 0.526
CTj =  1 0.043(0.285)
-0.269***
(0.094)
-1.116 -1.134
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF
Unrestricted
1.204***
(0.243)
0.598***
(0.077)
-0 .2 1 2 ***
(0.040)
0.530 0.520
a t  = 1
0.032
(0.171)
-0.413***
(0.055)
0.304 0.296
MS
Unrestricted
2.054***
(0.427)
0.346***
(0.099)
-0.046
(0.031)
0.514 0.503
=  1 0.145(0.557)
-0.375***
(0.132)
-0.860 -0.880
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF
Unrestricted
1 307*** 
(0.226)
0.538***
(0.069)
-0.321***
(0.089)
0.624 0.613
a 1 =  1
-0.053
(0.560)
-0.514***
(0.179)
0.181 0.168
MS
Unrestricted 1.810***(0.118)
0.386***
(0.036)
0.022
(0.043)
0.672 0.662
a t  = 1
0.004
(0 .21 1 )
-0.234**
(0.104)
-0.657 -0.683
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
Unrestricted 1.787***(0.073)
0.167***
(0.030)
-0.071***
(0 .02 1 )
0.661 0.618
a t  =  1 -0.129(0.426)
-0.469***
(0.104)
-15.535 -16.507
MS
,* indicE
Unrestricted 2.338***(0.168)
0.402***
(0.105)
-0.082*
(0.044)
0.603 0.554
« !  =  1
ite significance at
0.963**
(0.379)
1, 5 and 10 j>ercent levels
-0.368***
(0.125)
-0.303 -0.379
Appendix 3.3. Cagan Adaptive Expectations 
Testing Equation:
E i A n t+*\ = < * 0  +  a i E t , t - i [ n t +3\ +  cc2 [ n t ] +  e t
a 0 « i a 2 Wald x 2- R 2 R 2
a 1 +  a 2 =  l
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 =  1
0.083**
(0.033)
0.930***
(0.016)
0.037***
(0 .01 1 )
6.169** 0.957 0.956
y =  4
0.355***
(0.091)
0.706***
(0.029)
0.158***
(0.045)
12.089*** 0.892 0.890
MS
7 =  1
1.463***
(0.145)
0.309***
(0.067)
0.227***
(0.052)
92 243*** 0.563 0.555
7 =  4
1.539***
(0.155)
0.216***
(0.057)
0.292***
(0.049)
97.645*** 0.583 0.575
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 =  1 0.043
(0.051)
0.946***
(0.025)
0.033***
(0 .01 2 )
1.165 0.960 0.959
7 =  4 0.069
(0.154)
0.841***
(0.055)
0.113***
(0.034)
0.556 0.892 0.890
MS
7 =  1 1.362***
(0.109)
0.356***
(0.067)
0 .2 1 0 ***
(0.047)
110.740*** 0.575 0.566
7 =  4 1 496*** 
(0.359)
0.224*
(0.127)
0.302***
(0.058)
14.573*** 0.552 0.543
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF
7 =  1 0.138*
(0.079)
0.890***
(0.037)
0.052**
(0.024)
4.352** 0.936 0.934
7 =  4 0.373***
(0.135)
0.711***
(0.062)
0.126***
(0.043)
15.481*** 0.889 0.885
MS
7 =  1 1.806***
(0.098)
-0.014
(0.096)
0.401***
(0.073)
291.684*** 0.670 0.660
7 =  4
1 819***
(0.138)
-0.017
(0.045)
0.400***
(0.026)
207.186*** 0.671 0.660
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 =  1
0 7 4 9 *** 
(0.217)
0.610***
(0.104)
0.042***
(0 .0 1 2 )
11.809*** 0.644 0.600
7 =  4 0.765**
(0.314)
0.560***
(0.145)
0.068***
(0 .0 1 1 )
6.329** 0.587 0.536
MS
7 =  1
2 047*** 
(0 .2 2 1 )
0.198**
(0.076)
0.257***
(0.050)
131.197*** 0.585 0.533
7 =  4 0.730
(0.901)
0.500**
(0.234)
Q411 ***
(0.089)
0.083 0.712 0.676
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 3.4. Adaptive Expectations (j  =  1 , j  =  4)
Testing Equation: E i t [ n t+h] = a 0 +  a 1£ w_y[7rt_y+ft_ + a 2£i,t + €t
a  i
Wald x 2-
« i  + a 2 =  1
Wald x 2 - 
a 0 =  0, 
a 1 + a 2 = l
R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 = 1
0.093***
(0.034)
0.963***
(0.013)
0.018**
(0.008)
0.970 17.782*** 0.956 0.955
j  =  4
0.355***
(0.091)
0.864***
(0.039)
0.158***
(0.045)
0.072 37.882*** 0.892 0.890
MS
7 = 1
1 414*** 
(0.119)
0.549***
(0.033)
0 .102***
(0.028)
118.190*** 141.222*** 0.468 0.458
7 =  4
1.539***
(0.155)
0.508***
(0.050)
0.292***
(0.049)
6.182** 150.086*** 0.583 0.575
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 =  1
0.049
(0.048)
0 9 7 7 *** 
(0.018)
0.027***
(0.009)
0.056 5.785* 0.960 0.959
7 =  4
0.069
(0.154)
0.955***
(0.061)
q j
(0.034)
0.701 9.109** 0.892 0.890
MS
7 =  1
1.486***
(0.106)
0.522***
(0.035)
0.131**
(0.050)
179.927*** 198.081*** 0.520 0.510
7 =  4 1.496***
(0.359)
0.527***
(0.124)
0.302***
(0.058)
1.365 47.847*** 0.552 0.543
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF
7 = 1
0.140**
(0.056)
0.943***
(0.019)
0.033**
(0.018)
1.170 6.941** 0.934 0.932
7 =  4 0.373***
(0.135)
0.837***
(0.041)
0.126***
(0.043)
0.401 10.728*** 0.890 0.885
MS
7 =  1
1.907***
(0.300)
0.354***
(0 .102)
0.266***
(0.046)
40.109*** 40.404*** 0.573 0.560
7 = 4 1.819***
(0.138)
0.383***
(0.043)
0.400***
(0.026)
15.696*** 739.684*** 0.671 0.660
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF
7 = 1
0.767***
(0.229)
0.645***
(0.105)
0.039***
(0 .01 2 )
9.462*** 12.694*** 0.637 0.591
7 =  4 0.765**
(0.314)
0.628***
(0.148)
0.068***
(0 .011 )
4.013** 15.348*** 0.587 0.536
MS
7 =  1
2.319*** 
(0.389)
0.335***
(0.087)
0.149**
(0.051)
29.150*** 64.105*** 0.476 0.411
7 =  4 0.730
(0.901)
0.912***
(0.308)
0 411***
(0.089)
0.694 43.883*** 0.712 0.676
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 3.7. REH Properties -  Unbiasedness of Survey Forecasts
Testing Equation: n t t+h =  a 0 +  a ^ E t [Ttt.t+h] +  e t
«0 a l Wald x 2- R 2 R 2
a 0 =  0, a x =  1
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 1 231*** 
(0.402)
0.514***
(0.109)
25.448*** 0.258 0.251
MS 1.809*
(0.917)
0.372
(0.313)
4.036 0.048 0.039
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF 0.218
(0.779)
0.890***
(0.225)
0.847 0.342 0.335
MS 2.324
(1.938)
0.194
(0.701)
1.647 0.007 -0.004
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF 0.709
(0.740)
0.728***
(0.191)
8.378** 0.280 0.269
MS 0.096
(1.099)
0.951**
(0.417)
0.039 0.248 0.236
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF -1.448
(3.764)
1.565
(1.933)
20.041*** 0.032 -0.025
MS 6.952**
(2.425)
-1.499** 
(0.659)
19 771*** 0.332 0.293
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 3.8. REH Properties -  Orthogonality of Survey Forecasts
Testing Equation: n t+h -  E i t [ n t+h] =  a 0 +  a x { n t -  E u  h [n t ] )  +  e t
<*0 «1 Wald x Z: R 2 R 2
a 0 =  0 , =  0
Period: Whole 1982Q 3-2 0 1  l Q l f
SPF -0.301
(0.236)
0.106
(0.199)
4.365 0.013 0.004
MS -0.169
(0.193)
-0.073
(0 . 102)
0.774 0.005 -0.004
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF -0.138
(0.180)
-0.107
(0.128)
0.868 0.014 0.004
MS -0.150
(0.208)
-0.075
(0 .100)
0.615 0.006 -0.005
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF -0.073
(0.489)
0.201
(0.396)
1.386 0.032 0.017
MS -0.050
(0.217)
-0.005
(0.169)
0.059 0.000 -0.016
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF -0.114
(0.960)
-0.284
(0.432)
0.464 0.092 0.038
MS -1.401
(1.452)
-0.291
(0.430)
0.939 0.096 0.043
*** ** * in(}jcate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
fDue to the lack o f availability o f four period ahead forecast errors from the SPF, the whole sample 
period for both agent classes is modified to 1983Q3 -  2011Q1 to ensure comparability. Utilising the 
initial whole sample period for the Michigan Survey does not significantly change the results.
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Appendix 3.9. Comparison of Backward-Looking and Forward-Looking 
Behaviour -  Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
4 4 4
n t+h -  E lit[ n t+h] =  «o +  «1 n t+j +  a 2n t +  a 3 ^  7rt_; +  a 4 ^ ( 7 r t_y -  E i i M [ n M + h \ )  +  e iit
J iii. iz i . /=!
« i a 2 « 3 a 4 R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
SPFf -0.021
(0.090)
-0.017
(0 .0 1 1 )
1.013***
(0 .01 2 )
-0.232***
(0.007)
0
(0.006)
0.957 0.956
MS -1 317*** 
(0.150)
-0.019**
(0.008)
1.214***
(0.047)
-0.178***
(0.007)
0.084***
(0.015)
0.927 0.924
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
SPF 0.066
(0.156)
-0.019*
(0 .0 1 0 )
1.0 2 1 ***
(0 .0 20 )
-0.239***
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.215***
(0 .011 )
0.967 0.965
MS -0.942***
(0.251)
-0 .0 2 1 ***
(0.008)
1.232***
(0.044)
-0 .2 1 2 ***
(0.032)
0.118***
(0.036)
0.942 0.939
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
SPF -0.224***
(0.081)
0.004
(0 .0 1 1 )
1.009***
(0.041)
-0.232***
(0.008)
0.204***
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.964 0.961
MS -1.586***
(0.160)
-0.038***
(0 .0 1 1 )
1.292***
(0.045)
-0.153***
(0 .0 1 1 )
-0.003
(0 .02 1 )
0.923 0.918
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
SPF 0.219
(0.571)
-0 .0 1 1 **
(0.005)
1.015***
(0.016)
-0.260***
(0.061)
0.245***
(0.062)
0.995 0.994
MS -0.810*
(0.428)
-0.008
(0.013)
1 259*** 
(0.092)
-0.246***
(0.033)
0.157
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.968 0.959
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 4
Appendix 4.1. Disaggregate Household Inflation Forecasts -  Elementary
Statistics -  Whole and Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Periods
Whole Sample Period 
1982q3 -  2011ql
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period 
1987q2 -  2011ql
Mean
Forecast
Max. Min. St.Dev. Mean
Forecast
Max. Min. St.Dev.
SPF 3.246 6.000 1.800 1.072 2.949 5.000 1.800 0.863
A1834 3.172 5.100 0.800 0.692 3.067 5.100 0.800 0.640
A3544 3.162 5.000 0.700 0.678 3.067 5.000 0.700 0.630
A4554 3.096 5.100 1.400 0.577 3.079 5.100 1.400 0.586
A5564 2.938 4.900 1.000 0.574 2.963 4.900 1.000 0.587
A6597 2.968 5.000 0.900 0.655 3.070 5.000 0.900 0.606
ELHS 3.483 5.900 2.300 0.740 3.546 5.900 2.300 0.754
EHSD 3.203 5.300 1.300 0.551 3.209 5.300 1.300 0.550
ESC 3.098 5.200 1.100 0.606 3.081 5.200 1.100 0.589
ECD 2.990 4.900 0.400 0.739 2.886 4.800 0.400 0.690
EGS 3.149 5.000 0.300 0.870 2.988 4.800 0.300 0.805
MALE 2.918 4.900 0.800 0.575 2.875 4.900 0.800 0.580
FEMALE 3.326 5.100 1.100 0.636 3.290 5.100 1.100 0.626
Y14 3.555 5.400 2.000 0.673 3.573 5.400 2.000 0.692
Y24 3.221 5.200 1.600 0.619 3.196 5.200 1.600 0.610
Y34 2.985 5.000 0.600 0.594 2.938 5.000 0.600 0.570
Y44 2.856 4.800 0.200 0.721 2.771 4.700 0.200 0.719
NC 3.077 5.000 0.700 0.564 3.060 5.000 0.700 0.577
NE 3.134 5.100 0.300 0.749 3.051 5.100 0.300 0.736
S 3.115 5.100 1.700 0.549 3.089 5.100 1.700 0.537
w 3.116 5.000 1.100 0.633 3.056 5.000 1.100 0.599
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Appendix 4.2. Disaggregate Household Inflation Forecasts -  Elementary 
Statistics -  Stable and Volatile Sample Periods
Stable Sample Period 
1990ql -  2006q2
Volatile Sample Period 
2006q3 -201lq l
Mean
Forecast
Max. Min. St.Dev. Mean
Forecast
Max. Min. St.Dev.
SPF 2.894 4.500 1.800 0.635 2.166 2.500 1.800 0.234
A1834 2.945 4.800 0.800 0.569 3.079 5.100 2.200 0.717
A3544 2.976 5.000 0.700 0.559 3.074 5.000 1.900 0.816
A4554 2.947 4.600 1.400 0.450 3.221 5.100 1.600 0.811
A5564 2.836 4.300 1.000 0.506 3.211 4.900 1.500 0.761
A6597 2.903 4.600 0.900 0.500 3.379 5.000 2.600 0.692
ELHS 3.426 5.000 2.300 0.714 3.874 5.900 2.800 0.847
EHSD 3.062 4.700 1.300 0.451 3.537 5.300 2.800 0.676
ESC 2.932 4.600 1.100 0.522 3.358 5.200 2.700 0.695
ECD 2.779 4.800 0.500 0.572 2.889 4.800 0.400 0.969
EGS 2.852 4.800 0.300 0.636 2.821 4.800 0.300 0.995
MALE 2.774 4.600 0.900 0.479 2.953 4.900 0.800 0.851
FEMALE 3.136 4.800 1.100 0.522 3.479 5.100 2.600 0.741
Y14 3.380 5.000 2.000 0.577 4.026 5.400 2.900 0.779
Y24 3.0454 4.900 1.600 0.479 3.447 5.200 2.400 0.823
Y34 2.835 4.600 0.600 0.521 3.074 5.000 1.800 0.739
Y44 2.694 4.700 0.300 0.559 2.605 4.700 0.200 1.077
NC 2.932 4.700 0.700 0.501 3.268 5.000 2.400 0.707
NE 2.867 4.700 0.300 0.623 3.200 5.100 1.100 0.869
S 2.971 4.900 1.700 0.452 3.258 5.100 2.000 0.703
w 2.947 4.500 1.100 0.505 3.074 5.000 1.900 0.758
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Appendix 4.3. ANOVA F-Test Equality of Mean Forecasts -  Age
Disaggregated Expectations
A1834 A3544 A4554 A5564 A6597
A3544 W 0.011
G-B 0 .000
S 0.095
V 0.000
A4554 w 0.830 0.651
G-B 0.020 0.020
S 0.000 0.106
V 0.328 0.312
A5564 w 7.783*** 7.337*** 4.300**
G-B 1.381 1.404 1.899
S 1.354 2.253 1.760
V 0.301 0.286 0.002
A6597 w 5.286** 4.908** 2.464 0.132
G-B 0.001 0.001 0 .012 1.552
S 0.207 0.620 0.282 0.579
V 1.721 1.546 0.417 0.509
SPF w 0.385 0.497 1.753 7.361*** 5.634**
G-B 1.143 1.156 1.486 0.015 1.251
S 0.242 0.618 0.308 0.330 0.009
V 27.855*** 21.747*** 29.712*** 32.731*** 52.330***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.4. ANOVA F-Test Equality of Mean Forecasts -  Education 
Disaggregated Expectations
ELHS EHSD ESC ECD EGS
EHSD W 10.521***
G-B 12.460***
S 12.241***
V 1.835
ESC w 18.560*** 1.897
G-B 22.604*** 2.423
S 20.575*** 2.353
V 4.208** 0.647
ECD w 25.546*** 6.1911** 1.487
G-B 39.903*** 12.838*** 4.420**
S 33.023*** 9 992 *** 2.576
V 11.104*** 5.7011** 2.929*
EGS w 9 827*** 0.325 0.260 2.234
G-B 24.593*** 4.972** 0.848 0.872
S 23.795*** 4.812** 0.628 0.477
V 12.332*** 6.730)** 3.717* 0.046
SPF w 3.791* 0.143 1.654 4.458** 0.571
G-B 25.982*** 6.1911** 1.528 0.311 0.100
S 20.445*** 3.07(9* 0.141 1.196 0.146
V 71 749*** 69.794*** 50.140*** 10.005*** 7 813***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 peircent levels.
Appendix 4.5. ANOVA F-Test Equality of Mean Forecasts -  Gender
Disaggregated Expectations
M ALE FEM A LE
FEM A LE W 26.022***
G-B 22.662***
S 17.246***
V 4.134**
SPF w 8.342*** 0.474
G-B 0.491 9 7 7 3 ***
S 1.492 5.738**
V 15.110*** 5.738**
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.6. ANOVA F-Test Equality of Mean Forecasts -  Income 
Disaggregated Expectations
Y14 Y24 Y34 Y44
Y24 W 15.336***
G-B 16.032***
S 13.154***
V 4.957**
Y34 w 46.293*** 8.670***
G-B 48.238*** 9 193***
S 32.482*** 5.834**
V 14 940*** 2.168
Y44 w 57.787*** 16.978*** 2.211
G-B 61.977*** 19.486*** 3.167*
S 48.163*** 15.025*** 2.241
V 21.700*** 7.332** 2.442
SPF w 6.840*** 0.047 5.203** 10.493***
G-B 30.488*** 5.217** 0.013 2.424
S 21.209*** 2.395 0.340 3.680*
V 99.284*** 42.638*** 26.046*** 3.020*
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.7. ANOVA F-Test Equality of Mean Forecasts -  Regionally
Disaggregated Expectations
NC NE S W
NE W 0.418
G-B 0.010
S 0.438
V 0.071
S w 0.260 0.049
G-B 0.122 0.163
S 0.225 1.218
V 0.002 0.051
w w 0.234 0.040 0.000
G-B 0.002 0.003 0.154
S 0.030 0.661 0.084
V 0.671 0.228 0.603
SPF w 2.227 0.845 1.365 1.260
G-B 1.098 0.771 1.798 0.993
S 0.145 0.061 0.650 0.283
V 41.631*** 25.113*** 41.231*** 24.896***
*** ** * jn(iicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.8. Mean Forecast Error and Mean Square Forecast Error
Statistics -  Disaggregate Forecasts
MEAN FORECAST ERROR 
(MFE)
MEAN SQUARE FORECAST ERROR 
(MSFE)
WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE WHOLE G-B STABLE VOLATILE
SPF -0.433*** -0.115 -0.114 -0.175 1.778 1.128 0.777 2.913
MS -0.194 -0.140 -0.050 -1.177** 1.820 1.893 0.760 6.103
A1834 -0.292** -0.154 -0.087 -1.051* 1.841 1.780 0.752 5.764
A3544 -0.292** -0.153 -0.094 -1.135** 1.950 1.932 0.795 6.198
A4554 -0.178 -0.147 -0.070 -1.203** 1.883 1.953 0.766 6.350
A5564 0.040 -0.017 0.074 -1.203** 1.993 2.083 0.847 6.312
A6597 0.047 -0.115 -0.006 -1.329** 2.104 2.013 0.766 6.333
ELHS -0.509*** -0.593*** -0.478*** -2.003*** 2.528 2.761 1.177 8.948
EHSD -0.258** -0.265* -0.143 -1.466*** 1.930 2.065 0.868 6.588
ESC -0.186 -0.148 -0.043 -1.312** 1.948 2.023 0.749 6.638
ECD -0.105 0.026 0.085 -0.872 1.912 1.863 0.770 5.790
EGS -0.292** -0.103 0.018 -0.929* 1.877 1.768 0.775 5.851
MALE -0.007 0.041 0.125 -0.956* 1.809 1.913 0.821 5.817
FEMALE -0.403*** -0.358** -0.268** -1.419** 1.936 1.989 0.769 6.749
Y14 -0.605*** -0.624*** -0.481*** -2.035*** 2.281 2.473 0.920 8.619
Y24 -0.285** -0.266* -0.153 -1.440** 1.945 2.042 0.836 6.598
Y34 -0.088 -0.021 0.068 -1.061* 1.917 1.970 0.835 6.051
Y44 0.033 0.128 0.179 -0.651 1.778 1.825 0.803 5.557
NC -0.153 -0.133 -0.035 -1.219** 1.878 1.976 0.833 6.173
NE -0.219* -0.138 -0.008 -1.182** 1.768 1.826 0.675 6.313
S -0.184 -0.158 -0.079 -1.214** 1.856 1.968 0.795 6.256
w -0.230* -0.141 -0.070 -1.093** 1.837 1.826 0.753 5.808
***,**,* indicate significance o f t-tests o f the null hypothesis that M F E t =  0 at 1, 5 and percent 
levels.
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Appendix 4.9. Mean Forecast Error Statistics -  Disaggregate Forecasts
WHOLE 
1982Q3 -  2011Q1
G-B
1987Q2 -  2011Q1
STABLE 
I990Q1 -  2006Q2
VOLATILE 
2006Q3 -  2011Q1
AGE 1.669 0.170 0.397 0.039
EDUCATION 1.224 2.360* 3.520*** 0.732
GENDER 4.981** 4.008** 6.716** 0.401
INCOME 4 697*** 5.151*** 7.463*** 1.268
REGION 0.076 0.006 0.095 0.013
*** ** * ^d icate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.10. Mean Square Forecast Error Statistics -  Disaggregate 
Forecasts
WHOLE 
1982Q3 -  2011Q1
G-B
1987Q2 -  2011Q1
STABLE 
1990Q1 -  2006Q2
VOLATILE 
2006Q3- 2011Q1
AGE 0.040 0.037 0.057 0.008
EDUCATION 0.204 0.309 0.721 0.153
GENDER 0.032 0.008 0.061 0.056
INCOME 0.153 0.183 0.113 0.194
REGION 0.009 0.020 0.229 0.007
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.11. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MFE’s -  Age Disaggregated
Expectations
A1834 A3544 A4554 A5564 A6597
A3544 W 0.000
G-B 0.000
S 0 . 0 0 2
V 0.013
A4554 w 0.404 0.392
G-B 0.004 0 . 0 0 2
S 0 . 0 1 2 0.025
V 0.044 0.009
A5564 w 3.340* 3.245* 1.413
G-B 0.512 0.471 0.408
S 1.057 1.129 0.840
V 0.044 0.009 0.000
A6597 w 3.382* 3.288* 1.463 0 . 0 0 1
G-B 0.056 0.047 0.029 0.218
S 0.277 0.323 0.172 0.261
V 0.152 0.072 0.030 0.030
SPF w 0.681 0.659 2.144 7  i i i* * * 7.102***
G-B 0.084 0.070 0.045 0.259 0.000
S 0.032 0.016 0.082 1.428 0.491
V 1.829 2.127 2.444 2.456 3.221*
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.12. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MSFE’s -  Age Disaggregated 
Expectations
A1834 A3544 A4554 A5564 A6597
A3544 W 0.024
G-B 0.034
S 0.045
V 0 . 0 1 2
A4554 w 0.004 0.009
G-B 0.043 0 .0 0 1
S 0.005 0 .0 2 1
V 0 . 0 2 2 0 .0 0 1
A5564 w 0 . 0 2 0 0.004 0.024
G-B 0.136 0.032 0.023
S 0.195 0.053 0.143
V 0 . 0 2 0 0 .0 0 1 0.000
A6597 w 0.135 0.045 0.091 0.024
G-B 0.078 0.009 0.005 0.007
S 0.005 0.018 0.000 0.126
V 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 0 1 0.000 0.000
SPF w 0 . 0 1 2 0.089 0.032 0.141 0.303
G-B 1 .1 0 1 1.566 1.584 2.270 1.858
S 0 . 0 2 1 0 .0 1 1 0.004 0.133 0.003
V 0.949 1.190 1.244 1.330 1.275
*** ** * in(jjcate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.13. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MFE’s -  Education Disaggregated
Expectations
ELHS EHSD ESC ECD EGS
EHSD W 1.730
G-B 2.322
S 4.056**
V 0.553
ESC w 2.837* 0.157
G-B 4.261** 0.324
S 7 244*** 0.407
V 0.857 0.042
ECD w 4.451** 0.709 0.195
G-B 8.515*** 2.080 0.744
S 12 .0 0 0 *** 2.085 0.697
V 2.313 0.672 0.363
EGS w 1.327 0.034 0.341 1.069
G-B 5.464** 0.660 0.051 0.438
S 9.258*** 1.034 0.157 0.188
V 2.091 0.550 0.276 0.006
SPF w 0.171 1.004 1.978 3.501* 0.673
G-B 6.146** 0.682 0.033 0.637 0.005
S 5.021** 0.034 0.217 1.676 0.733
V 7.695*** 4.100* 3.027* 1.104 1.302
* * ****  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.14. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MSFE’s -  Education 
Disaggregated Expectations
ELHS EHSD ESC ECD EGS
EHSD W 0.538
G-B 0.515
S 1.142
V 0.280
ESC w 0.495 0.001
G-B 0.569 0.002
S 2.526 0.295
V 0.262 0.000
ECD w 0.602 0.001 0.003
G-B 0.912 0.060 0.036
S 2.181 0.189 0.010
V 0.529 0.042 0.046
EGS w 0.666 0.006 0.010 0.003
G-B 1.112 0.127 0.091 0.014
S 2.160 0.174 0.016 0.001
V 0.510 0.036 0.039 0.000
SPF w 1.176 0.068 0.081 0.058 0.032
G-B 4.287** 2.051 1.796 1.444 1.094
S 2.527 0.216 0.027 0.002 0.000
V 2.832 1.463 1.420 1.008 1.053
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.15. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MFE’s -  Gender Disaggregated
Expectations
MALE FEMALE
FEMALE W 4.981**
G-B 4.008**
S 6.716**
V 0.401
SPF w 6.077** 0.031
G-B 0.762 1.887
S 2.372 1.065
V 1.409 3.656*
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.16* ANOVA F-Test Equality of MSFE’s -  Gender Disaggregated 
Expectations
MALE FEMALE
FEMALE W 0.032
G-B 0.008
S 0.061
V 0.056
SPF w 0.003 0.070
G-B 1.660 1.655
S 0.055 0.002
V 1.040 1.506
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.17. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MFE’s -  Income Disaggregated
Expectations
Y14 Y24 Y34 Y44
Y24 W 3.088*
G-B 3.008*
S 4.636**
V 0.707
Y34 w 7 9 5 2 *** 1.167
G-B 8.527*** 1.444
S 12.864*** 1.936
V 1.815 0.274
Y44 w 12.543*** 3.154* 0.452
G-B 13.807*** 3.896** 0.558
S 19.338*** 4.520** 0.496
V 3.588* 1.162 0.302
SPF w 0.958 0.726 3.873* 7 342***
G-B 7.688*** 0.696 0.274 1.924
S 6.019** 0.064 1.346 3.619*
V 8.457*** 3.887* 1.810 0.508
* * * * * *  indiCate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.18. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MSFE’s -  Income Disaggregated 
Expectations
Y14 Y24 Y34 Y44
Y24 W 0.178
G-B 0.207
S 0.138
V 0.214
Y34 w 0.221 0.002
G-B 0.300 0.007
S 0.142 0.000
V 0.366 0.018
Y44 w 0.458 0.059 0.044
G-B 0.539 0.071 0.034
S 0.326 0.024 0.023
V 0.565 0.073 0.018
SPF w 0.585 0.078 0.060 0.000
G-B 3.246* 1.863 1.785 1.459
S 0.429 0.095 0.096 0.024
V 2.815 1.388 1.135 0.961
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.19. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MFE’s -  Regionally Disaggregated
Expectations
NC NE S W
NE W 0.139
G-B 0.000
S 0.032
V 0.003
S w 0.029 0.041
G-B 0.015 0.011
S 0.077 0.225
V 0.000 0.002
w w 0.183 0.004 0.067
G-B 0.001 0.000 0.008
S 0.050 0.176 0.003
V 0.031 0.015 0.028
SPF w 2.857 1.570 2.074 1.393
G-B 0.010 0.016 0.058 0.021
S 0.252 0.507 0.051 0.083
V 2.591 2.341 2.533 2.022
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 4.20. ANOVA F-Test Equality of MSFE’s -  Regionally 
Disaggregated Expectations
NC NE S W
NE W 0.024
G-B 0.031
S 0.561
V 0.001
S w 0.001 0.015
G-B 0.000 0.029
S 0.029 0.406
V 0.000 0.000
w w 0.003 0.010 0.001
G-B 0.032 0.000 0.029
S 0.133 0.170 0.046
V 0.009 0.017 0.013
SPF w 0.030 0.000 0.018 0.011
G-B 1.742 1.186 1.720 1.246
S 0.084 0.404 0.012 0.019
V 1.179 1.287 1.239 0.965
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.21. REH Properties - Unbiasedness -  Age Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Inflation Forecasts
Testing Equation; n t t+h =  a 0 +  +  €t
«0 a t Wald x2- R 2 R 2
a Q = 0, a x = 1
Period; Whiole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 1.598***
(0.574)
0.425**
(0.196)
8.585** 0.087 0.078
A3544 1.829***
(0.611)
0.355
(0.216)
9.266*** 0.060 0.052
A4554 1.990*
(1.186)
0.317
(0.457)
3.419 0.036 0.027
A5564 2.767**
(1.153)
0.077
(0.443)
7.210** 0.002 -0.007
A6597 2.761**
(1.382)
0.079
(0.560)
7.092** 0.002 -0.008
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 1.656
(1.612)
0.409
(0.577)
1.057 0.039 0.029
A3544 2.287
(1.759)
0.204
(0.620)
1.691 0.009 -0.001
A4554 2.521
(3.179)
0.129
(1.176)
1.100 0.003 -0.007
A5564 3.190*
(1.670)
-0.093
(0.617)
3.899 0.002 -0.009
A6597 2.732
(1.798)
0.060
(0.649)
2.404 0.001 -0.010
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.399
(0.966)
0.838**
(0.377)
0.184 0.270 0.258
A3544 0.470
(0.964)
0.812**
(0.368)
0.262 0.231 0.219
A4554 0.030
(1.132)
0.967**
(0.433)
0.095 0.244 0.232
A5564 0.602
(1.042)
0.814*
(0.423)
0.932 0.172 0.159
A6597 0.221
(0 .886 )
0.922***
(0.330)
0.064 0.240 0.228
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 6.792***
(1.637)
-1.509***
(0.470)
39.532*** 0.324 0.284
A3544 6.209**
(2.207)
-1.287*
(0.615)
15.678*** 0.304 0.263
A4554 5.751**
(2.361)
- 1.121
(0.714)
9.650*** 0.253 0.209
A5564 5.908**
(2.491)
-1.169
(0.776)
8.563** 0.262 0.219
A6597 7.416***
(2.495)
-1.568**
(0 .686)
18.082*** 0.321 0.281
* * * * * *  indiCate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.22. REH Properties - Unbiasedness -  Education Disaggregated
Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
Testing Equation: n tt+h =  a 0 +  a \ E t [ n tx+h] +  e t
«0 «1 Wald x2- R 2 R 2
a 0 =  0 , a i  =  1
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 3.095***
(1.107)
-0.029
(0.346)
9.516*** 0.000 -0.009
EHSD 2 .2 1 1 *
(1.140)
0.241
(0.364)
4.499 0.015 0.007
ESC 2.124**
(0.899)
0.274
(0.309)
5.651* 0.028 0.019
ECD 1 9 1 3 *** 
(0.535)
0.349*
(0.196)
12.766*** 0.065 0.056
EGS 1.571***
(0.441)
0.433**
(0.165)
12.746*** 0.133 0.126
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 3.400***
(1.195)
-0.138
(0.375)
10.055*** 0.006 -0.004
EHSD 3.113
(1.957)
-0.062
(0.657)
2.616 0.001 -0.010
ESC 2.821
(2.029)
0.031
(0.709)
1.936 0.000 -0.010
ECD 2.045
(1.260)
0.301
(0.506)
5.919* 0.025 0.014
EGS 1.593
(1.119)
0.438
(0.431)
2.657 0.071 0.062
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 0.998
(0.917)
0.565*
(0.307)
6.048** 0.139 0.125
EHSD 0.134
(1.301)
0.909*
(0.478)
0.387 0.159 0.146
ESC 0.153
(1.066)
0.934**
(0.401)
0.037 0.258 0.246
ECD 0.644
(0.741)
0.803**
(0.304)
1.173 0.258 0.246
EGS 0.775
(0.728)
0.739**
(0.293)
1.330 0.263 0.252
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 5.282**
(1.952)
-0.786
(0.523)
17 197*** 0.160 0.110
EHSD 7.218**
(2.990)
-1.452*
(0.790)
15.271*** 0.268 0.225
ESC 7.773***
(2 .0 2 2 )
-1.678***
(0.468)
68.791*** 0.421 0.387
ECD 4.326*
(2.094)
-0.764
(0.828)
4.595 0.161 0.111
EGS 3.954*
(1.928)
-0.625
(0.801)
4.340 0.118 0.066
*** ** * inciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.23. REH Properties - Unbiasedness -  Gender Disaggregated
Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
Testing Equation: n tt+h =  a 0 +  a 1 E t [ n tt+ h ] +  e t
«0 «1 Wald x2- R 2 R 2
a n =  0 ,a - i  =  1
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 1 9 4 5 ** 
(0.826)
0.349
(0.296)
5.606* 0.043 0.034
FEMALE 1.708
(1.046)
0.378
(0.338)
4.246 0.049 0.041
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 2.496
(1.569)
0.146
(0.612)
4.580 0.004 -0.006
FEMALE 2.076
(2.080)
0.256
(0.700)
1.641 0.014 0.004
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE 0.360
(1.132)
0.916*
(0.461)
0.657 0.201 0.189
FEMALE -0.129
(1.148)
0.956**
(0.405)
1.489 0.308 0.297
Period; Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 5.039**
(2.033)
-0.977
(0.738)
7.188** 0.211 0.165
FEMALE 7.504**
(2.975)
-1.553*
(0.774)
19.203*** 0.351 0.313
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.24. REH Properties - Unbiasedness -  Income Disaggregated
Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
Testing Equation; n t t+h =  tt0 +  tt1E,t [7rt f+/t] +  e t
«0 £*1 Wald x2- R 2 R 2
a o II o a ii
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 2.121
(1.327)
0.242
(0.399)
6.307** 0.019 0.011
Y24 2.140**
(1.065)
0.260
(0.348)
4.604 0.020 0.011
Y34 2  117*** 
(0.765)
0.285
(0.266)
7.688** 0.031 0.023
Y44 1 7 6 4 *** 
(0.566)
0.415*
(0.223)
10.838*** 0.087 0.079
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 2.670
(1.779)
0.069
(0.559)
3.694 0.001 -0.009
Y24 2.622*
(1.541)
0.092
(0.549)
2.957 0.002 -0.009
Y34 2.785
(1.739)
0.045
(0.654)
3.548 0.000 -0.010
Y44 1.880
(1.186)
0.372
(0.487)
5.499* 0.041 0.031
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 -0.378
(1.180)
0.970***
(0.358)
5.923* 0.315 0.304
Y24 0.249
(0.960)
0.869**
(0.357)
0.291 0.197 0.184
Y34 0.600
( 1.100)
0.813*
(0.455)
0.826 0.184 0.171
Y44 0.672
(0.884)
0.820**
(0.367)
1.730 0.245 0.234
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 5.423
(3.856)
-0.814
( 1.0 2 1 )
6.640** 0.129 0.077
Y24 5.200*
(2.917)
-0.889
(0.937)
4.437 0.149 0.099
Y34 6.838***
(2 .2 2 2 )
-1.518**
(0.578)
33.697*** 0.377 0.341
Y44 3.455***
(1.029)
-0.506
(0.521)
12.151*** 0.093 0.040
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.25. REH Properties - Unbiasedness -  Regionally Disaggregated
Michigan Survey Inflation Forecasts
Testing Equation: n t t+h =  g 0 +  g^tpTt.t-t-ft] +  €t
a 0 Wald x2- R 2 R 2
a 0 =  0 , =  1
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 2.031**
(0.881)
0.306
(0.305)
5.345* 0.032 0.024
NE 1.567**
(0.782)
0.444
(0.278)
4.055 0.089 0.081
S 2.087*
(1.239)
0.285
(0.411)
3.038 0.021 0.013
w 1.717**
(0.702)
0.396
(0.242)
6.275** 0.068 0.060
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 - 2011Q1
NC 2.721
(1.869)
0.064
(0.679)
2.469 0.001 -0.010
NE 1.758
(1.388)
0.379
(0.523)
2.175 0.045 0.035
S 2.814
(2.085)
0.033
(0.743)
1.970 0.000 -0.010
w 1.935
(1.718)
0.321
(0.628)
1.431 0.022 0.011
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 0.472
(0.963)
0.828**
(0.387)
0.266 0.181 0.168
NE 0.471
(0.736)
0.836***
(0.290)
0.466 0.342 0.332
S -0.003
(1.242)
0.974**
(0.432)
0.096 0.216 0.203
w 0.166
(1.065)
0.921**
(0.398)
0.073 0.258 0.247
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 7.400***
(2.404)
-1.616**
(0.640)
24.227*** 0.358 0.320
NE 5.441**
(1.963)
-1.033**
(0.395)
51.545*** 0.229 0.183
S 7.195***
(2.077)
-1.556**
(0.547)
33.505*** 0.361 0.323
w 5.503**
(2.448)
-1.082
(0.808)
6.879** 0.206 0.159
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.26. Disagreement across Household Inflation Forecasts -  
Elementary Statistics -  Whole and Greenspan-Bernanke 
Sample Periods
Whole Sample Period 
1982q3 -  2011ql
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period 
1987q2 -  2011ql
Mean Max. Min. St.Dev. Mean
Forecast
Max. Min. St.Dev.
MS 5.182 8.500 3.100 1.434 4.874 8.100 3.100 1.321
A1834 5.215 8.500 3.100 1.550 4.872 8.100 3.100 1.411
A3544 5.094 9.000 2.700 1.570 4.784 8.900 2.700 1.446
A4554 4.995 11.100 2.600 1.564 4.795 11.100 2.600 1.557
A5564 4.909 9.000 2.500 1.455 4.638 7.700 2.500 1.334
A6597 5.342 9.900 2.900 1.634 5.024 9.900 2.900 1.538
ELHS 6.790 12.700 3.200 2.393 6.418 12.700 3.200 2.392
EHSD 5.543 9.100 3.200 1.556 5.240 9.000 3.200 1.462
ESC 4.810 8.100 2.700 1.224 4.561 8.100 2.700 1.131
ECD 4.197 8.400 2.500 1.162 3.999 6.800 2.500 1.030
EGS 3.594 6.400 2.100 0.929 3.492 6.400 2.100 0.907
MALE 4.171 4.100 2.700 0.998 3.970 6.800 2.700 0.898
FEMALE 5.827 5.800 3.300 1.781 5.458 9.400 3.300 1.670
Y14 6.439 11.400 3.200 2.141 6.027 11.400 3.200 2.041
Y24 5.353 9.400 3.000 1.634 5.042 8.200 3.000 1.493
Y34 4.578 7.800 2.600 1.242 4.313 7.600 2.600 1.093
Y44 3.753 7.300 2.200 0.940 3.553 6.000 2 .200 0.818
NC 5.046 9.200 2.800 1.553 4.755 9.200 2.800 1.478
NE 5.160 8.900 2.700 1.535 4.841 8.900 2.700 1.416
S 5.398 9.100 3.100 1.582 5.068 8.000 3.100 1.448
w 4.871 9.200 2.500 1.366 4.604 7.900 2.500 1.242
Appendix 4.27. Disagreement across Household Inflation Forecasts -
Elementary Statistics -  Stable and Volatile Sample Periods
Stable Sample Period 
1990ql -  2006q2
Volatile Sample Period 
2006q3 -2011ql
Mean
° t
Max. Min. St.Dev. Mean
a t
Max. Min. St.Dev.
MS 4.770 8.100 3.100 1.419 4.489 6.000 3.300 0.757
A1834 4.730 8.100 3.100 1.438 4.474 6.300 3.200 0.963
A3544 4.785 8.900 2.700 1.617 4.426 6.100 3.000 0.937
A4554 4.683 11.100 2.600 1.660 4.395 6.100 3.000 0.802
A5564 4.559 7.700 2.500 1.456 4.484 5.600 3.200 0.662
A6597 4.853 9.900 2.900 1.631 4.637 6.100 3.600 0.668
ELHS 6.270 12.700 3.200 2.497 5.347 7.500 3.900 0.892
EHSD 5.182 9.00 3.200 1.621 4.789 5.900 3.700 0.597
ESC 4.495 8.100 2.700 1.238 4.616 6.100 3.000 0.891
ECD 3.862 6.500 2.500 1.022 4.042 5.800 2.800 0.947
EGS 3.432 6.400 2.100 0.979 3.747 5.600 2.300 0.845
MALE 3.778 3.550 6.800 0.879 4.153 5.600 2.800 0.793
FEMALE 5.040 4.800 9.400 1.812 4.758 6.300 3.700 0.743
Y14 6.005 11.400 3.200 2.257 5.095 6.600 4.000 0.636
Y24 4.911 8.200 3.000 1.558 4.532 5.600 3.300 0.712
Y34 4.164 7.600 2.600 1.130 4.289 6.500 2.900 0.933
Y44 3.408 6.000 2.200 0.815 3.837 5.400 2.700 0.853
NC 4.611 9.200 2.800 1.507 4.342 5.900 3.000 0.802
NE 4.753 8.900 2.7800 1.517 4.495 6.500 3.500 0.821
S 4.978 8.000 3.100 1.567 4.605 6.000 3.500 0.718
w 4.521 7.900 2.500 1.341 4.495 5.900 3.100 0.815
Appendix 4.28. Welch F-Test Equality of Cross-Sectional Mean Disagreement
WHOLE 
1982Q3 -2011Q 1
G-B
1987Q 2- 2011Q1
STABLE 
1990Q1 -  2006Q2
VOLATILE 
2006Q3 -  2011Q1
AGE 1.405 0.915 0.342 0.303
EDUCATION 69.376*** 50.271*** 29.655*** 9 7 9 7 ***
GENDER 75.615*** 59.157*** 42.977*** 5.901**
INCOME 65.883*** 55.769*** 36.602*** 9 251***
REGION 2.528* 1.934 1.165 0.367
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.29. ANOVA F-Test on Equality of Mean Disagreement -  Age
Disaggregated Michigan Survey Expectations
A1834 A3544 A4554 A5564 A6597
A3544 W 0.345
G-B 0.184
S 0.042
V 0.024
A4554 w 1.148 0.230
G-B 0.133 0.002
S 0.030 0.127
V 0.075 0 .012
A5564 w 2.384 0.861 0.187
G-B 1.411 0.535 0.565
S 0.462 0.711 0.209
V 0.002 0.048 0.141
A6597 w 0.365 1.376 2.707 4.506**
G-B 0.503 1.236 1.052 3.458*
S 0.210 0.058 0.351 1.193
V 0.369 0.636 1.023 0.501
SPF w 912.559*** 843.459*** 811.318*** 894.075*** 872.678***
G-B 829.966*** 757.665*** 659.591*** 824.957*** 752.232***
S 543.443*** 442.441*** 399.787*** 487.339*** 448.896***
V 250.584*** 256.921*** 338.474*** 506.713*** 542.052***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
Appendix 4.30. ANOVA F-Test on Equality of Mean Disagreement -  
Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Expectations
ELHS EHSD ESC ECD EGS
EHSD W 21.983***
G-B 16.956***
S 8.813***
V 5.131**
ESC w 62.470*** 15.776***
G-B 47.257*** 12.915***
S 26.745*** 7 4 7 2 ***
V 6.397** 0.498
ECD w 109.335*** 55.261*** 15.173***
G-B 82.836*** 46.196*** 12.982***
S 52.555*** 31.304*** 10.273***
V 19.133*** 8.473*** 3.701*
EGS w 178.310*** 132.996*** 71.973*** 18.854***
G-B 125.634*** 99.066*** 52.271*** 13.125***
S 73.890*** 56.362*** 29 972*** 6.104**
V 32.218*** 19.279*** 9.506*** 1.025
SPF w 718.698*** 1044.925*** 1181.301*** 936.741*** 958.496***
G-B 549.383*** 914.920*** 1091.272*** 956.180*** 873.768***
S 341.577*** 527.033*** 649.240*** 664.495*** 545.462***
V 447.974*** 717.523*** 313.767*** 200.109*** 203.848***
*** ** * jncjicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
Appendix 4.31. ANOVA F-Test on Equality of Mean Disagreement -  Gender
Disaggregated Michigan Survey Expectations
M ALE FEM A LE
FEM ALE W 75.615***
G-B 59.157***
S 42.977***
V 5.901**
SPF w 1221 .8 6 8 *** 902.913***
G-B 1217.129*** 774.483***
S 843.244*** 464.022***
V 299.623*** 475.397***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
Appendix 4.32. ANOVA F-Test on Equality of Mean Disagreement -  Income 
Disaggregated Michigan Survey Expectations
Y14 Y24 Y34 Y44
Y24 W 18.707***
G-B 14.577***
S 10.501***
V 6.609**
Y34 w 65.024*** 16.391***
G-B 52.641*** 14.908***
S 35.104*** 9.940***
V 9.664*** 0.809
Y44 w 151.839*** 82.881*** 32.290***
G-B 121.522*** 73.410*** 29.701***
S 77.304*** 48.234*** 19.429***
V 26.535*** 7.427*** 2.436
SPF w 793 137*** 877.077*** 1021.617*** 1048.404***
G-B 653.022*** 804.211*** 1020.991*** 1106.296***
S 379.689*** 504.971*** 650.279*** 763.895***
V 744.659*** 455.486*** 239.405*** 212.830***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.33. ANOVA F-Test on Equality of Mean Disagreement -
Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Expectations
NC NE S W
NE W 0.821
G-B 0.587
S 0.130
V 0.338
S w 2.901* 1.343
G-B 2.190 1.207
S 1.862 0.688
V 1.136 0.195
w w 0.821 2.271 7 309***
G-B 0.589 1.513 5.670**
S 0.130 0.865 3.205*
V 0.338 0.000 0.197
SPF w 841.766*** 907.519*** 950.999*** 990.196***
G-B 716.402*** 811.566*** 864.074*** 932.030***
S 467.294*** 494.377*** 514.213*** 562.107***
V 327.929*** 342.596*** 467.147*** 346.883***
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.34. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation: a ix =  a 0 +  a 1cri t _ 1 +  a 2n t +  a 3 \nt — 7tc_4 | +  a 4G a p t +  e t
a 0 «2 «3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MS 0.357** 0.781*** 0.224*** 0.010 -0.046** 0.834 0.828 2.602
(0.162) (0.046) (0.042) (0.044) (0 .0 2 2 )
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MS 0.394** 0.759*** 0.235*** 0.017 -0.049** 0.784 0.774 2.544
(0.188) (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.025)
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS 0.571
(0.378)
0.646***
(0.108)
0.352***
(0.059)
0.006
(0.126)
-0.127*
(0.065)
0.787 0.773 2.357
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q 1
MS
** * y
0.588*
(0.326)
idicate signi
0.788***
(0.118)
ficance at 1,
0.096**
(0.037)
5 and 10 perc
0.028
(0.052)
ent levels
-0.019
(0.029)
0.687 0.597 2.167
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Appendix 4.35. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation; o ix =  a 0 +  a 1(Tu _ 1 +  a 2n t +  a 3|A7rt l 4- a 4G a p t +  e t
1 <*0 « 1 « 2 « 3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
1 Stat
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.716***
(0.241)
0 .6 8 8 ***
(0.051)
0.257***
(0.073)
0.009
(0.069)
-0.064*
(0.035)
0.699 0.688 2.543
A3544 0.552**
(0.233)
0.670***
(0.067)
0.329***
(0.058)
0.004
(0.070)
-0.080*
(0.041)
0.695 0.684 2.436
A4554 1.076***
(0.280)
0.492***
(0.079)
0.402***
(0.097)
0.072
(0.089)
-0.098**
(0.046)
0.517 0.499 2.506
A5564 1.214***
(0.397)
0.475***
(0 .111)
0.377***
(0.089)
0.053
(0.104)
-0.099**
(0.048)
0.491 0.472 2.275
A6597 1.206***
(0.408)
0.509***
(0.086)
0.391***
(0.090)
0.098
(0.080)
-0.070
(0.056)
0.505 0.486 2.508
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.763**
(0.301)
0.653***
(0.063)
0.276***
(0.092)
0.013
(0.085)
-0.070*
(0.035)
0.635 0.619 2.377
A3544 0.651**
(0.265)
0.674***
(0.085)
0.283***
(0.065)
-0.031
(0.077)
-0.077**
(0.035)
0.657 0.642 2.362
A4554 0.815***
(0.263)
0.514***
(0.085)
0.437***
(0 .121)
0.081
(0.119)
-0 .102**
(0.042)
0.536 0.516 2.556
A5564 1.562***
(0.445)
0.420***
(0.140)
0.346***
(0.096)
-0.049
(0 .121)
-0.114**
(0.052)
0.402 0.376 2.198
A6597 1 239*** 
(0.416)
0.482***
(0.095)
0.396***
(0.107)
0.081
(0.107)
-0.077*
(0.046)
0.457 0.433 2.455
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.865**
(0.403)
0.555***
(0.106)
0 3 9 9 *** 
(0 .101)
-0.034
(0.135)
-0.169**
(0.064)
0.719 0.701 2.137
A3544 0.704
(0.511)
0.619***
(0 .111)
0.383***
(0.056)
-0.116
(0.082)
-0.153
(0.105)
0.734 0.717 2.091
A4554 1.003**
(0.450)
0.362**
(0.171)
0.560***
(0.142)
0.238
(0.396)
-0.279**
(0.132)
0.590 0.563 2.288
A5564 1 821*** 
(0.642)
0.299**
(0.140)
0.481***
(0.077)
-0.192
(0.187)
-0.233**
(0.097)
0.458 0.422 2.055
A6597 1.514
(1.080)
0.386*
(0.199)
0.443***
(0 .101)
0.072
(0.233)
-0.192
(0.174)
0.440 0.403 2.240
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 - 2011Q1
A1834 3 3 3 4 *** 
(0.391)
-0.008
(0.126)
0.079
(0.052)
0.290***
(0.072)
-0.064**
(0.023)
0.408 0.239 2.040
A3544 0.356
(0.452)
0.755***
(0.118)
0.182***
(0.040)
0.082***
(0.027)
-0.032
(0.039)
0.668 0.573 1.896
A4554 1 249*** 
(0.277)
0.577***
(0.141)
0.106
(0.072)
0.062
(0.041)
-0.044
(0.042)
0.596 0.481 2.130
A5564 0.558
(0.509)
0.855***
(0.151)
0.048
(0.073)
0.029
(0.041)
0.006
(0.032)
0.730 0.653 2.328
A6597 0.891
(0 .888 )
0.733**
(0.274)
0.106
(0.080)
-0.014
(0.095)
-0.029
(0.027)
0.573 0.451 2.164
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.36. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation: o i t =  a Q +  a xa ix^x +  ^2n t +  or31An11 +  a^ G a p t +  e t
a 0 « i «2 «3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.034**
(0.418)
0.610***
(0.068)
0.487***
(0.114)
-0.011
(0 .102)
-0.097*
(0.051)
0.571 0.555 2.701
EHSD 0.733***
(0.226)
0.684***
(0.060)
0.289***
(0.061)
0.014
(0.068)
-0.070**
(0.032)
0.717 0.707 2.581
ESC 1.160***
(0.253)
0.581***
(0.071)
0.234***
(0.069)
0.018
(0.055)
-0.073**
(0.033)
0.579 0.564 2.154
ECD 1.116***
(0.266)
0.419***
(0.095)
0.343***
(0.079)
0.117***
(0.043)
-0.091**
(0.044)
0.544 0.527 2.457
EGS 1 3 3 4 *** 
(0.339)
0.307**
(0.124)
0.456***
(0 .112)
0 172*** 
(0.063)
-0.106
(0.046)
0.477 0.458 1.616
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.148**
(0.457)
0.594***
(0.071)
0.470***
(0.144)
-0.059
(0.142)
-0 .101*
(0.053)
0.531 0.510 2.661
EHSD 0.763***
(0.279)
0.663***
(0.070)
0.303***
(0.073)
0.007
(0.095)
-0.076
(0.032)
0.664 0.650 2.502
ESC 1 120*** 
(0.314)
0.575***
(0.085)
0.241***
(0.083)
-0.009
(0.071)
-0.083**
(0.033)
0.568 0.549 1.967
ECD 1.149***
(0.260)
0 4 4 7 *** 
(0.103)
0.291***
(0.089)
0.093*
(0.048)
-0.078**
(0.035)
0.496 0.474 2.483
EGS 1.172***
(0.400)
0.374**
(0.165)
0.418**
(0.175)
0.149**
(0.072)
-0.090*
(0.052)
0.442 0.418 1.560
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 1.529
(0.952)
0.455***
(0.117)
0.640***
(0.087)
-0.212
(0.228)
-0.289
(0.160)
0.508 0.476 2.514
EHSD 1.032
(0.629)
0.536***
(0.134)
0.435***
(0.059)
-0.024
(0.186)
-0 .2 1 0 *
(0.106)
0.702 0.683 2.394
ESC 1.013
(0.689)
0.544***
(0.136)
0.339***
(0.040)
-0.022
(0.116)
-0.127
(0.087)
0.656 0.633 1.831
ECD 1.155***
(0.400)
0.398***
(0.128)
0.376***
(0.059)
0.005
(0.093)
-0 .122*
(0.063)
0.581 0.554 2.310
EGS 1.299
(0.808)
0.272
(0.183)
0.515***
(0.065)
0.054
(0.117)
-0.156
(0.115)
0.544 0.514 2.297
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 - 2011Q1
ELHS 3.066***
(0.967)
0.412**
(0.144)
-0.016
(0.119)
0.014
(0.091)
-0.019
(0.060)
0.256 0.044 2.828
EHSD 3.066***
(0.799)
0.114
(0 .2 2 2 )
0.189**
(0.083)
0.193**
(0.068)
-0.063**
(0.028)
0.517 0.378 2.080
ESC 1.171
(0.821)
0.575**
(0.257)
0.152
(0.107)
0.069
(0.083)
-0.055
(0.045)
0.567 0.444 2.084
ECD 1.184***
(0.381)
0.651***
(0.140)
0.024
(0.078)
0.039
(0.014)
-0.021
(0.060)
0.575 0.454 1.956
EGS 0.750
(0.476)
0.967***
(0.139)
-0.062
(0.066)
0.004
(0.027)
0.031
(0 .02 1 )
0.692 0.605 1.607
? 5 indicate significance at I, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.37. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation: o i t  =  a Q +  a xa i t _ 1 +  a 2n t +  a 3 \Ant \ +  a 4G a p t +  e t
a 0 «2 «3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 1.017***
(0.264)
0.462***
(0.116)
0.310***
(0.069)
0.143***
(0.053)
-0.072**
(0.030)
0.674 0.662 2.338
FEMALE 0.429**
(0.195)
0.786***
(0.043)
0.246***
(0.056)
-0.032
(0.047)
-0.057*
(0.030)
0.803 0.796 2.647
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 1.164***
(0.266)
0.394***
(0.126)
0.334***
(0.082)
0.126*
(0.065)
-0.087**
(0.033)
0.590 0.572 2.282
FEMALE 0.469**
(0.230)
0.768***
(0.053)
0.250***
(0.066)
-0.022
(0.063)
-0.058*
(0.031)
0.756 0.746 2.606
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE 1.519***
(0.372)
0.200
(0.157)
0.435***
(0.080)
0.181
(0 .110)
-0.160***
(0.059)
0.612 0.587 1.951
FEMALE 0.567
(0.447)
0.674***
(0.091)
0.396***
(0.083)
-0.071
(0.185)
-0.152**
(0.072)
0.776 0.762 2.303
Period; Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q 1
MALE -0.022
(0.371)
0.916***
(0.173)
0.144**
(0.054)
0.023
(0.060)
-0.009
(0.026)
0.792 0.732 2.680
FEMALE 1.669**
(0.741)
0.554**
(0.237)
0.062
(0.107)
0.050
(0.079)
-0.037
(0.044)
0.551 0.422 2.003
* * * * * *  indiCate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.38. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation: a i t =  a 0 +  a 1a i t _ 1 +  +  g 3|A7rt | +  a 4G a p t +  e t
«0 «1 «2 «3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.780**
(0.323)
0.689***
(0.064)
q
(0.088)
-0.042
(0.093)
-0.083**
(0.041)
0.674 0.663 2.707
Y24 0.778***
(0.263)
0.628***
(0.071)
0.325***
(0.072)
0.096
(0.079)
-0.059
(0.036)
0.656 0.643 2.637
Y34 0.922***
(0.249)
0.525***
(0.081)
0.343***
(0.074)
0.054
(0.057)
-0.091**
(0.042)
0.649 0.636 2.499
Y44 0.933***
(0.198)
0 474*** 
(0.091)
0.252***
(0.058)
0.139***
(0.049)
-0.068**
(0.030)
0.639 0.625 2.214
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.762**
(0.326)
0.680***
(0.066)
0.360***
(0.105)
-0.013
(0 .120)
-0.079**
(0.039)
0.642 0.626 2.624
Y24 0.807**
(0.312)
0.629***
(0 .101)
0 317*** 
(0 .101)
0.040
(0.104)
-0.064
(0.043)
0.611 0.594 2.529
Y34 1.088***
(0.390)
0.470***
(0.130)
0.348***
(0.103)
0.026
(0.074)
-0.102
(0.064)
0.577 0.558 2.327
Y44 1 .121***
(0.249)
0.404***
(0.105)
0.263***
(0.068)
0.095*
(0.049)
-0.085***
(0.032)
0.547 0.527 2.053
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 1.062*
(0.592)
0.551***
(0.113)
0.535***
(0.105)
-0.102
(0.306)
-0.247**
(0.119)
0.638 0.614 2.467
Y24 0.913*
(0.539)
0.548***
(0.127)
0.404***
(0.077)
0.030
(0.149)
-0.173**
(0.081)
0.665 0.643 2.415
Y34 1.607***
(0.509)
0.254
(0.153)
0.496***
(0.091)
-0.088
(0.132)
-0.215**
(0.087)
0.616 0.591 2.106
Y44 1.346***
(0.337)
0.225*
(0 .120)
0.376***
(0.079)
0.156*
(0.086)
-0.143***
(0.043)
0.560 0.531 1.931
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 2 309*** 
(0.360)
0.440***
(0.075)
0.084**
(0.036)
0.067***
(0 .021)
-0.040
(0.024)
0.463 0.309 2.163
Y24 1.397**
(0.495)
0.517***
(0.156)
0.136
(0.103)
0.127*
(0.064)
-0.038
(0.043)
0.597 0.482 2.254
Y34 1.004*
(0.563)
0.584***
(0.168)
0.151
(0.096)
0.088
(0.080)
-0.050*
(0.028)
0.586 0.467 2 .102
Y44 0.271***
(0.056)
0.856***
(0.156)
0.102
(0.136)
0.013
(0.031)
-0.011
(0.083)
0.720 0.640 2 .120
*** ** * jnciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.39. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement
Testing Equation: a ix =  a 0 +  ct1a U:- 1 +  a 2n t +  a 3
a 0 « 2 « 3 a 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
A n t \ +  a 4G a p t +  e t
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 0.860***
(0.315)
0.596***
(0 .1 0 2 )
0.341***
(0.094)
0 .0 1 1
(0.087)
-0.080**
(0.040)
0.620 0.606 2.530
NE 0.906***
(0.302)
0.564***
(0.093)
0.362***
(0.093)
0.095
(0.068)
-0.077*
(0.045)
0.593 0.578 2.541
S 0.450**
(0.181)
0.727***
(0.045)
0.291***
(0.056)
0.027
(0.056)
0.027
(0.056)
0.775 0.767 2.399
w 1 407*** 
(0.428)
q 47i***
(0.104)
0.322***
(0.083)
0.031
(0.068)
-0.097*
(0.057)
0.483 0.464 2.427
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 0.986***
(0.348)
0.560***
(0.118)
0.344***
(0 .1 1 2 )
-0.024
(0.107)
-0.089**
(0.043)
0.560 0.540 2.463
NE 1.018***
(0.261)
0  4 7 9 *** 
(0.095)
0 441*** 
(0.099)
0.055
(0.088)
-0.104*
(0.053)
0.522 0.501 2.451
S 0.478**
(0 .2 2 2 )
0.718***
(0.053)
0.279***
(0.066)
0.042
(0.068)
-0.059**
(0.025)
0.727 0.715 2.307
w 1.518***
(0.540)
0.458***
(0.145)
0.289***
(0.108)
-0 . 0 2 2
(0 .1 0 1 )
-0 . 1 0 0
(0.063)
0.433 0.409 2.291
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 1.133
(1.039)
0.403
(0.322)
0.496**
(0.209)
0.053
(0.137)
-0.219
(0.175)
0.601 0.574 2.274
NE 1.474**
(0.592)
0.314**
(0.141)
0.585***
(0.083)
-0.084
(0.207)
-0.269**
(0 .1 2 1 )
0.588 0.561 2.057
S 0.656
(0.484)
0.617***
(0.098)
0.402***
(0.039)
-0.013
(0.145)
-0.154*
(0.078)
0.747 0.731 2.159
w 1.646*
(0.887)
0.360*
(0.185)
0 397*** 
(0.078)
-0.043
(0 .1 1 2 )
-0.209*
(0.125)
0.514 0.482 2.273
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 1.167**
(0.449)
0.652***
(0.131)
0.070
(0.043)
0.015
(0 .0 2 1 )
-0.032
(0.040)
0.567 0.444 2.333
NE 0.224
(0.342)
0.848***
(0.093)
0.160**
(0.055)
0.006
(0.017)
-0.023
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.664 0.568 2.141
S 1.990**
(0.817)
0.380
(0.233)
0.135***
(0.035)
0.115**
(0.047)
-0.058
(0.041)
0.550 0.422 2.181
w 1.160
(0.988)
0.626**
(0.223)
0.076
(0.071)
0.087***
(0.017)
-0.028
(0.029)
0.629 0.523 2.058
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.40. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement and Forecast Errors 
Testing Equation:
°i.t =  Yo +  + Y i f r t  ~  Et - h [n t ] ) 2 +  y37rt +  y4 n t -  n t - A\ +  Y sG a p t + e t
Yo Y i Y2 Ys Y4 Y  5 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MS
0.335**
(0.166)
0.775***
(0.044)
0.016*
(0.008)
0.246***
(0.041)
-0.024
(0.042)
-0.044**
(0.018)
0.836 0.828 2.602
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q 2-2011Q 1
MS
0.439**
(0.177)
0.739***
(0.053)
0 .0 2 0 *
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.263***
(0.052)
-0.045
(0.068)
-0.050**
(0.019)
0.786 0.775 2.530
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS 0.617(0.402)
0.662***
(0.082)
0.097**
(0.044)
0.307***
(0.049)
-0.069
(0.054)
-0.117
(0.079)
0.791 0.774 2.321
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MS 0.418(0.372)
0.859***
(0.137)
-0.015
(0.009)
0.045
(0.059)
0.081**
(0.027)
-0.009
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.695 0.577 2.144
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.41. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
<Tj.t = Yo +  YiQj.t-1 +  Y i f r t  -  Et _ h [n t \ ) 2 +  y 3n t +  y ^ \ n t -  n t _4 \ +  y5Gapt + e t
Yo Y i Y i Ys Y  4r Ys R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.696**
(0.292)
0.677***
(0.061)
0.024**
(0 .01 2 )
0.292***
(0.075)
-0.043
(0.079)
-0.062
(0.048)
0.702 0.688 2.539
A3544 0.515
(0.314)
0.655***
(0.068)
0.037***
(0.007)
0.382***
(0.049)
-0.088
(0.062)
-0.077**
(0.035)
0.702 0.688 2.391
A4554 1 041*** 
(0.342)
0.486***
(0.080)
0.020
(0.023)
0.432***
(0.106)
0.026
(0.086)
-0.096
(0.067)
0.519 0.497 2.513
A5564 1.161***
(0.417)
0.473***
(0.108)
0.028
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.407***
(0.086)
-0.007
(0.130)
-0.094**
(0.042)
0.496 0.473 2.277
A6597 1.196***
(0.382)
0.504***
(0.093)
0.014
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.408***
(0.113)
0.067
(0.114)
-0.068*
(0.036)
0.506 0.483 2.502
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.823**
(0.313)
0.625***
(0.073)
0.029*
(0.017)
0  2 17*** 
(0.103)
-0.071
(0.104)
-0.070*
(0.037)
0.640 0.620 2.362
A3544 0.746**
(0.314)
0.634***
(0.080)
0.047***
(0.013)
0.344***
(0.051)
-0.187**
(0.082)
-0.078**
(0.033)
0.670 0.651 2.292
A4554 0.832**
(0.322)
0.495***
(0.080)
0.030
(0.026)
0 4 7 9 *** 
(0.125)
-0.014
(0.173)
-0.101
(0.064)
0.541 0.515 2.556
A5564 1.684***
(0.507)
0 3 7 9 *** 
(0.141)
0.063**
(0.026)
0.406***
(0.082)
-0.254
(0.166)
-0.109***
(0.041)
0.430 0.399 2.170
A6597 1.263***
(0.411)
0.470***
(0.094)
0.019
(0.025)
0.419***
(0 .122)
0.021
(0.169)
-0.076**
(0.038)
0.459 0.429 2.446
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.916**
(0.446)
0.567***
(0.098)
0.108**
(0.042)
0.360***
(0.065)
-0.124
(0.119)
-0.160**
(0.071)
0.724 0.701 2.162
A3544 0.743*
(0.423)
0.625***
(0.088)
0.071
(0.046)
0.358***
(0.051)
-0.181**
(0.081)
-0.146
(0.096)
0.736 0.714 2.044
A4554 1 .0 2 2 *
(0.556)
0.366**
(0.158)
0.096
(0.105)
0.539***
(0 .112)
0.172
(0.328)
-0.277*
(0.142)
0.594 0.560 2.278
A5564 1.838***
(0.656)
0.300*
(0.155)
0.016
(0.060)
0.473***
(0 .101)
-0.204
(0.149
-0.232**
(0.106)
0.458 0.413 2.052
A6597 1.560*
(0.850)
0.395**
(0.155)
0.073*
(0.039)
0.407***
(0.086)
0.023
(0.130)
-0.187
(0.157)
0.442 0.395 2.238
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A 1834| 3.520***
(0.625)
-0.081
(0.266)
0.020
(0.038)
0.133
(0 .21 1 )
0.228
(0.177)
-0.072
(0.043)
0.418 0.195 2.009
A3544f 0.428
(0.937)
0.724**
(0.329)
0.008
(0.040)
0.206
(0.178)
0.052
(0.135)
-0.037
(0.058)
0.669 0.541 1.884
A4554 1 178***
(0.302)
0.616***
(0.094)
-0.011
(0.051)
0.066
(0.057)
0.105
(0.281)
-0.037
(0.043)
0.600 0.446 2.090
A5564 0.615
(0.664)
0.828***
(0.177)
0.007
(0 .01 2 )
0.072
(0.045)
0.003
(0.030)
0.001
(0.024)
0.731 0.629 2.330
A6597f 0.812
(0.921)
0.783**
(0.293)
-0.020
(0.039)
0.036
(0.157)
0.065
(0.183)
-0.019
(0.033)
0.592 0.434 2.144
tD u e  to length o f  volatile period, no lag can be specified for the N ew ey-W est covariance m atrix
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.42. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
°i,t = Yo + Y i^ u - 1
tsCM+ Et - h M ) 2 + Ys^t  + 74 K t - n t - 4l + 7sC ap t + *t
Yo Y i 72 73 74 7s R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 0.848*
(0.458)
0.606***
(0.065)
0.035*
(0 .02 0 )
0.568***
(0.117)
-0.100
(0 .122)
-0.092*
(0.048)
0.575 0.556 2.683
EHSD 0.708***
(0.235)
0.682***
(0.058)
0.011
(0.009)
0.306***
(0.059)
-0.009
(0.071)
-0.068**
(0.031)
0.718 0.705 2.585
ESC 1.142***
(0.255)
0.574***
(0.071)
0.016
(0.014)
0.257***
(0.078)
-0.020
(0.061)
-0.071**
(0.031)
0.582 0.563 2.153
ECD 1.103***
(0.295)
0.398***
(0.105)
0.034***
(0.013)
0.387***
(0.083)
0.044
(0.044)
-0.088***
(0.032)
0.554 0.533 2.442
EGS 1.750***
(0.261)
0.205***
(0.075)
0.024**
(0 .01 1 )
0.281***
(0.069)
0.041
(0.053)
-0.105***
(0.024)
0.383 0.355 2.001
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.0 0 2 *
(0.505)
0.567***
(0.065)
0.063**
(0.027)
0.613***
(0.143)
-0.300
(0 .21 2 )
-0.097**
(0.044)
0.543 0.518 2.621
EHSD 0.802***
(0.274)
0.643***
(0.067)
0.023*
(0.013)
0.337***
(0.061)
-0.067
(0.117)
-0.075**
(0.029)
0.668 0.649 2.488
ESC 1.188***
(0.299)
0.548***
(0 .100)
0.024**
(0 .01 1 )
0.273***
(0.083)
-0.088
(0.079)
-0.083*
(0.043)
0.573 0.550 1.957
ECD 1.259***
(0.330)
0 3 9 9 *** 
(0.119)
0.035**
(0.016)
0.334***
(0.096)
-0.007
(0.066)
-0.080***
(0.024)
0.509 0.481 2.448
EGS 1.380***
(0.248)
0.318***
(0.082)
0.015
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.263***
(0.073)
0.061
(0.059)
-0.095***
(0 .02 0 )
0.395 0.362 1.963
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 1.382
(1.152)
0.457***
(0.126)
0.076
(0.084)
0 .6 6 8 ***
(0.096)
-0.261
(0.196)
-0.297*
(0.171)
0.511 0.471 2.498
EHSD 1.037*
(0.565)
0.537***
(0 .110)
0.007
(0.050)
0.432***
(0.067)
-0.030
(0.137)
-0 .2 1 0 *
(0 .110)
0.702 0.677 2.394
ESC 1.067*
(0.607)
0.556***
(0.109)
0.105*
(0.059)
0.295***
(0.054)
-0.094
(0 .121)
-0.118
(0.090)
0.662 0.634 1.829
ECD 1.126**
(0.481)
0.398**
(0.168)
-0.026
(0.031)
0.386***
(0.084)
0.027
(0.074)
-0 .122*
(0.071)
0.582 0.547 2.317
EGS 1.531***
(0.365)
0.277**
(0.128)
0.230***
(0.069)
0.223**
(0.088)
0.047
(0.123)
-0 147*** 
(0.044)
0.444 0.398 1.829
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHSf 3.082***
(0.918)
0.413**
(0.150)
-0.002
(0.031)
-0.025
(0.114)
0.023
(0 .2 12 )
-0.018
(0.054)
0.256 -0.030 1.819
EHSD 3.140***
(0.460)
0.083
(0.149)
0.007
(0.013)
0.216*
(0.107)
Q
(0.028)
-0.066**
(0.028)
0.519 0.334 2.107
ESC 1.192
(0.755)
0.563**
(0.254)
0.003
(0 .02 2 )
0.163*
(0.083)
0.057
(0 .100)
-0.058*
(0.031)
0.568 0.401 2.080
ECD 1.080**
(0.446)
0.702***
(0.182)
-0.013
(0.016)
-0.013
(0.076)
0.084*
(0.047)
-0.013
(0.060)
0.579 0.417 1.986
EGS 0.549**
(0.197)
0.557***
(0.096)
0.010
(0.025)
0.270***
(0.044)
0.061
(0.151)
-0.065**
(0.026)
0.658 0.526 2.412
f  Due to length o f  volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-W est covariance matrix
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.43. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
_____________0i.t =  Yo +  Y i ^ . t - i  +  Y z f r t  ~  Et - h M ) 2 +  Y3n t +  Y *\n t ~  ” t - 41 +  Y s p W t  +
Yo Y i Y i 73 74 7s R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 1 014*** 
(0.279)
0.452***
(0.126)
0.016
(0 .010)
0.328***
(0.074)
0 .111**
(0.052)
-0.071***
(0.025)
0.678 0.663 2.328
FEMALE 0.363*
(0.214)
0 7 7 9 *** 
(0.039)
0.025***
(0.009)
0.291***
(0.050)
-0.091*
(0.051)
-0.054**
(0.025)
0.805 0.797 2.655
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 1 295*** 
(0.305)
0.345**
(0.143)
0.031*
(0.016)
0.368***
(0.081)
0.036
(0.074)
-0.089***
(0.024)
0.604 0.582 2.243
FEMALE 0.487*
(0.253)
0.746***
(0.050)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.303***
(0.062)
-0.121
(0.089)
-0.057**
(0.027)
0.760 0.747 2.599
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE \ 7 4 9 *** 
(0.320)
0.227**
(0.104)
0.163***
(0.042)
0.306***
(0.048)
0.072
(0.123)
-0.151**
(0.062)
0.648 0.619 1.747
FEMALE 0.557
(0.576)
0.675***
(0 .101)
0.032
(0.066)
0 3 9 7 *** 
(0.035)
-0.102
(0.097)
-0.150
(0.104)
0.776 0.758 2.301
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE -0.106
(0.331)
0.959***
(0.155)
-0.016*
(0.008)
0.101
(0.059)
0.083***
(0 .02 0 )
-0.001
(0.025)
0.800 0.723 2.657
FEMALEf 1.923
( 1.20 2 )
0.459
(0.444)
0.015
(0.051)
0.124
(0.263)
0.000
(0.155)
-0.050
(0.058)
0.557 0.386 2.020
f  Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.44. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
Qj.t =  Yo +  Y i a i . t - i  +  Y i & t  ~  E t - h M ) 2 +  Y i * t  +  Y * \ n t ~  * t - 4 I +  Y s G a P t  +  e t
Yo Y i Yz Y 3 Y 4 Ys R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.979**
(0.416)
0.670***
(0.071)
-0.028
(0 .020 )
0.458***
(0.130)
-0.038
(0.092)
-0.099**
(0.050)
0.677 0.662 2.693
Y24 0.709**
(0.278)
0.621***
(0.068)
0.027**
(0 .011 )
0.370***
(0.069)
0.037
(0.094)
-0.056*
(0.031)
0.660 0.644 2.615
Y34 0.916***
(0.257)
0.519***
(0.087)
0.012
(0 .012 )
0.358***
(0.0800)
0.028
(0.058)
-0.089*
(0.047)
0.650 0.634 2.502
Y44 0.923***
(0 .20 0 )
0.472***
(0.090)
0.010
(0.016)
0.262***
(0.063)
0.117*
(0.062)
-0.067**
(0.029)
0.640 0.623 2.220
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.836**
(0.401)
0.672***
(0.074)
-0.012
(0 .020 )
0.401***
(0.141)
-0.008
(0.117)
-0.086*
(0.048)
0.642 0.623 2.618
Y24 0.852**
(0.327)
0.596***
(0.093)
0.042***
(0.014)
0.383***
(0.075)
-0.098
(0.109)
-0.063*
(0.033)
0.621 0.600 2.471
Y34 1.223**
(0.467)
0.419**
(0.169)
0.036
(0.026)
0.394***
(0.140)
-0.082
(0.143)
-0.104
(0.063)
0.590 0.567 2.288
Y44 1.216***
(0.232)
0.367***
(0 .101)
0.030
(0 .02 1 )
0.288***
(0.066)
0.013
(0.080)
-0.085***
(0.028)
0.560 0.535 2.056
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 1.168*
(0.654)
0.542***
(0.115)
-0.024
(0.034)
0.615***
(0.179)
-0.114
(0.356)
-0.249**
(0.115)
0.639 0.609 2.455
Y24 0.944*
(0.480)
0.554***
(0.104)
0.053
(0.039)
0.383***
(0.093)
-0.020
(0.065)
-0.168*
(0.091)
0.666 0.638 2.385
Y34 1.625**
(0.627)
0.255
(0.192)
0.015
(0.071)
0.487***
(0.137)
-0.099
(0.185)
-0.214**
(0.104)
0.617 0.585 2.109
Y44 1.455***
(0.323)
0.249**
(0 .112)
0.153**
(0.065)
0 297*** 
(0.066)
0.055
(0.083)
-0.135***
(0.043)
0.589 0.555 1.916
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 1.652**
(0.587)
0 4 7 9 *** 
(0.119)
0.049***
(0 .01 2 )
-0.047
(0.066)
0.024
(0.049)
-0.040***
(0.009)
0.599 0.445 2.472
Y24 1.507***
(0.416)
0.409**
(0.155)
0.036
(0 .02 2 )
0.285**
(0.099)
-0.009
(0.078)
-0.060**
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.655 0.522 2.231
Y34 0.599
(0.813)
0.770**
(0.324)
-0.042
(0.050)
0.026
(0.209)
0.227
(0.164)
-0.018
(0.049)
0.624 0.479 2.151
Y44 0.195
(0.383)
0.891**
(0.357)
-0.012
(0.075)
0.074
(0 .212 )
0.057
(0.427)
-0.006
(0.188)
0.724 0.617 2.050
f  Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix 
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.45. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Forecast Errors
Testing Equation:
v u  =  Yo +  Y i ° i . t - i  +  Y z f r t  ~  Et - h [n t ] ) 2 +  y37rt +  y 4 n t -  7tc. 4| +  Y sG a p t +  e t
Yo Y i Y i Y3 Y4 Ys R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 0.822***
(0.313)
0.582***
(0.098)
0.033**
(0.014)
0.389***
(0.094)
-0.062
(0.098)
-0.076**
(0.032)
0.626 0.609 2.531
NE 0.898***
(0.295)
0.563***
(0 .101)
0.004
(0.014)
0.368***
(0.104)
0.087
(0.072)
-0.076*
(0.042)
0.593 0.574 2.539
S 0.415**
(0.189)
0.723***
(0.043)
0.017
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.314***
(0.058)
-0.009
(0.059)
-0.059**
(0.023)
0.777 0.767 2.395
w 1.355***
(0.422)
0.461***
(0.092)
0.041***
(0.015)
0.373***
(0.068)
-0.065
(0.075)
-0.093**
(0.042)
0.494 0.471 2.419
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 1.087***
(0.321)
0.509***
(0.118)
0.053***
(0.017)
0.420***
(0.128)
-0.191
(0.130)
-0.089***
(0.029)
0.575 0.551 2.448
NE 1.055***
(0.267)
0.456***
(0.091)
0.033**
(0.016)
0.487***
(0.094)
-0.046
(0.116)
-0 .101**
(0.044)
0.528 0.502 2.419
S 0.506**
(0.233)
0.705***
(0.051)
0.017
(0.013)
0.301***
(0.063)
-0.012
(0.077)
-0.058*
(0.031)
0.729 0.714 2.290
w 1.633
(2.357)
0.411
(0.632)
0.058*
(0.030)
0.358
(0.348)
-0.204
(0.281)
-0.101
(0.326)
0.459 0.429 2.273
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 1.243
(0.834)
0.413**
(0.180)
0.119*
(0.067)
0.436***
(0.079)
-0.045
(0.092)
-0.211
(0.168)
0.609 0.577 2.275
NE 1.457**
(0.712)
0.328**
(0.157)
0.080
(0.061)
0.567***
(0.067)
-0.140
(0.195)
-0.258*
(0.139)
0.591 0.556 2.040
S 0.728
(0.439)
0.635***
(0.079)
0.132**
(0.050)
q 337***
(0.053)
-0.111
(0.138)
-0.143**
(0.069)
0.753 0.733 2.103
w 1.682*
(0.894)
0.362
(0.195)
0.053
(0.050)
0.379***
0.070)
-0.087
(0.098)
-0.208
(0.135)
0.515 0.475 2.274
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 1.077**
(0.378)
0.697***
(0.105)
-0.009
(0.025)
0.035
(0.066)
0.047
(0.103)
-0.024
(0.040)
0.570 0.404 2.349
N Ef -0.217
(0.498)
1.016***
(0.182)
-0.042
(0.033)
0.034
(0.147)
0.158
(0.131)
-0.003
(0.039)
0.707 0.594 2.135
S 1.930**
(0.854)
0.406*
(0.206)
-0.006
(0.028)
0.113*
(0.053)
0.138
(0.164)
-0.054*
(0.030)
0.552 0.380 2.174
W f 1.348
(1.313)
0.545
(0.395)
0.022
(0.043)
0.145
(0.154)
0.005
(0.169)
-0.043
(0.056)
0.645 0.509 2.001
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.46. Age Disaggregated Disagreement and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Testing Equation: a ix -  y0 +  y xaU - \  + Yi^p.t + Y3B ^ o m t +  Y*n t +  e t
Yo Y i Y  2 Y3 74 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q lt
A1834 0.237
(0.397)
0.713***
(0.044)
0.182
(0.300)
0.510**
(0.250)
0.182**
(0.075)
0.639 0.625 2.542
A3544 0.117
(0.364)
0.711***
(0.059)
0.048
(0.351)
0.589**
(0.275)
0.217***
(0.059)
0.654 0.641 2.417
A4554 0.617
(0.499)
0.561***
(0.075)
0.105
(0.369)
0.566
(0.358)
0.292***
(0.107)
0.478 0.457 2.624
A5564 1.029*
(0.568)
0.483***
(0 .120)
0.259
(0.470)
0.573**
(0.234)
0.213**
(0.083)
0.365 0.340 2.276
A6597 0.822*
(0.458)
0.524***
(0.090)
0.742*
(0.415)
0.360
(0.319)
0.253***
(0.067)
0.452 0.430 2.504
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.222
(0.407)
0.708***
(0.050)
0.166
(0.334)
0.533**
(0.250)
0.180**
(0.084)
0.631 0.615 2.458
A3544 0.094
(0.373)
0.729***
(0.067)
0.076
(0.405)
0.544**
(0.261)
0 .2 0 2 ***
(0.063)
0.653 0.638 2.447
A4554 0.480
(0.454)
0.586***
(0.075)
0.109
(0.414)
0.600*
(0.350)
0.279***
(0.104)
0.509 0.487 2.665
A5564 1.032*
(0.571)
0.496***
(0.133)
0.068
(0.578)
0.575**
(0.231)
0.226*
(0.116)
0.371 0.343 2.266
A6597 1.017**
(0.440)
0.524***
(0.093)
0.415
(0.436)
0.321
(0.317)
0.259***
(0.082)
0.437 0.412 2.501
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 -0.082
(0.335)
0.708***
(0.060)
-0.920
(0.588)
0.806***
(0.288)
0.398***
(0.119)
0.727 0.709 2.225
A3544 -0.141
(0.442)
0.737***
(0.079)
-0.281
(0.584)
0.533*
(0.315)
0.345***
(0.069)
0.724 0.706 2.224
A4554 0.511
(0.805)
0.542***
(0.094)
-0.905*
(0.530)
0.562
(0.537)
0.536***
(0 .120)
0.527 0.496 2.618
A5564 1.502*
(0.867)
0.442***
(0.131)
-2.336***
(0.722)
0.408
(0.354)
0.678***
(0.117)
0.445 0.408 2.169
A6597 1.418**
(0.545)
0 4 9 3 *** 
(0.106)
-1.005
(0.675)
0.202
(0.448)
0.481***
(0 .120)
0.406 0.368 2.411
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 2.352
(1.525)
0.155
(1.016)
1.229
(2.637)
0.443
(4.709)
-0.089
(1.014)
0.339 0.151 1.931
A3544 0.094
(0.434)
0.684***
(0 .101)
0.435
(0.385)
0.612***
(0.151)
0.103***
(0.018)
0.705 0.621 2.149
A4554 1.258**
(0.424)
0.663***
(0.194)
-0.675
(0.501)
0.703**
(0.251)
0.005
(0.045)
0.680 0.588 2.341
A5564 0.659
(0.548)
0.718***
(0.131)
0.321
(0.402)
0.223
(0.203)
0.043
(0.045)
0.742 0.668 2.321
A6597 1.072**
(0.419)
0.704***
(0.177)
-0.625*
(0.321)
0.639*
(0.303)
0.057**
(0 .021 )
0.685 0.595 2.469
f  Sample period adjusted to 1985Q1 -  2011Q1 due to availability of Bloom Uncertainty data.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.47. Education Disaggregated Disagreement and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Testing Equation; a i t =  y 0 +  Y i^ i x - i  +  Y iQ pt  +  Y i B l o o m t +  y47rt +  e t
Yo Y i Y2 Y s 74 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period; Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1 f
ELHS 1.417*
(0.758)
0.628***
(0.062)
-0.016
(0.556)
0.006
(0.470)
0.347***
(0 .111)
0.521 0.502 2.663
EHSD 0.352
(0.378)
0.726***
(0.052)
0.024
(0.363)
0.480*
(0.274)
0 .2 0 1 ***
(0.063)
0.659 0.645 2.590
ESC 0.306
(0.362)
0.628***
(0.065)
0.448
(0.382)
0.672***
(0.226)
0.142***
(0.053)
0.554 0.536 2.154
ECD 0.588*
(0.306)
0.439***
(0 .101)
0.684
(0.461)
0.626***
(0.197)
0.189**
(0.090)
0.458 0.437 2.543
EGS 0.935**
(0.406)
0.386***
(0.083)
0.138
(0.327)
0.743***
(0.228)
0 .122*
(0.067)
0.296 0.267 2.248
Period; Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.452*
(0.774)
0.628***
(0.065)
-0.096
(0.646)
-0.010
(0.480)
0 3 4 4 *** 
(0.126)
0.517 0.496 2.661
EHSD 0.420
(0.395)
0.726***
(0.058)
-0.052
(0.397)
0.451*
(0.269)
0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.070)
0.653 0.638 2.580
ESC 0.241
(0.368)
0.648***
(0.071)
0.283
(0.382)
0.700***
(0.227)
0.151**
(0.061)
0.576 0.558 2.041
ECD 0.449
(0.290)
0.478***
(0.098)
0.831*
(0.473)
0.596***
(0.204)
0.160**
(0.072)
0.500 0.478 2.582
EGS 0.764**
(0.359)
0.430***
(0.081)
0.125
(0.359)
0.754***
(0.215)
0.124*
(0.066)
0.344 0.315 2.209
Period; Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 2.425*
(1.294)
0.551***
(0.065)
-3.295***
(0.959)
-0.397
(0.703)
q 9 11*** 
(0.159)
0.499 0.466 2.654
EHSD 0.245
(0.482)
0.698***
(0.070)
-0.693
(0.601)
0.517
(0.393)
0.407***
(0.086)
0.678 0.657 2.660
ESC 0.096
(0.278)
0.657***
(0.078)
-0.581
(0.445)
0.758***
(0.279)
0.348***
(0.072)
0.672 0.651 1.839
ECD 0.401
(0.255)
0.486***
(0.066)
-0.203
(0.444)
0.646**
(0.306)
0.357***
(0.065)
0.579 0.552 2.514
EGS 1.028**
(0.396)
0.356***
(0.097)
-0.939
(0.568)
0.643**
(0.254)
0.368***
(0.079)
0.340 0.297 2.156
Period; Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 3.328***
(0.763)
0.230
(0.169)
-0.200
(0.881)
0.955
(0.704)
-0.062
(0.058)
0.383 0.207 1.926
EHSD 2 144***
(0.343)
0 .2 1 2 *
(0.114)
1 173***
(0.253)
0.419
(0.319)
0.047
(0.046)
0.487 0.340 2.093
ESC 1.065**
(0.384)
0.690***
(0.145)
-0.587
(0.524)
0.685***
(0.160)
0.042*
(0 .022 )
0.616 0.506 2.384
ECD 1.030**
(0.446)
0.628***
(0.082)
-0.245
(0.275)
0.658**
(0.276)
-0.024
(0.024)
0.632 0.527 2.171
EGS 0.118
(0.474)
0.622***
(0.161)
0.335
(0.518)
0.645
(0.402)
0.128*
(0.070)
0.681 0.590 2.498
t  Sample period adjusted to 1985Q1 -  2011Q1 due to availability o f Bloom Uncertainty data.
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
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Appendix 4.48. Gender Disaggregated Disagreement and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Testing Equation: a i t =  y0 +  Y i^ ix - i  +  Yz^p.t +  Y ^ o o m t +  Y4 n t +  e t
Yo Y i Y2 Y s Y4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q 11
MALE 0.522*
(0.278)
0.524***
(0.095)
0.465*
(0.243)
0.558**
(0.218)
0.167**
(0.068)
0.554 0.536 2.493
FEMALE 0.050
(0.294)
0.809***
(0.038)
-0.120
(0.273)
0.484**
(0.213)
0 J99*** 
(0.060)
0.768 0.759 2.695
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 0.513*
(0.307)
0.523***
(0.104)
0.443
(0.314)
0.557**
(0.214)
0.173**
(0.086)
0.544 0.524 2.487
FEMALE 0.079
(0.310)
0.807***
(0.044)
-0.122
(0.307)
0.486**
(0.217)
0.188***
(0.065)
0.757 0.746 2.668
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE 0.857**
(0.348)
0.380***
(0.132)
-0.357
(0.444)
0.548**
(0.265)
0.386***
(0.125)
0.548 0.518 2.197
FEMALE 0.124
(0.428)
0.777
(0.055)
-1.526**
(0.624)
0.528
(0.326)
0.483***
(0.113)
0.784 0.770 2.435
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 0.018
(0.328)
0.887***
(0.096)
-0.054
(0.229)
0.244
(0.172)
0.117***
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.799 0.742 2.810
FEMALE 1.308*
(0.624)
0.656**
(0.243)
-0.410
(0.730)
0.612
(0.378)
-0.007
(0.046)
0.624 0.516 2.328
t  Sample period adjusted to 1985Q1 -  2011Q1 due to availability o f Bloom Uncertainty data.
*** ** * in(}icate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.49. Income Disaggregated Disagreement and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Testing E quation: a ix = Yo + Y i ° u - i  +  Y2°p.t +  y 3B l o o m t +  y ^ n t +  e t
Yo Y i Y2 Y s 74 R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1 f
Y14 0.272
(0.451)
0.708***
(0.055)
0.009
(0.479)
0.621*
(0.330)
0.300***
(0.089)
0.629 0.614 2.717
Y24 0.708
(0.435)
0.642***
(0.070)
0.328
(0.381)
0.249
(0.259)
0 .2 1 2 ***
(0.068)
0.573 0.556 2.575
Y34 0.385
(0.296)
0.581***
(0.071)
0.262
(0.271)
0.642***
(0.189)
0.203**
(0.085)
0.572 0.555 2.543
Y44 0.424
(0.270)
0.529***
(0.070)
0.413**
(0.205)
0.605***
(0.197)
0.124**
(0.054)
0.531 0.512 2.338
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.477
(0.432)
0.723***
(0.056)
-0.265
(0.486)
0.554*
(0.310)
0.268***
(0 .101)
0.638 0.622 2.676
Y24 0.511
(0.394)
0.671***
(0.070)
0.408
(0.388)
0.260
(0.238)
0.208***
(0.068)
0.601 0.583 2.564
Y34 0.341
(0.315)
0.577***
(0.082)
0.237
(0.28)
0.684***
(0.189)
0 .2 1 1 **
(0.099)
0.558 0.539 2.470
Y44 0.447
(0.292)
0.517***
(0.080)
0.349
(0.273)
0.624***
(0.194)
0.134*
(0.072)
0.515 0.493 2.326
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 0.473
(0.590)
0.673***
(0.062)
-1.385
(0.852)
0.576
(0.494)
0.576***
(0 .110)
0.622 0.597 2.659
Y24 0.514
(0.525)
0.676***
(0.082)
-0.908**
(0.401)
0.355
(0.298)
0 421*** 
(0.067)
0.647 0.624 2.620
Y34 0.649
(0.474)
0 4 7 7 *** 
(0.082)
-0.877*
(0.458)
0.615**
(0.268)
0  4 7 9 *** 
(0.096)
0.572 0.544 2.380
Y44 0.800**
(0.320)
0.354***
(0.091)
-0.794**
(0.392)
0.644***
(0.231)
0  414***
(0.092)
0.542 0.512 2.225
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 2.265***
(0.619)
0.393**
(0.163)
0.133
(0.489)
0.614
(0.490)
-0.001
(0.047)
0.524 0.388 2.205
Y24 1.0 0 2 *
(0.551)
0.500**
(0 .20 2 )
0.721
(0.647)
0.443
(0.380)
0.043
(0.058)
0.607 0.495 2.116
Y34 0.995**
(0.448)
0.708***
(0.085)
-0.843*
(0.396)
0.807**
(0.360)
0.041
(0.072)
0.670 0.575 2.458
Y44 0.301***
(0.065)
0.827***
(0.057)
-0.254
(0.352)
0.392**
(0.175)
0.075***
(0.024)
0.745 0.673 2.296
f  Sample period adjusted to 1985Q1 -  2011Q1 due to availability o f Bloom Uncertainty data. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.50. Regionally Disaggregated Disagreement and Macroeconomic
Uncertainty
Testing Equation: a ix =  Yo +  Y i& u - i  +  Y2 ffp,t +  Y3^ l ° o m t +  y47rt +  e t
7o Y i Y i Y3 Y4 R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1 f
NC 0.438
(0.444)
0.617***
(0.089)
0.562
(0.374)
0.360
(0.367)
0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.073)
0.569 0.552 2.533
NE 0.544
(0.373)
0.566***
(0.075)
0.204
(0.325)
0.633**
(0.242)
0.272***
(0.073)
0.499 0.479 2.596
S 0.202
(0.302)
0.778***
(0.039)
-0.222
(0.340)
0.483**
(0.197)
0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.066)
0.729 0.718 2.447
w 0.843
(0.707)
0.514***
(0 .102)
0.379
(0.514)
0.601
(0.408)
0.190**
(0.075)
0.396 0.372 2.447
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 0.483
(0.461)
0.615***
(0.097)
0.502
(0.404)
0.359
(0.358)
0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.081)
0.547 0.527 2.516
NE 0.595
(0.362)
0.553***
(0.076)
0.136
(0.388)
0.606**
(0.247)
0.291***
(0.088)
0.492 0.469 2.581
S 0.207
(0.305)
0 7 7 4 *** 
(0.042)
-0.166
(0.393)
0.470**
(0.199)
0.192***
(0.071)
0.722 0.710 2.370
w 0.815
(0.707)
0.546***
(0 .121)
0.101
(0.486)
0.655*
(0.348)
0.179*
(0.099)
0.419 0.393 2.370
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 0.366
(0.513)
0.559***
(0.174)
-0.605
(0 .68 8 )
0.665
(0.472)
0.454**
(0.177)
0.569 0.541 2.487
NE 0.759
(0.523)
0.532***
(0.076)
-1.138
(0.741)
0.399
(0.354)
0.588***
(0.099)
0.530 0.499 2.423
S 0.198
(0.239)
0.735***
(0.039)
-1.055***
(0.362)
0.440**
(0.188)
0.437***
(0.052)
0.742 0.726 2.334
w 1.162
(0.732)
0.511***
(0 .120)
-1.639*
(0.910)
0.515
(0.395)
0.498***
(0.137)
0.498 0.466 2.377
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 1.173**
(0.511)
0.584***
(0.148)
-0.187
(0.170)
0.678**
(0.308)
0.012
(0.038)
0.636 0.532 2.630
NE 0.339
(0.281)
q  7 7 9 ***
(0.059)
-0.331
(0.322)
0.634**
(0.295)
0 .112**
(0.042)
0.732 0.655 2.369
S 1.450**
(0.498)
0.561**
(0.192)
-0.013
(0.395)
0.480
(0.311)
0.016
(0.047)
0.542 0.411 2.493
w 0.805
(0.676)
0.613***
(0.116)
0.245
(0.229)
0.591**
(0.237)
0.009
(0.039)
0.680 0.588 2.094
f  Sample period adjusted to 1985Q1 -  2011Q1 due to availability of Bloom Uncertainty data. 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.51. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement and Perceived News
Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
  __________  a i t  =  a Q +  +  a 2N e w s i t  +  a 3n t +  a 4 |A7rt | +  a 5GAPt +  e t
«0 «1 a 2 «3 a 4 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
-0.331 0.808*** 1.141** 0.178*** 0.830 0.826 2.638
MS
(0.266) (0.037) (0.432) (0.037)
0.328
(0.528)
0.781***
(0.049)
0.048
(0.764)
0.223***
(0.048)
0.010
(0.046)
-0.045
(0.030)
0.834 0.826 2.603
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
-0.357 0.794*** 1 259*** 0.177*** 0.779 0.772 2.581
MS
(0.302) (0.048) (0.451) (0.043)
0.276
(0.556)
0.760***
(0.064)
0.195
(0.764)
0.231***
(0.062)
0.014
(0.057)
-0.045
(0.034)
0.784 0.772 2.548
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
-0.417 0 744*** 1.217** 0.286*** 0.774 0.763 2.508
MS
(0.276) (0.060) (0.551) (0.045)
0.981 0.638*** -0.661 0.363*** 0.023 -0.149* 0.788 0.770 2.341
(0.922) (0.114) (1.179) (0.068) (0.145) (0.089)
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
-2 .2 0 2 * 0.236 7.270*** 0.034 0.816 0.779 1.892
MS
(1.173) (0.187) (2.394) (0.029)
-3.249
(2.448)
0.266***
(0.034)
9.154*
(4.765)
-0.044
(0 .2 2 1 )
-0.037
(0.134)
0.049
(0.068)
0.838 0.776 2.267
*** ** * in£jjcate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.52. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
a Lt =  a 0 +  a ^ u - i  +  a 2N e w s ix +  a 3n t +  g 4 |A7rt | +  a s GAPt +  e t
a 0 « 2 « 3 « 4 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.926**(0.383)
0.711***
(0.063)
-0.273
(0.355)
0.232**
(0.089)
-0.005
(0.059)
-0.054
(0.044)
0.701 0.687 2.562
A3544
q 7 1 7 ***
(0.241)
0.685***
(0.074)
-0.223
(0 .212 )
0 3 i i  *** 
(0.068)
-0.007
(0.069)
-0.072*
(0.040)
0.697 0.683 2.461
A4554 1 094*** (0.243)
0 4 9 4 *** 
(0.083)
-0.025
(0.225)
0.400***
(0 .101)
0.070
(0.077)
-0.097*
(0.051)
0.517 0.495 2.508
A5564 1 079*** (0.360)
0.466***
(0 .120)
0.187
(0.291)
0.388***
(0 .101)
0.063
(0.106)
-0.104*
(0.056)
0.492 0.469 2.259
A6597
0.914**
(0.370)
0.495***
(0.096)
0.399
(0.349)
0 411 ***
(0.095)
0.114
(0.079)
-0.079*
(0.043)
0.507 0.485 2.501
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 1.662***(0.526)
0.679***
(0.073)
-0.864*
(0.454)
0.193
(0.134)
-0.066
(0 .110)
-0.043
(0.057)
0.654 0.632 2.383
A3544 1.376***(0.313)
0.679***
(0.084)
-0.655***
(0.150)
0.217***
(0.069)
-0.110
(0.086)
-0.061*
(0.031)
0.672 0.654 2.409
A4554 0.978***(0.291)
0.517***
(0.089)
-0.163
(0.277)
0.421***
(0.126)
0.063
(0.117)
-0.098**
(0.044)
0.538 0.511 2.560
A5564 1.750***(0.473)
0.420***
(0.141)
-0.179
(0.310)
0.331***
(0 .112)
-0.067
(0 .121)
-0 .110**
(0.052)
0.403 0.370 2.208
A6597 1.146**(0.550)
0.480***
(0 .102)
0.099
(0.478)
0.403***
(0.116)
0.088
(0.107)
-0.079*
(0.041)
0.457 0.427 2.456
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 1.669**(0.722)
0.584***
(0.105)
-0.770
(0.497)
0.317**
(0.125)
-0.119
(0.151)
-0.131*
(0.067)
0.729 0.707 2.132
A3544 1.326*(0.726)
0.638***
(0 .101)
-0.576**
(0.264)
0.309***
(0.050)
-0.194*
(0 .100)
-0.125
(0.098)
0.741 0.720 2.108
A4554 0.951(0.638)
0.361**
(0.171)
0.052
(0.478)
0.566***
(0.159)
0.244
(0.397)
-0.282**
(0.132)
0.590 0.556 2.287
A5564 1.833***(0.642)
0.299*
(0.154)
-0.012
(0.484)
0.480***
(0.082)
-0.193
(0.153)
-0.232*
(0.127)
0.458 0.413 2.055
A6597 1.405**(0.698)
0.385**
(0.174)
0.113
(0.840)
0.452***
(0.132)
0.081
(0.207)
-0.196
(0.167)
0.440 0.393 2.243
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834f 6.190***(0.532)
-0.168
(0.160)
-1 9 9 5 *** 
(0.318)
-0.143
(0.099)
0.130
(0 .100)
-0.038
(0.023)
0.709 0.597 2.334
A3544 3.624***(0.436)
0.190**
(0.072)
-1 3 9 3 *** 
(0.185)
0.043
(0.037)
0.028
(0.041)
-0.081***
(0 .01 1 )
0.856 0.801 1.681
A4554 4.755***(0.637)
-0.036
(0.191)
-1.645***
(0.156)
-0.045
(0.029)
-0.082***
(0 .0 2 2 )
-0.126***
(0.032)
0.873 0.824 2.512
A5564 2.816***(0.331)
0.403***
(0.082)
-0.809***
(0.175)
0.002
(0.039)
-0.017
(0.032)
-0.049***
(0.016)
0.805 0.730 2.669
A6597 4.891***(0.989)
0.119
(0.172)
-1 948*** 
(0.413)
-0.018
(0.036)
-0.061
(0.0387)
-0.055***
(0.009)
0.841 0.780 2.576
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.53. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
a Lt = a 0 +  a 1<Jix- 1 +  a 2N e w s ix  +  a 3n t +  a 4 \A n t +  a s GAPt +  e t
a 0 a i (*2 «3 a 4 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS
0.452
(0.858)
0.597***
(0.073)
0.711
(1.006)
0.512***
(0.126)
0.009
(0.097)
-0.114*
(0.068)
0.572 0.553 2.684
EHSD 0.687***(0.213)
0.680***
(0.066)
0.068
(0 .2 0 1 )
0.293***
(0.065)
0.017
(0.067)
-0.072*
(0.036)
0.717 0.704 2.576
ESC 1.250***(0.292)
0.590***
(0.076)
-0.131
(0.297)
0.225***
(0.073)
0.014
(0.055)
-0.068*
(0.035)
0.580 0.561 2.166
ECD 1.153***(0.252)
0.423***
(0.106)
-0.049
(0.192)
0.339***
(0.093)
0.115***
(0.040)
-0.089*
(0.047)
0.544 0.523 2.465
EGS 2.067***(0.285)
0.205**
(0.103)
-0.278*
(0.144)
0.238***
(0.060)
0.080
(0.054)
-0.109***
(0.031)
0.394 0.366 2.018
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.165(1.359)
0.594***
(0.073)
-0.019
(1.452)
0.469***
(0.163)
-0.060
(0.154)
-0.100
(0.068)
0.531 0.504 2.661
EHSD 0.892**(0.383)
0.665***
(0.071)
-0.144
(0.352)
0.295***
(0.080)
-0.003
(0.091)
-0.072**
(0.035)
0.665 0.646 2.506
ESC
2.034***
(0.409)
0.576***
(0.086)
-0.848***
(0.265)
0.163**
(0.081)
-0.088
(0.070)
-0.056**
(0.027)
0.597 0.574 1.973
ECD
1 7 1 7 *** 
(0.321)
0.435***
(0.093)
-0.463**
(0 .2 1 2 )
0.241**
(0.114)
0.043
(0.053)
-0.067**
(0.032)
0.514 0.487 2.499
EGS
2 244*** 
(0.360)
0.278***
(0 .101)
-0.564***
(0.162)
q 172***
(0.059)
-0.002
(0.049)
-0.098***
(0.024)
0.440 0.409 1.998
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 0.289(1.076)
0.428***
(0.142)
1.421
(1.384)
0.710***
0.117)
-0.121
(0.272)
-0.363*
(0.208)
0.513 0.472 2.493
EHSD 0.698(0.680)
0.525***
(0.138)
0.374
(0.552)
0.462***
(0.093)
0.010
(0.209)
-0.230**
(0 .102)
0.703 0.678 2.381
ESC 1.859(1.141)
0.554***
(0.108)
-0.793
(0.522)
0.259***
(0.096)
-0.110
(0.141)
-0.090
(0.058)
0.675 0.648 2.387
ECD 1.683***(0.456)
0.386**
(0.146)
-0.412
(0.277)
0.325***
(0.083)
-0.043
(0.083)
-0.112
(0.076)
0.593 0.559 2.323
EGS
2 311 *** 
(0.589)
0.197
(0.143)
-0.555**
(0.252)
0 .2 2 1 **
(0.083)
0.138
(0.118)
-0.171***
(0.045)
0.426 0.378 1.852
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHSf
9.782***
(1.343)
-0.025
(0.168)
-5.239***
(1.019)
-0.203***
(0.059)
-0.268***
(0.073)
-0.007
(0.033)
0.654 0.521 1.836
EHSD 5.917***(0.174)
-0.270***
(0.041)
-1.558***
(0.048)
0.125***
(0 .022 )
0.140***
(0 .0 22 )
-0.071***
(0.008)
0.762 0.671 2.147
ESC
5.070***
(0.673)
0.047
(0.128)
-2.170***
(0.276)
-0.057
(0.071)
-0.055
(0.054)
-0.091***
(0.015)
0.857 0.802 2.696
ECD
4 4 6 4 ***
(0.553)
0.063
(0.140)
-1.556***
(0.283)
-0.171***
(0.037)
-0.019
(0.059)
-0.071***
(0.014)
0.848 0.789 2.178
EGS
2.504**
(0.932)
0.149
(0.296)
-0.877**
(0.298)
0.142
(0.093)
0.003
(0.081)
-0.128
(0.057)
0.795 0.717 2.646
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 4.54. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
__________  Qjt =  ftp +  A i^ u - i  +  a 2N e w s u  +  a 3 n t +  a 4 |A7rt | +  a s GAPt +  e t
a 0 « 3 « 4 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 1.037***(0.278)
0.465***
(0.116)
-0.028
(0.188)
0.307***
(0.071)
0.142**
(0.056)
-0.072**
(0.028)
0.674 0.659 2.423
FEMALE
0.502***
(0.185)
0.792***
(0.051)
-0.108
(0 .21 0 )
0.238***
(0.066)
-0.037
(0.044)
-0.053
(0.033)
0.803 0.794 2.661
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 1.685***(0.432)
0.389***
(0.145)
-0.442**
(0.205)
0.295***
(0.089)
0.076
(0.058)
-0.080***
(0.030)
0.604 0.582 2.302
FEMALE
0.744**
(0.294)
0.776***
(0.056)
-0.302
(0.259)
0 .2 2 2 ***
(0.080)
-0.048
(0.078)
-0.047
(0.029)
0.758 0.745 2.629
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE
2 .0 0 2 *** 0.197 -0.404 0.394*** 0.141 -0.155*** 0.622 0.591 1.938
(0.544) (0.161) (0.295) (0 .102) (0.155) (0.055)
FEMALE 0.646(0.534)
0.678***
(0.098)
-0.089
(0.462)
0.387***
(0.107)
-0.080
(0.198)
-0.146*
(0.086)
0.776 0.758 2.309
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE
3 3 2 3 *** 
(0.627)
0.213
(0.149)
-1.315***
(0.224)
0.065***
(0.004)
0.010
(0 .02 1 )
-0.084***
(0.013)
0.896 0.857 2.886
FEMALE 4.823***(0 .666 )
0.126
(0.190)
-1.648***
(0 .21 2 )
-0.088
(0.050)
-0.056
(0.087)
-0.061***
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.845 0.786 2.611
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.55. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
Qj.t =  <*0 +  1 +  a 2N e w s Lt +  a 3n t +  g 4 |A7rt | +  a 5GAPt +  e t
a 0 « i «2 «3 a 4 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
0.342
(0.352)
0.664***
(0.067)
0.606
(0.434)
0.406***
(0.091)
-0.023
(0.091)
-0 .100*
(0.053)
0.677 0.662 2.681
Y24 0.585**(0.243)
0.607***
(0.090)
0.286
(0.329)
0.348***
(0.086)
0.112
(0.081)
-0.069
(0.046)
0.657 0.642 2.613
Y34 1.050***(0.238)
0.541***
(0.127)
-0.183
(0.301)
0.327***
(0.103)
0.042
(0.052)
-0.084
(0.069)
0.651 0.635 2.522
Y44 1.058***(0.231)
0.486***
(0.092)
-0.154
(0.137)
0.240***
(0.059)
0.129**
(0.054)
-0.064**
(0.029)
0.643 0.626 2.243
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.533(0.495)
0.672***
(0.066)
0.273
(0.564)
0.380***
(0 .110)
0.001
(0 .121)
-0.087*
(0.048)
0.642 0.622 2.615
Y24 0.892***(0.292)
0.632***
(0.104)
-0.094
(0.312)
0.309***
(0.117)
0.030
(0.089)
-0.061
(0.046)
0.611 0.589 2.529
Y34 1.763***(0.406)
0 471*** 
(0.089)
-0.619**
(0.254)
0 291***
(0.094)
-0.044
(0.069)
-0.086***
(0.032)
0.597 0.575 2.358
Y44 2.108***(0.315)
0.324***
(0.095)
-0.642***
(0.145)
0.205***
(0.058)
0.011
(0.048)
-0.082***
(0.026)
0.606 0.584 2.104
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 -0.009(0.824)
0 4 9 9 *** 
(0.118)
1.331
(0.940)
0.638***
(0.125)
-0.013
(0.312)
-0.325**
(0.136)
0.645 0.615 2.434
Y24 0.941(0.751)
0.550***
(0.123)
-0.032
(0.313)
0.401***
(0.074)
0.026
(0.109)
-0.171
(0.119)
0.665 0.637 2.416
Y34 2.250***(0.726)
0.253
(0.159)
-0.568
(0.350)
0.436***
(0.103)
-0.151
(0.153)
-0.196*
(0 .102)
0.629 0.598 2.121
Y44 2.415***(0.493)
0.142
(0.108)
-0.673***
(0.215)
0.303***
(0.070)
0.065
(0.080)
-0 149*** 
(0.045)
0.615 0.583 1.951
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
7 995***
(1.095)
-0.341*
(0.180)
-2.593***
(0.474)
-0.075*
(0.025)
-0.018
(0.033)
-0.081***
(0.018)
0.785 0.702 2.391
Y24 3.969***(0.630)
0.202
(0.132)
-1 4 9 7 *** 
(0.294)
0.008
(0.041)
0.012
(0.070)
-0.051**
(0.017)
0.841 0.779 2.351
Y34
4.711*** 
(0.215)
-0.026
(0.130)
_1 g44**+
(0.071)
-0.036
(0.064)
-0.029
(0.047)
-0.113***
(0.028)
0.887 0.844 2.579
Y44 2.465***(0.271)
0.372***
(0.084)
-0.962***
(0.281)
0.025
(0.039)
-0.030
(0.054)
-0.067***
(0.015)
0.842 0.781 2.164
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.56. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
a i,t =  <*0 +  a i 0 j . t - i  + a 2 N e w s iit +  a 3n t +  g 4 |A7rt | +  a 5GAPt +  e t
«o « i a 2 «3 a 4 a 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 0.632**(0.318)
0.577***
(0.108)
0.311
(0.276)
0.362***
(0.103)
0.028
(0.084)
-0.087*
(0.048)
0.623 0.606 2.500
NE 0.821**(0.323)
0.556***
(0 .100)
0.116
(0.301)
0.373***
(0.094)
0.101
(0.070)
-0.081
(0.054)
0.593 0.574 2.534
S 0.503**(0.219)
0.733***
(0.053)
-0.079
(0.219)
0.284***
(0.066)
0.023
(0.054)
-0.059**
(0.029)
0.776 0.765 2.408
w
I 4 4 3 ***
(0.383)
0 474*** 
(0.113)
-0.051
(0.230)
0.318***
(0.092)
0.029
(0.068)
-0.095
(0.061)
0.483 0.459 2.433
Period: G reens pan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 1.0 2 0 **(0.436)
0.560***
(0.117)
-0.034
(0.349)
0.341***
(0 .121)
-0.027
(0.097)
-0.088*
(0.045)
0.560 0.535 2.464
NE 1.378***(0.400)
0.480***
(0.093)
-0.330
(0.335)
0.406***
(0.116)
0.022
(0.082)
-0.096*
(0.052)
0.525 0.499 2.453
S 0.795**(0.324)
0.733***
(0.055)
-0.347
(0.238)
0.246***
(0.079)
0.011
(0.075)
-0.047*
(0.025)
0.730 0.715 2.326
w 2.155***(0.558)
0.466***
(0.131)
-0.592**
(0.257)
0.232**
(0.119)
-0.090
(0.108)
-0.082
(0.053)
0.448 0.417 2.325
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 1.020(1.281)
0.401
(0.338)
0.114
(0.397)
0.506**
(0.204)
0.065
(0.104)
-0.222
(0.175)
0.601 0.568 2.274
NE 1.385**(0.607)
0.312**
(0.130)
0.081
(0.582)
0.596***
(0.115)
-0.074
(0.175)
-0.274**
(0.125)
0.589 0.554 2.055
S 0.843(0.543)
0.624***
(0.094)
-0.195
(0.344)
0.381***
(0.068)
-0.033
(0.146)
-0.145*
(0.079)
0.748 0.727 2.172
w 2.176**(1.044)
0.371**
(0.174)
-0.517*
(0.292)
0.349***
(0.082)
-0.098
(0.106)
-0.185
(0.114)
0.522 0.482 2.274
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 5.074(18.928)
-0.098
(3.591)
-1.919
(3.560)
-0.008
(1.039)
-0.044
(1.237)
-0.129
(0.508)
0.870 0.820 2.427
NE 3.676**(1.389)
0.278
(0.253)
-1.416***
(0.413)
-0.001
(0 .100)
-0.061
(0.052)
-0.065**
(0.026)
0.824 0.756 1.847
S 5.063***(1.147)
-0.054
(0.272)
-1.552***
(0.299)
0.000
(0.049)
0.044
(0.048)
-0.076**
(0.030)
0.802 0.726 2.455
w
***
?
3 4 9 2 *** 
(0.892)
*“*,* indicate
0.329*
(0.163)
significanc
-1.168***
(0.170)
s at 1, 5 and !
-0.073
(0.069)
0 percent le
-0.040
(0.058)
vels.
-0.049**
(0 .02 2 )
0.796 0.717 2.912
Appendix 4.57. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement and Perceived News
Intensity regarding Favourable and Unfavourable Business
Conditions
Testing Equation:
Gj.t ~  a o +  a i a i , t - i  +  a 2N e w s F i t +  a 3N e w s U i t +  a 4n t +  cr5 |7rt — n t - 4 \ +  a 6G a p t + e t
a 0 a 2 « 3 a 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
0.077 0.812*** 0.413 0.644*** 0.177*** 0.833 0.827 2.653
MS
(0 .20 0 ) (0.045) (0.430) (0.207) (0.043)
0.378
(0.389)
0.796***
(0.053)
-0.317
(0.624)
0.081
(0.416)
0.209***
(0.050)
0.004
(0.044)
-0.044
(0.029)
0.835 0.826 2.636
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
0.148 0.798*** -0.063 0.652*** 0.158*** 0.784 0.774 2.597
MS
(0.343) (0.047) (0.656) (0.216) (0.052)
1.007
(0.651)
0.769***
(0.056)
-1.559
(1.147)
-0.141
(0.519)
0.193***
(0.057)
-0.025
(0.054)
-0.066*
(0.036)
0.790 0.776 2.598
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
-0.123 0.740*** 0.376 0.837** 0.268*** 0.777 0.763 2.492
MS
(0.412) (0.062) (1.037) (0.375) (0.062)
1.251
(1.041)
0.653***
(0.103)
-1.518
(1.711)
-0.326
(0.703)
0.316***
(0.061)
-0.015
(0.129)
-0.156
(0.096)
0.790 0.769 2.372
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
0.994* 0.086 1.860* 3 294*** -0.042 0.890 0.859 2.142
MS
(0.485) (0 .111) (0.878) (0.588) (0.035)
2.116*
(0.976)
0.102
(0.068)
-0.284
(1.559)
2.293*
(1.115)
-0.039
(0.036)
-0.034
(0.055)
-0.051
(0.033)
0.903 0.855 2.416
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.58. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
Qj.t =  <?o +  +  a 2N e w s F ix +  a 3N e w s U i t + a 4n t +  a 5 \ n t -  7rt_4l +  a 6G a p t +  e t
« 0 « 1 « 2 « 3 a 4 t*5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  20U Q 1
A1834 -0.031(0.332)
0.667***
(0.064)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.014**
(0.006)
0 .2 2 0 **
(0.099)
-0.048
(0.062)
-0.014
(0.039)
0.709 0.693 2.522
A3544 0.524(0.481)
0 .6 8 6 ***
(0.081)
-0.003
(0 .0 10 )
0.002
(0.006)
0.311***
(0.068)
-0.006
(0.066)
-0.074
(0.046)
0.697 0.680 2.460
A4554 1.032(0.925)
0.493***
(0.081)
0.000
(0.014)
0.001
(0.009)
0.400***
(0.095)
0.071
(0.085)
-0.096
(0.067)
0.517 0.490 2.508
A5564 2.337**(0.932)
0.458***
(0 .121)
-0.015
(0 .0 1 1 )
-0.011
(0.007)
0.386***
(0.098)
0.071
(0 .110)
-0.158**
(0.074)
0.501 0.473 2.274
A6597 1.126(0.685)
0.496***
(0.095)
0.008
(0.016)
-0.002
(0.008)
0.409***
(0.094)
0.113
(0.079)
-0.067
(0.060)
0.508 0.480 2.501
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 - 2011Q1
A1834 0.360(0.529)
0 .6 6 6 ***
(0.079)
0.002
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.013**
(0.006)
0.201
(0.148)
-0.064
(0.103)
-0.025
(0.048)
0.653 0.629 2.362
A3544 1.675**(0.679)
0.696***
(0.088)
-0.024**
(0 .0 1 2 )
-0.002
(0.006)
0 .2 2 1 ***
(0.066)
-0.103
(0.080)
-0.098**
(0.039)
0.677 0.655 2.395
A4554 0.386(1.015)
0.511***
(0.091)
0.005
(0.017)
0.005
(0.008)
0.433***
(0.130)
0.075
(0.115)
-0.083
(0.056)
0.538 0.506 2.552
A5564 3.072***(1.144)
0.402***
(0.143)
-0.026*
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.308***
(0 .111)
-0.079
(0.127)
-0.178**
(0.068)
0.421 0.382 2.219
A6597 1.091(0.798)
0.482***
(0.103)
0.004
(0 .02 1 )
0.001
(0.008)
0.404***
(0.118)
0.090
(0.107)
-0.070
(0.060)
0.457 0.421 2.456
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.660(0.764)
0.576***
(0.109)
-0.002
(0.016)
0.010
(0.007)
0.324**
(0.132)
-0.125
(0.150)
-0.117
(0.075)
0.790 0.702 2.121
A3544 2.277*(1.143)
0.649***
(0.117)
-0.032**
(0.015)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.314***
(0.069)
-0.163*
(0.087)
-0.215*
(0.113)
0.750 0.724 2.035
A4554 0.135(1.361)
0.351**
(0.173)
0.013
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.006
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.593***
(0.168)
0.257
(0.402)
-0.236
(0.162)
0.593 0.551 2.270
A5564 3.836***(0.956)
0.286***
(0.098)
-0.032**
(0.015)
-0.016**
(0.008)
0 441*** 
(0.104)
-0.170
(0.135)
-0.352***
(0.117)
0.488 0.435 2.064
A6597 1.041(0.629)
0.392*
(0.225)
0.012
(0.045)
0.004
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.458**
(0 .21 2 )
0.081
(0.307)
-0.161*
(0.094)
0.441 0.384 2.243
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 4.383***(0.558)
-0.166
(0.558)
-0.024*
(0.013)
0.018***
(0.006)
-0.148
(0.085)
0.127
(0.080)
-0.044
(0.031)
0.710 0.564 2.267
A3544 2.798(3.732)
0.229
(0.506)
-0.025
(0.070)
0.007
(0.049)
0.054
(0.094)
0.033
(0.224)
-0.100
(0.142)
0.860 0.790 1.776
A4554 1.433(0.864)
-0.051
(0.245)
0.013
(0.013)
0.029***
(0.007)
-0.051
(0.051)
-0.066
(0.056)
-0.071*
(0.039)
0.891 0.837 2.591
A5564 1.018(1.077)
0.233
(0.316)
0.011
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.024
(0 .02 1 )
-0.029
(0.018)
-0.055***
(0.016)
-0.024
(0.027)
0.821 0.732 2.428
A6597
0.722
(1.684)
0.154
(0.213)
0.024
(0.027)
0.042***
(0 .01 2 )
-0.042
(0.037)
-0.066
(0.066)
0.050
(0.069)
0.877 0.816 2.489
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.59. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
gt,t ~  a o +  a \ a i . t - i  +  a 2N e w s F Lt +  a 3N e w s U i t  +  a 4n t +  a 5 \n t — n t _4 \ +  a 6G a p t +  e t
a 0 a 2 « 3 a 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS
1.145*
(0.655)
0.597***
(0.076)
0.008
(0 .02 1 )
-0.007
(0.018)
0.511***
(0.127)
0.008
(0.106)
-0.113
(0.076)
0.572 0.549 2.684
EHSD
0.485
(0.313)
0.661***
(0.068)
0.008
(0.006)
0.005
(0.005)
0.289***
(0.067)
-0.003
(0.068)
-0.054
(0.037)
0.718 0.703 2.565
ESC
0.300
(0.399)
0.538***
(0.087)
0.017*
(0.009)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.189**
(0.073)
-0.037
(0.054)
-0.021
(0.035)
0.594 0.571 2.160
ECD
0.346
(0.341)
0.393***
(0.113)
0.011
(0.008)
0.009*
(0.005)
0 3 ]7*** 
(0 .100)
0.098**
(0.042)
-0.048
(0.042)
0.553 0.528 2.380
EGS
0.552
(0.452)
0.167
(0.103)
0 .0 1 1 **
(0.004)
0.014***
(0.004)
0 .2 1 0 ***
(0.057)
0.059
(0.055)
-0.060*
(0.036)
0.421 0.389 2.076
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS
1.355**
(0.763)
0.595***
(0.074)
-0.009
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.018)
0.473***
(0.163)
-0.060
(0.155)
-0.113
(0.071)
0.531 0.499 2.662
EHSD
0.432
(0.613)
0.650***
(0.074)
0.009
(0.019)
0.006
(0.007)
0.300***
(0.083)
-0.007
(0.093)
-0.057
(0.042)
0.665 0.643 2.493
ESC
1.593***
(0.530)
0.588***
(0.087)
-0.018*
(0.009)
0.004
(0.006)
0.166**
(0.080)
-0.088
(0.071)
-0.074**
(0.034)
0.599 0.572 1.968
ECD
0.583
(0.530)
0.433***
(0.094)
0.006
(0 .0 1 1 )
0 .0 1 0 *
(0.005)
0.231**
(0.108)
0.043
(0.065)
-0.035
(0.038)
0.519 0.487 2.418
EGS
0.637
(0.606)
0.251**
(0 .102)
0.007
(0.007)
0.014***
(0.004)
0.158***
(0.057)
-0.004
(0.052)
-0.058*
(0.033)
0.458 0.421 1.991
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS
1.541
(1.342)
0.428***
(0 .112)
0.021
(0.043)
-0.012
(0.024)
0.710***
(0.182)
-0.119
(0.438)
-0.352**
(0.157)
0.513 0.463 2.495
EHSD
0.731
(0.906)
0.511***
(0.126)
0.015
(0.024)
0.000
(0 .01 0 )
0.473***
(0.108)
-0.002
(0.246)
-0.209*
(0.106)
0.704 0.674 2.367
ESC
1.243
(1.245)
0.557***
(0 .111)
-0.012
(0.017)
0.006
(0.005)
0.260**
(0.099)
-0.107
(0.145)
-0.102
(0.099)
0.675 0.642 0.741
ECD
0.269
(0.474)
0.378**
(0.168)
0.011
(0.014)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.308***
(0.081)
-0.067
(0.087)
-0.037
(0.028)
0.605 0.565 2.237
EGS
0.958
(0.867)
0.187
(0.141)
0.003
(0.009)
0 .0 1 2 **
(0.005)
0.218***
(0.081)
0.125
(0 .120)
-0.124**
(0.061)
0.434 0.376 1.863
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS
4.115***
(0.700)
-0.056
(0.178)
-0.029
(0.024)
0.062***
(0.016)
-0.232**
(0.103)
-0.271***
(0.085)
0.026
(0.055)
0.669 0.504 1.804
EHSD
4 3 7 2 *** 
(0.626)
-0.269***
(0.083)
-0.016
(0 .02 0 )
0.015
(0.009)
0.125***
(0.024)
0.140***
(0.018)
-0.072***
(0.016)
0.762 0.643 2.150
ESC
3.592**
(1.375)
0.081
(0 .2 1 0 )
-0.037
(0.037)
0.014
(0.018)
-0.051
(0.028)
-0.051
(0.087)
-0.116**
(0.053)
0.860 0.790 2.719
ECD
1.862
(1.436)
0.010
(0.192)
0.001
(0.017)
0.025*
(0.013)
-0.189**
(0.066)
-0.026
(0.094)
-0.042
(0.047)
0.854 0.781 1.931
EGS
-1.315
(1.414)
0.128
(0.282)
0.024*
(0.013)
0.032***
(0.009)
0.041
(0 .111)
-0.060
(0.097)
-0.048
(0.070)
0.847 0.770 2.537
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.60. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
a i.t =  a o +  +  a 2 N e w s F iit + a 3N e w s U ix +  a ^ n t  +  a 5 |7r t — n t - 4 \ +  a 6G a p t +  e t
a  o a  i a 2 «3 a 4 «5 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
M ALE 0.811*(0.423)
0.460***
(0.117)
0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.004)
0.303***
(0.074)
0.136**
(0.056)
-0.061*
(0.035)
0.675 0.657 2.339
FEM A LE 0.198(0.434)
0.790
(0.053)
0.003
(0 .01 0 )
0.003
(0.005)
0.237***
(0.068)
-0.043
(0.051)
-0.042
(0.036)
0.803 0.792 2.657
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
M ALE
1 7 4 4 *** 
(0.572)
0.388***
(0.116)
-0.012
(0.008)
0.000
(0.004)
0.297***
(0.077)
0.073
(0.061)
-0.103***
(0.038)
0.608 0.581 2.308
FEM A LE 0.393(0.872)
0.776***
(0.061)
-0.002
(0 .02 1 )
0.003
(0.007)
0.223**
(0.089)
-0.048
(0.084)
-0.045
(0.046)
0.758 0.742 2.627
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
M ALE 1.915**(0.880)
0.200
(0.160)
-0.009
(0.013)
0.001
(0.006)
0.392***
(0.099)
0.144
(0.154)
-0.176**
(0.083)
0.624 0.586 1.952
FEM A LE 0.185(1.062)
0.678***
(0 .100)
0.007
(0.027)
0.004
(0.008)
0.396***
(0.117)
-0.083
(0.205)
-0.125
(0.094)
0.777 0.754 2.302
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
M ALE 0.758 0.146 0.006
0.027*** 0.051 0.008 -0.053* 0.905 0.858 2.587
( 1.00 2 ) (0.176) (0 .01 1 ) (0.007) (0.027) (0.036) (0.027)
FEM A LE 2.687**(1.119)
0.112
(0.198)
-0.005
(0.024)
0 .0 2 2 *
(0 .0 12 )
-0.093
(0.053)
-0.058
(0.088)
-0.038
(0.049)
0.848 0.772 2.585
♦**,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.61. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
a i,t -  ftp +  a i a i x - i  +  Q^NewsFit +  a 3N e w s U u  +  a 4n t +  a 5 \n t — n t _4 \ +  a 6G a p t +  e t
a 0 « i a 2 « 3 a 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -2011Q 1
Y14 1.386*(0.803)
0.667***
(0.066)
-0.006
(0 .02 0 )
-0.012
(0 .010 )
0.412***
(0.092)
-0.008
(0.099)
-0.125*
(0.067)
0.678 0.660 2.670
Y24 0.635(0.561)
0.602***
(0.091)
0.008
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.000
(0.007)
0.344***
(0.088)
0 .100
(0.090)
-0.054
(0.052)
0.658 0.639 2.604
Y34 0.756(0.522)
0.540***
(0.117)
0.000
(0.008)
0.003
(0.006)
0.328***
(0.099)
0.039
(0.053)
-0.079
(0.074)
0.651 0.631 2.520
Y44 0.298(0.429)
0.462***
(0.095)
0.006
(0.005)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.236***
(0.060)
0.128**
(0.055)
-0.036
(0.036)
0.649 0.629 2.225
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 2.173*(1.273)
0.671***
(0.059)
-0.038
(0.040)
-0.017
(0.013)
0.369***
(0.097)
0.001
(0.118)
-0.152**
(0.072)
0.648 0.625 2.590
Y24 0.859(0.625)
0.632***
(0.109)
-0.002
(0.019)
0.000
(0.006)
0.309**
(0 .122)
0.031
(0.090)
-0.064
(0.044)
0.611 0.585 2.530
Y34 1.695**(0.662)
0.462***
(0.086)
-0.015
(0 .01 1 )
0 .002
(0.005)
0.285***
(0.092)
-0.049
(0.069)
-0 .110***
(0.039)
0.600 0.573 2.385
Y44 1.063*(0.615)
0.318***
(0.098)
-0.001
(0.008)
0 .0 1 0 **
(0.004)
0.206***
(0.059)
0.017
(0.051)
-0.065*
(0.037)
0.609 0.582 2.081
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 2.855(1.849)
0.507***
(0.113)
-0.031
(0.055)
-0.029
(0.019)
0.589***
(0.131)
-0.019
(0.303)
-0.396**
(0.173)
0.651 0.616 2.389
Y24 0.870(0.560)
0.549***
(0.131)
0.001
(0.014)
0.001
(0.005)
0.402***
(0.082)
0.024
(0 .101)
-0.169*
(0 .101)
0.665 0.631 2.415
Y34 1.683**(0.715)
0.253
(0.167)
-0.006
(0.016)
0.006
(0.005)
0.436***
(0.135)
-0.151
(0.162)
-0.196**
(0.075)
0.628 0.591 2.121
Y44 1.367(0.935)
0.132
(0.104)
-0.002
(0 .0 1 1 )
0 .0 1 0 *
(0.006)
0.305***
(0.072)
0.065
(0.084)
-0.126*
(0.072)
0.617 0.578 1.927
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 5.403***(1.637)
-0.341
(0.216)
-0.026
(0.033)
0.026**
(0 .01 1 )
-0.075**
(0.026)
-0.018
(0.033)
-0.081
(0.061)
0.785 0.677 2.391
Y24 1.870***(0.359)
0.194**
(0.070)
-0.001
(0.008)
0 .0 2 1 ***
(0.004)
0.000
(0.032)
0.009
(0.045)
-0.018
(0.024)
0.844 0.767 2.325
Y34
4 024*** 
(0.860)
0.042***
(0.004)
-0.038***
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.007
(0.007)
-0.035***
(0 .0 1 0 )
-0.035***
(0.004)
-0.145***
(0 .02 0 )
0.893 0.840 2.712
Y44
-0.444
(0.437)
0.254***
(0.039)
0.016***
(0.004)
0.027***
(0.004)
0.006
(0.015)
-0.024
(0 .02 2 )
-0.014
(0.008)
0.876 0.814 2.087
*** ** * jnciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.62. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Business Conditions
Testing Equation:
Gi.t =  a o +  +  cc2N e w s F Lt +  a 3N e w s U Lt +  a An t +  a 5 |7rt -  7rt_4l +  a 6G a p t +  gt^1,1
« 0 a 2
' ww 1,1 ' '''’5* ’
« 3 a  4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 DW.
Sfat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 1.226**(0.547)
0.579***
(0 .110)
-0.002
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.006)
0.371***
(0.107)
0.042
(0.085)
-0.102
(0.062)
0.624 0.603 2.494
NE 1.070(0.747)
0.558***
(0 .101)
-0.001
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.007)
0.374***
(0.094)
0.102
(0.072)
-0.087
(0.064)
0.593 0.571 2.531
S 0.409(0.501)
0.733***
(0.054)
-0.001
(0 .01 1 )
0.001
(0.006)
0.284***
(0.065)
0.023
(0.056)
-0.058
(0.036)
0.776 0.763 2.408
w 0.968(0.742)
0.468***
(0 .112)
0.007
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.005
(0.007)
0.313***
(0.094)
0.014
(0.073)
-0.072
(0.070)
0.485 0.456 2.434
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC
2.273***
(0.829)
0.544***
(0 .120)
-0.026*
(0.014)
-0 .0 1 1 *
(0.006)
0.352***
(0.117)
-0.022
(0.117)
-0.149
(0.062)
0.571 0.542 2.425
NE 1.684(1.198)
0.483***
(0.092)
-0.015
(0 .0 2 2 )
-0.002
(0.009)
0.396***
(0.116)
0.015
(0.079)
-0.123*
(0.065)
0.527 0.496 2.442
S 0.709(0.675)
0.733***
(0.054)
-0.009
(0.014)
0.001
(0.006)
0.245***
(0.079)
0.009
(0.075)
-0.059
(0.037)
0.730 0.712 2.340
w 1.993(1.274)
0.466***
(0.135)
-0.013
(0.017)
0.002
(0 .01 0 )
0.228*
(0.116)
-0.092
(0.099)
-0.102
(0.082)
0.449 0.412 2.321
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC
2.982***
(0.914)
0.378*
(0.219)
-0.035**
(0.015)
-0.017***
(0.006)
0.500***
(0.141)
0.094
(0.080)
-0.338**
(0.143)
0.626 0.588 2.194
NE 2.108( 1.86 6 )
0.319**
(0.143)
-0.010
(0.032)
-0.006
(0.013)
0.575***
(0.151)
-0.065
(0 .220 )
-0.313*
(0.171)
0.590 0.548 2.045
S
0.922
(0.585)
0.622***
(0.086)
-0.007
(0.017)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.381***
(0.064)
-0.031
(0.159)
-0.163**
(0.066)
0.748 0.722 2.180
w 1.625(1.567)
0.371**
(0.175)
-0.005
(0.017)
0.005
(0.008)
0 3 4 9 *** 
(0.068)
-0.099
(0 .100)
-0.183
(0.150)
0.522 0.473 2.274
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 2.813***(0.728)
-0.109
(0.179)
-0.012
(0.008)
0.023***
(0.004)
-0.011
(0.068)
-0.044
(0.073)
-0.117***
(0 .02 0 )
0.872 0.807 2.367
NE 2.833*(1.488)
0.283
(0.246)
-0.024
(0.017)
0.008
(0.007)
0.017
(0.077)
-0.048
(0.046)
-0.084
(0.034)
0.826 0.739 1.885
S
2.659***
(0.457)
-0.118
(0.189)
0.003
(0.016)
0.026**
(0 .01 1 )
0.001
(0.034)
0.047**
(0.017)
-0.044
(0.030)
0.813 0.719 2.269
w 0.629(1.514)
0.171
(0.286)
0.025
(0.033)
0.033
(0 .02 0 )
-0.107
(0.090)
-0.033
(0.076)
0.032
(0.071)
0.827 0.741 2.703
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.63. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement and Perceived News
Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
aLt =  a 0 +  giOiit- i  +  a 2N ew sPu  +  a 3n t + a 4\Ant +  a 5GAPt +  e t
«0 «1 «2 «3 a 4 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.494** 0.691*** -1.105 q 343*** -0.097** -0.056*** 0.841 0.834 2.449
MS
(0.240) (0.079) (1.067) (0.074) (0.040) (0.018)
(2 ) 0.364*
(0.217)
0.904***
(0.038)
2.006***
(0.694)
0 .022
(0.030)
-0.007
(0.013)
0.816 0.809 2.613
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.498* 0.593*** -2.116 0.502*** -0 179*** -0.085*** 0.801 0.790 2.312
MS
(0.285) (0.115) (1.371) (0.116) (0.056) (0.025)
(2) 0.404
(0.252)
0.892***
(0.048)
2 137*** 
(0.749)
0.022
(0.034)
-0.006
(0 .01 2 )
0.763 0.753 2.565
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
( 1) 0.637 0.530*** -2.153 0.549*** -0.188* -0.123** 0.798 0.782 2 .210
MS
(0.451) (0.147) (1.862) (0.128) (0.095) (0.058)
(2 ) 0.595
(0.433)
0.828***
(0.091)
4.035***
( 1.120)
0.010
(0.107)
-0.084
(0.053)
0.755 0.739 2.414
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) t 1.213 0.471* 4.559 0.072 -0.063 0.097 0.768 0.679 1.779
MS
(0.884) (0.246) (3.475) (0 .2 1 1 ) (0.083) (0.061)
(2 ) 1.315***
(0.316)
0.481***
(0 .121)
5.197***
(1.230)
-0.036
(0.028)
-0.089***
(0.030)
0.766 0.700 1.738
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
435
Appendix 4.64. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
a ix  =  a 0 +  a xa ix- x +  a 2N e w s P u  + a 3n t +  a 4 |A7rt | +  a s GAPt +  e t
a 0 « i «2 «3 a 4 <*6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.822***(0.246)
0.574***
(0.068)
-1.194
(1.364)
0.426***
(0.081)
-0.160***
(0.041)
-0.073***
(0.024)
0.715 0.703 2.377
A3544
0 7 4 9 *** 
(0.088)
0.526***
(0.088)
-2.975**
(1.190)
0.542***
(0.071)
-0 174*** 
(0.044)
-0.093***
(0.027)
0.720 0.707 2.299
A4554
1 401*** 
(0.327)
0.293**
(0.125)
-3.770**
(1.845)
0.696***
(0.168)
-0.247***
(0.093)
-0.127***
(0.032)
0.569 0.549 2.268
A5564 1.468***(0.375)
0.318***
(0 .112)
-2 971*** 
( 1.101)
0.596***
(0.088)
-0.207***
(0.057)
-0 .120***
(0.028)
0.534 0.512 2.146
A6597 1.427***(0.428)
0  3 7 4 *** 
(0 .112)
-5.548**
(2.676)
0.642***
(0.154)
-0 .2 2 1 ***
(0.078)
-0.093***
(0.030)
0.545 0.524 2.325
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.727***(0.254)
0.487***
(0.078)
-2.301
(1.475)
0.588***
(0.096)
-0.235***
(0.053)
-0.105***
(0.028)
0.666 0.648 2.214
A3544 0.578*(0.334)
0.521***
(0.135)
-2.397*
(1.242)
0.579***
(0 .111)
-0 219*** 
(0.055)
-0.104***
(0.033)
0.684 0.666 2.217
A4554 0 .8 8 8 ***(0.254)
0.154
(0.183)
-5.704**
(2.534)
1.107***
(0.311)
-0.468***
(0.170)
-0 192*** 
(0.048)
0.637 0.616 2.217
A5564 1.467***(0.445)
0.252*
(0.146)
-3.129**
(1.213)
0.674***
(0.118)
-0.258***
(0.062)
-0.138***
(0.029)
0.458 0.428 2.050
A6597 1.217***(0.406)
0.316**
(0.139)
-6.560**
(3.051)
0.785***
(0 .220 )
-0.280***
(0.105)
-0.125***
(0.039)
0.509 0.481 2.233
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.800**(0.358)
0.464***
(0.105)
-1.909
(1.701)
0.581***
(0.125)
-0 191*** 
(0.071)
-0.154**
(0.060)
0.732 0.709 2.046
A3544 0.590(0.450)
0.544***
(0.076)
-3.408**
(1.597)
0.565***
(0.059)
-0.112
(0 .120)
-0.138*
(0.080)
0.743 0.721 2.064
A4554 1.144**(0.488)
0.100
(0.271)
-3.685
(3.521)
1.056**
(0.418)
-0.595*
(0.352)
-0.255***
(0.085)
0.654 0.626 2.013
A5564 1.603***(0.550)
0.238*
(0.134)
-3.009
(2.027)
0.648***
(0.156)
-0.154
(0.182)
-0.198**
(0.086)
0.466 0.422 2.000
A6597 1.345*(0.804)
0.260**
(0.115)
-4.038
(3.140)
0.776***
(0.118)
_0 4 4 4 *** 
(0.131)
-0.133
(0.119)
0.492 0.450 2.067
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834
3 279*** 
(0.486)
-0.084
(0.139)
12.293***
(2.682)
-0.224**
(0 .102)
-0.076**
(0.027)
-0.157***
(0.032)
0.670 0.544 1.768
A3544f 0.692(0.837)
0.478*
(0.232)
4.919
(4.055)
0.171
(0.288)
-0.099
(0.113)
-0.129
(0.082)
0.730 0.627 1.660
A4554f 1.332**(0.534)
0.364
(0.268)
2.934
(1.928)
0.176
(0.277)
-0.104
(0.113)
-0.124
(0.085)
0.692 0.573 1.917
A5564f 1.228(0.703)
0.601***
(0.198)
4.408
(2.572)
-0.074
(0.174)
-0.009
(0.063)
-0.050
(0.048)
0.797 0.719 2.084
A6597f 0.983(0.929)
0.517***
(0.162)
0.582
(3.712)
0.323
(0.226)
-0.123
(0.095)
-0.085**
(0.034)
0.635 0.494 2.094
Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.65. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
a Lt = a 0 +  a xOix- 1 +  a 2N e w s Lt +  a 3n t + a 4 \ k n t \ +  a s GAPt +  e t
a 0 « i a 2 «3 « 4 a 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
EL H S 1.403**(0.546)
0 4 4 3 *** 
(0.085)
-12.407***
(4.203)
0.863***
(0.130)
-0.260***
(0.077)
-0.116***
(0.039)
0.609 0.591 2.535
EHSD 1.003***(0.318)
0.535***
(0.092)
-4.319**
(2.009)
0.511***
(0.096)
-0.167***
(0.050)
-0.092***
(0.024)
0.739 0.727 2.358
ESC 1.253***(0.271)
0.506***
(-0.339)
-0.339
(1.236)
0.325***
(0.075)
-0 .110***
(0.036)
-0.081***
(0.026)
0.594 0.575 2.055
ECD
1 3 5 9 *** 
(0.232)
q 231***
(0.084)
-1.586
(1.004)
0.570***
(0.077)
-0.242***
(0.045)
-0.124***
(0.025)
0.608 0.590 2.259
EG S 1 897*** (0.334)
0.128
(0.119)
-0.050
(1.072)
0.335***
(0.083)
-0.125**
(0.050)
-0 129*** 
(0.030)
0.398 0.370 1.906
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELH S -1.041*(0.565)
0.360***
(0.096)
-15.671***
(4.728)
1 174*** 
(0.254)
-0.423***
(0.127)
-0.164***
(0.047)
0.589 0.566 2.417
EHSD 0.844**(0.350)
q  4 7 i * * *
(0.117)
-5.451**
(2.173)
0.670***
(0.133)
-0.245***
(0.064)
-0.123***
(0.026)
0.703 0.686 2.243
ESC 1 043*** (0.300)
0.500***
(0.089)
-0.184
(1.084)
0.377***
(0.088)
-0.136***
(0.037)
-0.096***
(0.027)
0.587 0.564 1.897
ECD 1.289***(0.258)
0.198*
(0.115)
-1.792
(1.197)
0.626***
(0 .112)
-0.283***
(0.078)
-0.134***
(0.030)
0.571 0.547 2.191
EGS 1.408***(0.325)
0.253**
(0.105)
0.247
(1.024)
0  3 4 4 *** 
(0.114)
-0.141*
(0.073)
-0 .121***
(0.042)
0.414 0.381 1.920
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 1.441(0.976)
0.293***
(0.095)
-16.527***
(5.122)
1.146***
(0 .102)
-0.374**
(0.153)
-0.255*
(0.136)
0.547 0.509 2.341
EHSD 0.993*(0.574)
0.427***
(0.144)
-5.405
(3.601)
0 .6 8 8 ***
(0.137)
-0.252**
(0.119)
-0.189**
(0.078)
0.725 0.702 2.229
ESC 0.916**(0.357)
0.543***
(0.103)
0.467
(1.386)
0.362***
(0.114)
-0.073
(0.078)
-0.116**
(0.052)
0.658 0.629 1.809
ECD 1.266***(0.407)
0.167*
(0.096)
-2 .6 6 8 **
(1.074)
0.687***
(0.053)
-0.307**
(0.115)
-0.099*
(0.052)
0.643 0.614 2.134
EGS 1.647***(0.364)
0.168*
(0.089)
0.066
(1.426)
0.381***
(0.058)
-0.184**
(0.071)
-0.152***
(0.050)
0.387 0.336 1.901
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 3.961***(0.323)
0.044
(0.115)
9.920***
(2.683)
-0.031
(0.117)
-0.107**
(0.039)
-0.088*
(0.049)
0.404 0.174 1.757
EHSD 3.369**(1.357)
0.145
(0.340)
11 7 3 7 *** 
(2.041)
-0.263*
(0.144)
0.069
(0.096)
-0.070
(0.057)
0.669 0.541 2.048
ESCf
1.578*
(0.776)
0.320
(0.227)
8.824**
(3.652)
-0.051
(0.284)
-0.035
(0.117)
-0.147*
(0.069)
0.708 0.596 2.021
ECD f
1.181
(0.737)
0.281
(0.248)
3.880
(3.064)
0.184
(0.280)
-0.175
(0.144)
-0.147
(0.085)
0.700 0.585 1.670
EG St
0.102
(0.348)
0.344*
(0.179)
1.374*
(0.665)
0.529**
(0.205)
-0.207**
(0.093)
-0.173**
(0.070)
0.760 0.668 2.212
t  Due to length of volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 4.66. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
__________ |_____ |_______ (Jj.t = a 0 +  giffi.t-1  +  a 2 N e w s P u  +  a 3n t +  a 4 \A n t \ +  a 5GAPt +  e t
«0 «1 a 2 «3 « 4 a 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE
(1) 1.298***
(0.329)
0.314**
(0.139)
-0.510
(1.051)
0.459***
(0.089)
-0.167***
(0.039)
-0 .1 1 0 ***
(0.028)
0.696 0.682 2.141
(2) 1.007***
(0.311)
0.718***
(0.073)
2.050**
(0.839)
-0.005
(0.029)
-0.025
(0.018)
0.585 0.570 2.433
FEMALE
(1) 0.533**
(0.245)
0 .6 8 8 ***
(0.066)
-2.533*
(1.436)
q
(0.075)
-0 .1 2 1 ***
(0.044)
-0.062***
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.811 0.802 2.478
(2) 0.580**
(0.254)
0.880***
(0.037)
1.741*
(1.028)
0.017
(0.039)
-0.008
(0.018)
0.784 0.776 2.645
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE
(1) 1.398***
(0.441)
0.207
(0.191)
-0.852
(1.308)
0.547***
(0.114)
-0.196***
(0.053)
-0.136***
(0.032)
0.624 0.603 2.068
(2) 1.223***
(0.375)
0.653***
(0.087)
1.842*
(0.932)
0.034
(0.028)
-0.031
(0.025)
0.482 0.459 2.372
FEMALE
(1) 0.414
(0.272)
0.595***
(0.087)
-4.085**
(1.630)
0.625***
(0.104)
-0.240***
(0.049)
-0.097***
(0.023)
0.779 0.767 2.372
(2) 0.612**
(0.276)
0.870***
(0.045)
1.912*
(1.029)
0.008
(0.041)
-0.005
(0.016)
0.737 0.725 2.608
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE
(1) 1.804***
(0.331)
0 .0 2 1
(0.130)
-2 199*** 
(0.588)
0.654***
(0.077)
-0.227***
(0.063)
-0.139***
(0.042)
0.644 0.614 1.952
(2) 1.617***
(0.466)
0.518***
(0.115)
2.652**
(1.026)
0.023
(0.045)
-0.123*
(0.066)
0.458 0.422 2.154
FEMALE
(1) 0.435
(0.450)
0.592***
(0.099)
-1.985
(1.983)
0.595***
(0.113)
-0.231**
(0.094)
-0.140**
(0.066)
0.786 0.768 2.171
(2) 0.720
(0.434)
0.821***
(0.082)
5.346***
(1.303)
-0.007
(0.119)
-0.097
(0.068)
0.749 0.732 2.283
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE
(1) 0.196
(0.286)
0  7 4 9 *** 
(0.089)
2  79j***
(0.713)
0.118**
(0.049)
-0.036
(0.027)
-0.055**
(0.025)
0.823 0.755 2.328
(2) 0.362
(0.419)
0.770***
(0 .1 1 1 )
3.696***
(0.555)
0.009
(0.016)
-0.041**
(0.018)
0.819 0.767 2 . 2 2 2
FEMALE
(1) 2  3 4 4 *** 
(0.614)
0.146
(0.166)
4.919
(2.845)
0.183*
(0.103)
-0.152***
(0.029)
-0.147***
(0.039)
0.712 0.601 1.958
(2) 2.607***
(0.468)
0.169
(0.172)
6.727***
(2.218)
-0.084**
(0.038)
-0.128**
(0.044)
0.702 0.616 1.958
f  Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.67. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
a tx = a 0 + cx1(Ti t _ 1 +  a 2N e w s P ix +  a 3n t +  cy4 |A7rt | +  a 5GAPt +  e t
« 0 a  i a 2 « 3 C t 4 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 1.050**(0.432)
0.540***
(0.095)
-8.734***
(3.325)
0.676***
(0.129)
-0 199*** 
(0.069)
-0.094***
(0.028)
0.699 0.685 2.505
Y24 1.087***(0.320)
0.436***
(0.089)
-4 931*** 
(1.817)
0.641***
(0.117)
-0.223***
(0.058)
-0 .102***
(0.026)
0.689 0.674 2.425
Y34
1 324*** 
(0.257)
0.276***
(0.104)
-2.772**
(1.337)
0.620***
(0 .110)
-0 .2 2 1 ***
(0.043)
-0.133***
(0.031)
0.696 0.682 2.199
Y44 1.151***(0 .21 1 )
0.328***
(0.093)
0.753
(0.909)
0.371***
(0.067)
-0.181***
(0.031)
-0.103***
(0.023)
0.678 0.663 2.054
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.833**(0.401)
0 4 1 9 *** 
(0 .120)
-12.289***
(3.993)
0  999*** 
(0 .2 00 )
-0.377***
(0.091)
-0  147***
(0.035)
0.695 0.678 2.355
Y24 0.908**(0.349)
0.415***
(0.108)
-5.213***
(1.977)
0.722***
(0.140)
-0.250***
(0.068)
-0.117***
(0.027)
0.651 0.632 2.284
Y34 1.371***(0.424)
0.154
(0.164)
-3.642
(2.514)
0.757***
(0.134)
-0.272***
(0.035)
-0.170***
(0.037)
0.652 0.633 2.080
Y44 1.230***(0.249)
0.252**
(0.105)
0.683
(0.939)
0.413***
(0.085)
-0.185***
(0.046)
-0  121*** 
(0.025)
0.599 0.577 1.917
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 0.978(0.639)
0.360**
(0.146)
-14.784**
(5.774)
1.085***
(0.253)
-0.396**
(0.187)
-0.209**
(0.090)
0.679 0.652 2.245
Y24 0.953(0.588)
0.432***
(0.140)
-3.145
(2.830)
0.631***
(0 .201 )
-0.221
(0.146)
-0.164*
(0.083)
0.681 0.654 2.297
Y34
1 771***
(0.510)
-0.013
(0.129)
-6.512***
(1.510)
0.884***
(00056)
-0.245**
(0 .111)
-0.205***
(0.061)
0.687 0.661 2.019
Y44 1.487***(0.314)
0.131
(0 .120)
0.320
(1.416)
0.472***
(0.114)
-0.198**
(0.086)
-0 131*** 
(0.044)
0.579 0.544 1.946
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14f 2.482***(0.544)
0.222
(0.134)
5.269***
(1.594)
0.186
(0.138)
-0 .122*
(0.065)
-0.115**
(0.050)
0.645 0.509 1.911
Y24
1 9 2 1 *** 
(0.464)
0.268**
(0.123)
6.156**
(2.067)
0.080
(0.134)
-0.087
(0.056)
-0 .112**
(0.040)
0.685 0.564 1.684
Y34f 1.105(0.797)
0.468**
(0.187)
5.145*
(2.894)
0.011
(0.329)
-0.037
(0.153)
-0.107
(0.062)
0.658 0.526 2.012
Y44 0.395(0.295)
0.515***
(0.077)
3.607**
(1.339)
0.174
(0.153)
-0.101
(0.064)
-0.114**
(0.040)
0.800 0.723 1.969
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.68. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Prices
Testing Equation:
<fj.t =  <*0 + g i g a - i  +  a 2N e w s P u  +  a 3n t +  a 4 |A7rt | +  a^G A P t  +  e t
a  o « i «2 «3 a 4 «5 R 2 R 2 ).W .
>tat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 1.050***(0.358)
0.409***
(0.139)
-4.004**
(1.667)
0.632***
(0.143)
-0 .2 2 2 ***
(0.066)
-0.097***
(0.029)
0.662 0.646 1259
NE 1.136***(0.346)
0.429***
(0.119)
-2.018
(1.706)
0.564***
(0.125)
-0.192***
(0.058)
-0.103***
(0.036)
0.614 0.597 2375
S 0.663***(0.231)
0.616***
(0.055)
-2.404**
(0.943)
0.454***
(0.063)
-0.123***
(0.043)
-0.078***
(0.019)
0.787 0.777 2292
w 1.824***(0.388)
0 .2 0 1 **
(0.096)
-4.603***
(1.583)
0.675***
(0.113)
-0.308***
(0.066)
-0.130***
(0.027)
0.576 0.556 2116
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 0.833**(0.365)
0.271*
(0.161)
-5.704***
(1.827)
0.919***
(0.192)
-0.368***
(0.095)
-0 147*** 
(0.033)
0.639 0.618 2147
NE 1.156***(0.349)
0.228*
(0.128)
-4.693**
(1.846)
0.885***
(0.144)
-0.305***
(0.086)
-0.161***
(0.036)
0.580 0.556 2211
S 0.612**(0.240)
0.568***
(0.072)
-2.826***
(1.015)
0.541***
(0.080)
-0.176***
(0.044)
-0.097***
(0 .02 1 )
0.746 0.732 2153
w 1.576***(0.351)
0.159
(0.128)
-4.842***
(1.742)
0.790***
(0.125)
-0 371*** 
(0.061)
-0.157***
(0.031)
0.547 0.522 2084
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 1.053(0.910)
0.242
(0.288)
-3.838*
(2.132)
0.842***
(0.240)
-0.365**
(0.163)
-0.185
(0.148)
0.643 0.613 2.054
NE 1.399*(0.703)
0.124
(0.131)
-5.526*
(3.095)
0.972***
(0.171)
-0.356**
(0.154)
-0.243**
(0.098)
0.637 0.607 1.940
S 0.654(0.481)
0.518***
(0.077)
-2.352*
(1.229)
0.598***
(0.069)
-0 .2 0 2 ***
(0.069)
-0.140**
(0.068)
0.760 0.740 2.097
w 1.658**(0.762)
0.187
(0.141)
-4.536*
(2.416)
0.712***
(0.127)
-0.301***
(0.062)
-0.187*
(0.095)
0.556 0.519 2.120
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
N C t
2.031*
(1.085)
0.257
(0.378)
5.521
(3.468)
0.005
(0.264)
-0.047
(0.140)
-0.118
(0.089)
0.643 0.505 2.022
NE 0.527(0.378)
0.665***
(0.094)
3.887
(2.217)
0.099
(0.174)
-0.036
(0.081)
-0.070**
(0.029)
0.714 0.604 1.845
S 2.063(1.574)
0.249
(0.450)
5.698**
(2.435)
0.054
(0.119)
-0.072
(0.053)
-0 .122*
(0.068)
0.688 0.568 2.018
w 1.221(1.313)
0.353
(0.327)
2.083
(1.857)
0.305*
(0.161)
-0.183***
(0.055)
-0.132***
(0.029)
0.713 0.603 1.807
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix 
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.69. Aggregate Michigan Survey Disagreement and Perceived News
Intensity regarding Favourable and Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
 ]_________ a n  =  ftp +  +  a 2N e w s F u  +  a 3N e w s (J Lt +  a 4n t +  a 5 \ n t -  n t _4 \ +  a 6G a p t +  e t
a  o « 2 « 3 a 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
0.310 0.865*** -4.888** 1.191 0.124** 0.829 0.823 2.662
MS
(0.194) (0.046) (0.024) (0.787) (0.052)
0.356
(0.217)
0.790***
(0.073)
-3.030
(3.010)
-0.026
(1.157)
0.217***
(0.071)
0.020
(0.047)
-0.042
(0.027)
0.834 0.825 2.607
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
0.459* 0.841*** -8.826** 1.470* 0 .110* 0.778 0.769 2.596
MS
(0.238) (0.053) (4.210) (0.796) (0.058)
0.456**
(0.239)
0.762***
(0.088)
-6.593
(4.206)
0.066
(1.325)
0.225**
(0.092)
0.025
(0.092)
-0.045
(0.032)
0.786 0.772 2.549
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
0.476 0.746*** -22.692 -1.080 0.309*** 0.776 0.761 2.530
MS
(0.320) (0.067) (18.702) (2.006) (0.077)
0.703
(0.441)
0.624***
(0 .121)
-13.583
(16.893)
-1.669
(2.067)
0.395***
(0.092)
0.007
(0.133)
-0.118
(0.064)
0.790 0.769 2.360
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
1.2 2 0 *** 0.732*** -7.803*** 4.487** -0.123 0.788 0.727 2.134
MS
(0.366) (0.061) (1.129) (1.675) (0.099)
1.388***
(0.081)
0.648***
(0 .020 )
-4.447*
(2.487)
5.998***
(0.936)
-0.155***
(0.041)
-0.045
(0.046)
-0.036
(0.013)
0.803 0.705 1.951
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.70. Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
Gix = a o + a i u i,t-x +  a -z N e w s P F i t  +  a 3N e w s P U i t  +  a 4n t +  a 5\n t — n t _ 4 | +  a 6G a p t +  €t
a 0 « i «2 «3 a 4 as a 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834
0.814***
(0.279)
0.622***
(0.080)
0.077
(0.046)
-0.020
(0.017)
0.329***
(0.106)
0.002
(0.060)
-0.077*
(0.043)
0.705 0.689 2.490
A3544 0.640**(0.290)
0.642***
(0 .100)
-0.028
(0.039)
-0.020
(0.016)
0.375***
(0 .100)
0.030
(0.077)
-0.081
(0.051)
0.699 0.683 2.423
A4554 1.256***(0.339)
0 411 *** 
(0 .101)
0.032
(0.073)
-0.037*
(0.019)
0.508***
(0.126)
0.082
(0.106)
-0.115**
(0.055)
0.532 0.506 2.443
A5564 1.355***(0.413)
0.416***
(0.129)
0.013
(0.052)
-0.033**
(0.014)
0.454***
(0 .112)
0.076
(0.106)
-0.108*
(0.054)
0.501 0.474 2.255
A6597 1.366***(0.428)
0.406***
(0.107)
0 .2 0 0 *
(0.116)
-0.079***
(0.030)
0.545***
(0.128)
0.133
(0.096)
-0.087*
(0.046)
0.532 0.506 2.400
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.770**(0.322)
0.626***
(0.091)
0.035
(0.077)
-0.014
(0.018)
0.321**
(0.129)
0.024
(0.072)
-0.075
(0.046)
0.637 0.612 2.365
A3544 0.737**(0.293)
0.667***
(0.107)
-0.065**
(0.028)
-0.004
(0.014)
0.286***
(0.107)
-0.018
(0.082)
-0.073
(0.046)
0.661 0.638 2.377
A4554 0.928***(0.279)
0.435***
(0 .122)
-0.004
(0.076)
-0.037
(0.024)
0.568***
(0.174)
0.128
(0.139)
-0.118**
(0.054)
0.551 0.521 2.508
A5564 1.633***(0.477)
0.378**
(0.160)
-0.005
(0.050)
-0.025
(0.016)
0.416***
(0.130)
-0.018
(0.126)
-0 .120**
(0.058)
0.410 0.371 2.184
A6597
j 177***
(0.390)
0.378***
(0.123)
0.220
(0.150)
-0.084**
(0.038)
0.610***
(0.172)
0.180
(0.119)
-0.099**
(0.048)
0.489 0.454 2.367
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 0.830*(0.419)
0.504***
(0.126)
0.191
(0.167)
-0.029
(0.016)
0.485***
(0.126)
-0.010
(0.132)
-0.170**
(0.067)
0.728 0.700 2.148
A3544 0.852(0.662)
0.554***
(0.117)
-0.087
(0.157)
-0.035*
(0.018)
0.502***
(0.077)
-0.120
(0.114)
-0.157
(0.098)
0.742 0.716 2.113
A4554 1.151**(0.522)
0.301
(0 .20 2 )
-0.129
(0.207)
-0.047
(0.045)
0.705***
(0.258)
0.276
(0.415)
-0.265**
(0 .122)
0.603 0.563 2.235
A5564 1.789***(0..612)
0.259**
(0.124)
0.061
(0.148)
-0.034*
(0.019)
0.576***
(0.134)
-0.161
(0.252)
-0.225***
(0.083)
0.467 0.413 2.057
A6597
1.370
(0.851)
0.297
(0.191)
0.434
(0.330)
-0.059
(0.041)
0.621***
(0.134)
0.123
(0.163)
-0.215
(0.150)
0.465 0.411 2.203
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 4.251***(1.027)
-0.186
(0.556)
0.015
(0.091)
0.132
(0.113)
-0.400
(0.544)
0.140
(1.213)
-0.104
(0 .22 1 )
0.721 0.582 2.225
A3544 1.450**(0.505)
0.588***
(0.044)
-0.064***
(0.014)
0.079***
(0.006)
-0.194*
(0.107)
-0.027
(0.057)
-0.050***
(0.009)
0.820 0.730 1.734
A4554
1.602*
(0.781)
0.470*
(0.228)
0.014
(0.035)
0.043***
(0.006)
-0.079
(0.068)
-0.002
(0.045)
-0.078
(0.049)
0.678 0.517 1.939
A5564 1.324**(0.599)
0.691***
(0.117)
-0.007
(0 .01 1 )
0.052***
(0.006)
-0.176***
(0.049)
-0.049
(0.032)
-0.024*
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.824 0.735 2.222
A6597 1.256***(0.228)
0.595***
(0.113)
0.065
(0 .100)
0.042***
(0.005)
0.024
(0.090)
-0.033
(0.065)
-0.057*
(0.030)
0.605 0.408 2.029
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.71. Education Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
c ix — a o +  a i Gi. t - i  +  a 2^ e w sP F i t +  a 3N e w s P U u  +  a 4n t +  ff5 l7rt -  7rt_4l +  a 6G a p t +  e t
a 0 U i a 2 «3 a 4 “ s a 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.405***(0.515)
0.503***
(0.092)
0.163
(0.185)
-0.140***
(0.050)
0.692***
(0.148)
0.047
(0.103)
-0 .122*
(0.070)
0.594 0.572 2.666
EHSD 0.902***(0.325)
0.626***
(0.089)
0.038
(0.072)
-0.038*
(0.023)
0.363***
(0.089)
0.029
(0.077)
-0.082*
(0.042)
0.722 0.707 2.515
ESC
1 177*** 
(0.287)
0.572***
(0.088)
0.014
(0.079)
-0.003
(0.014)
0.242***
(0.080)
0.015
(0.054)
-0.076**
(0.035)
0.579 0.556 2.139
ECD 1.286***(0.298)
0.300**
(0.136)
0.059
(0.040)
-0.026**
(0 .0 1 2 )
0 441*** 
(0.113)
0.132***
(0.043)
-0.113**
(0.047)
0.571 0.547 2.335
EGS
1 7 9 4 *** 
(0.307)
0 .2 0 2 *
(0 .112)
-0.003
(0 .022 )
-0.002
(0.009)
0.261***
(0.070)
0.105**
(0.053)
-0.109***
(0.035)
0.376 0.341 1.991
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 1.364***(0.509)
0.488***
(0.094)
0.091
(0.239)
-0.143**
(0.057)
0.726***
(0.196)
0.047
(0.154)
-0.131*
(0.072)
0.556 0.526 2.621
EHSD 0.879**(0.336)
0.619***
(0.090)
-0.089
(0.160)
-0.033
(0.024)
q 3 7 3 ***
(0.097)
0.043
(0.098)
-0.088**
(0.040)
0.671 0.649 2.437
ESC
I 174***
(0.336)
0.603***
(0.090)
-0.116*
(0.059)
0.015
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.192**
(0.093)
-0.007
(0.068)
-0.070**
(0.034)
0.580 0.551 2.027
ECD
1 1 24*** 
(0.286)
0.394**
(0.170)
0.045
(0.069)
-0.018
(0.017)
0.367**
(0.171)
0.123***
(0.039)
-0.091**
(0.042)
0.509 0.476 2.425
EGS 1.428***(0.293)
0.331***
(0.104)
-0.024
(0 .02 0 )
0.004
(0.009)
0.231***
(0.082)
0.101
(0.066)
-0.093***
(0.031)
0.396 0.355 1.981
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 1.849(1.123)
0.340***
(0 .122)
-0.070
(0 .20 1 )
-0 197*** 
(0.057)
0.963***
(0.069)
-0.149
(0.272)
-0.298*
(0.160)
0.537 0.490 2.506
EHSD 1.136*(0.568)
0.488***
(0.133)
-0.123
(0.250)
-0.055
(0.038)
0.535***
(0.116)
0.003
(0.235)
-0 .2 1 0 **
(0.090)
0.709 0.680 2.329
ESC
1.054**
(0.418)
0.575***
(0.092)
-0.219
(0.138)
0.013
(0.015)
0.301***
(0.105)
-0.010
(0.107)
-0.117**
(0.048)
0.671 0.638 1.955
ECD 1.008***(0.349)
0.299**
(0.139)
0.158
(0.141)
-0.032**
(0.015)
0.539***
(0 .110)
0.066
(0.103)
-0 .122**
(0.053)
0.614 0.574 2.251
EGS
1 5 4 4 ***
(0.550)
0 .2 2 1 **
(0.107)
-0.057
(0.097)
-0.007
(0.013)
q 3 3 4 ***
(0.055)
0.233***
(0.081)
-0.158***
(0.051)
0.396 0.334 1.873
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 5.213***(0.726)
-0.026
(0.076)
0.203
(0.336)
0.184***
(0.033)
-0.475***
(0.079)
-0.185***
(0.042)
-0.074*
(0.034)
0.444 0.166 2.764
EHSD 3.637***(0.517)
-0.083
(0.092)
0.126***
(0.027)
0.084***
(0.013)
0.003
(0.037)
0.135***
(0.040)
-0.097***
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.712 0.568 2.243
ESC
1.861*
(0.909)
0.446**
(0.162)
0.011
(0.117)
0.105***
(0.013)
-0.252***
(0.078)
-0.085
(0.099)
-0 .101**
(0.040)
0.734 0.602 2.023
ECD 1.990***(0.113)
0.457***
(0.048)
-0.010
(0.015)
0.064***
(0.008)
-0.290***
(0.040)
-0.042*
(0 .0 2 0 )
-0.058*
(0.030)
0.704 0.556 2.252
EGS
0.900***
(0.176)
0.488***
(0.092)
-0 .0 1 0 **
(0.004)
0.034**
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.070
(0.109)
0.040
(0.106)
-0.085***
(0.023)
0.714 0.571 1.990
* * * * * *  jnciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.72. Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
_________  a i t  =  a 0 +  +  a 2N e w s P F i t  +  a 3N e w s P U i t  +  a 4n t +  a c \ n t — 7rt_4| +  a 6G a p t +  e t
«0 «1 a 2 a 3 a 4 <*5 «6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE
1.091***
(0.314)
0.428***
(0.142)
0.002
(0.035)
-0.010
(0 .01 1 )
0.339***
(0.091)
0.153**
(0.064)
-0.077**
(0.035)
0.677 0.659 2.314
FEMALE
0.523*
(0.271)
0 7 4 4 *** 
(0.079)
0.035
(0.065)
-0.020
(0 .020 )
0.304***
(0.096)
-0.023
(0.061)
-0.065*
(0.037)
0.804 0.794 2.608
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE
1.279***
(0.317)
0.387**
(0.150)
-0.083**
(0.040)
-0.006
(0 .01 2 )
0.337***
(0.108)
0.147*
(0.079)
-0.080**
(0.037)
0.601 0.574 2.269
FEMALE 0.518*(0.266)
0.730***
(0.088)
0.027
(0.085)
-0.021
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.316***
(0.115)
-0.002
(0.073)
-0.066
(0.040)
0.758 0.742 2.574
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE
1.714*** 0.165 -0.186** -0.030 0.511*** 0.189 -0.123*** 0.641 0.604 1.949
(0.333) (0.140) (0.075) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0 .110) (0.157) (0.045)
FEMALE
0.607
(0.547)
0.581***
(0.158)
0.472
(0.284)
-0.039
(0.027)
0.546***
(0.135)
-0.041
(0.163)
-0.140
(0.107)
0.788 0.767 2.276
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE
0.637
(0.889)
0.820**
(0.336)
-0.067***
(0.007)
0.032***
(0 .0 0 1 )
-0.027
(0.046)
-0.008
(0.127)
-0.005
(0.024)
0.860 0.790 2.627
FEMALE 2.608***(0.841)
0.379
(0.241)
-0.015
(0.091)
0.087**
(0.038)
-0.264*
(0.145)
-0.074
(0.081)
-0.074
(0.054)
0.711 0.566 2.075
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.73. Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
a i.t — a o +  flifl't.t-i +  a 2N e w s P F Lt +  a 3N e w s P U i t +  a 4n t +  or5 |7rt -  n t _4 \ +  a 6G a p t +  e t
« 0
V A 
« 1 a 2 « 3 a 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
1 .111**
(0.430)
0.580***
(0.092)
0.180
(0.119)
-0.096**
(0.039)
0.549***
(0.133)
-0.018
(0.106)
-0.103*
(0.055)
0.692 0.675 2.614
Y24
0.941***
(0.330)
0.551***
(0.109)
-0.018
(0.078)
-0.047**
(0.023)
0.448***
(0 .121)
0.138*
(0.080)
-0.074
(0.049)
0.666 0.647 2.575
Y34
1.096***
(0.289)
0 4 1 4 *** 
(0.116)
0.077
(0.053)
-0.032**
(0.015)
0.455***
(0.106)
0.065
(0.063)
-0 .111**
(0.050)
0.672 0.654 2.396
Y44
0.935***
(0.213)
0.465***
(0.098)
0.016
(0.031)
0.003
(0.007)
0.250***
(0.066)
0.130**
(0.054)
-0.072**
(0.029)
0.640 0.620 2.213
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14
1.0 0 2 **
(0.399)
0.585***
(0 .101)
0.002
(0.129)
-0.087**
(0.041)
0.544***
(0.157)
0.047
(0 .121)
-0 .101*
(0.054)
0.657 0.634 2.552
Y24
0.985***
(0.344)
0.569***
(0.114)
-0.112
(0.086)
-0.032
(0 .02 2 )
0.406***
(0.127)
0.080
(0.091)
-0.074
(0.046)
0.623 0.598 2.516
Y34
1.2 0 0 ***
(0.355)
0.387***
(0.134)
0.004
(0.046)
-0.029*
(0.015)
0.450***
(0 .120)
0.071
(0.083)
-0.116**
(0.054)
0.592 0.565 2.249
Y44
1.139***
(0.262)
0.439***
(0 .120)
-0.031*
(0.019)
0.011
(0.008)
0 .2 2 0 **
(0.085)
0.080
(0.052)
-0.076**
(0.038)
0.554 0.524 2.080
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14
1.255*
(0.658)
0  4 3 4 *** 
(0.137)
-0.118
(0.268)
-0.144**
(0.063)
0.837***
(0.208)
-0.021
(0.352)
-0.247**
(0 .112)
0.659 0.625 2.387
Y24
1.032
(0.728)
0.495***
(0.127)
-0.076
(0.311)
-0.033**
(0.016)
0.500***
(0.083)
0.032
(0.059)
-0.177*
(0.091)
0.669 0.636 2.405
Y34
1.820***
(0.472)
0.101
(0.155)
-0.066
(0.130)
-0.068***
(0.025)
0.721***
(0.115)
-0.044
(0.139)
-0.216***
(0.060)
0.662 0.627 2.025
Y44
1 3 9 3 *** 
(0.347)
0.231*
(0.116)
-0.052
(0.051)
-0.001
(0.014)
0.378***
(0.090)
0.153*
(0.088)
-0.134***
(0.047)
0.564 0.520 1.940
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
2.467***
(0.417)
0 292*** 
(0.068)
0.185**
(0.081)
0.078***
(0 .02 0 )
-0.033
(0.079)
0.018
(0.023)
-0.090***
(0.008)
0.627 0.441 1.689
Y24
1.814***
(0.238)
0.571***
(0.140)
-0.150***
(0.019)
0.063***
(0 .01 2 )
-0.145
(0.104)
0.033
(0.076)
-0.010
(0 .01 1 )
0.798 0.696 1.302
Y34
1.300
(1.067)
0.465
(0.523)
0.047
(0.105)
0.056***
(0.008)
-0.069
(0.118)
0.015
(0.415)
-0.096***
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.657 0.485 2.371
Y44
0.893***
(0.084)
0.729***
(0 .102)
-0.021
(0.015)
0.056***
(0.004)
-0.182***
(0.037)
-0.080*
(0.039)
-0.040*
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.827 0.741 2.193
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 4.74. Regionally Disaggregated Michigan Survey Disagreement and
Perceived News Intensity regarding Favourable and
Unfavourable Prices
Testing Equation:
a ix =  q 0 +  a x(Ji t_t +  a 2N e w s P F u  +  a 3N e w s P U Lt +  a 4n t +  a 51 ^  -  7rt_4 | +  a ^ G a p t +  e t
a 0 « 2 « 3 « 4 « 5 « 6 R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC
1.003***
(0.369)
0.487***
(0.149)
0.122
(0.103)
-0.048**
(0.024)
0.484***
(0.149)
0.028
(0.097)
-0.099**
(0.049)
0.640 0.620 2.416
NE 1.006***(0.361)
0.513***
(0.119)
0.038
(0.060)
-0.023
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.425***
(0.119)
0.099
(0.067)
-0.088
(0.055)
0.597 0.575 2.520
S 0.587**(0.236)
0.652***
(0.070)
0.049
(0.044)
-0.028**
(0.014)
0.386***
(0.081)
0.038
(0.061)
-0.077**
(0.034)
0.781 0.769 2.321
w 1.678***(0.466)
0.360***
(0.132)
0.050
(0.055)
-0.048**
(0 .02 2 )
0.435***
(0.117)
0.049
(0.092)
-0.117**
(0.058)
0.505 0.477 2.316
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 1.016**(0.390)
0.486***
(0.166)
0.043
(0.084)
-0.042
(0.027)
0.478**
(0.188)
0.024
(0.134)
-0 .102*
(0.052)
0.573 0.544 2.393
NE 1 182*** (0.326)
0.424***
(0.133)
-0.097
(0.061)
-0.030
(0.024)
0.527***
(0.154)
0.104
(0.088)
-0.107
(0.065)
0.536 0.505 2.425
S 0.565**(0.243)
0.670***
(0.074)
0.003
(0.061)
-0.021
(0.014)
0.350***
(0.089)
0.064
(0.064)
-0.069**
(0.034)
0.731 0.713 2.283
w 1.580**(0.603)
0.388**
(0.176)
0.058
(0.099)
-0.036
(0.024)
0.392**
(0.151)
0.017
(0.095)
-0.115
(0.071)
0.450 0.413 2.206
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC
1.031*
(0.573)
0.323
(0.254)
0.290
(0.223)
-0.051*
(0.029)
0 .6 6 6 ***
(0 .210 )
0.064
(0.229)
-0.196
(0.124)
0.625 0.587 2.197
NE 1.643**(0.756)
0.256
(0.183)
-0.216*
(0 .120)
-0.055**
(0.023)
0.733***
(0.088)
-0.071
(0.198)
-0.252*
(0.140)
0.609 0.570 2.086
S 0.425(0.389)
0.535***
(0.081)
0.300
(0.243)
-0.043
(0.044)
0.583***
(0.147)
0.036
(0.175)
-0 174*** 
(0.061)
0.762 0.738 2.063
w 1.714*(0.927)
0.284
(0.215)
0.038
(0.219)
-0.048
(0.032)
0.531**
(0.162)
-0.012
(0.088)
-0 .2 1 2 *
(0.118)
0.527 0.479 2.211
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 2.192*(1.087)
0.391
(0.309)
-0.022
(0.084)
0.067**
(0.030)
-0.169
(0 .122)
-0.041
(0.079)
-0.073
(0.057)
0.666 0.500 2.242
NE 1.126(0.684)
0.665***
(0.193)
-0.022
(0.038)
0.054**
(0 .0 2 0 )
-0.068
(0.108)
-0.043
(0.054)
-0.042
(0.026)
0.734 0.600 1.910
S 2.500**( 1.022 )
0.233
(0.301)
0.028
(0.085)
0.069**
(0.028)
-0.107
(0.141)
0.044
(0.073)
-0.095
(0.055)
0.694 0.540 2.062
w 1.568(4.979)
0.536
(0.832)
-0.005
(0.348)
0.043
(0.070)
-0.087
(0.130)
0.023
(0 .121)
-0.053
(0.143)
0.667 0.500 2.073
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 5
Appendix 5.1. Survey Updating Model (including Inflation) -  Aggregate
Michigan Survey Forecasts
Testing Equation:
^ H . t i n t+ h \ ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  a l ^ H , t - l \ . n t + h - l \  +  a 3 n t - k  +  € t
« i a  2 «3 Wald x2 Test 7?2 R 2 D.W. Stat
PANEL A: Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 
k  =  1
0.149*** 
(0.056)
0.885***
(0.057)
-0.054*
(0.028)
a l +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
1.982
0.336 0.324 2.148
(2) 
k  =  1 , R
0.138**
(0.059)
0.913***
(0.048)
-0.051
(0.032)
a 1 +  a 3 =  0.25 
11.533***
0.323 0.317 2.174
(3) 
k  =  0
0.075
(0.046)
0.785***
(0.047)
0.126**
(0.049)
a l +  a 2 +  CC3 =  1
1.287
0.369 0.358 2.008
(4) 
k  = 0 , R
0.065*
(0.038)
0.803***
(0.036)
0.132***
(0.043)
a i +  a 3 =  0.25 
2.134
0.363 0.357 2.027
PANEL B: Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 - 2011Q1
(1) 
k  =  1
0.206**
(0.086)
0.875***
(0.094)
-0.082**
(0.035)
+  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.008
0.407 0.394 1.979
(2) 
k  =  1 , R
0.207**
(0.082)
0.875***
(0.081)
-0.082
(0.034)
a i  +  a 3 =  0 .25  
2.371
0.407 0.400 1.979
(3) 
k  = 0
0.105*
(0.062)
0.789***
(0.047)
0.105**
(0.051)
a i  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.004
0.419 0.406 1.864
(4) 
k  =  0 , R
0.106
(0.065)
0.789***
(0.047)
0.105**
(0.050)
a t +  a 3 =  0.25 
0.705
0.418 0.413 1.864
PANEL C: Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
(1) 
k =  1
0.291*
(0.154)
0.776***
(0.156)
-0.070
(0.068)
+ a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.042
0.413 0.394 2.092
(2) 
k  = l , R
0.293*
(0.154)
0.778***
(0.152)
-0.071
(0.074)
a i +  a 3 = 0 .25  
0.034
0.413 0.403 2.094
(3) 
k  =  0
0.234*
(0.140)
0.605***
(0.159)
0.154***
(0.057)
a ± + a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.068
0.448 0.431 1.817
(4) 
k  = 0 , R
0.239*
(0.126)
0.609***
(0.147)
0.152***
(0.054)
a i  +  a3 — 0-25 
0.917
0.446 0.438 1.821
PANEL D: Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 
k  = 1
0 .8 8 6 ***
(0.182)
0.398**
(0.178)
0.011
(0.068)
a l +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
6.253**
0.381 0.303 1.319
(2) 
k  = l , R
0.175
(0.203)
0.902***
(0.145)
-0.076
(0.083)
a i  +  a 3 -  0-25 
1.103
0.202 0.155 1.438
(3) 
k  = 0
0.931***
(0.230)
0.253
(0.152)
0.180***
(0.059)
a t +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
8.342***
0.534 0.476 1.261
(4) 
k  = 0 , R
0.048
(0 .111)
0.846***
(0.057)
0.107
(0.074)
a i  + a 3 =  0 .25  
2.831*
0.232 0.187 1.432
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.2. Differenced Survey-Updating Model
Testing Equation:
(1) L E h x [n t+h] =  Y i ^ E Pit[n t+h] +  y2A£’w>t_y[7rt+/l_y] + e t 
(2) A E Hit[n t+h] = Yo +  Y i ^ Pit[n t+h] + Y2^ E H i M [n t+h. j ]  + e t 
(3) L E HX[nt+h] = Y i ^ E Pit[n t+h] +  y2AEw>t_y[7rt+h_y] +  y3A7rt +  e t 
(4 ) A E HX[n t+h] = Yo +  Y i ^ E P>t[n t+h] + y2AEw>t_;[7rt+h_y] +  y3A7rt +  e t
Yo Y i Y i Y  3 W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. S tat
Period: W hole 1982CJ3-2011Q 1
M S (1) 0.889***
(0.128)
-0.249*
(0.127)
Yi  +  y2 = l  
2.753*
0.204 0.197 2.035
(2 ) 0 . 0 2 2
(0.015)
0.903***
(0.141)
-0.249**
(0.119)
Yi  +  Yz =  1  
2.364
0.206 0.192 2.044
(3) q  7 3 4 * * *  
( 0 . 1 2 0 )
-0.302***
(0.086)
0.278***
(0.044)
Yi + y 2 + y3 = i  
2.473
0.371 0.360 2.104
(4) 0.028**
( 0 . 0 1 2 )
0.751***
(0.125)
-0.302***
(0.079)
0.279***
(0.040)
Yl + Y2 + Y3 =  1  
2.214
0.374 0.357 2.115
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 0.925***
(0.247)
-0.165
(0.116)
Yi  +  Yz =  1  
0.794
0.125 0.116 1.970
(2 ) 0.028*
(0.016)
0.945***
(0.258)
-0.166
(0.117)
Yi  +  Yz =  1 
0.593
0.129 0.110 1.979
(3) 0.738***
(0.239)
-0.238***
(0.077)
0.303***
(0.049)
Yi  +  Y2 +  Ys =  1  
0.685
0.349 0.335 2.043
(4) 0.024**
(0 .01 1 )
0.755***
(0.243)
-0.239***
(0.075)
0.302
(0.044)
Yi  + Y 2 + y3 = i  
0.569
0.352 0.331 2.049
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS (1) 0.863***
(0.312)
-0.278***
(0.071)
Yi  +  Yi  =  1 
1.641
0.196 0.183 1.965
(2) 0.024
(0.027)
0.887***
(0.305)
-0.278***
(0.059)
Yi  +  Y 2 =  1  
1.494
0.199 0.174 1.973
(3) 0.529**
(0.229)
-0.326***
(0.083)
0.429***
(0.080)
Yi  +  Y2 +  Ys =  1  
2.262
0.402 0.383 2.158
(4) 0.016
(0.018)
0.547**
(0.247)
-0.326***
(0.067)
0.428***
(0.083)
Yi  +  y2 + y3 = i  
1.731
0.404 0.375 2.160
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MS
*
(1) 1.371*
(0.698)
0.077
(0.133)
Yi  +  Yz =  1  
0.406
0.135 0.085 1.859
(2 ) 0.040
(0.131)
1.393*
(0.732)
0.076
(0.133)
Yi  +  Yz =  1  
0.401
0.139 0.032 1.872
(3) 1.512***
(0.428)
-0.098
(0.067)
0.263***
(0.072)
Yi  +  Yz  +  Ys =  1  
2.356
0.421 0.348 1.984
(4)
** **? 9
0.067
(0.066)
* indicate
1.551***
(0.382)
significance
-0.103*
(0.053)
at 1, 5 and 1C
0.266***
(0.071)
percent lev<
Yl  +  Y2 +  Ys =  1  
3.144*
sis.
0.431 0.317 2.028
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Appendix 5.3. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Sub-Sample Periods
Testing Equation:
( l ) .£ ? [ j r t+h] =  p 0 +  +  P 2E t - j [ n t+h- j \  +
(2).£'t,//[7rt+/i] =  Po  +  P l n t -k  + (1 — P l ) E t - l ,H \n t+h-j \  + € t
(3 ) .tf? [ ir t+fc] =  P o + P i ( P 2n t k  + (1 - P i ) E Pt [fft+fc]) + ( l ~ P i ) E ? - i n t+h-i \ + € t
Po P i ( i - f t ) p 2 ( i - f t ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 0.140***
(0.050)
0.855***
(0.051)
Pi + P2 ~  1 
0.150
0.402 0.396 1.936
(2 ) q
(0.044)
0.859***
(0.044)
f t  =  0.35 
22.258***
0.402 0.402 1.941
(3) 0 .2 1 1 ***
(0.047)
0.789***
(0.047)
0.499**
(0.251)
0.501**
(0.251)
P 1 =  0.25 
0.705 
A  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
4.982**
0.419 0.413 1.864
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS (1) 0.184**
(0.079)
0.804***
(0.082)
Pi + Pi — 1
0.498
0.389 0.379 2.085
(2 ) 0.182**
(0.072)
0.818***
(0.072)
p1 =  0.35 
5.422**
0.384 0.384 2.103
(3) 0.391**
(0.147)
0.609***
(0.147)
0.388***
(0.135)
0.612***
(0.135)
P1 =  0.25 
0.917 
Pi * ( 1 -  f t )  - 0 . 2 5  
0.007
0.446 0.438 1.821
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 0.160**
(0.071)
0.878***
(0.051)
P i +  P2 -  1
1.970
0.249 0.205 1.514
(2) 0.122
(0.105)
0.878***
(0.105)
f t  =  0.35 
4.729**
0.227 0.227 1.470
(3) 0.154**
(0.057)
0.846***
(0.057)
0.691
(0.630)
0.309
(0.630)
f t  =  0.25 
2.831* 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
3.340*
0.232 0.187 1.432
*** ** * jn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.4. Rational Updating Model -  Sub-Periods
Testing Equation:
Ej.t[nt+h] =  Yo +  Y i E RE.t[^t+h] +  Y i E u -  ifrt+ft-i] +  v t
Yo Y i Y i Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. J-Stat
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MS (1) 0.099**
(0.049)
0.909***
(0.051)
Yi +  Yi = 1 
4.921
0.340 0.333 2.0621 13.861*
(2 ) 0.090***
(0.034)
0.910***
(0.034)
y 1 =  0.16 
4.139**
0.346 0.346 2.070 13.358
(3) 0.881***
(0.127)
0.000
(0.047)
0.716***
(0.076)
0.440 0.428 1.907 10.910
(4) 0.033***
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.084
(0.056)
0.916***
(0.056)
Yi =  0.16 
1.868
0.349 0.342 2.085 15.069*
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MS (1) 0.477***
(0.135)
0.528***
(0.103)
Yi + Y i  =  1 
0.021
0.169 0.156 1.526 139.604***
(2) 0.210
(0.189)
0.790***
(0.189)
Yi =  0.16
0.071
0.417 0.417 2.360 107.133***
(3) 0.135
(0.279)
0 4 1 4 *** 
(0.094)
0.554***
(0.140)
0.283 0.260 1.723 160.576***
(4) 0.034
(0 .110)
0.464***
(0.135)
0.536***
(0.135)
Yi =  0.16
5.051***
0.203 0.190 1.584 152.372***
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
M Sf (1) 0.125***
(0.036)
0.915***
(0.025)
Yi +  Y i =  1 
4.235**
-0.026 -0.087 1.474 4.754
(2) 0.078**
(0.027)
0 922*** 
(0.027)
Yi =  0.16 
8.926***
0.057 0.057 1.491 5.784
(3) 2.064***
(0.539)
-0.099*
(0.054)
0.438***
(0.135)
0.424 0.352 1.285 5.701
(4) 0.115***
(0.036)
0.118***
(0.035)
0.882***
(0.035)
Yi =  0.16
645.512***
0.004 -0.055 1.465 4.579
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f the volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance 
estimation weighting matrix.
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Appendix 5.5. Heterogeneous Updating Model
Testing Equation:
Et,H[n t+h\ ~  0 0  +  0 1 ^t,p[7r t+/i] +  0 2 n t +  03^t,RE[7rt+/i] +  0 4 [7lt+ft-l] +  e t
0 o 0 i 0 2 03 04 W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. J-S ta t
01 + 02 + 03 Stat
+  0 4 = 1
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.048
(0.050)
0.132***
(0.049)
0.036
(0.047)
0 7 7 3 *** 
(0.051)
0.700 0.374 0.358 2.028
(2) -0.077*
(0.042)
0.075*
(0.043)
0.272***
(0.089)
0.738***
(0.090)
0.407 0.129 0.106 1.729 7.115
(3) 1 522*** 
(0.194)
0.038
(0.053)
0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.041)
-0.036
(0.054)
0.291***
(0.082)
43.711*** 0.568 0.552 1.652
(4) 2.631***
(0.239)
0.286***
(0.061)
0.136***
(0.033)
-0.460***
(0.071)
0.156***
(0.058)
94.990*** -0.117 -0.158 0.629 5.487
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
(1) 0.095
(0.091)
0.107**
(0.042)
0.009
(0.056)
0.789***
(0.060)
0.001 0.419 0.400 1.870
(2) 0.163*
(0.090)
-0.051
(0.034)
-0.064
(0.114)
0.959***
(0.054)
0.273 0.319 0.297 1.989 12.063*
(3) 1 4 4 9 *** 
(0.184)
0.012
(0.058)
0.218***
(0.035)
-0.037
(0.056)
0.343***
(0.061)
89.462*** 0.581 0.562 1.536
(4) 1.905***
(0.157)
0.400***
(0.083)
0.080**
(0.032)
-0.420***
(0.053)
0.318***
(0.039)
114.347*** 0.033 -0.010 0.725 3.573
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
(1) 0.174**
(0.081)
0.148**
(0.063)
0.150***
(0.053)
0.532***
(0 .122)
0.080 0.505 0.481 1.925
(2) -0.175
(0.147)
0.023
(0.038)
0.757***
(0.149)
0 441***
(0.063)
3.952** -0.477 -0.549 1.038 84.450***
(3) 1.624***
(0.103)
0.074
(0.064)
0.365***
(0.045)
0.042
(0.034)
-0.029
(0.051)
285.932*** 0.681 0.660 1.542
(4) 0.928***
(0.116)
0.082***
(0.023)
0.213***
(0.025)
0.275***
(0.067)
q 137***
(0.015)
42.998*** 0.553 0.524 1.564 30.920***
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
(1) 1.420
(1.345)
0.130***
(0.025)
-0.156
(0.322)
0.063
(0.769)
2.916* 0.648 0.578 1.255
(2)t 1.214***
(0.309)
0.072
(0.042)
-0.131
(0.085)
0.203
(0.159)
0.273 0.613 0.536 1.298 4.084
(3) 1.948
(4.152)
0.581
(2.336)
0.201
(0.154)
-0.162
(0.155)
-0.016
(0.169)
0.044 0.709 0.626 1.628
(4)t 1.874*
(0.950)
0.758
(0.445)
0.160***
(0.050)
-0.216**
(0.077)
-0.054
(0.168)
0.775 0.693 0.605 1.495 4.285
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f the volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance 
estimation weighting matrix.
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Appendix 5.6. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Restricted Specification
Testing Equation:
E t,H[n t+h\ =  K<t>iE t A n t+h\ +  0 2 ^  + (1 -  01 +  <t>2) E tiRE[ n t+h]) +  (1 -  A ) E t H [ n t+h. 1] +  c t
A 0 i 02 (1 -  01  +  <f)2) ( 1 - * ) Wald x 2 
Test
R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
f-Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
(1)
OLS
0.217***
(0.060)
0.164
(0.217)
0.633**
(0.252)
0.202
(0.197)
0.783***
(0.060)
A =  0.25 
0.299
(2)
GMM
0.213**
(0 .100)
-0.045
(0.252)
0.227*
(0.117)
0.818***
(0 .221 )
0.787***
(0 .100)
A =  0.25 
0.140
0.270 0.257 1.996 11.396*
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
(1)
OLS
0 2 1 1*** 
(0.079)
0.452
(0.321)
0.505
(0.320)
0.043
(0.249)
0.788***
(0.079)
A =  0.25 
0.242
0.419 0.407 1.870
(2)
GMM
0.086**
(0.041)
1.326
(1.054)
-0.195
(0.410)
-0.132
(1.107)
0 914*** 
(0.041)
A =  0.25 
16.275***
0.368 0.355 2.054 0.003
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
(1)
OLS
0.468***
(0.145)
0.370***
(0.137)
0.319**
(0.140)
0.311***
(0.105)
0.531***
(0.145)
A =  0.25 
2.263
0.505 0.489 1.919
(2)
GMM
0.393***
(0.092)
0.407
(0.386)
0.006
(0.761)
0.587
(0.408)
0.587
(0.408)
A =  0.25 
2.379
0.445 0.428 2.069 S.551
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
(1)
OLS
0.166
(0.182)
0.738
(1.032)
0.527
(0.772)
-0.264
(0.574)
0.834***
(0.182)
A =  0.25 
0.215
0.243 0.148 1.377
(2)t
GMM
0.090*
(0.048)
-0.173
(1.081)
0.331
(0.747)
0.842
(0.787)
0.910***
(0.058)
A =  0.25 
10.876***
0.100 -0.012 1.502 5.888
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f the volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance 
estimation weighting matrix.
452
Appendix 5.7. Granger Causality -  Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Expectations
PANEL A 
SPF -> MS(AGE)
PANELB  
MS (AGE) -»• SPF
LAGS 2 4 8f 2 4 8f
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 3.919** 1.707 1.371 2.342 2.229* 1.942*
A3544 6.723*** 3.893*** 2.705** 2.420* 1.597 2.639**
A4554 1.606 1.242 1.518 6.591*** 3.422** 1.659
A5564 3.225** 1.452 0.692 2.234 1.609 0.491
A6597 0.693 0.379 0.289 6.601*** 3.905*** 1.501
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 3.785** 2.255* 1.505 3.665** 1.659 1.691
A3544 5.457*** 3.086** 1.958* 5.224*** 5.798*** 3.633***
A4554 1.309 0.790 0.819 4.037** 2.088* 1.995*
A5564 2.147 1.068 0.824 2.172 2.227* 1.407
A6597 1.785 0.950 0.924 3.180** 1.635 1.510
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 4.512** 1.988 1.019 2.344 1.489 1.395
A3544 3.808** 1.920 1.042 1.192 2.683** 1.539
A4554 0.412 1.048 0.586 1.522 0.874 1.435
A5564 1.254 0.681 0.428 0.288 0.985 0.803
A6597 1.102 0.380 0.314 0.093 0 .112 0.424
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0.814 0.625 10.252* 1.172 1.763 0.482
A3544 1.345 2.128 0.480 4.277** 4.969** 1.138
A4554 0.543 0.436 1.488 1.477 1.754 0.535
A5564 0.321 0.210 2.369 1.580 0.880 0.466
A6597 0.156 0.704 1.093 2.784* 3.338* 1.123
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
fEstimated for 111 observations for the whole sample period due to availability of SPF CPI forecasts 
from 1981Q3.
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Appendix 5.8. Granger Causality -  Education Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Expectations
PANEL A PANELB
SPF -> MS(EDU) MS(EDU) -► SPF
LAGS 2 4 8f 2 4 8f
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 0.097 0.156 0.980 3.461** 2.515** 1.8 6 8 *
EHSD 0.521 0.451 1.182 2.742* 2.047* 1.359
ESC 3.491** 1.674 1.147 4.057** 2.855** 2.062**
ECD 5.710*** 2.788** 2.375** 2.826* 1.821 1.486
EGS 7.830*** 3.025** 1.530 2.704* 2.539** 1.797*
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS 0.069 0.590 1.079 2.376* 1.174 1.536
EHSD 0.414 0.795 1.281 2.372* 1.408 1.469
ESC 0.942 0.380 0.296 4.806** 2.585** 2.205**
ECD 5.253*** 2.506** 1.552 2.730* 2.009 1.407
EGS 5 7 9 9 *** 3.627*** 2 .120** 2.148 2.626** 1.462
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS 0.097 0.761 0.594 1.137 0.753 0.678
EHSD 1.262 0.930 0.762 0.119 0.597 0.589
ESC 0.940 0.262 0.300 2.562* 1.919 1.297
ECD 4.674** 1.684 1.255 0.701 0.974 0.984
EGS 4.885** 2.363* 1.127 1.557 1.572 0.795
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS 0.308 0.336 0.282 0.042 0.019 0.444
EHSD 0.214 0.838 0.883 1.037 0.978 1.263
ESC 0.270 0.279 0.626 1.711 1.396 3.143
ECD 0.306 0.192 13.251* 2.640 1.918 0.996
EGS 0.983 0.461 51.709** 1.292 0.978 0.621
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
fEstimated for 111 observations for the whole sample period due to availability o f SPF CPI forecasts 
from 1981Q3.
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Appendix 5.9. Granger Causality -  Gender Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Expectations
PANEL A 
SPF -+ MS(GEN)
PANEL B 
MS(EDU) -> SPF
LAGS 2 4 8f 2 4 8t
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 5.290*** 1.591 1.110 5.683*** 3.372** 2.982***
FEMALE 2.535* 1.794 1.984* 3.469** 2.333* 1.562
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE 3.935** 2.114* 2.225** 4.882*** 1.528 3 4 1 9 ***
FEMALE 3.152** 3 819*** 1.299 3.994** 2.424* 2.099**
Period: Stable 1990Q] -  2006Q2
MALE 3.526** 1.594 1.064 2.401* 1.886 1.447
FEMALE 2.294 1.071 0.525 0.374 0.630 0.947
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE 0.597 0.276 3.807 1.819 1.921 0.842
FEMALE 0.504 0.327 0.231 3.357* 1.881 0.844
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
fEstimated for 111 observations for the whole sample period due to availability o f SPF CPI forecasts 
from 1981Q3.
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Appendix 5.10. Granger Causality -  Income Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Expectations
PANEL A 
SPF -> MS(INC)
PANEL B 
MS(INC) SPF
LAGS 2 4 8f 2 4 8t
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.474 0.504 0.453 3.194** 1.958 1.475
Y24 1.165 0.308 0.966 6.315*** 4 3 7 4 *** 3 7 1 3 ***
Y34 4.370** 1.782 1.077 1.969 2.009* 2.357**
Y44 9.638*** 2.269* 1.778* 2.950* 2.272* 1.897*
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.456 0.495 0.828 1.692 1.045 1.635
Y24 1.759 1.131 1.563 6.113*** 3.097** 2.564**
Y34 2.940* 1.473 0.836 5.095*** 3.167** 2.130**
Y44 6.963*** 2.566** 1.561 1.925 2.014* 1.806*
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 0.702 0.435 0.407 0.156 0.734 0.720
Y24 3.458** 2.429* 1.215 0.941 0.505 0.972
Y34 2.854* 1.727 0.746 2.514* 1.359 0.917
Y44 2.561* 0.930 0.787 0.879 1.264 1.235
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 0.091 0.303 0.088 0.364 0.251 3.013
Y24 0.922 0.703 0.951 3.850** 7.202*** 3.277
Y34 0.363 0.544 289.672*** 1.890 2.804* 0.494
Y44 0.859 0.897 3.440 1.529 1.763 5.731
*** ** * inciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
fEstimated for 111 observations for the whole sample period due to availability of SPF CPI forecasts 
from 1981Q3.
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Appendix 5.11. Granger Causality -  Regionally Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Expectations
PANEL A PANELB
SPF MS(REG) MS(REG) -► SPF
LAGS 2 4 8f 2 4 8f
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 2.477* 0.696 1.316 9.369*** 5.575*** 2.219**
NE 2.712* 1.826 2.083** 2.143 1.583 2.677**
S 2.811* 0.690 0.486 4.681** 2.795** 3.592***
w 4.074** 1.970 1.666 1.259 1.244 1.097
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC 2.432* 1.203 0.988 4.529** 2.188* 3.078***
NE 2.594* 1.956 1.268 3.276** 2.731** 2.660**
S 2.771* 1.343 1.019 5.554*** 3.939*** 3.602***
w 4.080** 1.780 1.233 3.923** 2.471* 1.511
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC 3.619** 1.795 0.660 1.332 0.861 1.099
NE 1.987 0.778 0.478 1.341 1.524 1.657
S 2.542* 1.202 0.521 2.143 2.154* 1.632
w 2.848* 0.778 0.327 0.794 0.643 0.785
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC 0.125 0.274 0.477 1.692 1.251 1.249
NE 0.321 0.367 3.315 1.954 1.742 0.844
S 0.128 0.109 0.789 1.736 1.693 0.896
w 1.015 0.663 1.136 2.228 1.982 0.785
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tEstimated for 111 observations for the whole sample period due to availability o f SPF CPI forecasts 
from 1981Q3.
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Appendix 5.12. Epidemiological Tests -  Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
EH.t[nt+h\ =  <*0 + giEp.t[wt+ft] + g2Ffr.t-ifrt+ft-i] + <*3 n t+€t
a 0  a x a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834
(1) 0.275***
(0.069)
0.698***
(0.085)
a - ,  +  a 2  =  1 
2.097
0.362 0.356 2.409
(2) 0.265***
(0.052)
0.735***
(0.052)
a x =  0.25 
0.089
0.345 0.345 2.446
(3) 1 213*** 
(0.231)
0.281***
(0.086)
0.328**
(0.145)
0.508 0.499 2.050
(4) 0.215**
(0.091)
0.608***
(0.145)
0.160***
(0.059)
a l  + a 2 +  a 3 “  1
0.548
0.409 0.399 2.309
(5) 1.365***
(0.256)
0.202**
(0.100)
0.162
(0.182)
0.212***
(0.044)
0.589 0.578 1.916
A3544
(1) 0.234***
(0.064)
0 741*** 
(0.077)
a 1 +  a 2  =  1 
2.048
0.370 0.365 2.232
(2) 0.227***
(0.067)
q 773***
(0.067)
a 1 =  0.25 
0.120
0.355 0.355 2.257
(3) 1.108***
(0.177)
0.216***
(0.073)
0.426***
(0.120)
0.492 0.483 1.984
(4) 0.165***
(0.062)
0.628***
(0.093)
q 193***
(0.070)
a t  +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.606
0.439 0.429 2.074
(5) 1 407*** 
(0.100)
0.112*
(0.067)
0.178*
(0.106)
0.276***
(0.038)
0.623 0.613 1.814
A4554
(1) 0.152***
(0.049)
0.829***
(0.059)
a 1 + a 2  =  1 
1.543
0.165 0.158 2.290
(2) 0.145***
(0.053)
0.855***
(0.054)
a 1 =  0.25 
3.845**
0.154 0.154 2.326
(3) 1.300***
(0.216)
0.109**
(0.048)
0.467***
(0.100)
0.328 0.317 1.917
(4) 0.088
(0.055)
0.753***
(0.036)
0.144**
(0.055)
a, +  a 2  +  a 3 =  1 
0.990)
0.217 0.203 2.192
(5) 1.884***
(0.202)
-0.039
(0.066)
0.152
(0.105)
0.290***
(0.048)
0.506 0.493 1.695
A5564
(1) 0 144***
(0.043)
0.830***
(0.056)
a l  +  a 2  =  1
2.329
0.042 0.034 2.144
(2) 0.131***
(0.045)
0.869***
(0.045)
a 1 =  0.25 
6.937***
0.024 0.024 2.197
(3) 1.428***
(0.228)
0.048
(0.042)
0.463***
(0.091)
0.230 0.216 1.825
(4) 0.058
(0.047)
0.762***
(0.037)
0.157***
(0.055)
CC-l + CL2 "I" # 3  — 1
2.482
0.108 0.092 2.032
(5) I 921*** 
(0.223)
-0.138**
(0.059)
0.218***
(0.054)
0.276***
(0.049)
0.410 0.394 1.688
A6597
(1) 0 147*** 
(0.035)
0.831***
(0.045)
a 1  +  a 2  =  1  
1.890
0.078 0.070 2.330
(2) 0 142*** 
(0.034)
0.858***
(0.034)
a x =  0.25 
10.131***
0.068 0.068 2.374
(3) 1 532*** 
(0.268)
-0.004
(0.060)
0.493***
(0.066)
0.252 0.238 1.975
(4) 0.058
(0.044)
q 779***
(0.053)
0.145***
(0.046)
a 1 +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.603
0.122 0.106 2.203
(5) 1.888***
(0.369)
-0.189**
(0.076)
0.328***
(0.090)
0.243***
(0.048)
0.366 0.349 1.758
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.13. Epidemiological Tests -  Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
^ H . t [ n t+ h \  ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t \ n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H , t - l \ - n t + h - l ]  +  a 3 n t + € t
a 0 «2 «3 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834
(1) 0.258***
(0.080)
0  74i***
(0.085)
a ,  +  a 2 =  1 
0.004
0.439 0.433 2.178
(2) 0.259***
(0.080)
0 741*** 
(0.080)
a t =  0.25 
0.012
0.439 0.439 2.178
(3) 0.889***
(0.155)
0.226***
(0.076)
0  494*** 
(0.095)
0.518 0.508 1.957
(4) 0.186***
(0.068)
0.687***
(0.075)
0.127*
(0.066)
a l  + a2 +  a3 = 1  
0.000
0.474 0.462 2.124
(5) 1 192*** 
(0.089)
0.096
(0.073)
0.321***
(0.099)
0.209***
(0.043)
0.601 0.588 1.839
A3544
(1) 0.236***
(0.079)
0.761***
(0.086)
a l  + a2 =  1  
0.028
0.375 0.368 1.989
(2) 0.238**
(0.095)
0.762***
(0.095)
= 0.25 
0.015
0.375 0.375 1.990
(3) 0.942***
(0.181)
0.183**
(0.086)
0.517***
(0.113)
0.461 0.450 1.821
(4) 0.158**
(0.078)
0.687***
(0.054)
0.153**
(0.074)
a t +  a 2 + a  3 =  1 
0.011
0.423 0.411 1.867
(5) 1.528***
(0.080)
-0.003
(0.060)
0.223**
(0 .101)
0.296***
(0.053)
0.608 0.596 1.650
A4554
(1) 0.181**
(0.074)
0.818***
(0.080)
a l  + a2 = 1
0.009
0.297 0.289 2.237
(2) 0.182**
(0.086)
0.818***
(0.086)
a x = 0.25 
0.622
0.297 0.297 2.238
(3) 1.054***
(0.184)
0 .122*
(0.072)
0.542***
(0.106)
0.402 0.389 1.984
(4) 0 .12 2**
(0.051)
0.772***
(0.030)
0.105**
(0.048)
a\ +  a2 +  a3 = 1
0.004
0.324 0.309 2.168
(5) 1.706***
(0.192)
-0.063
(0.085)
0.253***
(0.075)
0.268***
(0.052)
0.536 0.521 1.753
A5564
(1) 0.185***
(0.062)
0.807***
(0.073)
a l  + a2 = 1
0.273
0.182 0.174 2.109
(2) 0.187***
(0.066)
0.813***
(0.066)
a x =  0.25 
0.916
0.181 0.181 2.117
(3) 1.185***
(0.189)
0.082
(0.054)
0.520***
(0.094)
0.310 0.295 1.886
(4) 0.101
(0.063)
0.766***
(0.039)
0.123**
(0.058)
a l  + a2 +  a3 ~ 1
0.407
0.221 0.204 2.031
(5) 1 7 4 0 *** 
(0.276)
-0.140
(0.090)
0.300***
(0.045)
0.258***
(0.053)
0.449 0.431 1.751
A6597
*
(1) 0.215***
(0.059)
0.784***
(0.068)
a l  +  a2 = 1 
0.002
0.124 0.115 2.276
(2) 0.215***
(0.063)
0.785***
(0.063)
a x =  0.25 
0.296
0.124 0.124 2.277
(3) 1 3 1 7 *** 
(0.204)
0.113
(0.092)
0.465***
(0.114)
0.273 0.257 1.981
(4) 0.136*
(0.074)
0.755***
(0.075)
0.109**
(0.052)
a  i  +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.000
0.154 0.135 2.197
(5) 1.687***
(0.288)
* indicate si
-0.069 
(0 .101) 
gnificance at
0.317** 
(0.124) 
1,5 and 10
0 .2 1 2 *** 
(0.053) 
3ercentleve Is.
0.371 0.351 1.810
459
Appendix 5.14. Epidemiological Tests -  Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Periods
Testing Equation:
E H . t [ n t + h \  =  ftp +  E P . t [ n t + h ] +  a i E H . t - A ^ t + h - i ]  +  a 3 n t + € t
a 0 «2 «3 W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. S tat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834
(1) 0.412**
(0.191)
0.586***
(0.195)
a i +  a 2 =  1 
0.014
0.552 0.545 2.037
(2) 0.414**
(0.188)
0.586***
(0.188)
a x =  0.25 
0.759
0.552 0.552 2.036
(3) 0.648***
(0 .102)
0.352**
(0.156)
0.433***
(0.155)
0.570 0.584 1.917
(4) 0.404**
(0.182)
0.358
(0 .22 0 )
0.235***
(0.060)
a l +  a 2 +  Ct3 =  1 
0.022
0.623 0.611 1.744
(5) 1 138***
(0.172)
0.294***
(0.081)
-0.034
(0 .101)
0.363***
(0.059)
0.742 0.729 1.647
A3544
(1) 0.365*
(0.184)
0.635***
(0.187)
+ a 2 = 1 
0.000
0.416 0.407 1.952
(2) 0.365**
(0.181)
0.635***
(0.181)
a t  =  0.25 
0.401
0.416 0.416 1.953
(3) 0.942***
(0.181)
0.183**
(0.086)
0.517***
(0.113)
0.461 0.450 1.821
(4) 0.329**
(0.157)
0.443**
(0.197)
0.229***
(0.069)
a i  + a 2 + a 3 = 1 
0.000
0.485 0.468 1.679
(5) 1.546***
(0.089)
0.140**
(0.061)
-0.075
(0.069)
0.428***
(0.045)
0.676 0.660 1.597
A4554
(1) 0.186*
(0.108)
0.805***
(0 .112)
a ,  +  a 2 = 1 
0.336
0.272 0.261 2.064
(2) 0.194*
(0.108)
0.806***
(0.108)
a x =  0.25 
0.273
0.269 0.269 2.057
(3) 1.106***
(0.258)
0.127
(0.141)
0.498***
(0.106)
0.420 0.402 1.850
(4) 0.158*
(0.090)
0 727*** 
(0 .101)
0.106**
(0.041)
a 1 + a 2 + a 3 = 1 
0.392
0.298 0.275 1.933
(5) 1.963***
(0.250)
-0.015
(0.084)
-0.006
(0.105)
0.358***
(0.073)
0.619 0.601 1.539
A5564
(1) 0.261*
(0.135)
0.726***
(0.157)
a ,  +  a 2 =  1 
0.253
0.110 0.096 2.059
(2) 0.259**
(0.105)
0 741*** 
(0.105)
a x =  0.25 
0.007
0.105 0.105 2.080
(3) 1 231*** 
(0.123)
0.130
(0.147)
0.435**
(0.177)
0.254 0.231 1.847
(4) 0.172
(0.107)
0.635***
(0 .101)
0.174
(0.109)
a.i +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 0.169 0.143 1.899
(5) 1.946*** 
(0.328)
-0.130
(0.124)
0.077
(0.054)
0.361***
(0.079)
0.461 0.435 1.670
A6597
0 ) 0.383**
(0.153)
0.606***
(0 .20 2 )
a t +  a 2 = 1 
0.042
-0.007 -0.022 2.252
(2) 0.387***
(0.118)
0.613***
(0.118)
a ± =  0.25 
1.364
-0.011 -0.011 2.260
(3) 1.486***
(0.260)
0.225*
(0 .122)
0.264*
(0.144)
0.206 0.181 1.923
(4) 0.291**
(0 .120)
0.521***
(0 .100)
0.174**
(0.083)
a x + a 2 + a  3 =  1 
0.266
0.055 0.025 2.055
(5) 2.238***
(0.410)
* indicate s
-0.058 
(0.129) 
ignificance a
-0.096 
(0 .112) 
t 1, 5 and 10
0.382*** 
(0.079) 
percent levt:1s.
0.448 0.422 1.626
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Appendix 5.15. Epidemiological Tests -  Age Disaggregated Michigan Survey
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Periods
Testing Equation:
^ H .t \ - n t+ h \ ~  a 0  +  a l E p . t i n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H , t - l i n t + h - l ]  +  CC3 1 tt + € t
a  o a 2 « 3 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834
(1) 0.848***
(0.131)
0.407***
(0 .101)
a 1 + a 2 =  1 
15.816***
0.330 0.291 1.715
(2) 0.175
(0.132)
0.825***
(0.132)
a x =  0.25 
0.321
0.120 0 .120 1.850
(3) -0.006
(1.303)
0.851
(0.710)
0.407***
(0.073)
0.330 0.247 1.715
(4) 0.789***
(0.140)
0.348***
(0.086)
0.143**
(0.051)
a i  +  cc2 +  a 3 =  1 
9 9 1 0 ***
0.434 0.363 1.786
(5) 1.543*
(0.811)
0.084
(0.312)
0.310***
(0.069)
0.196***
(0.051)
0.473 0.368 1.830
A3544
(1) 0.865***
(0.175)
0.394**
(0.155)
a t +  a 2 =  1 
53.973***
0.452 0.420 1.362
(2) 0.204
(0.191)
0.796***
(0.191)
a t =  0.25 
0.058
0.284 0.284 1.461
(3) -1.173
(1.397)
1.456*
(0.787)
0.355
(0.247)
0.475 0.409 1.357
(4) 0.973***
(0 .101)
0.146**
(0.060)
0.246***
(0.067)
a 1 + a 2 +  a 3 = 1 
25.723***
0.655 0.612 1.285
(5) 0.610
(0.696)
0.675*
(0.376)
0.146***
(0.039)
0.266***
(0.075)
0.660 0.592 1.353
A4554
(1) 0.934***
(0.173)
0.373**
(0.157)
a i + a2 — 1
56.363***
0.341 0.303 1.477
(2) 0.175
(0.185)
0.825***
(0.185)
a t =  0.25 
0.163
0.139 0.139 1.638
(3) -0.199
( 1.68 8 )
1.031 ' 
(0.948)
0.369*
(0.176)
0.342 0.260 1.477
(4) 1.134***
(0.177)
0.070
(0.123)
0.253**
(0.096)
a l  +  a2 +  a3 =  1
13.961***
0.538 0.480 1.379
(5) 2.092**
(0.885)
0.180
(0.399)
0.015
(0.086)
0.334***
(0.078)
0.593 0.512 1.601
A5564
(1) 0.949***
(0.290)
0.359
(0 .22 2 )
a l +  a2 — 1
12.224***
0.333 0.294 1.270
(2) 0.185
(0.145)
0.815***
(0.145)
a 1 =  0.25 
0.200
0.105 0.105 1.508
(3) -0.108
(1.538)
1.000
(0.862)
0.358**
(0.141)
0.333 0.250 1.262
(4) \ 0 4 4 *** 
(0.265)
0.155
(0.174)
0.209***
(0.059)
c*i +  a 2 +  a  3 =  1 
8.104***
0.503 0.441 1.220
(5) 2.073*
(1.174)
0.118
(0.632)
0.087
(0.103)
0.289***
(0.049)
0.564 0.477 1.657
A6597
(1) 0.965***
(0.225)
0.387**
(0.139)
cti 4- a 2 =  1 
12.711***
0.261 0.217 1.348
(2) 0.082
(0.159)
0.918***
(0.159)
a 1 =  0.25 
1.116
0.004 0.004 1.536
(3) 0.483
(1.090)
0.763
(0.639)
0.374**
(0.142)
0.266 0.174 1.357
(4) 0.936**
(0.333)
0.310
(0.209)
0 147***
(0.050)
a l +  a2 +  a3 — 1
5.671**
0.378 0.300 1.244
(5) 2.433**
(0.859)
-0.097
(0.445)
0 .2 0 2 **
(0.088)
0.235***
(0.052)
0.476 0.371 1.487
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Appendix 5.16. Epidemiological Tests -  Education Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E H.t[n t+h\ ~  a 0 +  a lE p . t [ n t+h\ +  « 2 fo .t-lfo t+ f» -l]  +  a Zn t + e t
«o a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS
(1) 0.152***
(0.047)
0.845***
(0.047)
a x +  a 2  =  1 
0.051
0.066 0.058 2.4.50
(2) 0.155***
(0.047)
0.845***
(0.047)
a x =  0.25 
4.158**
0.066 0.066 2.4 51
(3) I 7 7 9 ***
(0.359)
-0.005
(0.057)
0 494*** 
(0.097)
0.241 0.228 2.0:89
(4) 0.069
(0.062)
0.804***
(0.045)
0.135*
(0.075)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1 
0.266
0.096 0.080 2.381
(5) 2  139*** 
(0.345)
-0.184**
(0.090)
0.350***
(0.086)
0.242**
(0.106)
0.331 0.312 1.9.56
EHSD
(1) 0.097**
(0.041)
0.890***
(0.047)
a x +  a  2 =  1 
0.938
0.105 0.097 2.371
(2) 0.097**
(0.043)
0.903***
(0.043)
a x =  0.25 
12.549***
0.099 0.099 2.3 8 6
(3) 1.436***
(0.182)
0.040
(0.044)
0.512***
(0.074)
0.286 0.274 2.035
(4) 0.040
(0.037)
0.849***
(0.036)
0.104***
(0.033)
a l  +  a2 +  a3 = 1 0.137 0 . 1 2 2 2.315
(5) 1.785***
(0.186)
-0.082
(0.053)
0.342***
(0.062)
q 197*** 
(0.062)
0.392 0.375 1.9'07
ESC
(1) q |29***
(0.043)
0.849***
(0.054)
a x +  a 2 =  1  
2.544
0.207 0 . 2 0 0 2.281
(2) 0 .1 2 2 ***
(0.037)
0.878***
(0.037)
a x =  0.25 
12.029***
0.195 0.195 2.313
(3) 1 2 2 7 *** 
(0.278)
0.077
(0.055)
0.523***
(0 .1 2 0 )
0.354 0.343 1.999
(4) 0.077
(0.049)
0.798***
(0.051)
0.107*
(0.057)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  = 1 
1.691
0.235 0 .2 2 1 2.214
(5) 1.517***
(0.190)
-0.031
(0.064)
0.351***
(0 . 1 2 0 )
0  199***
(0.048)
0.440 0.425 1.860
ECD
(1) 0.366***
(0.088)
0.577***
(0.113)
a x + a 2  = 1  
3.922**
0.230 0.224 2.160
(2) 0.319***
(0.075)
0.681***
(0.075)
a x - -  0.25 
0.827
0.177 0.177 2.277
(3) 1 25i***
(0.214)
0.302***
(0.084)
0.253*
(0.134)
0.395 0.384 1.928
(4) 0.269***
(0.097)
0.396**
(0.171)
0.283***
(0.089)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
2.156
0.350 0.339 1.900
(5) 1.511*** 
(0.291)
0.164
(0 .1 2 2 )
-0.044
(0.155)
0.360***
(0.057)
0.581 0.570 1.735
EGS
(1) 0.409***
(0 . 1 1 0 )
0.560***
(0.124)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
2.501
0.552 0.548 1.986
(2) 0.397***
(0.103)
0.603***
(0.103)
a x —  0.25 
2.020
0.538 0.538 2.020
(3) 0.166***
(0.130)
0.369***
(0.118)
0.375***
(0.121)
0.606 0.599 1.864
(4) 0.357***
(0.084)
0.367***
(0.083)
0.257***
(0.057)
a x + a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.773
0.621 0.614 1.744
(5) 0 878***
(0.227)
0.306***
(0.094)
0.132*
(0.069)
0.287***
(0.066)
0.692 0.683 1.661
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Appendix 5.17. Epidemiological Tests -  Education Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
^ H ,t \ -n t+ h \ ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H . t - l \ - n t + h - l \  +  ^ 3 7 l t + € t
a 0 « 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS
(1) 0.234***
(0.062)
0  7 9 4 *** 
(0.058)
a l  +  a 2  =  1
2.994*
0.076 0.066 2.472
(2) 0.188***
(0.058)
0.812***
(0.058)
—  0.25 
1.158
0.063 0.063 2.487
(3) 1.725***
(0.374)
0.042
(0.076)
0.480***
(0.106)
0.234 0.217 2.136
(4) 0.159*
(0.093)
0.775***
(0.051)
0.098
(0.084)
a x 4- a 2 +  0C3  =  1 
2.331
0.091 0.071 2.423
(5) 2.145***
(0.404)
-0.180
(0.149)
0.358***
(0.094)
0.229*
(0.133)
0.307 0.285 1.986
EHSD
(1) 0  1 4 9 *** 
(0.050)
0.857***
(0.053)
a l  +  a 2  =  1
0.314
0 . 1 2 2 0.113 2.294
(2) 0.142**
(0.061)
0.858***
(0.061)
a x =  0.25 
3.099*
0 .1 2 1 0 .1 2 1 2.293
(3) 1.386***
(0.208)
0.068
(0.064)
0.508***
(0.089)
0.275 0.259 1.965
(4) 0.087*
(0.048)
0.836***
(0.039)
0.085**
(0.033)
+  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.348
0.143 0.125 2.253
(5) 1.867***
(0 .2 0 0 )
-0.108
(0.080)
0.335**
(0.139)
0.203***
(0.057)
0.379 0.359 1.821
ESC
(1) 0.142***
(0.051)
0.858***
(0.056)
ai +  a 2  =  1 
0 .0 0 1
0.383 0.376 2.058
(2) 0.142**
(0.054)
0.858***
(0.054)
a 1 =  0.25 
3.946**
0.383 0.383 2.058
(3) 0.905***
(0.219)
0.081
(0.057)
0.631***
(0.097)
0.458 0.446 1.861
(4) 0.087*
(0.052)
0.828***
(0.034)
0.085
(0.053)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1  
0.000
0.401 0.388 2.016
(5) 1.304***
(0.161)
-0.067
(0.066)
0.465***
(0.066)
0.187***
(0.054)
0.531 0.515 1.723
ECD
(1) 0.343***
(0.103)
0.634***
(0.115)
a x +  a 2  =  1 
1.023
0.273 0.265 1.960
(2) 0.342***
(0.108)
0.658***
(0.108)
a x =  0.25 
0.725
0.264 0.264 1.984
(3) 1 .0 1 2 ***
(0.167)
0.246***
(0.093)
q  3 9 9 * * *  
(0 .1 1 1 )
0.376 0.363 1.818
(4) 0.236***
(0.065)
0.511***
(0.083)
0.225***
(0.049)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 0.357 0.343 1.753
(5) 1.595***
(0.306)
0 .0 1 1
(0.086)
0.057
(0.062)
0.376***
(0.054)
0.575 0.561 1.634
EGS
(1) 0.460***
(0.123)
0.530***
(0.136)
a t  +  a 2  =  1  
0.163
0.455 0.449 1.912
(2) 0.466***
(0 .1 2 1 )
0.534***
(0 . 1 2 1 )
a 1 =  0.25 
3.203*
0.454 0.454 1.914
(3) 0.740***
(0.157)
0.370***
(0.114)
0.387***
(0.107)
0.506 0.496 1.828
(4) 0.368***
(0.091)
0.351***
(0.080)
0.271***
(0.067)
a 1 +  a 2 +  a 3  =  1 0.540 0.530 1.712
(5) 1.135***
(0.242)
0.196**
(0.094)
0.065
(0.042)
0.370***
(0.052)
0.649 0.638 1.696
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Appendix 5.18. Epidemiological Tests -  Education Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E H . t f a t + h i  =  t*o +  Ep.t [ n t+h] +  a 2 E H . t - i [ n t + h - i ]  + a 3 n t + e t
«Q « i « 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS
(1) 0.345
(0.290)
0.699***
(0.262)
a x +  a 2  =  1  
1.283
0.057 0.043 2.507
(2) 0.248
(0.192)
0.752***
(0.192)
a x =  0.25 
0 . 0 0 0
0.029 0.029 2.576
(3) 1.684***
(0.492)
0.086
(0.145)
0.438**
(0.176)
0 .2 0 1 0.175 2.194
(4) 0.199
(0.145)
0.636***
(0 .1 0 0 )
0.216*
(0.128)
a x +  a 2  +  c t 3  =  1 
2.146
0.106 0.078 2.371
(5) 2.257***
(0.495)
-0.258
(0.176)
0.237*
(0.123)
0.379***
(0.114)
0.335 0.303 1.921
EHSD
(1) 0.270***
(0.099)
q 7 3 7 *** 
(0 .1 0 0 )
(Xx +  CCo —  1
0.192
0.043 0.028 2.339
(2) 0.260**
(0 .1 0 2 )
0.740***
(0 .1 0 2 )
a x =  0.25 
0 . 0 1 0
0.041 0.041 2.344
(3) 1.473***
(0.337)
0.167
(0 .1 1 2 )
0.362***
(0.107)
0.245 0 .2 2 1 1.968
(4) 0 .2 0 1 **
(0.092)
0.673***
(0.071)
0.133**
(0.050)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
0.153
0.088 0.059 2.216
(5) 2.530***
(0.231)
-0.108
(0.084)
-0.094
(0.084)
0.388***
(0.072)
0.520 0.497 1.820
ESC
(1) 0.234*
(0.125)
0.760***
(0.133)
a x +  a 2  =  1 
0.176
0.345 0.335 2.069
(2) 0.238*
(0.128)
0.762***
(0.128)
a x =  0.25 
0.009
0.344 0.344 2.070
(3) 0.926***
(0.193)
0.149
(0.098)
0.536***
(0.059)
0.435 0.417 1.908
(4) 0.193*
(0.099)
0.630***
(0.114)
0.168***
(0.059)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.250
0.390 0.370 1.856
(5) 1 .6 8 8 ***
(0.338)
-0.015
(0.098)
0.053
(0.145)
0.388***
(0 .1 1 2 )
0.612 0.593 1.522
ECD
0 ) 0 474*** 
(0.171)
0.494**
(0.193)
a l  +  a 2  — 1
0.943
0.380 0.370 1.929
(2) 0.453***
(0.162)
0.547***
(0.162)
a x =  0.25 
1.586
0.356 0.356 1.974
(3) 0.796***
(0.197)
0.361**
(0.139)
0.337***
(0.106)
0.449 0.431 1.851
(4) 0.406***
(0.144)
0.293*
(0.148)
0.256***
(0.079)
a x +  a 2  +  cc3  =  1 0.469 0.452 1.632
(5) 1.225***
(0.287)
0 .2 0 1 **
(0.094)
-0.038
(0.089)
0.370***
(0.064)
0.615 0.597 1.625
EGS
(1) 0.405**
(0.185)
0.582***
(0.203)
a x +  a 2  =  1  
0.295
0.477 0.469 1.894
(2) 0.405**
(0.155)
0.595***
(0.155)
a x — 0.25 
1 .0 0 2
0.474 0.474 1.908
(3) 0.596
(0.490)
0.303
(0.401)
0.484*
(0.277)
0.511 0.496 1.833
(4) 0.370***
(0.126)
0.275
(0.167)
0.331***
(0.095)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1  
0.940
0.578 0.564 1.528
(5) 1.092
(0.286)
0.170
(0.123)
-0.020
(0.069)
0.454***
(0.077)
0.678 0.662 1.488
* * *  * *  *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.19. Epidemiological Tests -  Education Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E f / , t [ n t + / i ]  —  f t p  +  t t j E p t  [7 lt+ h ] +  CC2 E  H , t - l [ ^ t + h - l \  +  a 3 n t + € t
« i  a2 Wald x 2 Test R2 R2 D.W. Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q 3 -  2011Q1
ELHS
(1) 1.157***
(0.361)
0.349*
(0.194)
at + a2 = 1 
7.845***
0.165 0.116 1.518
(2) 0.130
(0.116)
0.870***
(0.116)
a1 =  0.25 
1.078
-0.173 -0.173 1.918
(3) 1.042
(1.780)
0.734
(0.898)
0.319
(0.185)
0.182 0.079 1.542
(4) 1 138***
(0.378)
0.313
(0.215)
0.084
(0.176)
at + a2 + a3 =  1 
6.428**
0.190 | 0.089 1.478
(5) 2.726
(2.873)
0.008
(1.233)
0.190
(0 .2 0 0 )
0.188
(0.321)
0.265 0.1181 1.588
EHSD
(1) 1.027***
(0.336)
0.373**
(0.174)
a l  +  a 2 =  1
5.974**
0.186 0.139 1.554
(2) 0.060
(0.114)
0.940***
(0.114) 2.754*
-0.073 -0.073 1.844
(3) 0.953
(1.132)
0.645
(0.684)
0.341**
(0.134)
0.209 0 . 1 1 0 1.551
(4) 1.038**
(0.453)
0.284
(0.276)
0.134**
(0.057)
c* i + a2 + a3 = 1 
4  1 4 4 **
0.288 0.198 1.498
(5) 3.140**
(1.461)
-0.214
(0.568)
0.096
(0.188)
0.253**
(0 .1 1 1 )
0.450 0.340 1.730
ESC
(1) 0.753***
(0.167)
0.514***
(0.105)
a l  +  a 2 =  1
12.729***
0.380 0.344 1.275
(2) 0 . 1 0 0
(0.146)
0.900***
(0.146)
at = 0.25 
1.062
0.224 0.224 1.429
(3) 0.350
(1.348)
0.603
(0.802)
0.508***
(0.152)
0.383 0.306 1.276
(4) 0.776***
(0.209)
0.422**
(0.153)
0 . 1 2 0
(0.083)
a l  +  a 2 + a3 = 1 
6.082**
0.454 0.385 1.270
(5) 1.995*
(0.990)
-0.062
(0.459)
0.325***
(0.087)
0.197**
(0.077)
0.517 0.421 1.437
ECD
(1) 1.055***
(0.106)
0.217*
(0.118)
at + a2 = 1 
83.171***
0.259 0.216 1.643
(2) 0.420
(0.275)
0.580**
(0.275)
a1 = 0.25 
0.382
0.037 0.037 1.754
(3) -1.366
(2.097)
1.733
(1.042)
0.176
(0.112)
0.281 0.191 1.615
(4) 1.168***
(0.201)
-0.172
(0.135)
0.404***
(0.048)
at + a2 + a3 = 1 
20.095***
0.616 0.568 1.738
(5) 1.537
(0.936)
0.420
(0.509)
-0.177
(0.123)
0.456***
(0.039)
0.638 0.566 2.032
EGS
(1) 1.069***
(0.127)
0.188
(0.137)
a l  + a 2 =  1
72.029***
0.331 0.291 1.653
(2) 0.483
(0.280)
0.517*
(0.280)
ax = 0.25 
0.695
0.138 0.138 1.775
(3) 0.596
(0.490)
0.303
(0.401)
0.484*
(0.277)
0.511 0.496 1.833
(4) 1.152***
(0.114)
-0.162*
(0.077)
0.383***
(0.052)
a1 + a2 + £*3 = 1 
62.810***
0.638 0.593 2.048
(5) -0.849
(0.886)
1.583***
(0.487)
-0.177**
(0.081)
0.359***
(0.055)
0.645 0.573 1.951
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.20. Epidemiological Tests -  Gender Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Eqiuation:
EH.t[n t+h\ — a o + a iEp. t [n t+h\ + a 2 ^H , t - i [n t+h- i \  + Q^t+et
a  o a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982.3-2011.1
MALE
(1) 0.167***
(0.056)
0.798***
(0.068)
a l  + a 2 ~  1
4.745**
0.206 0.199 2.034
(2) 0.133**
(0.065)
0.867***
(0.065)
=  0.25 
3.230*
0.176 0.176 2.104
(3) 1.2 0 0 ***
(0.175)
0.137***
(0.049)
0.436***
(0.099)
0.369 0.358 1.780
(4) 0.106**
(0.052)
0.709***
(0.043)
0.149*** 
(0.045)
a ± + a 2 + a 3 = 1 
6.147**
0.262 0.249 1.888
(5) 1.639***
(0.232)
0.017
(0.072)
0.143***
(0.039)
0.270***
(0.046)
0.529 0.516 1.604
FEMALE
(1) 0.133**
(0.054)
0.858***
(0.064)
R
O 
+
“ 
II 0.352 0.346 2.273
(2) 0.136***
(0.048)
0.864***
(0.048)
£*! =  0.25 
5.666**
0.350 0.350 1.520
(3) 1 103*** 
(0.0272)
0.114*
(0.061)
0.557***
(0.118)
0.458 0.448 1.994
(4) 0.082
(0.050)
0 797*** 
(0.059)
0 .121**
(0.049)
a l  +  a 2 + a 3 = 1  
0.000
0.383 0.372 2.195
(5) 1.462***
(0.282)
0.016
(0.063)
0.347*
(0.198)
0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.071)
0.548 0.536 1.831
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.21. Epidemiological Tests -  Gender Disaggregated Michigan 
Survey Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E//.t[fl't+/1] =  a 0 +  g 1gf».t [g t+ft] +  g 2^ . t - i k + h - i ]  +  a 3n t + e t
a 0 « i a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE
(1) 0.226***
(0.071)
0.756***
(0.079)
a l  +  a 2 ~  1  
1.222
0.238 0.230 1.980
(2) 0 .2 2 2 **
(0 .101)
0.778***
(0 .101)
a x =  0.25 
0.076
0.230 0.230 2.002
(3) 1.080***
(0.158)
0.157**
(0.062)
0.464***
(0.091)
0.364 0.351 1.786
(4) 0.156**
(0.072)
0.694***
(0.057)
0.128**
(0.054)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 ~  1
1.841
0.278 0.263 1.868
(5) 1.699***
(0.297)
-0.039
(0.087)
0.157***
(0.050)
0.289***
(0.057)
0.527 0.512 1.609
FEMALE
(1) 0.138**
(0.066)
0.873***
(0.067)
a \  +  a 2 =  1  
1.344
0.519 0.513 1.817
(2) 0.119*
(0.069)
0.881***
(0.069)
a x =  0.25 
3.623*
0.516 0.516 1.822
(3) 0.731***
(0.163)
0.107
(0.065)
0.685***
(0.085)
0.563 0.554 1.684
(4) 0.081
(0.064)
0.837***
(0.052)
0.095**
(0.042)
a l  +  a 2 +  a Z =  1
1.492
0.538 0.528 1.752
(5) 1.130***
(0.158)
-0.020
(0.072)
0.511***
(0 .100)
0.187***
(0.046)
0.626 0.614 1.539
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.22. Epidemiological Tests -  Gender Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
a n « i «2 Wald x z Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
M ALE
(1) 0.267
(0.189)
0.713***
(0.209)
tfi +  a 2 =  1 
0.750
0.356 0.346 2.079
(2) 0.247*
(0.136)
0.753***
(0.136)
a x — 0.25 
0.001
0.342 0.342 2.126
(3) 0.878***
(0.172)
0.201
(0.173)
0 4 7 4 *** 
(0.172)
0.448 0.431 1.896
(4) 0.225*
(0.131)
0.587***
(0.157)
0.158***
(0.040)
a x +  a 2  + a  3 =  1 
1.774
0.405 0.386 1.846
(5) 1.560***
(0.226)
0.059
(0.094)
0.013
(0.125)
0.346***
(0.071)
0.628 0.610 1.505
FEM A LE
(1) 0.248
(0.153)
0.765***
(0.149)
a - ,  + a  2 =  1 
0.782
0.489 0.481 2.002
(2) 0.215
(0.150)
0.785***
(0.150)
a x — 0.25 
0.054
0.485 0.485 2.035
(3) 0.800***
(0.270)
0.207
(0.133)
0.554***
(0.150)
0.552 0.537 1.835
(4) 0.224*
(0.130)
0.630***
(0.150)
0.164**
(0.070)
a x +  a 2 + a 3  =  1 
0.430
0.531 0.516 1.793
(5) 1.765***
(0.074)
0.098*
(0.058)
-0.044
(0.066)
0.420***
(0.042)
0.733 0.720 1.597
Appendix 5.23. Epidemiological Tests -  Gender Disaggregated Michigan 
Survey Forecasts — Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E H t [ n t+h] =  ftp +  a i E p . t [ n t+ h \  +  ^ 2 E H . t - i i n t + h - i \  +  g 3 ^ t + g t
a0 «2 Wald x  Test R i R ‘ D.W. Stat
M ALE
(1) 1.042***
(0.109)
0.239**
(0.105)
a 1 +  a 2 =  1 
82.634***
0.286 0.244 1.596
(2) 0.342
(0.225)
0.658***
(0.225)
a t  = 0.25 
0.167
0.040 0.040 1.700
(3) -0.844
(1.623)
1.451*
(0.806)
0 .2 2 2 ***
(0.064)
0.297 0.209 1.586
(4) 1.176***
(0.144)
-0.071
(0.093)
0.290***
(0.073)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
23.123***
0.526 0.466 1.634
(5) 1.534
(0.909)
0.460
(0.490)
-0.101
(0.072)
0.348***
(0.068)
0.553 0.464 1.854
FEM A LE
(1) 0.782**
(0.312)
0.519**
(0 .210 )
a 1 +  a 2 =  1 
6.636**
0.396 0.361 1.029
(2) 0.056
(0.105)
0  9 4 4 *** 
(0.105)
a t = 0.25 
3.391*
0.254 0.254 1.217
(3) 0.166
(1.417)
0.707
(0.751)
0.518**
(0.214)
0.397 0.321 1.040
(4) 0.821***
(0.199)
0.397***
(0.125)
0.156**
(0.061)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
10.082
0.505 0.443 0.945
(5) 1.959
(1.252)
-0.038
(0.551)
0.329***
(0.097)
0.228***
(0.064)
0.563 0.475 1.268
* * * * * *  jnd icate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.24. Epidemiological Tests -  Income Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing E quation :
F / f . t f o t + f t ]  ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H . t - l [ n t + h - l \  +  & 3 7Tt + € t
a 0 «2 Waid x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
(1) 0.108**
(0.045)
0.890***
(0.044)
ai +  a 2 =  1 
0.034
0.249 0.243 2.654
(2) 0 .110**
(0.044)
0.890***
(0.044)
a x =  0.25 
10.170***
0.249 0.249 2.654
(3) 1.339***
(0.362)
0.030
(0.050)
0.595***
(0 .112)
0.370 0.359 2.320
(4) 0.051
(0.046)
0.851***
(0.045)
0.106**
(0.048)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
0.373
0.271 0.258 2.603
(5) 1.690***
(0.316)
-0.101
(0.062)
0 444*** 
(0.104)
0.206***
(0.066)
0.444 0.429 2.184
Y24
(1) 0.142***
(0.038)
0.843***
(0.046)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
1.261
0.203 0.196 2.228
(2) q 142***
(0.046)
0.858***
(0.046)
a x =  0.25 
5.352**
0.196 0.196 2.243
(3) 1.288***
(0.227)
0.096*
(0.053)
0.503***
(0.094)
0.354 0.342 1.946
(4) 0.064
(0.039)
0.766***
(0.035)
0.164***
(0.041)
a \  +  a Z +  a 3  ~  1
0.164
0.264 0.251 2.110
(5) 1.683***
(0.217)
-0.044
(0.071)
0.275***
(0.091)
0.265***
(0.040)
0.499 0.486 1.771
Y34
(1) 0.175***
(0.057)
q 7 9 i***
(0.072)
a l  +  a 2 =  1
3.693*
0.186 0.179 2.242
(2) 0.150***
(0.056)
0.850***
(0.056)
a x =  0.25 
3.212*
0.157 0.157 2.309
(3) 1.256***
(0.278)
0.136**
(0.057)
0.430***
(0.138)
0.359 0.348 1.956
(4) 0.114**
(0.051)
0.713***
(0.077)
0.141**
(0.060)
a , +  a 2 +  a? =  1 
2.825*
0.234 0.220 2.149
(5) 1.593***
(0.138)
0.022
(0.062)
0.199*
(0.105)
0.242***
(0.038)
0.488 0.475 1.817
Y44
(1) 0.325***
(0.097)
0.610***
(0 .121)
a i +  cl2 =  1 
4.995**
0.313 0.307 1.858
(2) 0.247***
(0.094)
0.753***
(0.094)
a t =  0.25 
0.001
0.252 0.252 1.989
(3) 1.031***
(0.161)
0.268***
(0.059)
0.334***
(0.066)
0.431 0.421 1.717
(4) 0.255***
(0.077)
0 441*** 
(0.069)
0.234***
(0.064)
a x + a 2 + a  3 =  1 
5.573**
0.393 0.383 1.622
(5)
$$ $  aje s|
5
1.310***
(0.209)
,* indicate s
0.157**
(0.063)
ignificance a
0.028
(0.060)
t 1, 5 and 10
0.319***
(0.076)
percent lev els.
0.573 0.561 1.568
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Appendix 5.25. Epidemiological Tests -  Income Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
X
«o «1
“ 0 ^  **1 "P, 
«2
. V ' - t + t i i  1
Wald x 2 Test R2 R2 D.W. Stat
Period: Greenspjin-Bernank e 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14
(1) 0.167***
(0.058)
0.856***
(0.054)
a - ,  +  a 2  =  1  
3.747*
0.315 0.308 2.657
(2) 0.123**
(0.049)
0.876***
(0.049)
a x —  0.25 
6.598**
0.306 0.306 2.682
(3) 1.175***
(0.363)
0.067
(0.070)
0.618***
(0 .1 1 2 )
0.400 0.387 2.357
(4) 0 .1 0 2 *
(0.059)
0.834***
(0.051)
0.091*
(0.052)
a i  +  a 2 +  # 3  =  1
3.838*
0.331 0.316 2.615
(5) 1.595***
(0.389)
-0 . 1 1 2
(0 .1 0 1 )
0.484***
(0.107)
0 .2 0 1 **
(0.077)
0.464 0.446 2 . 2 0 2
Y24
(1) 0  179***
(0.044)
0.828***
(0.050)
a l +  a 2 =  1
0.311
0.286 0.279 2.064
(2) 0.171**
(0.067)
0.829***
(0.067)
a x =  0.25 
1.375
0.285 0.285 2.063
(3) 1.098***
(0.228)
0.109
(0.070)
0.558***
(0.096)
0.389 0.376 1.849
(4) 0.088*
(0.046)
0.782***
(0.025)
0.139***
(0.041)
a l  +  a 2 +  <*3 =  1
0.312
0.331 0.317 1.969
(5) 1.635***
(0.268)
-0.095
(0.084)
0.340***
(0.058)
0.261***
(0.042)
0.524 0.509 1.658
Y34
(1) 0.169**
(0.073)
0.821***
(0.081)
a ,  +  a 2  =  1  
0.527
0.338 0.331 1.931
(2) 0.170**
(0.085)
0.830***
(0.085)
a x —  0.25 
0.870
0.335 0.335 1.940
(3) 0.939***
(0.185)
0.114**
(0.056)
0.567***
(0 .1 0 0 )
0.429 0.417 1.754
(4) 0.108
(0.068)
0.773***
(0.060)
0.108*
(0.055)
a x +  a 2  +  a 3  =  1 
0.847
0.368 0.354 1.873
(5) 1 471*** 
(0.126)
-0.055
(0.061)
0.318***
(0.088)
0.239***
(0.050)
0.548 0.533 1.628
Y44
(1) 0.386***
(0.128)
0.573***
(0.148)
& i  +  a 2  =  1 
2.434
0.325 0.318 1.801
(2) 0.362***
(0.123)
0.638***
(0.123)
a x =  0.25 
0.829
0.298 0.298 1.849
(3) 0.876***
(0.129)
0.283***
(0.076)
0.383***
(0.075)
0.406 0.394 1.731
(4) 0.309***
(0 .1 0 2 )
0  4 3 4 *** 
(0.085)
0.204**
(0.084)
CCX +  (X2  3 "  & 3  =  1
4.934**
0.383 0.379 1.591
(5) 1.358***
(0.323)
0.097
(0.085)
0.042
(0.092)
0.347***
(0.085)
0.550 0.535 1.554
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
469
Appendix 5.26. Epidemiological Tests -  Income Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
^ H ,t \ -n t+ h \  —  f t p  +  a l  E p , t [ n t+ h ]  +  a 2 ^ H . t - l \ . n t + h - l \  +  <X3n t  +  € t
a 0 « i « 2 Wald x 2  Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14
(1) 0.293***
(0.073)
0  7 4 2 *** 
(0.066)
a l  +  a 2 “  1
3.338*
0.125 0 . 1 1 2 2.457
(2 ) 0  2 9 9 *** 
(0.066)
0.801***
(0.066)
a x =  0.25 
0.584
0 .1 0 1 0 .1 0 1 2.555
(3) 2 4 4 4 *** 
(0.511)
0.157*
(0.094)
0.439***
(0.113)
0.274 0.251 2.124
(4) 0.207***
(0.072)
0.636***
(0.146)
0.203
(0.167)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
1.916
0.184 0.158 2.250
(5) 2.664***
(0.475)
-0.177
(0.132)
-0.083
(0.114)
0.517***
(0.103)
0.548 0.526 1.684
Y24
(1 ) 0.217*
(0 .1 1 0 )
0.789***
(0.113)
a l  +  a 2 =  1  
0.182
0.313 0.303 1.959
(2 ) 0.208*
(0.116)
0.792***
(0.116)
ax =  0.25 
0.132
0.312 0.312 1.962
(3) 1.008***
(0.304)
0.166
(0.163)
0.513***
(0.104)
0.411 0.392 1.744
(4) 0.158*
(0.082)
0.678***
(0.080)
0.171***
(0.047)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 “  1  
0 . 2 1 0
0.374 0.354 1.793
(5) 2.109***
(0.157)
-0.038
(0.075)
-0.063
(0.046)
0.424***
(0.037)
0.667 0.651 1.572
Y34
(1 ) 0.302
(0.185)
0.682***
(0.198)
ax +  a2 = 1 
0.645
0.385 0.375 2.087
(2 ) 0.297*
(0.161)
0.703***
(0.161)
ax = 0.25 
0.087
0.377 0.377 2.106
(3) 0.831***
(0.299)
0 .2 2 1
(0.153)
0.481***
(0.159)
0.462 0.445 1.929
(4) 0.269*
(0.138)
0.531***
(0.187)
0  2 7 7 *** 
(0.064)
ax + a2 + a3 = 1 
1.225
0.433 0.415 1.878
(5) 1 5 4 4 *** 
(0.176)
0.078
(0.084)
-0 .0 2 1
(0.116)
0.386***
(0.069)
0.632 0.614 1.632
Y44
(1) 0.448***
(0.168)
0.507**
(0.192)
ax + a2 = 1 
2.267
0.343 0.333 1.961
(2 ) 0.384**
(0.152)
0.616***
(0.152)
ax =  0.25 
0.782
0.296 0.296 2.082
(3) 0.824***
(0 .2 0 2 )
0.327*
(0.166)
0.342**
(0.147)
0.421 0.403 1.885
(4) 0.374***
(0.103)
0.337**
(0.157)
0.228**
(0.089)
cti + a2 + a-x — 1 
3.587*
0.421 0.403 1.691
(5) 1.147**
(0.487)
0.175
(0.134)
0.042
(0.166)
0 327*** 
(0.087)
0.562 0.541 1.623
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.27. Epidemiological Tests -  Income Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
£//.tPrt+/i] =  a Q +  a tE p t f r t + b ]  +  a 2EH. t- i[^ t+h- i]  +  «3  ^ t+ ^ t
«1 «2 W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W . Stat
Period: V olatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14
(1) 1.153***
(0.368)
0.380*
(0.207)
a \  +  «2 =  1 
9.766***
0.352 0.314 1.569
(2) 0.069
(0.089)
0.931***
(0.089)
a x ~  0 .25  
4.161**
0.074 0.074 2.282
(3) 0.178
(1.665)
1.078
(0.847)
0.376*
(0.214)
0.352 0.271 1.575
(4) 1.150***
(0.388)
0.318
(0.194)
0.119**
(0.053)
a i  +  olz +  a 3 =  1 
11.179***
0.411 0.338 1.583
(5) 1.680
(1.254)
0.442
(0.578)
0.252
(0.164)
0.181**
(0.070)
0.448 0.338 1.744
Y24
(1) 1.330***
(0.291)
0.167
(0.205)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
23.962***
0.335 0.295 1.734
(2) 0.152
(0.126)
0.848***
(0.126)
a x =  0.25  
0.604
0.007 0.007 1.994
(3) -0.723
(1.448)
1.718**
(0.775)
0.131
(0.214)
0.343 0.261 1.757
(4) 1.462***
(0.286)
-0.078
(0.153)
0.260**
(0.091)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
28.674***
0.569 0.515 1.693
(5) 1.275
(1.219)
0.796
(0.691)
-0.050
(0.137)
0.298**
(0.109)
0.589 0.507 1.747
Y34
(1) 0.798***
(0.150)
0 441***  
(0.125)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
20.434***
0.396 0.360 1.264
(2) 0.174
(0.191)
0.826***
(0.191)
a x =  0.25  
0.158
0.218 0.218 1.356
(3) -0.332
(1.432)
0.949
(0.813)
0.442**
(0.163)
0.398 0.323 1.256
(4) 0.857***
(0.260)
0.263
(0.177)
0 194*** 
(0.061)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
5.537**
0.556 0.501 1.220
(5) 1.698*
(0.926)
0.106
(0.569)
0.198*
(0.097)
0.260***
(0.051)
0.599 0.518 1.472
Y 44
(1) 0.875***
(0.195)
0.279
(0.180)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
2.980*
0.256 0.213 1.524
(2) 0.571**
(0.207)
0.429*
(0.207)
a x =  0.25  
2.394
0.176 0.176 1.511
(3) -1.780
(1.796)
1.779*
(0.842)
0.204***
(0.039)
0.284 0.194 1.508
(4) 1.010***
(0.038)
-0.159
(0.274)
0.399
(0.304)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
24.466***
0.481 0.416 1.615
(5) 0.197
(1.740)
0.913
(0.819)
-0.157
(0.325)
0.405
(0.405)
0.481 0.377 1.627
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.28. Epidemiological Tests -  Regionally Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
E H .tb t t+ h ]  =  «o  +  <*i Ep.tfrt+ft] +  « 2 V i [ % f t - i ]  +  a 3n t + € t
“ 0 a x a 2 Wald x 2 Test R2 R2 D.W. Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC
(1) 0.126***
(0.044)
0.857***
(0.053)
a 1 +  a 2 =  1 
1.513
0.218 0.211 2.137
(2) 0.118***
(0.038)
0.882***
(0.038)
a x =  0.25 
12.308***
0.209 0.209 2.168
(3) 1.201***
(0.217)
0.092*
(0.053)
0.513***
(0.104)
0.358 0.347 1.826
(4) 0.069
(0.046)
0.802***
(0.041)
0.116**
(0.047)
a l  +  a 2 +  CC3 =  1
0.930
0.255 0.242 2.062
(5) 1.543***
(0.181)
-0.018
(0.054)
0 329*** 
(0.115)
0.206***
(0.037)
0.465 0.450 1.677
NE
(1) 0.256***
(0.070)
0.715***
(0.086)
a-, +  a 2 =  1 
2.040
0.290 0.284 2.261
(2) 0.248***
(0.079)
0.752***
(0.079)
a x =  0.25 
0.001
0.274 0.274 2.301
(3) 1.136***
(0.210)
0.200**
(0.081)
0.430***
(0.123)
0.412 0.402 2.018
(4) 0.180**
(0.072)
0.587***
(0.122)
0.213**
(0.098)
a l  + a 2 +  CC3 =  1
0.702
0.355 0.344 2.030
(5) 1.412***
(0.264)
0.080
(0.092)
0.181*
(0.101)
0.299***
(0.063)
0.533 0.521 1.728
S
(1) 0.115***
(0.042)
0.866***
(0.050)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
2.012
0.256 0.250 2.093
(2) 0.109**
(0.045)
0.891***
(0.045)
a x =  0.25 
10.033***
0.245 0.245 2.117
(3) 1 291*** 
(0.188)
0.094**
(0.041)
0.519***
(0.082)
0.402 0.391 1.841
(4) 0.060
(0.036)
0.811***
(0.032)
0.116***
(0.043)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
1.520
0.296 0.283 2.034
(5) 1.526***
(0.153)
-0.010
(0.057)
0.324***
(0.066)
0.204***
(0.040)
0.513 0.499 1.745
w
(1) 0.225***
(0.061)
0.746***
(0.075)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
2.504
0.272 0.265 2.372
(2) 0.212***
(0.062)
0.788***
(0.062)
a x =  0.25 
0.375
0.251 0.251 2.418
(3) 1.253***
(0.289)
0.206***
(0.071)
0.382**
(0.148)
0.434 0.424 2.035
(4) 0.158***
(0.057)
0.639***
(0.096)
0.181***
(0.060)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
1.091
0.340 0.328 2.240
(5) 1.648***
(0.175)
0.092
(0.076)
0.094
(0.107)
0.292***
(0.036)
0.595 0.584 1.866
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
472
Appendix 5.29. Epidemiological Tests -  Regionally Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
F H ,t\.n t+ h \ ~  a 0  +  a l E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  a 2 ^ H . t - l [ n t + h - l ]  +  a 3 n t  +  € t
« i «2 Wald x2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC
(1) 0.161***
(0.060)
0.838***
(0.067)
a.A +  a 2 =  1 
0.005
0.341 0.334 1.937
(2) 0.162**
(0.063)
0.838***
(0.063)
a x = 0.25 
1.937
0.341 0.341 1.938
(3) 0.956***
(0.161)
0 .110*
(0.059)
0.581***
(0.090)
0.430 0.417 1.756
(4) 0.103
(0.063)
0.807***
(0.043)
0.089*
(0.049)
a i + cc2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.003
0.362 0.349 1.890
(5) 1.328***
(0 .121)
-0.030
(0.074)
0.422***
(0.077)
0.183***
(0.043)
0.506 0.490 1.643
NE
(1) 0.264***
(0.085)
0.734***
(0.092)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
0 .020
0.380 0.374 2.022
(2) 0.266**
(0.115)
0.734***
(0.115)
a x = 0.25 
0.018
0.380 0.380 2.023
(3) 0.867***
(0.197)
0.178*
(0.091)
0.546***
(0.115)
0.447 0.435 1.875
(4) 0.190**
(0.080)
0.649***
(0.090)
0.158**
(0.067)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0 .010
0.416 0.403 1.871
(5) 1 3 3 9 *** 
(0.285)
-0.005
(0.108)
0.287***
(0.070)
0.292***
(0.073)
0.549 0.534 1.615
S
(1) 0.159***
(0.054)
0.841***
(0.059)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
0.000
0.300 0.293 1.993
(2) 0.159***
(0.059)
0.841***
(0.059)
a x =  0.25 
2.414
0.300 0.300 1.993
(3) 1.063***
(0.172)
0.114**
(0.051)
0.548***
(0.085)
0.409 0.397 1.776
(4) 0.092*
(0.048)
0.808***
(0.030)
0 .100**
(0.047)
cti + a 2 + a 3 =  1 
0.004
0.331 0.317 1.942
(5) 1.527***
(0.204)
-0.044
(0.068)
0.352***
(0.051)
0.208***
(0.043)
0.521 0.505 1.650
w
(1) 0.217***
(0.076)
0.781***
(0.081)
a x +  a 2 =  1 
0.034
0.418 0.412 2.060
(2) 0.219***
(0.079)
0.781***
(0.079)
a x =  0.25 
0.156
0.418 0.418 2.061
(3) 0.897***
(0 .112)
0.182***
(0.067)
0.532***
(0.081)
0.499 0.489 1.864
(4) 0.147**
(0.063)
0.715***
(0.050)
0.136***
(0.049)
a x +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0 .020
0.461 0.450 1.969
(5) 1.468***
(0.181)
0.020
(0.074)
0.242***
(0.055)
0.271***
(0.043)
0.636 0.624 1.701
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.30. Epidemiological Tests -  Regionally Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing E quation:
=  a0 +  aiEpAnt+h] +  +  a ^ t+et
a 0 « 1  «2 W ald x 2 Test R2 R2 D.W. Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC
(1) 0.303**
(0.134)
0.693***
(0.141)
a l  +  a 2 =  1
0.055
0.364 0.355 1.997
(2) 0.306**
(0.143)
0.694***
(0.143)
ax =  0.25 
0.152
0.364 0.364 1.998
(3) 0 9 2 7 ***
(0.214)
0.237**
(0.118)
0.453***
(0.091)
0.454 0.437 1.815
(4) 0.258**
(0 .100)
0.589***
(0.136)
0.147**
(0.064)
a l  + a 2 +  a 3 —  1
0.113
0.405 0.386 1.823
(5) 1.544***
(0 .22 0 )
0.093
(0.065)
0.063
(0.068)
0.320***
(0.056)
0.604 0.584 1.533
NE
(1) 0.336*
(0.186)
0.650***
(0 .2 0 2 )
ax + a2 = 1 
0.219
0.384 0.375 2.099
(2) 0.341*
(0.174)
0.659***
(0.174)
ax =  0.25 
0.273
0.379 0.379 2.103
(3) 0.780***
(0.270)
0.204
(0.141)
0.520***
(0.151)
0.440 0.423 2.019
(4) 0.271*
(0.139)
0.426*
(0.225)
0.280**
(0.115)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1
0.774
0.459 0.442 1.742
(5) 1.435***
(0.146)
-0.014
(0.084)
0.034
(0.151)
0.472***
(0.092)
0.614 0.595 1.617
S
(1) 0.199***
(0.068)
0.798***
(0.078)
a1 + a2 = 1 
0.036
0.398 0.389 2.052
(2) 0 .2 0 2 ***
(0.069)
0.798***
(0.069)
ax =  0.25 
0.482
0.398 0.398 2.050
(3) 0 929*** 
(0.175)
0.171
(0.144)
0.519***
(0.113)
0.495 0.479 1.845
(4) 0.168*
(0.090)
0.717***
(0.092)
0 .112***
(0.038)
ax + a2 + a3 = 1 
0.074
0.427 0.409 1.873
(5) 1.701***
(0.179)
0.061
(0.095)
0.059
(0.113)
q 214***
(0.069)
0.657 0.641 1.414
w
(1) 0.309*
(0.165)
0.689***
(0.170)
a, + a2 = 1 
0.027
0.426 0.417 2.051
(2) 0.310*
(0.169)
0.690***
(0.169)
ax =  0.25 
0.129
0.426 0.426 2.051
(3) 0.853***
(0.227)
0.258*
(0.134)
0.457***
(0.141)
0.505 0.489 1.863
(4) 0.265*
(0.133)
0.536***
(0.139)
0 194*** 
(0.061)
a l  +  a 2 +  a 3 =  1 
0.080
0.493 0.477 1.870
(5) 1.596***
(0.155)
0.128*
(0.069)
-0.046
(0.097)
0.383***
(0.059)
0.706 0.692 1.759
* * * * * *  indieate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.31. Epidemiological Tests -  Regionally Disaggregated Michigan
Survey Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
^ H , t [n t+ h \  ~  a 0 +  a l E p A n t+ h \  +  ^ ^ H . t - l l ^ t + h - l ]  +  **3^ t  +  c t
«o a  i  a 2 Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W. Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC
(1) 0.856***
(0.137)
0.438***
(0.094)
ax + a2 = 1 
22.396***
0.391 0.355 1.224
(2) 0.102
(0.156)
0.898***
(0.156)
ax =  0.25 
0.903
0.187 0.187 1.403
(3) -0.168
(1.350)
0.929
(0.671)
0.441*
(0.219)
0.391 0.315 1.216
(4) 0 .8 6 8 ***
(0.208)
0.329**
(0.140)
0.150*
(0.075)
a l  +  <X2 +  a 3 =  1
8.733***
0.504 0.442 1.224
(5) 1.490
(0.927)
0.220
(0.426)
0.271***
(0.077)
0.206**
(0.078)
0.540 0.448 1.453
NE
(1) 1 074*** 
(0.199)
0.279
(0.165)
a l  + a 2 = 1
58.555***
0.309 0.268 1.485
(2) 0.206
(0.284)
0.794**
(0.284)
ax = 0.25 
0.024
0.040 0.040 1.686
(3) -0.709
(1.689)
1.421
(0.897)
0.263*
(0.136)
0.316 0.231 1.462
(4) 1.254***
(0.227)
-0.037
(0.140)
0.282***
(0.065)
a l  + a 2 +  a 3 =  1
17.754***
0.526 0.466 1.424
(5) 1.609
(0.971)
0.506
(0.484)
-0.068
(0.115)
0.343***
(0.053)
0.555 0.465 1.659
S
(1) 0.943***
(0.178)
q 3 7 4 ***
(0.117)
at + a2 = 1 
16.747***
0.299 0.257 1.403
(2) 0.149
(0.105)
0.851***
(0.105)
=  0.25 
0.922
0.033 0.033 1.614
(3) 0.136
(1.304)
0.886
(0.714)
0.371***
(0 .111)
0.299 0.212 1.408
(4) 0.930***
(0.254)
0.278*
(0.156)
0.157***
(0.049)
a l  + a 2 +  a 3 = 1
7.851***
0.425 0.353 1.390
(5) 2.163*
( 1.101)
0.016
(0.683)
0.175*
(0.095)
0.239***
(0.067)
0.497 0.397 1.705
w
(1) 0.923***
(0.138)
0.350**
(0.139)
a l  +  a 2 =  1
44.428***
0.366 0.329 1.605
(2) 0.203
(0.186)
0 797*** 
(0.186)
at =  0.25 
0.065
0.169 0.169 1.746
(3) -0.366
(1.517)
1.106
( 1.122)
0.339
(0.549)
0.368 0.290 1.617
(4) 1.086***
(0.144)
0.065
(0.103)
0.254***
(0.065)
<*1 + a2 + a3 = 1 
18.675***
0.592 0.541 1.556
(5) 1.690**
(0.788)
0.282
(0.367)
0.046
(0.083)
0.304***
(0.072)
0.635 0.562 1.695
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.32. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Age Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h] = P 0 +  + P 2E ? - j [ n t+h-j ] + *t
( 2 ) . E t , / / [ 7 r t + / i ]  = Po  + P l n t -k  + (I “  P l ) ^ t - i , H \ j t t+h-j \  + €t 
(3). Et \j i t+h\ = Po P i ^ P i ^ t - i  +  (1 ~ P i ) ^ t  fot+ftD ( I  ~ P i ) E t - i \ ' I*t+h-j\
Po P i (1 - P i ) P i (1 - P i ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 (1) 0 .2 1 0 ***
(0.058)
0 779*** 
(0.063)
Pi +  Pi ~  1
1.114
0.356 0.351 2.605
(2) 0.216***
(0.055)
0.784***
(0.055)
f t  =  0.18 
0.415
0.354 0.354 2.610
(3) 0.375***
(0.083)
0.625***
(0.083)
0.457***
(0.131)
0.543***
(0.131)
f t  =  0.25 
2.283 
Pi* ( 1 - P i )  =  0.25 
0.719
0.402 0.397 2.329
A3445 (1) 0.239***
(0.070)
0.750***
(0.072)
Pi + Pi =  1
0.884
0.401 0.395 2.258
(2) 0.244***
(0.071)
0.756***
(0.071)
P1 =  0.18 
0.815
0.398 0.398 2.261
(3) 0.360***
(0.062)
0.640***
(0.062)
0.564***
(0.149)
0.436***
(0.149)
P1 =  0.25 
3.148* 
f t  * (1 -  Pi) =  0.25 
3.117*
0.433 0.428 2.085
A4554 (1) 0.182***
(0.049)
0.807***
(0.052)
Pi + Pi — 1
0.766
0.198 0.191 2.272
(2) 0.184***
(0.051)
0.816***
(0.051)
f t  =  0.18 
0.005
0.195 0.195 2.286
(3) 0.230***
(0.030)
0.770***
(0.030)
0.650***
(0.180)
0.350*
(0.180)
f t  =  0.25 
0.463 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
15.533***
0.211 0.204 2.217
A5564 (1) 0.190***
(0.052)
0.790***
(0.056)
f t  +  f t  =  1 
2.106
0.099 0.091 2.074
(2) 0.187***
(0.047)
0.813***
(0.047)
f t  =  0.18 
0.022
0.088 0.088 2.106
(3) 0.205***
(0.036)
0.795***
(0.036)
0.787***
(0.206)
0.213
(0.206)
f t  =  0.25 
1.574
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
23.186***
0.093 0.085 2.078
A6597 (1) 0.185***
(0.043)
0.800***
(0.052)
f t  +  f t  =  1 
0.859
0.114 0.106 2.214
(2) 0.185***
(0.041)
0.815***
(0.041)
f t  =  0.18 
0.017
0.109 0.109 2.239
(3) 0 .2 0 1 ***
(0.032)
0 7 9 9 ***
(0.032)
0.748***
(0.184)
0.252
(0.184)
f t  =  0.25 
2.400 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
26.588***
0.115 0.108 2.234
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.33. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Age Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l) .E?[nt+h\ = p 0 + f$\Tct- k +  P2E?-j[nt+h-)\ + et 
(2).EtM[nt+h] = Po + PiTtt_k +  ( 1  — P i ) E t - j H\ n t + h - j \  +  €t 
( 3 ) .  E?[nt+I,] =  Pq + Pi{P2n t. j  +  ( 1  -  / ? 2 ) f f  [n t+h\ )  +  ( 1  -  n t+h-j\  +  c t
Po P i (1 -f t) P i (I P i ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 (1) 0.176***
(0.062)
0.818***
(0.063)
Pi +  Pi — 1
0.335
0.440 0.434 2.294
(2) 0.178***
(0.045)
0.822***
(0.045)
P1 =  0.18 
0.002
0.439 0.439 2.301
(3) 0.313***
(0.073)
0.687***
(0.073)
0.407**
(0.156)
0.593***
(0.156)
P i  =  0.25 
0.740 
Pi* ( 1 -  P2) =  0.25
0.474 0.468 2.124
A3445 (1) 0 .2 0 1 ***
(0.068)
q 79i*** 
(0.068)
Pi +  P2 =  1 
0.379
0.393 0.386 1.973
(2) 0.204***
(0.066)
0.796***
(0.066)
&  =  0.18 
0.131
0.391 0.391 1.979
(3) 0  3]2***
(0.057)
0 .6 8 8 ***
(0.057)
0.491**
(0.223)
0.509**
(0.223)
Px =  0.25 
1.182
p 1 * a - p 2) =  0.25 
1.178
0.423 0.417 1.868
A4554 (1) 0.148***
(0.050)
0.846***
(0.052)
Pi +  Pi =  1
0.204
0.301 0.293 2.260
(2) 0.150**
(0.062)
0.850***
(0.062)
P1 =  0.18 
0.230
0.300 0.300 2.266
(3) 0.228***
(0.029)
0.772***
(0.029)
0.461**
(0 .21 2 )
0.539**
(0 .21 2 )
f t  =  0.25 
0.547
Pi* a -  P2 ) =  0.25 
5.596
0.324 0.316 2.168
A5564 (1) 0.170***
(0.049)
0.819***
(0.051)
Pi +  Pi — 1
0.677
0.203 0.195 2.098
(2) 0.170***
(0.047)
0.830***
(0.047)
f t  =  0.18 
0.044
0.200 0 .200 2.114
(3) 0.227***
(0.039)
0.773***
(0.039)
0.539**
(0.246)
0.461*
(0.246)
Pi =  0.25 
0.349 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
5.417**
0.219 0.210 2.041
A6597 (1) 0.168***
(0.044)
0.827***
(0.052)
Pi +  Pi =  1 
0.082
0.126 0.117 2.295
(2) 0.170***
(0.046)
0.830***
(0.046)
Pi =  0.18
0.051
0.126 0.126 2.301
(3) 0.245***
(0.051)
0.755***
(0.051)
0.445*
(0.262)
0.555**
(0.262)
Pi =  0.25 
0.008
Pi* ( 1 -  Pi)  =  0.25 
2.224
0.154 0.145 2.197
*** ** * jn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.34. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Age Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] = 0O + P i ^ t - k  + p 2 E?- j \n t+h- j \  +  e t 
C£) Et,H[n t+h\ =  P o  +  P l n t - k  +  (1  ~  P l ) E t- j ,H [n t+ h - j \  +  € t 
(3). E ? [ n t+h]  =  Po +  P i ( P 2n t- i  + (1 ~ P i ) E pt [ n t+h\ )  + (1 -  0i)Ef-/[7rf+/l_y] + c t
Po P i ( 1 - P i ) P  2 ( . 1 - P z ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 (1) 0.242***
(0.079)
0.745***
(0.082)
0 1 + 0 2 - 1
0.642
0.524 0.517 2.174
(2) 0 241*** 
(0.077)
0.759***
(0.077)
0 ! =  0.18 
0.632
0.519 0.519 2.186
(3) 0.642***
(0.216)
0.358
(0.216)
0.366***
(0.096)
0.634***
(0.096)
0! =  0.25 
3.300*
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
0.732
0.623 0.617 1.743
A3445 (1) 0.261***
(0.097)
0.727***
(0 .1 0 2 )
01  +  0 2  =  1 
0.476
0.395 0.385 1.994
(2) 0.263***
(0.097)
0.737***
(0.097)
0 ! =  0.18 
0.725
0.391 0.391 2.003
(3) 0.557***
(0.179)
0.443**
(0.179)
0.410***
(0.096)
0.590***
(0.096)
0! =  0.25 
2.946*
0i * (1 -  02) = 0.25 
0.320
0.485 0.477 1.679
A4554 (1) 0.130**
(0.061)
0.856***
(0.063)
01  +  0 2  =  1 
0.862
0.265 0.254 2.145
(2) 0129***  
(0.040)
0.871***
(0.040)
0 ! =  0.18 
1.607
0.256 0.256 2.155
(3) 0.271***
(0 .1 0 0 )
0 729*** 
(0 .1 0 0 )
0.383**
(0.152)
0.617***
(0.152)
0! =  0.25 
0.042 
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
0.890
0.293 0.282 1.928
A5564 (1) 0.233***
(0.079)
0.747***
(0.077)
01  +  0 2  =  1 
1 .0 2 1
0.130 0.116 2.064
(2) 0 .2 2 2 **
(0.093)
0.778***
(0.093)
0 x =  0.18 
0.206
0.117 0.117 2 .1 1 0
(3) 0.337***
(0.099)
0.663***
(0.099)
0.482
(0.296)
0.518*
(0.296)
0! =  0.25 
0.780 
0i * (1 ~  02) =  0.25 
0.437
0.157 0.144 1.937
A6597 (1) 0.277***
(0.077)
0.702***
(0.081)
0 1 + 0 2 - 1
0.849
-0.060 -0.077 2.327
(2) 0.274***
(0.082)
0.726***
(0.082)
0 ! =  0.18 
1.318
-0.076 -0.076 2.364
(3) 0.468***
(0.093)
0.532***
(0.093)
0.360**
(0.173)
0.640***
(0.173)
0! =  0.25 
5.527 
0i * (1 — 02) — 0.25 
0.204
0.047 0.032 2.070
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.35. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Age Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(l).Is? [7tt+h] -  Po  +  P i n t-u  +  P 2E ? - j [ n t+h- j \  + e t 
(2 ) E t,H[7tt+h] — Po  + P l n t -k  + (1 — P l ) E t - j , H [n t+h-j \  + €t 
( 3 ) . E f  b r t+ h ] =  p 0 +  P i ( P 2n t- i  + U ~ P z ) E Pt \ n t+h\) + (1 -  P i ) E ^ - i \ n t+h_ \^ + e t
P o P i a - P i ) P z (1 ~ P z ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 (1) 0.167**
(0.071)
0.869***
(0.060)
P i  +  P 2 — 1
2.693
0.194 0.147 2.124
(2) 0.136
(0.082)
0.864***
(0.082)
f t  = 0.18 
0.290
0.175 0.175 2.041
(3) 0.190***
(0.050)
0.810***
(0.050)
0.592
(0.342)
0.408
(0.342)
f t  =  0.25 
1.405
P i  * (1 P 2 )  ~  0.25 
6.282**
0.186 0.138 1.944
A3445 (1) 0.205**
(0.092)
0.827***
(0.062)
p t + p 2 =  l 
0.950
0.353 0.315 1.464
(2) 0.174*
(0.091)
0.826***
(0.091)
p 1 =  0.18 
0.005
0.341 0.341 1.444
(3) 0.251***
(0.057)
0  7 4 9 *** 
(0.057)
0.565
(0.520)
0.435
(0.520)
f t  = 0.25 
0 .0 0 0  
P i * ( l - P 2)  =  0.25 
0.844
0.361 0.323 1.378
A4554 (1) 0.168*
(0.084)
0.859***
(0.060)
P i  +  Pz  — 1 
0.530
0.164 0.115 1.683
(2) 0.138
(0 .1 0 0 )
0.862***
(0 .1 0 0 )
p 1 =  0.18 
0.172
0.156 0.156 1.667
(3) 0.209***
(0.069)
0  79i***
(0.069)
0.486
(0.527)
0.514
(0.527)
/?! = 0.25 
0.350 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
1.044
0.178 0.130 1.593
A5564 (1) 0.168**
(0.075)
0.857***
(0.062)
P i  4" P 2 =  1
0.580
0.136 0.085 1.593
(2) 0.142
(0.086)
0.858***
(0.086)
f t  = 0.18 
0.197
0.128 0.128 1.576
(3) 0.213**
(0.095)
0.787***
(0.095)
0.487
(0.554)
0.513
(0.554)
f t  =  0.25 
0.152 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  = 0.25 
0.776
0.153 0.104 1.490
A6597 (1) 0.157**
(0.055)
0.897***
(0.043)
Pi  +  f t  = 1 
5.085**
0.114 0.061 1.544
(2) 0 .1 0 1
(0.086)
0.899***
(0.086)
f t  =  0.18 
0.842
0.066 0.066 1.496
(3) 0.092
(0.067)
0.908***
(0.067)
1.148
( 1 .2 2 0 )
-0.148
( 1 .2 2 0 )
f t  = 0.25 
5.509*** 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
6.424**
0.066 0 .0 1 2 1.506
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.36. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Education Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( 1 ) .  E?[nt+h] = p 0 +  Pxitt-k +  PzE?_j[nt+h_j] + e t 
( 2 ) . E t ,H[ n t+h\ — P o  +  P \ n t -k + (1 — P i ) E t - j , H \n t+h-j \ + €t 
( $ ) . E t [ n t+h\ — P o  +  P i i . P i n t - i  + ( I  ~  P i ) ^ t [ n t+h\) + ( I  ~  P i ) E t - j [ n t+h-j] + €t
Po P i (1 - P i ) P i (1 - P z ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.181***
(0.058)
0.827***
(0.050)
Pi +  P2 ~  1
0.252
0.088 0.080 2.415
(2) 0.173***
(0.058)
0.827***
(0.058)
p 1 =  0.18 
0.016
0.087 0.087 2.414
(3) 0.196***
(0.043)
0.804***
(0.043)
0.649**
(0.313)
0.351
(0.313)
p 1 =  0.25 
1.566
A  * (1  — Pi) — 0-25
8.438***
0.095 0.087 2.382
EHSD (1) 0.124***
(0.037)
0.870***
(0.042)
Pi +  P2 =  1
0.292
0.133 0.125 2.357
(2) 0.127***
(0.041)
0.873***
(0.041)
p x =  0.18 
1.654
0.132 0.132 2.360
(3) 0.146***
(0.034)
0.854***
(0.034)
0.743***
(0.214)
0.257
(0.214)
Px =  0.25 
9 4 7 3 *** 
f t  * (1  -  Pi) =  0.25 
36.195***
0.136 0.128 2.321
ESC (1) 0.142***
(0.053)
0.844***
(0.055)
Pi +  Pi =  1
1.962
0.222 0.215 2.296
(2) 0.145**
(0.054)
0.855***
(0.054
p x =  0.18 
0.413
0.216 0.216 2.307
(3) 0.184***
(0.041)
0.816***
(0.041)
0.629***
(0.226)
0.371
(0.226)
Px =  0.25 
2.623
Pi* 0- — Pi) =  0-25 
20.053***
0.227 0.220 2.236
ECD (1) 0.360***
(0.074)
0.606***
(0.082)
Pi + Pi =  1
2.850*
0.260 0.254 2.211
(2) 0.357***
(0.070)
0.643***
(0.070)
/?! =  0.18 
6.323**
0.240 0.240 2.249
(3) 0.514***
(0 .122)
0.486***
(0 .122)
0.569***
(0.092)
0.431***
(0.092)
&  =  0.25 
4.720**
0 i  * (1  — Pi) =  0-25 
0.134
0.305 0.299 1.997
EGS (1) 0.303***
(0.064)
0.687***
(0.067)
0 1 + 0 2  =  1 
0.466
0.535 0.531 2.097
(2) 0.309***
(0.068)
0.691***
(0.068)
p x =  0.18 
3.627*
0.534 0.534 2.101
(3) 0.617***
(0.070)
0.383***
(0.070)
0.436***
(0.082)
0.564***
(0.082)
0! =  0.25 
27.127***
0i * ( 1  — 02) =  0.25 
1.884
0.616 0.613 1.753
* * * * * *  indiCate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.37. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Education Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( X ) - E t [ n t+h\ ~  Po + P i n t -k  + P i E t - j [ n t+h-j \ + € t 
(2). E t H [ n t+f,] =  p o  +  P i i t t . .k +  (1  — P i ) E t _j H [ n t+h_ j \  +  e t 
(3). £?[* ,+ ,,] =  /?„ +  +  (1 -  +  (1 ~  P D E ? - , [ n , + h- i ]  +  e.
Po P i a - P i ) P i ( 1 - 02 ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.183***
(0.066)
0.833***
(0.053)
Pi +  P2 ~  1
0.652
0.063 0.053 2.488
(2) 0.164***
(0.060)
0.836***
(0.060)
f t  =  0.18 
0.073
0.059 0.059 2.489
(3) 0.203***
(0.051)
0  7 9 7 *** 
(0.051)
0.432
(0.427)
0.568
(0.427)
p ± =  0.25 
0.827 
0 i  * (1  — Pi) =  0.25 
1.822
0.076 0.066 2.445
EHSD (1) 0 .122***
(0.038)
0.880***
(0.041)
Pi +  Pi =  1
0.053
0.130 0.121 2.320
(2) 0 .121***
(0.045)
0.879***
(0.045)
0 ! =  0.18 
1.709
0.130 0.130 2.318
(3) 0.163***
(0.042)
0.837***
(0.042)
0.513**
(0.243)
0.487**
(0.243)
0! =  0.25 
4.355**
01* ( l - 0 2) =  0.25 
10.849***
0.142 0.133 2.253
ESC (1) 0 .120***
(0.045)
0.877***
(0.044)
01 +  02 =  1 
0.107
0.389 0.383 2.070
(2) 0 .121**
(0.053)
0.879***
(0.053)
0 i =  0.18
1.247
0.389 0.389 2.074
(3) 0.172***
(0.033)
0.828***
(0.033)
0.495*
(0.297)
0.505*
(0.297)
0! =  0.25 
5.565**
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
9.009***
0.401 0.395 2.016
ECD (1) 0.300***
(0.059)
0.671***
(0.068)
01 +  02 =  1 
2.457
0.295 0.288 1.922
(2) 0.292***
(0.065)
0.708***
(0.065)
0 ! =  0.18 
2.933*
0.280 0.280 1.965
(3) 0.455***
(0.107)
0.545***
(0.107)
0.476***
(0.089)
0.524***
(0.089)
0! =  0.25 
3.634*
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
0.022
0.342 0.335 1.788
EGS (1) 0.347***
(0.075)
0.632***
(0.077)
01 +  02 =  1 
1.645
0.445 0.439 2.014
(2) 0.349***
(0.065)
0.651***
(0.065)
0 ! =  0.18 
6.726***
0.439 0.439 2.033
(3) 0.646***
(0.066)
0.354***
(0.066)
0.420***
(0.109)
0.580***
(0.109)
0! =  0.25 
35.738***
0i * (1 — Pi) — 0.25 
1.998
0.539 0.534 1.713
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.38. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Education Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) - F f  [7Tt+ h ] =  ft , +  +  P 2 ^ t - j [ n t+h-j]  +  e t
(2)- E t H [ n t +h ] =  P o  +  P x n t _ k +  (1  — p 1) E t _ j H \ n t+h_}^  +  € t 
(3)- E i \ n t+k\  — P q +  P i ( . P 2 ^ t - i  ( I  ~  ^ 2 ) ^ t>[7rt+fe]) 4- (1  — P i ) E t - j [ n t+h-j]  +  €t
Po P i a - P i ) P2 a - P i ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS (1) 0.316***
(0.114)
0 7 1 4 *** 
(0.085)
Pi +  P2 ~  1
0.692
0.075 0.061 2.473
(2) 0.264***
(0.061)
0.736***
(0.061)
f t  =  0 .1 8  
1.895
0.058 0.058 2.504
(3) 0.298***
(0.082)
0.702***
(0.082)
0.649
(0.394)
0.351
(0.394)
f t  =  0 .2 5  
0.343 
f t  * ( ! “  f t )  = 0 .2 5  
1.143
0.069 0.054 2.462
EHSD (1) 0.198***
(0.060)
0.799***
(0.062)
Pi +  Pi =  1
0.034
0.024 0.008 2.419
(2) 0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.050)
0.800***
(0.050)
Pt =  0 . 1 8  
0.155
0.023 0.023 2.421
(3) 0.324***
(0.074)
0.676***
(0.074)
0.410**
(0.193)
0.590***
(0.193)
Px =  0 .2 5  
0.990 
A  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0 .2 5  
0.361
0.085 0.071 2.222
ESC (1) 0.199**
(0.079)
0.787***
(0.078)
Pi + Pi =  1 
0.610
0.351 0.341 2.055
(2) 0.196***
(0.073)
0.804***
(0.073)
p x =  0 .1 8  
0.050
0.345 0.345 2.073
(3) 0.364***
(0 .111)
0.636***
(0 .111)
0.453**
(0.172)
0.547***
(0.172)
f t  =  0 .2 5  
1.057
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0 .2 5  
0.247
0.387 0.377 1.860
ECD (1) 0.322***
(0.085)
0.640***
(0 .100)
f t  +  f t  =  1
2.279
0.331 0.321 2.039
(2) 0.286***
(0.082)
0  7J4*** 
(0.082)
f t  =  0 .1 8  
1.662
0.296 0.296 2.125
(3) 0.606***
(0.166)
0.394**
(0.166)
0.359***
(0.117)
0.641***
(0.117)
f t  =  0 .2 5  
4.585** 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0 .2 5  
0.875
0.423 0.414 1.715
EGS (1) 0.360***
(0.118)
0.613***
(0.126)
f t  +  f t  =  1 
1.146
0.483 0.475 1.914
(2) 0.339***
(0 .121)
0.661***
(0 .121)
f t  =  0 .1 8  
1.728
0.469 0.469 1.971
(3) 0.682***
(0.147)
0.318**
(0.147)
0.454***
(0.113)
0.546***
(0.113)
f t  =  0 .2 5  
8.584*** 
f t  * ( 1 -  f t )  =  0 .2 5  
1.133
0.565 0.558 1.564
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.39. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Education Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
T esting  E q u a tio n :
( l) .E?[nt+h] = 0 O + P x U t - k  +  P 2E it - j [ n t + h - J]  +  c t
(2). Et,H[ n t+h\ =  Po + P l n t -k + (I — P l ) E t - j ,H [n t+h-j \ + € t 
( 3 ) .  Ef[nt+h] = p 0 + Pi(P2 n t-i  +  ( 1  ~  Pi)EPt [ n t+h\) +  ( 1  -  0 i ) g g . / [ i r e+fc- / ] +  et
Po P i ( l - 0 i ) P i (1-02) W ald x 2 Test R2 R2 D.W.
S tat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.105
(0.191)
0.910***
(0.133)
P i + P i ~ 1
0.035
-0 .200 -0.270 1.980
(2) 0.085
(0.118)
0 914*** 
(0.118)
P 1  =  0.18 
0.645
-0.202 -0.202 1.979
(3) 0.131
(0 .120)
0.869***
(0 .120)
0.141
(1.352)
0.859
(1.351)
f t  =  0.25 
0.985
P i *  a ~  P i)  =  0.25 
0.497
-0.172 -0.240 1.916
EHSD (1) 0.131***
(0.042)
q
(0.040)
P i +  P i -  1
4.074**
0.006 -0.052 1.926
(2) 0.077
(0.061)
0.923***
(0.061)
P x =  0.18 
2.881
-0.032 -0.032 1.857
(3) 0.068
(0.070)
0.932***
(0.070)
1.229
(1.337)
-0.229
(1.337)
P x  =  0.25 
6.809***
P i *  ( 1 - P i)  =  0.25 
11.997
-0.032 -0.092 1.873
ESC (1) 0.110
(0.087)
0 9 1 4 *** 
(0.062)
P i + P i = 1
0.514
0.253 0.209 1.538
(2) 0.084
(0.093)
0.916***
(0.093)
p x =  0.18 
1.073
0.243 0.243 1.503
(3) 0 .110*
(0.055)
0.890***
(0.055)
0.603
(0.740)
0.397
(0.740)
P x  =  0.25 
6.374**
0i * (1 — P i)  — 0.25 
5.109
0.248 0.204 1.461
ECD (1) 0.347***
(0.071)
0 .6 8 8 ***
(0.081)
P i + P i = 1
1.214
0.096 0.043 1.842
(2 ) 0.317**
(0.144)
0.683***
(0.144)
Px =  0.18 
0.906
0.086 0.086 1.810
(3) 0.555***
(0.160)
0.444**
(0.160)
0.452*
(0.252)
0.548**
(0.252)
Px =  0.25 
3.656*
0 i * ( 1 — p 2) =  0 .25  
0.061
0.194 0.147 1.561
EGS (1) 0.337***
(0.078)
0.673***
(0.071)
01 + 02 = 1 
0.070
0.123 0.071 1.949
(2) 0.329***
(0 .110)
0.671***
(0 .110)
P i  =  0.18
1.833
0.122 0.122 1.942
(3) 0.611***
(0.164)
0.389**
(0.164)
0.398
(0.306)
0.602*
(0.306)
P i  =  0.25 
4.863**
0i * (1 — 02) — 0.25 
0.175
0.278 0.236 1.684
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.40. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Gender Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X).E?[nt+h\ = p 0 + P in t. k + p 2E?-j[nt+h-j\ + et 
(:2).EtH[nt+h] =  P o  +  P i n t . k +  ( 1  -  P i ) E t _j>H[ n t+h_ j\  +  e t 
( 3 ) .  Ef[nt+h] = P 0 + Pi(f i2n t l  +  ( 1  -  fi2)Ej[nt+h]) +  ( 1  -  / ? i ) E f - / [ i r t+ft J  +  et
Po P i P i (1 - P z ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W .
Stat
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
M ALE (1) 0.188***
(0.054)
0.786***
(0.061)
P \  +  P 2 ~  1
4.154**
0.237 0.230 1.982
(2) 0.178***
(0.047)
0.822***
(0.047)
P i  =  0.18 
0.011
0.219 0.219 2.018
(3) 0.222***
(0.058)
0.778***
(0.058)
0.671***
(0.180)
0.329*
(0.180)
p t  =  0.25 
0.225 
P i *  ( 1 -  P 2 )  =  0.25 
10.671***
0.232 0.225 1.960
FEM ALE (1) 0.151***
(0.054)
0.850***
(0.053)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
0.002
0.371 0.365 2.298
(2) 0.150***
(0.049)
0.850***
(0.049)
P i  =  0.18
0.369
0.371 0.371 2.298
(3) 0.203***
(0.067)
0 797*** 
(0.067)
0.595***
(0.176)
0.405**
(0.176)
P i  =  0.25 
0.487 
P i *  C l -  P 2)  =  0-25 
11.270***
0.383 0.377 2.195
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.41. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Gender Disaggregated 
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( 1  ) . E t [ n t+h] -  p 0 + P i n t _ k +  P 2 E t - j [ n t+ h - j \  +  € t
(2)- E t H [ n t+h\ =  p 0 +  P i n t - k +  ( 1  -  P i ) E t - j  H [ n t+h_j\  +  et 
(3). E ? [ n t+h] = p p +  P i ( f i 2n t l  +  (1 -  P 2) E ? [ n t+h]) +  (1  -  p 1) E ? . , [ n t+h l ] +  c t
Po P i (1 - P i ) P i (1 - P i ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W .
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
M ALE (1) 0.181***
(0.059)
0 797***
(0.065)
P i  +  P i  -  1
2.480
0.240 0.232 1.975
(2) 0.175***
(0.053)
0.825***
(0.053)
P i  =  0.18
0.009
0.228 0.228 2.007
(3) 0.277***
(0.070)
0.723***
(0.070)
0.438***
(0.151)
0.562***
(0.151)
P i  =  0.25 
0.151
P i * ( l - P z )  =  0-25 
2.213
0.266 0.258 1.899
FEM ALE (1) 0.122**
(0.047)
0.886***
(0.043)
P i  +  P i  =  1
0.351
0.530 0.525 1.809
(2) 0.115***
(0.039)
0.885***
(0.039)
P i  =  0.18 
2.821*
0.529 0.529 1.805
(3)
icate signific
0.152***
(0.048)
;ance at 1, 5
0.848***
(0.048)
and 10 perce
0.596*
(0.314)
;nt levels
0.404
(0.314)
P i  =  0.25 
4.200**
P i *  a -  P 2 )  =  0-25 
9.658***
0.534 0.529 1.761
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Appendix 5.42. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Gender Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E t [ n t+h\ — Po  + P \ n t - k  + P i ^ t - ) [ n t+h-j \  + € t 
(2)-ft,//[7rt+/t] =  Po  + P l n t -k  + (I “  0l)ft-y,//[7rt+/i-y] + €t 
(3). Ef[nt+h] = P 0 +  P M z n t - i  +  (1 -  f o +*]) +  U  ~  Pi)E?-,[nt+h,] +  e t
Po P i a - P i ) P i (1 - P i ) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D .W .
Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -- 2006Q2
M A LE (1) 0.193***
(0.057)
0.783***
(0.067)
P i + P i -  1
1.720
0.346 0.336 2.108
(2) 0.167***
(0.056)
0.833***
(0.056)
A  = 0.18 
0.055
0.328 0.328 2.177
(3) 0.335**
(0.131)
0.665***
(0.131)
0.388**
(0.162)
0.612***
(0.162)
P t =  0.25 
0.417
P i *  a - P i)  =  0.25 
0.142
0.377 0.367 1.947
FEM AL E (1) 0.182**
(0.087)
0.819***
(0.083)
& + /* 2  =  l  
0.008
0.487 0.478 2.069
(2) 0.181**
(0.070)
0.819***
(0.070)
f t  = 0.18 
0.000
0.486 0.486 2.070
(3) 0.327**
(0.138)
0.672***
(0.138)
0.458**
(0.196)
0.542***
(0.196)
f t  =  0.25 
0.313 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
0.332
0.521 0.513 1.856
*** ** * jndicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.43. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Gender Disaggregated 
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(l).£?[7Tt+ft] = Po  +  P i ^ t - k  + P l E f - j f a t + h - j ]  +
(2)-EtH[nt+h] =  Po  + PiT t t - k  + (I — 0 l)ft-/,//[7rt+/i-;] + e t 
(3). E?[nt+h] = P q + PxiPi^t- i  +  ( 1  ~  Pz)Ei[nt+h\) +  ( 1  -  P1)EHt. i [ ^ h-l\ +
00 0 i ( 1 - 0 ! ) 02 ( l - 0 2) W ald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W .
Stat
Period: V olatile 2006Q 3 -  2011Q1
M A L E (1) 0.219**
(0.091)
0 794*** 
(0.073)
0 1 + 0 2 - 1
0.142
0.005 -0.053 1.815
(2) 0.207
(0.123)
0.793***
(0.123)
0! = 0.18 
0.048
0.004 0.004 1.807
(3) 0 4 ij* * *
(0.105)
0.589***
(0.105)
0.352
(0.287)
0.648**
(0.287)
f t  =  0.25 
2.330 
0i * (1 — 0 2) =  0.25 
0.009
0.110 0.058 1.611
FEM ALE (1) 0 144* * * 
(0.049)
0.907***
(0.045)
01 + 02 = 1 
2.831*
0.336 0.297 1.231
(2) 0.087
(0.073)
0.913***
(0.073)
0! = 0.18 
1.660
0.299 0.299 1.189
(3) 0.069
(0.071)
0.931***
(0.071)
1.431
(1.795)
-0.431
(1.795)
f t  =  0.25 
6.446** 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
8.325***
0.302 0.260 1.210
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.44. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Income Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = p 0 +  P i n  t - k  + p 2 ^ - j [ n t+h-i \  +
(2 ) E t>n [ n t + h ]  — Po + P i n t -k  +  (I — P i ) E t^j H [ n t + h - j ]  +  e t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] =  p o  +  P i i P z n t ^  +  (1 -  p 2) E ^ [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 -  P 1)E!_i [ n t+h. i \ +  e t
Po P i ( l - 0 i ) P 2 ( 1 - 02) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 (1) q
(0.044)
0.873***
(0.040)
P i + P i ~  1
0.315
0.266 0.260 2.651
(2) 0.125***
(0.040)
0.875***
(0.040)
P 1  =  0.18 
1.943
0.265 0.265 2.653
(3) 0.145***
(0.037)
0.855***
(0.037)
0.666***
(0.238)
0.334
(0.238)
P t  =  0.25 
7.889*** 
0 1 * ( 1 - 0 2) = O.25 
24.603***
0.270 0.263 2.609
Y24 (1) 0.192***
(0.047)
0.804***
(0.049)
P i + P i ~ 1
0.142
0.256 0.249 2.168
(2) 0 194*** 
(0.049)
0.806***
(0.049)
P r  =  0.18 
0.085
0.255 0.255 2.170
(3) 0.230***
(0.026)
0.770***
(0.026)
0.731***
(0.162)
0.269*
(0.162)
P i  =  0.25 
0.558 
0 1 * ( 1 - 0 2) =  O.25 
22.329***
0.263 0.257 2.114
Y34 (1) 0.185***
(0.065)
0.792***
(0.070)
P i + P i = 1
4.654**
0.206 0.199 2.291
(2) 0.182***
(0.065)
0.818***
(0.065)
P i  =  0.18 
0.001
0.192 0.192 2.316
(3) 0.236***
(0.057)
0.764***
(0.057)
0.624***
(0.171)
0.376**
(0.171)
P i  =  0.25 
0.063 
0i * (1 — P i)  =  0-25 
13.297***
0.209 0.202 2.210
Y44 (1) 0.303***
(0.073)
0.653***
(0.083)
0 1 + 0 2 - 1
5.366**
0.306 0.299 1.820
(2) 0.276***
(0.075)
0.724***
(0.075)
P i  =  0.18 
1.634
0.274 0.274 1.889
(3) 0.392***
(0.099)
0.608***
(0.099)
0.552***
(0.166)
0.448***
(0.166)
P i  =  0.25 
2.058 
0 i * (1 — P i)  — 0.25 
0.145
0.321 0.315 1.763
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.45. Na'ive Sticky Information Model -  Income Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  f t , +  P iT t t - k +  P 2 E? - j [ n t+h- j ]  +  e t 
(2) E tH [ n t+h] = Po  + P l n t -k  +  (1 ~ P l )E t - j ,H [n t+h-j ]  +  €t
(3). Et \7It+h] — Po  + P i i P 2 ^ t - l  ( I  ~ P2)Et[ l I t+hY)  ~i~ ( I  ~ P l ) E t - l [ f t t + h - j \  € t
Po P i a - P i ) p 2 (1 - P z ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 (1) 0.139***
(0.048)
0.877***
(0.043)
P i + @2 ~  1
1.445
0.318 0.311 2.686
(2) 0.117***
(0.042)
0.883***
(0.042)
p 1 =  0.18 
2.270
0.312 0.312 2.686
(3) 0.140***
(0.038)
0.860***
(0.038)
0.574*
(0.330)
0.426
(0.330)
p t  =  0.25 
8.571***
Pi * ( 1 -  P 2) =  0.25 
3.820*
0.318 0.310 2.646
Y24 (1) 0.173***
(0.034)
0.830***
(0.036)
P i + P 2 -  1
0.074
0.320 0.313 2.020
(2) 0.171***
(0.046)
0.829***
(0.046)
p x =  0.18 
0.038
0.320 0.320 2.018
(3) 0.216***
(0.027)
0.784***
(0.027)
0.635***
(0 .220)
0.365
(0.220)
P i  =  0.25 
1.513
P i * a - p 2) =  0.25 
8.079***
0.329 0.322 1.969
Y34 (1) 0.146***
(0.054)
0.841***
(0.058)
P i + P 2 — 1 
1.199
0.349 0.342 1.951
(2) 0.145***
(0.049)
0.855***
(0.049)
P i  =  0.18
0.515
0.345 0.345 1.967
(3) 0.215***
(0.059)
0.785***
(0.059)
0.490**
(0.235)
0.510**
(0.235)
P i  =  0.25 
0.344 
f t  * ( l - ^ 2) =  0.25 
4.374**
0.364 0.357 1.885
Y44 (1) 0.288***
(0.078)
0 .666***
(0.090)
P i + P 2 = 1 
4.592**
0.286 0.278 1.781
(2) 0.256***
(0.088)
0 744*** 
(0.088)
P i  =  0.18
0.745
0.253 0.253 1.859
(3) 0.464***
(0.128)
0.563***
(0.128)
0.370***
(0.124)
0.630***
(0.124)
P i  =  0.25 
2.811 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
0.802
0.341 0.334 1.672
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.46. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Income Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = p 0 +  P i ^ t - k  +  P z E ? - j [ n t+h- j ]  +  e t 
(2). Et H [ n t+h] =  p 0 +  +  (1 -  H[ n t+k- j ]  +  e t
(3). E { [ n t+h] =  p 0 +  0 1(0 27rt_1 +  (1 -  p 2) E ^ [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 -  P 1) E ? . , [ n t+^ l] +  <rt
Po P i a - p o p 2 ( 1 - 02 ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 (1) 0.265*
(0.159)
0.757***
(0.136)
P i  +  P i  —  1
0.588
0.141 0.128 2.448
(2) 0.220**
(0.088)
0.780***
(0.088)
P i  =  0.18  
0.207
0.128 0.128 2.488
(3) 0.268***
(0.100)
0.732***
(0.100)
0.616*
(0.317)
0.384
(0.317)
P i  =  0.25  
0.032  
P i  * ( 1 -  P z )  =  0.25  
3.871**
0.142 0.129 2.410
Y24 (1) 0.203***
(0.058)
0.796***
(0.058)
P i  +  P z  -  1 
0.000
0.344 0.334 1.960
(2) 0.204***
(0.044)
0.796***
(0.044)
P x =  0.18  
0.286
0.344 0.344 1.960
(3) 0.318***
(0.089)
0.682***
(0.089)
0.538***
(0.191)
0.462**
(0.191)
P i  =  0.25  
0.577  
P i * ( l - P z )  =  0.25  
3.340*
0.372 0.362 1.797
Y34 (1) 0.211**
(0.105)
0.766***
(0.115)
P i  +  P z  =  1
1.337
0.359 0.349 2.154
(2) 0.192*
(0.096)
0.808***
(0.096)
P i  =  0.18  
0.016
0.345 0.345 2.201
(3) 0.423**
(0.183)
0.577***
(0.183)
0.373***
(0.122)
0.627***
(0.122)
P i  =  0.25  
0.896  
/?i* ( ! - & )  =  0.25  
0.715
0.416 0.407 1.924
Y44 (1) 0.297***
(0.077)
0.657***
(0.095)
P i  +  p 2 =  1 
3.029*
0.302 0.291 2.102
(2) 0.241***
(0.077)
0.759***
(0.077)
P i  =  0.18
0.625
0.255 0.255 2.234
(3) 0.481**
(0.206)
0.519**
(0.206)
0.350***
(0.075)
0.650***
(0.075)
P i  =  0.25  
1.256
0 i * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25  
0.254
0.342 0.332 1.892
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.47. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Income Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( 1). E ? [ n t+h\ = p 0 +  P i ^ t - k  + P z  E ? - j [ n t+h- j ]  +  e t 
(2 )-£’t,//[7rt+/i] = Po  + P i n t -k + (1 — P i ) E t - j H[ n t+h^j\ +  e t
(3) . E ! [ n t+h] = P q  +  P i ( P 2 n t- i  + (1 ~ P 2) t f [ n t+h\) + (1 -  P i ) E ? _ , [ n t+h- , ]  +  e t
Po P i (1 - P i ) P z (1 - 0 2 ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3- 2011Q1
Y14 (1) 0.121
(0.072)
0.920***
(0.060)
P i + Pz ~  1 
0.977
0.109 0.056 2.387
(2) 0.068
(0.051)
0.932***
(0.051)
p x =  0.18 
4.870**
0.089 0.089 2.341
(3) 0.073
(0.085)
0.927***
(0.085)
0.829
(1.045)
0.171
(1.045)
f t  =  0.25 
4.366**
0i * (1 — P z) =  0-25 
0.813
0.090 0.036 2.326
Y24 (1) 0.214**
(0.100)
0.839***
(0.095)
P i + Pz = 1 
1.461
0.106 0.054 1.997
(2) 0.153*
(0.085)
0.847***
(0.085)
0 ! =  0.18 
0.104
0.075 0.075 1.970
(3) 0 174*** 
(0.045)
0.826***
(0.045)
0.779
(0.462)
0.221
(0.462)
0x =  0.25 
2.816* 
0 i * ( 1 - 0 2) =  O.25
3.034
0.078 0.024 1.945
Y34 (1) 0.172**
(0.076)
0.861***
(0.055)
01 +  02 =  1 
1.299
0.278 0.236 1.452
(2) 0.142
(0.090)
0.858***
(0.090)
0 ! =  0.18 
0.181
0.264 0.264 1.414
(3) 0.210***
(0.063)
0.790***
(0.063)
0.551
(0.493)
0.449
(0.493)
0! =  0.25 
0.411
0 i * ( 1 - 0 2) =  O.25 
1.205
0.281 0.239 1.339
Y44 (1) 0.292
(0.324)
0.673*
(0.344)
01 +  02 =  1 
0.226
0.029 -0.028 1.514
(2) 0.315
(0.328)
0.685*
(0.328)
0 i =  0.18
0.170
0.021 0.021 1.528
(3) 0.804***
(0.120)
0.196
(0.120)
0.337*
(0.188)
0.663***
(0.188)
0 i =  0.25 
21.385***
0 i * (1 — 0 2) — 0.25 
1.228
0.293 0.252 1.345
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.48. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(!)• E t [ n t+h] = p 0 +  p xn t . k +  P 2 ^ t - j [ ^ t + h - j ]  +  *t 
(2 ) - E t H [ n t+h] =  Po +  p xn t - k +  (1 — P x) E t_j H[ n t+h_j] +  e t 
(3)- E t [ n t+h] =  P q + p x ( P 2n t - i  + (1 -  P i ) E i [ n t+hJ) + (1 -  + ct
Po P i ( 1 - f t ) P i (I P i ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.146***
(0.041)
0.845***
(0.043)
P i  +  P i  ~  1
0.758
0.244 0.237 2.120
(2) 0 147*** 
(0.040)
0.853***
(0.040)
P 1 =  0.18 
0.671
0.241 0.241 2.132
(3) 0.182***
(0.033)
0.818***
(0.033)
0.666***
(0.202)
0.334
(0.202)
A = 0.25 
4.167**
P i *  i X  — P i )  — 0.25 
23.756***
0.250 0.244 2.084
NE (1) 0.270***
(0.087)
0.716***
(0.091)
P i  +  P i  — 1
0.896
0.313 0.307 2.210
(2) 0.276***
(0.092)
0.724***
(0.092)
P 1 =  0.18 
1.077
0.309 0.309 2.218
(3) 0.395***
(0.071)
0.605***
(0.071)
0.567***
(0.174)
0.433**
(0.174)
ft = 0.25 
4.180**
P i  * ( 1 - P 2)  =  0 . 2 5  
1.438
0.348 0.342 2.048
S (1) 0.140***
(0.040)
0.849***
(0.042)
P i  +  P i  =  1
1.241
0.287 0.281 2.100
(2) 0.143***
(0.039)
0.857***
(0.039)
P x =  0.18 
0.894
0.284 0.284 2.107
(3) 0.175***
(0.031)
0.825***
(0.031)
0.703***
(0.183)
0.297
(0.183)
/?! = 0.25 
5.870**
A *(1 - ft) = 0.25 
34.707***
0.290 0.284 2.050
w (1) 0.229***
(0.071)
0.756***
(0.076)
P i  +  P 2 -  1 
1.661
0.297 0.291 2.468
(2) 0.234***
(0.072)
0.766***
(0.072)
A = 0.18 
0.555
0.291 0.291 2.478
(3) 0.336***
(0.068)
0.664***
(0.068)
0.569***
(0.125)
0.431***
(0.125)
A =  0.25 
1.619
A *(1- P i )  = 0.25 
4.942**
0.328 0.322 2.270
**♦,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.49. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X ) . E j f [n t+h] ~  Po  +  P i n t - k  +  P l E t - j [ n t + h - j \  +  e t 
( 2 ) . E t,H[ n t+h] =  Po  +  0 17rt_fc +  (1 — P i ) E t-.]iH[ n t+h-.j\ +  e t 
{ 3 ) . E f [ n t+h] =  P o  +  P i ( P 2n t . 1 +  (1 -  P 2) E pt [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 ~  0 i ) i f f - / [7W / ]  +  et
Po P i (1 - P i ) P  2 ( 1 - 0 2 ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.127***
(0.041)
0.869***
(0.041)
Pi +  Pz ~  1 
0.116
0.347 0.340 1.964
(2) 0.128***
(0.041)
0.872***
(0.041)
ft  = 0.18 
1.577
0.346 0.346 1.968
(3) 0.192***
(0.041)
0.808***
(0.041)
0.463*
(0.278)
0.537*
(0.278)
f t  = 0.25 
1.974
0 i*  ( l - 0 2) =  0.25 
4.986**
0.362 0.356 1.891
NE (1) 0 .2 2 0 ***
(0.078)
0.770***
(0.081)
Pi +  02 =  1
0.416
0.380 0.373 2.004
(2) 0 .2 2 2 ***
(0.081)
0.778***
(0.081)
0! = 0.18 
0.275
0.378 0.378 2.014
(3) 0.350***
(0.073)
0.650***
(0.073)
0.452**
(0 .2 1 0 )
0.548**
(0 .21 0 )
A  = 0.25 
1.900
0 i*  ( l - / ? 2) = 0.25
0.396
0.416 0.409 1.871
S (1) 0.134***
(0.045)
0.863***
(0.045)
P i  +  02 = 1
0.071
0.316 0.309 2.004
(2) 0.135***
(0.042)
0.865***
(0.042)
0! = 0.18 
1.154
0.316 0.316 2.007
(3) 0.192***
(0.029)
0.808***
(0.029)
0.522**
(0.240)
0.478**
(0.240)
0! = 0.25 
3.862**
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
10.083
0.331 0.324 1.941
w (1) 0.178***
(0.052)
0.815***
(0.054)
01 + 02 = 1 
0.435
0.433 0.427 2.093
(2) 0.180***
(0.046)
0.820***
(0.046)
0! = 0.18 
0.000
0.432 0.432 2.100
(3) 0.285***
(0.051)
0.715***
(0.051)
0 4 7 9 ***
(0.177)
0.521***
(0.177)
0! = 0.25 
0.473 
0i * (1 — 02) =  0.25 
2.508
0.461 0.455 1.970
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.50. Naive Sticky Information Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h] = p 0 +  P xn t _ k + p 2 E ? - j [ n t +h- j \  +  e t 
(2)-Et,H[n t+h\ =  Po  + P l n t -k  + (1 -  P l ) E t-j ,HKt+ft-y] + € t 
(3). E f [ n t+h] =  p 0 +  P i ( P 2 n t - i  +  (1 ~  P z ) E j [ n t+H])  +  (1 -  P i ) E ? . , [ n t+h. , ]  + e t
Po P i a - P i ) P i (1 - P i ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC (1) 0.192**
(0.075)
0.796***
(0.079)
P i  +  P i  ~  1
0.439
0.335 0.324 2.080
(2) 0.190***
(0.069)
0.810***
(0.069)
p 1 =  0.18 
0.020
0.330 0.330 2.097
(3) 0.407***
(0.126)
0.593***
(0.126)
0.356**
(0.144)
0.644***
(0.144)
f t  =  0.25 
1.560
P i *  0 -  — P i )  =  0.25 
0.011
0.403 0.394 1.827
NE (1) 0.340**
(0.162)
0.632***
(0.168)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
1.303
0.392 0.382 1.988
(2) 0.323**
(0.156)
0.677***
(0.156)
&  =  0.18 
0.846
0.374 0.374 2.035
(3) 0.547***
(0.200)
0.453**
(0.200)
0.483***
(0.136)
0.517***
(0.136)
P i  =  0.25 
2.208 
P i  * ( 1 - P 2)  =  0.25 
0.065
0.448 0.439 1.763
S (1) 0.135**
(0.054)
0.856***
(0.056)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
0.444
0.393 0.384 2.059
(2) 0.136***
(0.035)
0.864***
(0.035)
P i  =  0.18
1.584
0.390 0.390 2.066
(3) 0.283***
(0.091)
0.717***
(0.091)
0.392**
(0.171)
0.608***
(0.171)
P i  =  0.25 
0.135
P i *  P i )  =  0.25 
0.682
0.426 0.417 1.871
w (1) 0.225***
(0.058)
0.764***
(0.059)
P i  +  P i  =  1
0.648
0.428 0.419 2.184
(2) 0.224***
(0.058)
0.776***
(0.058)
P i  =  0.18
0.575
0.424 0.424 2.197
(3) 0.463***
(0.139)
0.537***
(0.139)
0.418***
(0.150)
0.582***
(0.150)
P i  =  0.25 
2.343 
P i * ( l - P i )  =  0.25 
0.021
0.493 0.485 1.871
* * * * * *  in(jjcate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.51. Na'ive Sticky Information Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] =  p 0 +  f t  7Tt_fc +  p 1E I!-j [ n t+h_j \ +  e t 
(2)- E t H [ n t+h] =  P o  +  P t n t - k  +  (I  — A )A -y ,ff [^t+h-y] +  € t
(:3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] =  Pq  +  P t i P i n t - i  +  (1 ~  p 2 ) E pt [ n t+}J )  +  (1 -  ^ i)g g - / [7Tc+ft_/] +  e t
Po P i ( I - P i ) P z (1 - P z ) Wald x 2 Test R 2 R 2 D.W.
Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.146*
(0.084)
0.896***
(0.068)
P i +  Pz ~  1 
2.156
0.262 0.218 1.529
(2 ) 0.103
(0.091)
0.897***
(0.091)
f t  =  0.18 
0.712
0.234 0.234 1.461
(3) 0.118
(0.070)
0.882***
(0.070)
0.806
(0.764)
0.194
(0.764)
p 1 =  0.25 
3.527* 
f t  * ( l - f t )  =  0.25 
5.366**
0.235 0.190 1.439
NE (1) 0.196**
(0.074)
0.842***
(0.067)
P i + Pz = 1 
0.885
0.066 0.011 1.742
(2) 0.156
(0.131)
0.844***
(0.131)
P t  =  0.18 
0.034
0.051 0.051 1.719
(3) 0.247*
(0.122)
0.753***
(0 .122)
0.455
(0.493)
0.545
(0.493)
p x =  0.25 
0.001 
P i * a ~ P 2) =  0.25 
0.404
0.081 0.081 1.622
S (1) 0.163*
(0.077)
0.875***
(0.062)
Pi + p 2 = 1 
1.798
0.101 0.049 1.762
(2 ) 0.125
(0.100)
0.875***
(0.100)
p x =  0.18 
0.301
0.080 0.080 1.709
(3) 0.165**
(0.060)
0.835***
(0.060)
0.621
(0.560)
0.379
(0.560)
Px =  0.25 
1.999
A  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
3.035*
0.089 0.035 1.645
w (1) 0.185**
(0.072)
0.840***
(0.059)
P l +  P 2 =  1 
1.122
0.224 0.178 1.824
(2) 0.160
(0.116)
0.840***
(0.116)
f t  =  0.18 
0.028
0.215 0.215 1.799
(3) 0 247*** 
(0.063)
0.753***
(0.063)
0.517
(0.358)
0.483
(0.358)
f t  =  0.25 
0.002 
f t  * ( 1 - f t )  =  0.25 
1.428
0.241 0.197 1.701
*** ** * incjicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
493
Appendix 5.52. Rational Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated Forecasts -
Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E f [ n t+h] = y 0 +  Y in t + h  +  Y 2 E t - j [ n t+h- j ]  +  e t 
(2). E t H [ n t+h] =  Yo +  Y i^ t+ h  +  (1  -  Y i ) E t . jH [ n t+h_j\ +  e t
(3 ) . E f Jtt+h =  Yo +  Y i i Y i K t + h  +  (1 -  Y z ) E Pt [ n t+h]) +  (1 -~ yi)F?_/[jrt+h_y] +  e t
Yo Y i d - y i ) Y2 (1 -  Yz) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 (1) 0  3 4 9 *** 
(0.061)
0.662***
(0.052)
f t  + f t  -  1 
0.561
13.025
(2) 0  3 2 7 *** 
(0.044)
0.673***
(0.044)
f t  = 0.18 
11.262***
12.843
(3) 0.378***
(0.072)
0.622***
(0.072)
0.736***
(0.109)
0.264**
(0.109)
f t  = 0.25 
3.165*
12.341
A3445 (1) 0.255***
(0.055)
0.751***
(0.050)
f t  + f t  = 1 
0.332
12.366
(2) 0.265***
(0.057)
0.735***
(0.057)
f t  = 0.18 
2.177
12.403
(3) 0.272***
(0.077)
0.728***
(0.077)
0.876***
(0.207)
0.124
(0.207)
f t  = 0.25 
0.080
12.516
A4554 (1) 0.250***
(0.036)
0.760***
(0.033)
f t  + f t  = 1 
1.692
23.283
(2) 0.235***
(0.039)
0.765***
(0.039)
f t  = 0.18 
1.921
11.053
(3) 0.237***
(0.047)
0.763***
(0.047)
1.171***
(0.179)
-0.171
(0.179)
f t  = 0.25 
0.074
10.663
A5564 (1) 0.170***
(0.035)
0.821***
(0.040)
f t  + f t  = 1 
0.771
12.894
(2) 0.168***
(0.036)
0.832***
(0.036)
f t  = 0.18 
0 .1 1 1
13.050
(3) 0.148***
(0.054)
0.852***
(0.054)
0.693
(0.590)
0.307
(0.590)
f t  = 0.25 
3.512*
13.707
A6597 (1) 0.161***
(0.045)
0.841***
(0.051)
f t  + f t  = 1
0.055
14.207
(2) 0.174***
(0.050)
0.826***
(0.050)
f t  = 0.18 
0 . 0 1 2
14.416
(3) 0.166**
(0.065)
0.834***
(0.065)
0.707
(0.625)
0.293
(1.625)
f t  = 0.25 
1.703
14.864
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.53. Rational Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated Forecasts -
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) .E ? [7Tt+fc] =  Yo +  Y iK t+ h  +  Y 2 ^ - j [ n t+h. j ]  + e t 
Et,H[n t+h] =  Yo +  Y i^ t + h  +  (1 -  Y i ) E t -j,H[n t+h-j]  +  
(3 ). E t [ n t+h] =  Y o ...........................................................................................
Yo Y  l ( 1 - Y i ) Y  2 (1 ~  Y 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
A1834 (1) 0 . 2 0 4 * * *
(0.034)
0.805***
(0.032)
P i  +  P 2 -  1 
3.435*
11.150
(2) 0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.035)
0.800***
(0.035)
f t  =  0.18 
0.333
11.608
(3) 0.195***
(0.065)
0.805***
(0.065)
0.891
(0.662)
0.109
(0.662)
/?! =  0.25 
0.714
12.191
A3445 (1) 0.173***
(0.042)
0.836***
(0.043)
P i  +  P 2 =  1
2.895*
10.112
(2) 0.184***
(0.042)
0.816***
(0.042)
f t  =  0.18 
0.010
10.615
(3) 0.158***
(0.059)
0.842***
(0.059)
1.070
(0.919)
-0.070
(0.919)
f t  =  0.25 
2.458
10.999
A4554 (1) 0  147*** 
(0.016)
0.856***
(0.016)
P i  +  P 2 ~  1
0.493
8.745
(2) 0.175***
(0.027)
0.825***
(0.027)
/?! =  0.18 
0.029
10.480
(3) 0.168***
(0.024)
0.832***
(0.024)
1.017***
(0.322)
-0.017
(0.322)
/?! =  0.25 
11.349***
10.855
A5564 (1) 0.133***
(0.042)
0.867***
(0.047)
P i  +  P z  — 1 
0.000
12.774
(2) 0.137***
(0.038)
0.863***
(0.038)
f t  =  0.18 
1.291
12.750
(3) 0.074*
(0.044)
0.926***
(0.044)
-1.710
(1.719)
2.710
(1.719)
f t  =  0.25 
15.869***
14.509
A6597 (1) 0.098***
(0.025)
0.909***
(0.027)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
2.010
11.936
(2) 0.104***
(0.032)
0.896***
(0.032)
Pi =  0.18
5.540**
12.519
(3) 0.070
(0.086)
0.930***
(0.086)
-4.410
(5.898)
5.410
(4.898)
Pi  =  0.25 
4.399**
12.578
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.54. Rational Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated Forecasts -
Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  Yo +  YiKt+h +  Y 2 E?-} [ n t+h- j ]  +.£ ? [ jr f ] ^ - j
( 2 ) . E t f i [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y i^ t+ h  +  (1 “  Y i ) E t-j,H[n t+h- j \  +
C3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Y o +  Y i( .Y2 ^t+h  +  (1 ~  Y 2 ) E t [ n t+h])  +  (1 -  Y i ) E ? - j [ n t+h-j \
i nzn ^ (l-yo -  1  ^ ~ ' —  ~2
+ et
(1 - y 2) W ald x  Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 (1) 0.815***
(0.192)
0.258
(0.181)
P i + P i -  1
11.094***
5.052
(2) 0.507***
(0.069)
0.493***
(0.069)
P i  =  0.18
22.224***
8.013
(3) 0.645***
(0.055)
0.355***
(0.055)
0.625***
(0.080)
0.375***
(0.080)
P i  =  0.25 
51.341***
6.189
A3445 (1) 0.875***
(0.061)
0.200***
(0.055)
P i  + p 2 = 1 
15.607***
4.584
(2) 0.620***
(0.052)
0.380***
(0.052)
P i  = 0.18
71.501***
7.848
(3) 0.665***
(0.058)
0.335***
(0.058)
0.768***
(0.060)
0.232***
(0.060)
P i  =  0.25 
51.955***
5.822
A4554 (1) 0.675***
(0.104)
0 372*** 
(0.111)
Pi + P i = 1
6.243**
5.605
(2) 0.487***
(0.033)
0.513***
(0.033)
P i  = 0.18
84.263***
7.672
(3) 0.508**
(0.034)
q 492***
(0.034)
0.956***
(0.137)
0.044
(0.137)
P i  =  0.25 
58.384
7.240
A5564 (1) 0.863***
(0.105)
0.173**
(0.082)
Pi + P 2 ~  1
1.244
6.106
(2) 0.789
(44.345)
0.211
(44.345)
P i  =  0.18 
0.000
7.009
(3) 0.834***
(0.131)
0.166
(0.131)
0.933***
(0.176)
0.067
(0.176)
P i  =  0.25 
19.981***
5.741
A6597 (1) 1.127***
(0.052)
-0.072
(0.055)
Pi + P2 = 1 
2.316
4.550
(2) 1.038***
(0.070)
-0.038
(0.070)
P i  =  0.18
148.524***
6.555
(3) 1.046***
(0.156)
-0.046
(0.063)
0.926***
(0.150)
0.074***
(0.150)
P i  =  0.25 
122.576***
5.714
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.55. Rational Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated Forecasts -
Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X ) .E ? [ i r t+h\ =  Yo +  Y iK t+h  +  Y 2 E t - j [ n t+h- i \  + e t 
( Z ) . E tJI[ n t+h] =  Yo +  Y iK t+h  +  (1 -  Y i ) E M t H [ n t+h. j ]  +  e t 
(3). E ? [ n t+h] = Y q  +  Y i ( Y 2nt+h  +  (1  -  r z W t f a t + h D  +  (1  -  Y i ) E ?- j [ ^ t +h - j ]  +  e t
Yo Y i ( 1 - X i ) Y2 d - y 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 0 )f -0.006
(0.034)
0.994***
(0.040)
P i + &2 ~  1 
1.066
4.706
(2)t -0.004
(0.026)
1.004***
(0.026)
f t  =  0.18 
49 498***
5.289
(3)t 0 .212**
(0.096)
0.788***
(0.096)
-0.575*
(0.322)
1.575***
(0.322)
f t  =  0.25 
0.158
6.240
A3445 ( l) t 0.022
(0.029)
0.959***
(0.023)
P i +  P i =  1 
1.299
6.235
(2)t 0.036
(0.024)
0.964***
(0.024)
f t  =  0.18 
35.344***
6.182
(3)t 0.256***
(0.034)
0 744***
(0.034)
-0.382***
(0.103)
1.382***
(0.103)
f t  =  0.25 
0.034
6.249
A4554 ( l ) t 0.032
(0.050)
0.955***
(0.048)
P i + P2 =  1
0.379
5.952
(2)t 0.044
(0.044)
0.956***
(0.045)
p 1 =  0.18 
9.367***
5.932
(3)t 0 194*** 
(0.029)
0.806***
(0.029)
-0.309
(0.388)
1 309*** 
(0.388)
f t  =  0.25 
3.675*
6.132
A5564 0 )f -0.000
(0 .020)
q 979***
(0.023)
P i +  P2 = 1 
1.529
6.068
(2)t 0.016
(0.020)
0.984***
(0.020)
f t  =  0.18 
70.817***
5.982
(3) 0.177**
(0.074)
0.823***
(0.074)
-0.548
(0.328)
1.548***
(0.328)
f t  =  0.25 
0.987
6.093
A6597 (O t -0.013
(0.026)
1.008***
(0.025)
P i +  p 2 =  1 
0.239
6.308
(2)t -0.009
(0.025)
1.009***
(0.025)
P i  =  0.18
57.784***
6.286
(3)t 0.105***
(0.034)
0.895***
(0.034)
-0.768*
(0.393)
1.768***
(0.393)
P i  =  0.25 
18.041***
6.320
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.56. Rational Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated Forecasts
-  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Y o +  Y iK t+h  +  Y i E t - j f a t + h - j ]  +
( 2 ) . E tH [ n t+h] = Y o +  Y iK t+h  + (1 -  Y i ) E t - j , n [ n t+h- j \  +  €t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h\ = Y o +  Y i i Y z ^ t + h  +  C1 ~  72)£tV t+ft]) +  (1 ~  T i)g" /k t+ ft-y ] +
Yo Y i Y  2 ( l - X z ) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.204***
(0.058)
0.814***
(0.053)
P i + P2 ~  1
1.588
13.620
(2) 0.164***
(0.032)
0.836***
(0.032)
&  =  0.18 
0.240
14.077
(3) 0.164***
(0.033)
0.836***
(0.033)
0.926***
(0.214)
0.074
(0.214)
&  =  0.25 
6.669***
14.251
EHSD (1) 0.129***
(0.035)
0.873***
(0.037)
P i + P 2 -  1 
0.216
11.784
(2) 0.130***
(0.031)
0.870***
(0.031)
P x =  0.18 
2.567
11.955
(3) 0.128***
(0.034)
0.872***
(0.034)
0.945***
(0.204)
0.055
(0.204)
P1 =  0.25 
12.620***
11.881
ESC (1) 0.192***
(0.044)
0.809***
(0.045)
P i + p 2 = 1 
0.015
13.392
(2) 0.195***
(0.047)
0.805***
(0.047)
f t  =  0.18 
0.104
13.445
(3) 0 194*** 
(0.051)
0.806***
(0.051)
1.143***
(0.189)
-0.143
(0.189)
f t  =  0.25 
1.195
13.479
ECD (1) 0.506***
(0.105)
0.471***
(0.105)
Pi + P 2 -  1 
1.150
11.127
(2) 0.495***
(0.090)
0.505***
(0.090)
&  =  0.18 
12.220
12.111
(3) 0.496***
(0.095)
0.504***
(0.095)
0.870***
(0.173)
0.130
(0.173)
Pi =  0.25 
6.646***
12.140
EGS (1) 0.397***
(0.084)
0.615***
(0.083)
P i + P 2 = 1 
0.693
13.311
(2) 0.383***
(0.089)
0.617***
(0.089)
Pi =  0.18 
5.260
13.261
(3) 0.477***
(0.077)
0.523***
(0.077)
0.428***
(0.071)
0.572***
(0.072)
Pi =  0.25
g 7 9 1***
14.070
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.57. Rational Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated Forecasts
-  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( i) .E?[nt+h\ =  Yo +  Y iK t +h  +  Y 2 E ? - j [ n t+h- j ]  +
( 2 ) . E tiH[ n t+h\ = Y o +  Y i n t+h +  U  -  Y i ) E t -j,H[ n t+h- j ]  +  €t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h\ = Y o  +  Y i i Y z ^ t + h  +  U  ~  Y i ) E pt [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 - Y i ) E ? . , [ n t+h- j \  +  € t
Yo Y  i (1 “  7 i) 7 2 ( l - 7 2) W ald x 2 Test J-S ta t
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.213***
(0.059)
0.814***
(0.052)
P i + P2 ~  1
2.827*
13.451
(2) 0.159***
(0.029)
0.841***
(0.029)
&  =  0.18 
0.513
14.540
(3) 0.163***
(0.035)
0.837***
(0.035)
0.597
(1.356)
0.403
(1.356)
=  0.25 
6 .2 2 0 **
15.490*
EHSD (1) 0.105**
(0.040)
0.906***
(0.048)
/? !+ /?  2 =  1 
0.987
10.202
(2) 0.093
(0.078)
0.907***
(0.078)
Pi  =  0.18
1.242
11.434
(3) 0.059
(0.055)
0 941*** 
(0.055)
-1.041
(1.136)
2.041*
(1.136)
Pi  =  0.25 
158.907***
11.038
ESC (1) 0.117***
(0.041)
0.891***
(0.046)
P i + P2 =  1
1.015
13.053
(2) 0.125***
(0.039)
0.875***
(0.039)
Pi  =  0.18
1.976
13.596
(3) 0.109**
(0.049)
0.891***
(0.049)
0.987
(0.915)
0.013
(0.915)
Pi =  0.25 
8.229***
12.239
ECD (1) 0.285***
(0.077)
0.701***
(0.078)
P i + P 2 = 1 
2.347
9.874
(2) 0.260***
(0.084)
0.740***
(0.084)
Pi =  0.18
0.909
10.148
(3) 0.243
(1.959)
0.757
(1.959)
0.210
(12.831)
0.790
(12.831)
Pi  =  0.25 
0.000
11.996
EGS (1) 0.359***
(0.091)
0.642***
(0.095)
P i +  P2 =  1 
0.001
10.936
(2) 0.362***
(0.117)
0.638***
(0.117)
Pi  =  0.18
2.417
10.943
(3) 0.371**
(0.172)
0.630***
(0.172)
-0.134
(1.181)
1.134
(1.181)
Pi =  0.25 
0.495
14.497
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.58. Rational Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated Forecasts
-  Stable Sample Period
Testing E quation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ = Y o  +  Y i n t+h +  Y 2 E ?- j [ n t+h- j \  + e t 
(2). E t H [ n t+h] =  Yo +  Y i ^ t + h  + O - ~  7i)£t-/,//fct+/i-/] + e t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  Yo +  Y i ( Y 2 ^t+h  +  C1 ~  Y 2 ) E { [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 -  Y i ) E ? - i [ n t+h- j \  + e t
Yo Y i ( 1 - y i ) 7 2 CM1
rH W ald x 2 Test J-S ta t
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS (1) 1.016***
(0 .22 0 )
0.165
(0.178)
Pi +  02 -  1  
10.124***
8.373
(2) 0.315***
(0.029)
0.685***
(0.029)
&  = 0.18 
21.846***
12.568
(3) 0.273***
(0.031)
0 727*** 
(0.031)
1 4 3 4 *** 
(0.135)
-0.434***
(0.135)
0! =  0.25 
0.585
12.311
EHSD (1) 1.004***
(0.130)
0.103
(0.168)
P i + 02 =  1 
3.640**
5.113
(2) 0.516***
(0.075)
0.484***
(0.075)
/?! =  0.18 
19 940***
9.774
(3) 0.522***
(0.136)
0.478***
(0.136)
0.825***
(0.267)
0.175
(0.267)
0! =  0.25 
3.976**
8.255
ESC (1) 0.837***
(0.053)
0.219***
(0.047)
P i  + p2 =  1 
8.476***
6.497
(2) 0.646***
(0.125)
0.354***
(0.125)
0t =  0.18 
13.924***
8.541
(3) 0.690***
(0.093)
0.310***
(0.093)
0.844***
(0.113)
0.156***
(0.113)
f t  =  0.25 
22.324***
7.481
ECD (1) 0.833***
(0.026)
0.184***
(0 .02 2 )
01+ p2 = 1 
0.718
5.209
(2) 0.804***
(0.028)
0.196***
(0.028)
0X =  0.18 
480.628***
5.581
(3) 0.860***
(0.046)
0.140***
(0.046)
0.834***
(0.228)
0.166
(0.228)
0X =  0.25 
176.915***
5.190
EGS (1) 0.700***
(0.091)
0 3 4 i***
(0.090)
01 + 02 =  1 
3.080*
6.003
(2) 0.649***
(0 .111)
0.351***
(0 .111)
0! =  0.18 
17 919***
8.442
(3) 0.696***
(0.209)
0.304
(0.209)
0.692***
(0.175)
0.308*
(0.175)
0X = 0.25 
4.541**
5.739
*** ** * incJicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.59. Rational Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated Forecasts
-  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y iK t+h  +  Y 2 E ? - j [ n t+h. j ]  +  e t 
C2 ) . E t H [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y i n t + h  +  U  -  Y i ) E t - j ,H [ n t+h. j ]  +  c t 
(:3).Ejf[nt+h] = y 0 + Y i i Y z K t + h  +  ( 1  ~  Y i ) E Pt [ n t+h\ )  +  ( 1  -  7 i ) £ f - ; K + /1-y ] +  ct
Yo Y l 72 (1 “  72) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS ( l) t 0.135*
(0.072)
0.903***
(0.060)
P i  +  P 2 ~  1
1.844
5.703
(2)t 0.082*
(0.046)
0.918***
(0.046)
/?! =  0.18 
4.481**
6.638
(3)1* 0.125**
(0.051)
0.875***
(0.051)
0.540
(0.699)
0.460
(0.699)
&  = 0.25 
6.070**
6.190
EHSD ( l) f 0.031
(0.031)
0.981***
(0 .0 2 2 )
P i  +  P i  =  1 
0.646
5.884
(2)t 0.018
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.982***
(0 .0 2 0 )
p 1 =  0.18 
65.613***
5.939
(3)t 0.055
(0.041)
0.945***
(0.041)
-0.217
(0.596)
1.217* . 
(0.596)
/?! =  0.25 
22.360***
5.728
ESC ( l) t 0.028
(0.033)
0.963***
(0.032)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
1.079
5.577
(2)t 0.035
(0.030)
0.965***
(0.030)
f t  =  0.18 
23 190***
5.736
(3)t 0.117***
(0.028)
0.883***
(0.028)
-0.379
(0.244)
1.379***
(0.244)
P i  =  0.25 
22.436***
6.301
ECD ( l) t -0 .0 0 2
(0.034)
0.983***
(0.047)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
0.606
5.536
(2)t 0.033
(0 .0 2 2 )
0.967***
(0 .0 2 2 )
P i  =  0.18
43.376***
5.774
(3)1* 0.448***
(0.116)
0.552***
(0.116)
-0.517***
(0.173)
1.517***
(0.173)
P i  =  0.25 
2 .8 8 6 *
6.117
EGS ( l) f 0.026
(0.036)
0.931***
(0.047)
P i  +  P 2 =  1 
4.108
5.252
(2)t 0.063*
(0.032)
0.937***
(0.032)
P i  =  0.18
13.060***
5.780
(3)f 0.523***
(0.104)
0  4 7 7 *** 
(0.104)
-0.360**
(0.157)
1.360***
(0.158)
P i  =  0.25 
6.923***
5.945
*** ** * inciiCate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
+Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.60. Rational Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated Forecasts -
Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] = Yo + Y iK t+h  + Y 2E t - j [ n t+h-j] +  e t 
(2). E t H [ n t+h\  = Y o  + Y i ^ t + h  +  (1 -  Y i ) E t - j j i [ n t+h-j] +
(3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y i i Y i ^ t + h  +  (1 ~  Y i ) E ^ [ n t+h\ )  +  (1  -  n ) E t - i [ n t +h-j]  +
Yo Y  i U - X i ) 72 ( i  -  y 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -2011Q 1
M ALE (1) 0.249***
(0.057)
0.733***
(0.058)
P i  +  P i  “  1
2.259
12.098
(2) 0  229*** 
(0.054)
0.771***
(0.054)
p 1 =  0.18 
0.820
12.796
(3) 0.230***
(0.061)
0.770***
(0.060)
1.158***
(0.255)
-0.158
(0.255)
f t  =  0.25 
0.106
12.494
FEM A LE (1) 0.173*
(0.093)
0.839***
(0.092)
P i  +  P i  =  1
3.069*
11.220
(2) 0.141
(0.265)
0.859***
(0.265)
f t  =  0.18 
0.021
11.849
(3) 0.150
(0.266)
0.850***
(0.266)
0.830
(0.629)
0.170
(0.629)
Px =  0.25 
0.141
12.005
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels
Appendix 5.61. Rational Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated Forecasts -  
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  Yo + Y i ^ t + h  + Y z E ? - j [ n t+h_j] +  e t 
(2 ) . E tiH[irt+h] = Y o  + Y i * t +h + (1 -  Y i ) E t_JH[ n t+h. j ]  +  e t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Y o  + Y i i Y z i t t + h  +  U  ~  Y i ) E pt [ n t+h]) +  (1 -  y i)g " - /k t+ h -y ]  +  e t
7o 7 i (1 ~  7 i) 72 N1
rH Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
M ALE (1) q J79***
(0.042)
0.817***
(0.045)
P i  +  P i  -  1
0.274
10.757
(2) 0.176***
(0.037)
0.824***
(0.037)
Pi  =  0.18 
0.010
10.522
(3) 0.150***
(0.045)
0.850***
(0.589)
0.815
(0.589)
0.185
(0.589)
p 1 =  0.25 
4.924**
10.794
FEM A LE (1) 0.069***
(0.017)
0.943***
(0 .02 2 )
P i  +  P i  =  1
2.074
9.571
(2) 0.065**
(0.029)
0.935***
(0.029)
&  =  0.18 
15.598***
11.694
(3) 0.020
(0.087)
0.980***
(0.087)
-4.353
(85.923)
5.353
(85.923)
p 1 =  0.25 
7.003***
9.938
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.62. Rational Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated Forecasts -
Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l) .F ? [ jT t+fc] =  Yo + Y l n t+h +  Y 2 ^ t - j [ n t+h-j] +  e t 
(2). E tIf  [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y i ^ t + h  +  U  -  Y i ) E M i H [ n t+h. j ]  +  e t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ n t+h] = y o  +  Y i ( y 2n t+h +  C1 ~  Y 2) E pt [ n t+h]') +  (1  -  [wt+ft_y] +  e t
Yo Y  l (1 -X i) Y i (1 -  Y i ) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
MALE (1) 0.744***
(0.033)
0.275***
(0 .0 2 1 )
Pi  +  f t  =  1
0.832
5.719
(2) 0.725***
(0 .02 0 )
0.275***
(0 .0 2 0 )
f t  =  0.18 
755.975***
6.177
(3) 0.750***
(0.043)
0.250***
(0.043)
0.893***
(0.168)
0.107
(0.168)
f t  =  0.25 
133.715***
5.475
FEMALE (1) 0.877***
(0.031)
0.240***
(0.032)
f t  +  ft  = 1 
74.637***
4.787
(2) 0.346***
(0.074)
0.654***
(0.074)
f t  =  0.18 
5.029**
9.870
(3) 0.364***
(0.057)
0.636***
(0.057)
0.933***
(0.071)
0.067
(0.071)
f t  =  0.25 
3.942**
9.426
* * * * * *  in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.63. Rational Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated Forecasts -  
Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] = Y o +  Y i ^ t + h  +  Y i t f - j l n t + h - j ]  +
(2). E t H [ n t+h] =  Y o +  Y i ^ t + h  +  (1  -  Y i ) E t . JiH[ n t+h- j \  +  e t 
(3). E ^ [ n t+h] = Y o  + Y i t Y z K t + h  +  (1  ~  X z ^ tV t+ f t] )  +  C1  ~  X i)^"-/[^ t+ h -/] +  c t
Yo Y  l Y2 ( i  - y 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -2011Q 1
M ALE (1) 0.007
(0.034)
0.968***
(0.038)
f t  +  f t  =  1
1.754
5.588
(2)t 0.034
(0.031)
0.966***
(0.031)
f t  =  0.18 
21.792***
5.962
(3) 0.371***
(0.061)
0.629***
(0.061)
-0.399*
(0.190)
1 399*** 
(0.192)
f t  =  0.25 
3.698**
5.655
FEM A LE ( l ) t -0.004
(0.019)
1.003***
(0.017)
f t  +  f t  =  1
0.004
6.080
(2) t -0.004
(0.017)
1.004***
(0.017)
f t  =  0.18 
122.180***
6.101
(3) 0.049
(0.031)
0.951***
(0.031)
-1.033
(0.757)
2.033**
(0.757)
f t  =  0.25 
42.048***
6.095
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.64. Rational Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated Forecasts -
Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  Yo +  Yin t+h +  Yi E?-j l^t+h-j] +  e t 
(2). E t l i [ n t+h] =  Yo +  Yi^t+h +  (1 -  Yi)EM ,H[nt+h-j\ + €t 
(3). E ? [ n t+h] =  Yo + YiiYz^t+h +  (1 ~  Yi)Ept [nt+h\ )  +  (1 -  Yi)Et-j[^t+h-j\ +  *t
Yo Y l (1 -X i) Yz (1 -  Yz ) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982(J3-2011Q 1
Y14 (1) 0.126***
(0.034)
0.889***
(0.030)
Pi  +  &2 ~  1 
3.912**
15.166*
(2) 0.092**
(0.023)
0.908***
(0.023)
/?! =  0.18 
14.550***
16.082*
(3) 0.115***
(0.033)
0.885***
(0.033)
0.365
(0.350)
0.635*
(0.350)
f t  =  0.25 
17.052***
15.438*
Y24 (1) 0.214***
(0.041)
0 797*** 
(0.040)
f t  +  f t  =  1
0.856
13.677
(2) 0.205***
(0.043)
0.795***
(0.043)
f t  =  0.18 
0.357
14.131
(3) 0.206***
(0.042)
0.794***
(0.042)
0.967***
(0.150)
0.033
(0.150)
ft = 0.25 
1.114
14.171
Y34 (1) 0.226***
(0.074)
0.767***
(0.075)
f t  +  f t  =  1 
0.599
12.515
(2) 0 224*** 
(0.069)
0.776***
(0.069)
ft = 0.18 
0.399
12.604
(3) 0.223***
(0.070)
0.777***
(0.070)
1 171*** 
(0.293)
-0.171
(0.293)
ft = 0.25 
0.149
12.403
Y44 (1) 0.405***
(0.054)
0.567***
(0.058)
ft + f t  -  1 
2.880*
11.495
(2) 0.361***
(0.045)
0.639***
(0.045)
ft = 0.18 
16.210***
12.120
(3) 0.652***
(0.038)
0.348***
(0.038)
0.869***
(0.190)
0.131
(0.190)
f t  =  0.25 
6.709***
12.618
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
504
Appendix 5.65. Rational Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated Forecasts -
Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( X ) . E {  [ n t+h] =  Yo +  Y iK t+h  +  y zF j'-y K + h -;] +  e t 
(2). E t H [ n t+h] =  Yo +  Y i n t+h +  (1 -  Y i ) E t - jiH[ n t+h_j] +  e t 
( 3 ) . E ? [ i r t+h\ =  Yo  +  Y i i Y i ^ t + h  +  (1 -  Y i ) ^ [ n tx.h]) +  C1  ~  Y i ) E ? _ i [ n t+h_f ] +  e t
Yo Y i (1 -  Y i ) Y i ( 1 - 7 2 ) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 (1) 0.059**
(0.026)
0.954***
(0.023)
Pi +  P2 ~  1
5.077**
13.283
(2) 0.037
(0.024)
0.963***
(0.024)
f t  =  0.18 
34.576***
14.092
(3) 0.115***
(0.033)
0.885***
(0.033)
0.365
(0.350)
0.635*
(0.350)
/?! =  0.25 
17.052***
15.438*
Y24 (1) 0.171***
(0.028)
0.843***
(0.031)
P i + 2^ =  1
2.189
12.609
(2) 0.158***
(0.051)
0.842***
(0.051)
f t  =  0.18 
0.193
13.981
(3) 0.151***
(0.054)
0.849***
(0.054)
0.506
(0.903)
0.494
(0.903)
f t  =  0.25 
3.340*
13.729
Y34 (1) 0.095**
(0.045)
0.909***
(0.048)
P i + @2 = 1
0.594
10.523
(2) 0.107**
(0.041)
0.893***
(0.041)
=  0.18 
3.196**
10.715
(3) 0.095**
(0.043)
0.905***
(0.043)
1.310
(1.177)
-0.310
(1.177)
A  =  0.25 
13.012***
10.604
Y44 (1) 0.286***
(0.093)
0.698***
(0.097)
Pi +  P2 =  1 
1.716
10.463
(2) 0.270
(0.302)
0.730**
(0.302)
Pt =  0.18 
0.088
10.398
(3) 0.294
(0.245)
0.706***
(0.245)
0.433
(0.582)
0.567
(0.582)
f t  =  0.25 
0.032
11.811
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.66. Rational Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated Forecasts -
Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E f [ n t+h] = Y o  + Y i n t+h +  Y 2E ? - j [ n t+h-j]  +  e t 
( 2 ) . E t H [ n t+h] = Y o  +  Y i n t+h +  (1 -  Y i ) E t - j ,n[n t+h-j] +  *t 
(3). E ? [ n t+h] =  Yo  +  Y i i Y i K t + h  +  (1 ~  7 2 ) #  frt+ft]) +  C1 ~  Y i ) E ? _ , [ n t+h_j\  +  e t
Yo Y  l (1 ~ Y i ) 7 2 ( l - 7 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 (1) 1.186*
(0.596)
0.030
(0.542)
P i + ($2 ~  1 6.948
(2) 0.160**
(0.080)
0.840***
(0.080)
P x =  0.18 
0.062
11.903
(3) 0.149
(0.180)
0.851***
(0.180)
0.948
(0.742)
0.052
(0.742)
p x =  0.25 
0.314
12.236
Y24 (1) 0.778***
(0.059)
0.302***
(0.067)
P i + p2 =  1
11.361***
4.619
(2) 0.526***
(0.037)
0.474***
(0.037)
Px =  0.18 
86.098***
8.985
(3) 0.551***
(0.042)
0 449*** 
(0.042)
0.978***
(0.051)
0.022
(0.051)
f t  =  0.25 
51.091***
8.350
Y34 0) 0 74i***
(0.055)
0.295***
(0.025)
P i + p 2 = 1 
1.388
5.275
(2) 0.680***
(0.041)
0.320***
(0.041)
A  =  0.18 
148.583***
6.831
(3) 0.701***
(0.073)
0.299***
(0.073)
0.828***
(0.209)
0.172
(0.209)
f t  =  0.25 
38.455***
5.777
Y44 (1) 0.713***
(0.037)
0.288***
(0.053)
P i + p 2 = 1 
0.000
5.647
(2) 0.715***
(0.039)
0.285***
(0.039)
/?! =  0.18 
190.460***
5.496
(3) 0.725***
(0.026)
0.275***
(0.026)
0.930***
(0.091)
0.070
(0.091)
&  =  0.25 
328.744***
5.268
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.67. Rational Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated Forecasts -
Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [ n t+h] =  Yo  +  YiK t+ h  +  Y 2E t - j [ n t+h-j \  +
C2 ) . E t H [ n t+h] =  Yo + Y i n t+h +  (1 -  +  e t
(3). E ? \ n t+h] = Y q +  Y i ( Y 2n t +h +  (1 -  Y 2 ) E { [ n t+h\ )  +  (1 -  y i ) g " - / k t +h -/] +
Yo Y t 72 (1 ~  7z) Wald x 2 Test
vr
J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3- 2011Q1
Y14 (1) 0.032
(0.029)
0.972***
(0.024)
P i +  P2 -  1 
0.077
5.774
(2) 0.026
(0.022)
0 974*** 
(0.022)
/?! =  0.18 
47.838***
5.845
(3) 0.053**
(0.021)
0 947*** 
(0.021)
-0.514
(0.933)
1.514
(0.933)
P x =  0.25 
86.904***
5.871
Y24 (1) 0.066
(0.038)
0.938***
(0.039)
P i + @2 =  1
0.014
5.701
(2) 0.070*
(0.036)
0.930***
(0.036)
p x =  0.18 5.859
(3) 0.167**
(0.069)
0.834***
(0.069)
-0.130
(0.340)
1.130***
(0.340)
p x =  0.25 
1.455
6.010
Y34 (1) -0.001
(0.021)
0.985***
(0 .020)
P i +  p 2 =  1 
1.393
6.248
(2) 0.012
(0.019)
0.988***
(0.019)
f i x =  0.18 
82.618***
0.787
(3) 0.206***
(0.054)
0 794*** 
(0.054)
-0.528***
(0.133)
1.528***
(0.133)
P x =  0.25 
0.655
5.753
Y44 (1) 0.065
(0.046)
0.900***
(0.060)
P i +  p 2 =  1 
2.110
5.017
(2) 0.104**
(0.044)
0.896***
(0.044)
&  =  0.18 
2.905*
5.828
(3) 0.653***
(0.102)
0.347***
(0.102)
-0.321*
(0.160)
1.321***
(0.160)
f t  =  0.25 
15.591***
6.252
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix.
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Appendix 5.68. Rational Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h\ =  y 0 +  Y i n t+h +  Y 2 E ? - j [ n t+h- j]  +  e t 
( 2 ) . E t H [ n t+h\ = Y o  +  Y i ^ t + h  +  (1 -  Y i ) E t . JiH[ n t+h^ ]  +  e t 
( 3 ) . E f [ n t+h\ =  Yo  +  Y iC Y zK t+ h  +  (1 ~  7 z )^ f  frt+ft]) +  (1 ~  Y i ) E t - t [ n t +h- i \  +  € t
Yo Y i (1  -  Y i ) Y  2 ( l - 7 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.198***
(0.065)
0.801***
(0.062)
Pi  +  @2 -  1
0.013
13.831
(2) 0.196***
(0.065)
0.804***
(0.065)
f t  =  0.18 
0.059
13.871
(3) 0.205**
(0.084)
0.795***
(0.084)
1.284***
(0.286)
-0.284
(0.286)
/?! =  0.25 
0.291
13.352
NE (1) 0.270***
(0.061)
0.732***
(0.063)
Pi  +  P2 =  1
0.050
11.236
(2) 0.273***
(0.062)
0.727***
(0.062)
P1 = 0.18 
2.265
11.256
(3) 0.316***
(0.080)
0.684***
(0.080)
0.691***
(0.129)
0.309**
(0.129)
f t  =  0.25 
0.669
11.225
S (1) 0.177***
(0.042)
0.823***
(0.040)
/? i+ /? 2 =  l  
0.000
14.492
(2) 0.182***
(0.048)
0.818***
(0.048)
f t  =  0.18 
0.002
14.511
(3) 0.185***
(0.070)
0.815***
(0.070)
0.964***
(0.367)
0.036
(0.367)
f t  =  0.25 
0.857
14.549
w (1) 0.215***
(0.038)
0.787***
(0.036)
Pi  +  P2 =  1
0.048
10.486
(2) 0.213***
(0.036)
0.787***
(0.036)
f t  =  0.18 
0.870
10.479
(3) 0.234***
(0.040)
0.766***
(0.040)
0.676***
(0.137)
0.324**
(0.137)
P1 = 0.25 
0.165
10.434
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.69. Rational Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1). E ? [  n t+h] = Y o  + Y i ^ t + h  +  yzEf-yK +ft-y] +  *t 
( 2 ) . E t' „ [ n t+h] = Y o +  Y i ^ t + h  +  U  -  Y i ) E M iH [irt+h. j ]  +  e t 
(3). E f [ n t+h\ = Y o  +  Y i ( .Y 2^ t+ h  +  (1 ~  Y i ) E t  [rct+/l]) +  (1 -  Y i ) E ? - i [ n t+h-j] +  €t
Yo Y i ( i  -  y i ) Y i (1 -  Y i ) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.091***
(0.024)
0.912***
(0.022)
Pi +  Pi  ~  1 
0.238
12.159
(2) 0.089***
(0.023)
0 9 i i* * *
(0.023)
f t  =  0.18  
16.179***
12.041
(3) 0.099***
(0.031)
0.901***
(0.031)
0.432
(0.730)
0.568
(0.730)
/?! =  0.25  
24.231***
12.005
NE (1) 0.162***
(0.061)
0.845***
(0.067)
Pi +  P2 =  1
0.527
9.890
(2) q J79*** 
(0.061)
0.821***
(0.061)
P 1 =  0 .18  
0.000
10.205
(3) 0.108***
(0.040)
0.892***
(0.040)
-0.394
(2.505)
1.394
(2.505)
f t  =  0.25  
12.828***
10.028
S (1) q
(0.022)
0.866***
(0.023)
Pi +  P2 =  1 
1.060
12.861
(2) 0.143***
(0.024)
0.857***
(0.024)
f t  =  0.18  
2.294
13.612
(3) 0 124*** 
(0.038)
0.876***
(0.038)
0.485
(1.116)
0.515
(1.116)
f t  =  0.25  
10.853***
12.921
w (1) 0.167***
(0.032)
0.837***
(0.033)
Pi +  P2 =  1 
0.427
10.042
(2) 0.168***
(0.033)
0.832***
(0.033)
f t  =  0.18  
0.124
10.160
(3) 0.119**
(0.048)
0.881***
(0.048)
0.677
(0.451)
0.323
(0.451)
f t  =  0.25  
7.343***
11.259
*** ** * jn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.70. Rational Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Yo + Y i^ t+ h  + Y 2^ - j [ n t+h_j] +  e t 
(2). E t H[ n t+h] = Y o +  Y i n t+h +  (1 -  Y i ) E t -j,H[n t+h-j\ +  c t 
( 3 ) . E j f [ n t+h\ =  Yo  +  Y i i Y z ^ t + h  +  (1 ~  Y z W t b t t + i S )  +  (1 ~  Y i ) E ? - t [ n t+h-f]  +  €t
Yo Y i ( l - T i ) Y  2 ( 1  - y 2) Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC (1) 0.728***
(0.030)
0.334***
(0.046)
/?! +  /?2 -  1 
11.946***
7.732
(2) 0.608***
(0.050)
0.392***
(0.050)
/?! =  0.18 
71.676***
11.153
(3) 0.640***
(0.079)
0.360***
(0.079)
0.754***
(0.233)
0.246
(0.233)
f t  =  0.25 
24.276***
9.253
NE (1) 0.873***
(0.054)
0.163***
(0.055)
/?i +  /?2 =  1
4.457**
4.982
(2) 0.808***
(0.047)
0.192***
(0.047)
&  =  0.18 
179.488***
5.757
(3) 0.823***
(0.050)
0.177***
(0.050)
0.903***
(0.064)
0.097
(0.064)
f t  =  0.25 
132.560***
4.972
S (1) 0.713***
(0.024)
0.345***
(0 .0 2 2 )
f t  +  f t  =  1 
9.081***
5.608
(2) 0.501***
(0.053)
0 499*** 
(0.053)
f t  =  0.18 
37.064***
8.547
(3) 0.523***
(0.084)
0  4 7 7 *** 
(0.084)
0  9 i i ***
(0.113)
0.089
(0.113)
f t  =  0.25 
10.505***
8.142
w (1) 0.786***
(0.062)
0.280***
(0.041)
f t  +  f t  =  1 
6.443**
5.417
(2) 0.572***
(0.015)
0.428***
(0.015)
f t  =  0.18 
703.038***
8.743
(3) 0.641***
(0.053)
0.359***
(0.053)
0  7 4 3 *** 
(0.073)
0.257***
(0.073)
f t  =  0.25 
53.455***
6.715
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.71. Rational Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Forecasts -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) . E ? [ n t+h] = Yo + Y i ^ t + h  + Y 2E ? - j [ n t+h. j ]  +  e t 
( 2 ) . E t H [ n t+h\ = y 0 + Y i ^ t + h  +  (1  -  Y i ) E t . JiH[ n t+h. j ]  +  €t 
(3)- Ef [nt+h\ = Yo +  Y i i Y z ^ t + h  +  U  ~  Y z ) E % [ n t+h]) +  O - ~  Y i ) E t - j [ n t+h- , \  +  e t
Yo Y i ( 1 - X i ) Y z (1  ~ Y z ) W ald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC (1) -0.006
(0.024)
0.998***
(0.026)
Pi +  02 ~  1 
0.803
5.895
(2) -0.005
(0.024)
1.005***
(0.024)
P 1 =  0 .18  
57.690***
5.933
(3) 0.122**
(0.048)
0.878***
(0.048)
-0.676**
(0.319)
1.676***
(0.319)
/?! =  0.25  
7.036***
5.617
NE (1) 0.036***
(0.012)
0.959***
(0.015)
Pi +  Pz =  1 
0.122
5.425
(2) 0.040***
(0.010)
0.960***
(0.010)
f t  =  0.18  
182.006***
5.524
(3) 0.140**
(0.058)
0.860***
(0.058)
-0.263
(0.265)
1.263***
(0.265)
p 1 =  0.25  
3.567*
4.757
S (1) -0.046
(0.036)
1.017***
(0.036)
Pi + Pz =  1
2.743
6.167
(2) -0.017
(0.029)
1.017***
(0.029)
P 1 =  0 .18  
46.725***
6.281
(3) 0.169***
(0.049)
0.831***
(0.049)
-0.896**
(0.385)
1.896***
(0.385)
P t  =  0.25  
2.746*
5.563
w (1) 0.023
(0.018)
0.962***
(0.027)
Pi +  P2 =  1
0.579
5.787
(2) 0.029
(0.018)
q
(0.018)
&  =  0.18  
67.510***
5.446
(3) 0.225***
(0.038)
0.775***
(0.038)
-0.309
(0.236)
1 309*** 
(0.236)
f t  =  0.25  
0.445
6.124
* * * * * *  in<jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
+Due to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.72. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated
Expectations -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X)Ei , t [n t+h\ — 4>lEp,t[n t+h\ +  0 2 7rt +  03^ft£',t[7rt+/i] +  0 4 ^ /,t-l[7rt+/i-l] +  € t 
( ? )Ei , t [n t+h\ =  Q l E p M t + h ]  +  (t>2n t +  ^S^RE. t^ t+h l  +  (1 ~  01 ~  02 ~  (f>3 )^ i , t - l i 7Tt+ h - l \  +  €t 
(3) E t H [ n t+h] =  A(4>lEt,p[lIt+h] +  0 2 ^ - 1  +  (1 ~  01  +  <p 2 )^RE,tln t+h\)  +  (1 ~  X)EtiH[lTt+h-l \  +
A 0 i 02 03
/—
\ i-^ 1
 ^ 1 
+> Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Whole 1982(J3-2011Q 1
A1834 (1) 0 .122**
(0.054)
0.076
(0.090)
0 .2 0 1 ***
(0.059)
0.598***
(0.108)
01  + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1
0.087
10.042*
(2) 0.114**
(0.057)
0.079
(0.080)
0 .2 1 1 ***
(0.046)
0.596***
(0 .102)
0 !  =  0.25 
5.639**
0 2 =  0.25 
4.516**
10.173
(3) 0.404***
(0 .102)
0.281*
(0.125)
0.196
(0.163)
0.522***
(0.150)
0.596***
(0 .102)
A =  0.25 
2.283
10.173
A3544 (1) 0.069
(0.103)
0.108***
(0.035)
0.136
(0 .102)
0.690***
(0.087)
0 ! +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.280
11.347**
(2) 0.084
(0.096)
0.105***
(0.035)
0.134
(0.099)
0.678***
(0.087)
0 !  =  0.25 
2.997*
0 2 =  0.25 
17.393***
11.482*
(3) 0.322***
(0.087)
0.260
(0.282)
0.326***
(0.081)
0.415
(0.294)
0.678***
(0.087)
A =  0.25 
0.688
11.482
A4554 (1) -0.054
(0.045)
0.045
(0.041)
0.263***
(0.070)
0.757***
(0.054)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
0.539
9.475*
(2) -0.024
(0.051)
0.023
(0.043)
0.239***
(0.064)
0.762***
(0.054)
0 !  =  0.25 
29.439***
02 =  0.25 
27.996***
9.886
(3) 0.239***
(0.054)
-0.101
(0.206)
0.098
(0.171)
1.003***
(0.170)
0.761***
(0.054)
A =  0.25 
0.045
9.886
A5564 (1) 0.012
(0.090)
0.104
(0.092)
0.108
(0.119)
0.760***
(0.129)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
1.098
10.071*
(2) -0.030
(0 .100)
0.135*
(0.074)
0.134
(0.074)
0.761***
(0.092)
0 i  =  0.25 
7.886***
02 =  0.25 
2.395
10.243
(3) 0.239**
(0.092)
-0.125
(0.382)
0.565***
(0.174)
0.560*
(0.337)
0.761***
(0.092)
A =  0.25 
0.014
10.243
A6597
*
(1) -0.065
(0.285)
0.109
(0.173)
0 .210
(0.373)
0.750***
(0.251)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.005
12.653**
(2) -0.070
(0.308)
0.116
(0 .201 )
0.218
(0.403)
0.736**
(0.290)
0 X =  0.25 
1.078
02 =  0.25 
0.447
12.605**
(3)
$ s|c % $5 5
0.264
(0.290)
* indicate si
-0.266
(0.881)
gnificance £
0.439
(0.319)
it 1, 5 and 1(
0.827
(0.634)
3 percentleve
0.736**
(0.290)
:1s.
A =  0.25 
0.002
12.605**
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Appendix 5.73. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated
Expectations -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( ! )£ {  ,t\.n t+h\ — Q lE p .t fr t+ h ]  +  <t>2n t +  +  4>^ i , t - A n t+ h - l \  +  € t
(2)£ '/,t[^ t+ /i] =  <t>iEP t [ n t+h] +  4>2n t +  ^ ^ R E . t l ^ t + h ]  +  (1  — 0 1  — 0 2  — 0 3 ) £ i , t - l [ 7rt+ /i-l] +  € t 
(3 )  E t If [ n t +h\ — -^(01^'t,p[7rt+/t] +  (t) 2 n t - l  +  (1  ~  0 1  +  (t>2 ) ^ R E ,t \n t+ h \)  +  (1  ~  ^ )£ t ,/ /[7rt+ /i-l] +  e t
X 01 02 03 04
( 1 - X )
W ald x 2 Test J-S ta t
Period: G reenspan-B ernanke 1987Q2 -2011Q 1
A1834 (1) 0.109
(0.091)
-0.010
(0.044)
0.076
(0.073)
0.832***
(0.050)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
0.821
10.181*
(2) 0.118
(0.087)
-0.017
(0.043)
0.067
(0.067)
0.832***
(0.050)
0 !  =  0.25 
2.313
02 =  0.25 
38.405***
10.733*
(3) 0.168***
(0.050)
0.700
(0.432)
-0.099
(0.273)
0.399
(0.454)
0.832***
(0.050)
X =  0.25 
2 .686
10.733*
A3544 (1) 0.199
(2.958)
0.034
(1.284)
-0.067
( 1.866 )
0.833***
(0.215)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.001
8.494
(2) 0.217
(0.536)
0.031
(0.264)
-0.076
(0.341)
0.828***
(0.082)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.004
02 =  0.25 
0.687 j
8.484
(3) 0.172**
(0.082)
1.260
(3.472)
0.180
(1.471)
-0.441
(2 .102)
0.828***
(0.082)
X =  0.25 
0.904
8.484
A4554 (1) 0.084
(0.098)
-0.052
(0.046)
0.091
(0.086)
0.889***
(0.048)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
2.154
7.607
(2) 0.096
(0.089)
-0.069
(0.058)
0 .112
(0.071)
0.860***
(0.054)
0 !  =  0.25 
3.012*
02 =  0.25 
30.769***
8.985
(3) 0.140**
(0.054)
0.690
(0.757)
-0.495
(0.559)
0.805*
(0.414)
0.860***
(0.054)
X =  0.25 
4.165**
8.985
A5564 (1) 0.166
(0 .120)
0.022
(0.071)
-0.034
(0.104)
0.841***
(0.130)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.016
9.175
(2) 0.173
(0.119)
0.023
(0.077)
-0.040
(0 .101)
0.844***
(0.057)
01 =  0.25 
0.419
02 =  0.25 
8.612***
9.080
(3) 0.156***
(0.057)
1.111
(0.877)
0.146
(0.451)
-0.258
(0.648)
0.844***
(0.057)
X =  0.25 
2.775*
9.080
A6597 (1) 0.223
(0.247)
-0.017
(0.052)
-0.070
(0 .2 2 0 )
0.874***
(0.068)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.252
11.275**
(2) 0.213
(0.169)
-0.019
(0.047)
-0.050
(0.157)
0.856***
(0.052)
0 i  =  0.25 
0.048
02 =  0.25 
32.369***
11.845*
(3) 0 144*** 
(0.052)
1.482
(1.449)
-0.135
(0.364)
-0.626
(1.416)
0.856***
(0.052)
X =  0.25 
4.133**
11.845*
*** ,**,* indicate significance at 1 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.74. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated
Expectations -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( X ) E t , t [ n t+ h \ =  Q l E p . t f a t + h ]  +  0 2 ^ 1  +  03^R E,t[7rt+/i] +  0 4 ^ V t- l[7rt+ /i-l] +  € t
( 2 ) E i t l 7 l t +h]  —  0 1 ^ P , t [ 7 r t+ / i ]  +  0 2 n t  +  0 3 ^ R £ , t [ 7 rf+ ft] +  ( 1  ~  0 1  “  0 2  — 0 3 ) ^ i , t - l  [ ^ t + h - l ]  +  6 1
(3) E t H \7*t+/i] — ^ ( 0 i E t,p n t+h\  +  4>27lt - l  +  (1  — 01  +  02  ) E REit[Ttt+h\ )  +  (1 — X)E tl1 7rt+/i-i] +
X 01 02 03 04
( 1 - A )
Wald Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
A1834 (1) 0.238
(0.191)
0.152**
(0.060)
0.414**
(0.195)
0.236***
(0.067)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
3.151*
5.582
(2) 0.246*
(0.142)
0.116***
(0.044)
0.149*
(0.080)
0.489***
(0.092)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.001
0 2 =  0.25 
9 4 5 2 ***
10.818*
(3) 0.511*** 
(0.092)
0.481**
(0 .22 0 )
0.227**
(0.072)
0.292
(0.189)
0.489***
(0.092)
A =  0.25 
3.297*
10.818*
A3544 (1) 0.159
(0.096)
0.093
(0.076)
0.432**
(0.164)
0.350***
(0 .102)
01 + 0 2 + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
2.332
4.664
(2) 0.205***
(0.072)
0.022
(0 .121)
0 .2 2 1 ***
(0.059)
0.552***
(0.171)
0 ! =  0.25 
0.390
02 =  0.25 
3.567*
8.784
(3) 0.448**
(0.171)
0.458**
(0.209)
0.049
(0.252)
0 4 9 4 *** 
(0.142)
0.552***
(0.172)
A =  0.25 
1.340
8.784
A4554 (1) 0.047
(0.068)
0.003
(0.036)
0.364***
(0.131)
0.608***
(0.092)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
1.361
5.971
(2) 0.100
(0.152)
-0.009
(0.054)
0.226***
(0.067)
0.684***
(0.047)
0 ! =  0.25 
0.974
0 2 =  0.25 
22.831***
7.252
(3) 0.316***
(0.047)
0.316
(0.441)
-0.028
(0.168)
0.316
(0.441)
0.713**
(0.295)
A =  0.25 
1.990
7.252
A5564 (1) 0.111
(0.166)
0.066
(0.040)
0.388*
(0.197)
0.446***
(0.059)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.429
5.054
(2) 0.135
(0.116)
0.058
(0.041)
0.338**
(0.135)
0.469***
(0.049)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.978
02 =  0.25 
21.884***
5.356
(3) 0.531***
(0.049)
0.254
(0.238)
0.109
(0.075)
0.637***
(0 .2 0 2 )
0.469***
(0.049)
A =  0.25 
32.581***
5.356
A6597 (1) 0.001
(0.171)
0.049
(0.081)
1.045***
(0.308)
-0.041
(0.142)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
1.486
4.685
(2) 0.078
(0.132)
0.080
(0.057)
0.788***
(0 .2 1 2 )
0.054
(0 .110)
0 !  =  0.25 
1.705
02 =  0.25 
8.851***
7.575
(3) 0.946***
(0 .110)
0.082
(0.148)
0.085
(0.058)
0.833***
(0.134)
0.054
(0 .110)
A =  0.25 
40.117***
7.575
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
514
App endix 5.75. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Age Disaggregated
Expectations -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) E l , t [ n t+ h \  — 0 l £ p , t [ 7rt+ /J  +  0 2  n t +  0 3 ^ R F ,t [7rt+ft] +  4>4 ^ i , t - l [ 7Tt + h - l ]  +  € t 
C Z ) ^ i , t [ Ttt+ h \  =  0 1  E p , t [ n t+h]  +  <t) 2 n t  +  <t>-iERE,t[n t+ h \  +  ( 1  — 0 1  — 0 2  — 0 3 ) ^ f , t - l  \n t + h - l ]  +  € t 
(3 )  E t H [ n t+h] = A{4>1E t P [ n t+h] +  0 27r t_x +  (1 -  0 t +  0 2) E W n - f+/t]) +  (1 -  A ) E t H [ n t+h_ 1] +  e t
A 01 02 03 0 4 Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
(1 - A )
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
A1834 ( l) t 1.014**
(0.402)
-0.005
(0.067)
-0.080
(0.109)
0.330
(0.209)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
5.801**
3.554
(2)f -0.004
(0.192)
-0 .0 2 1
(0.080)
0.141*
(0.077)
0.884***
(0.105)
0 !  =  0.25 
1.753
0 2 =  0.25 
11.388***
2 . 1 0 0
(3)f 0.116
(0.105)
-0.036
(1.685)
-0.179
(0.719)
1.215
(1.594)
0.884***
(0.105)
A =  0.25 
1.635
2 . 1 0 0
A3544 0 ) f 2.152***
(0.279)
0147***  
(0.040)
-0.371***
(0.072)
-0.350**
(0.143)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
43.238***
4.025
(2)f 0.061
(0.165)
0.066
(0.083)
0.062
(0.059)
0.811***
(0.082)
0 !  =  0.25 
1.316
0 2 =  0.25 
4.870**
5.991
(3)f 0.189**
(0.082)
0.324
(0.773)
0.350
(0.525)
0.326
(0.356)
0.811***
(0.082)
A =  0.25 
0.561
5.991
A4554 (l) t 0.728
(0.506)
0.031
(0.113)
0.065
(0.119)
0.445
(0.306)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
2.347
2.954
(2)f -0.183
(0.189)
-0.026
(0.080)
0.231***
(0.077)
q 979*** 
(0.131)
0 !  =  0.25 
5.242**
02 =  0.25 
11 7 9 9 ***
2.119
(3)f 0 .0 2 1
(0.130)
-8.560
(59.635)
-1.214
(8.037)
10.773
(66.599)
0.979***
(0.131)
A =  0.25 
3.046**
2.119
A5564 (l)t 1.669***
(0.218)
0.078
(0.052)
-0.258***
(0.071)
-0.004
(0.131)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
58.898***
4.009
(2)t 0.013
(0.067)
0.036
(0.050)
0.073
(0.050)
0.878***
(0.075)
0 !  =  0.25 
12.523***
02 =  0.25 
18.195***
5.375
(3)t 0 . 1 2 2
(0.075)
0.108
(0.522)
0.298
(0.370)
0.594
(0.405)
0.878***
(0.075)
A =  0.25 
2.919*
5.375
A6597 (l)t 1.572***
(0.320)
0.032
(0.081)
-0.231**
(0.087)
0.096
(0.154)
01 + 0 2 + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
22.072***
3.607
(2)t 0.014
(0.079)
0.019
(0.055)
0.030
(0.048)
0.938***
(0.042)
0 !  =  0.25 
9.007***
02 =  0.25 
17.390
5.859
(3)f 0.062
(0.042)
0.225
(1.280)
0.300
(0.837)
0.474
(0.631)
0.938***
(0.042)
A =  0.25 
20.335
5.859
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.76. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated
Expectations -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) £ f  ,t\n t+h\ =  4>lEp,t[n t+h\ +  <t>2n t +  $ 3 ^  RE,t\jtt+h\ +  04^'<,t-l[7rt+/i-l] +  €t
( 2 ) E iit[ n t+h\ =  <t) l^P,t\-n t+h\ +  02  n t +  03  ^ RE,t\.n t+h\ + (1 — 01  — 02  — 03)^'f,t-l t^t+h-l] +  €t 
(3 )£ ,t,ff[7Tt+/i] — ^ (0 1  ^ t,p [7tt+h\ +  0 2 ^ - 1  +  ( t  — 0 1  +  <t>2)ERE,t[n t+h\) + (1  ~  t H[ n t+h_1] +  €t
A 01 02 03 04 Wald * 2 Test J-Stat
c1 - X )
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) -0 .0 0 1
(0.416)
0.046
(0.274)
0.179
(0.364)
0.783***
(0.152)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
0.013
6.958
(2) 0.003
(0.078)
0.051
(0.082)
0.123**
(0.057)
0.823***
(0.052)
0 ! =  0.25 
10.069***
0 2 =  0.25 
5.913**
7.731
(3) 0.177***
(0.052)
0.017
(0.443)
0.288
(0.397)
0.696***
(0.196)
0.823***
(0.196)
A  =  0.25 
0.161
7.730
EHSD (1) -0.049
(0.054)
0.036
(0.058)
0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.057)
0.818***
(0.050)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.236
8.582
(2) -0.038
(0.049)
0.028
(0.053)
0 193***
(0.055)
0.818***
(0.048)
0 i  =  0.25 
34.535***
02 =  0.25 
17.425***
8.619
(3) 0.182***
(0.048)
-0.209
(0.246)
0.151
(0.270)
1.058***
(0.213)
0.818***
(0.048)
A  =  0.25 
1.983
8.619
ESC (1) 0 . 0 1 1
(0.044)
-0 .0 0 1
(0.046)
0.178**
(0.079)
0.804***
(0.062)
01 + 02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.469
10.428*
(2) -0.008
(0.046)
0.017
(0.038)
0.184**
(0.080)
0.807***
(0.061)
01 =  0.25 
31.312***
02 = 0.25 
36.602***
10.690*
(3) 0.193***
(0.061)
-0.044
(0.237)
0.089
(0.198)
0.955***
(0.240)
0.807***
(0.061)
A  =  0.25 
0.878
10.690*
ECD (1) 0.113
(0.140)
0.227
(0.152)
0.245
(0.301)
0.384
(0.324)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
1.015
8.444
(2) 0.030
(0.171)
0.297**
(0.119)
0.311
(0.257)
0.363
(0.269)
01 = 0.25 
1.655
02 =  0.25 
0.155
8.441
(3) 0.637**
(0.268)
0.046
(0.276)
0.466***
(0.093)
0.488*
(0.256)
0.363
(0.268)
A  =  0.25 
2.081
8.441
EGS (1) 0.346***
(0 .1 1 0 )
0.183*
(0.105)
0 . 0 0 2
(0.087)
0.451***
(0.138)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.443
10.924
(2) 0.279***
(0.061)
0.219***
(0.063)
0.054
(0.084)
0.448***
(0.065)
0 i  =  0.25 
0.228
02 =  0.25 
0.252
11.669*
(3) 0.552***
(0.065)
0.506***
(0 .1 2 1 )
0.396***
(0.107)
0.098
(0.147)
0.448***
(0.147)
A  =  0.25 
21.458***
11.669*
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.77. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated
Expectations -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
=  <l>l ^ P , t [ n t+ h \  +  4 > ln t  +  03  ^ R E ,t [ n t+ h \  +  [n t + h - l ]  +  € t
(2)Ei,t[n t+h] ~  0 1  £ /> ,t[7rt+ ft] +  0 2 ^  +  0 3 ^ « £ , t t 7 rt+ /i] +  ( 1  — 0 1  — 0 2  — 0 3 ) £ < , t - l [ 7rt + / i - l ]  +
A 01 02 03 0 4 Wald * 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 ~ A )
+ ft
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
ELHS (1) 0.195
(0.167)
-0.106*
(0.056)
0.085
(0.169)
0.838***
(0.041)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  +  04 - 1  
0.877
8.882
(2) 0.204
(0.142)
-0.093*
(0.048)
0.024
(0.139)
0.865***
(0.038)
0* =  0.25 
0.104
0 2 =  0.25 
50.606***
9.170
(3) 0.135***
(0.038)
1.507
(0.981)
-0.684*
(0.359)
0.177
(1.026)
0.865***
(0.038)
A  =  0.25 
8.938***
9.170
EHSD (1) 0.039
(0.071)
-0.032
(0.038)
0.121
(0.077)
0.881***
(0.034)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
1.297
8.257
(2) 0.023
(0.080)
-0.033
(0.041)
0.128
(0.083)
0.882***
(0.042)
0 !  =  0.25 
8.136***
0 2 =  0.25 
47.117***
8.712
(3) 0.118***
(0.042)
0.195
(0.652)
-0.281
(0.292)
1.086*
(0.605)
0.882***
(0.042)
A = 0.25
9 347***
8.712
ESC (1) 0.144
(0.117)
-0.047*
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.103)
0.916***
(0.032)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.042
7.776
(2) 0.149
(0.113)
-0.048**
(0.023)
-0.013
(0 .101)
0.912***
(0.033)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.789
0 2  =  0.25 
165.727***
7.820
(3) 0.088***
(0.033)
1.705*
( 1.00 0 )
-0.553
(0.386)
-0.152
(1.132)
0.912***
(0.033)
A = 0.25 
24.812***
7.820
ECD (1) 0.448*
(0.238)
0.042
(0.040)
-0.209
(0.188)
0.699***
(0.099)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.353
7.624
(2) 0.417*
(0.238)
0.042
(0.036)
-0.180
(0.183)
0 722*** 
(0.082)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.491
0 2  =  0.25 
34.407***
7.664
(3) 0.278***
(0.082)
1.496**
(0.603)
0.150
(0.133)
-0.646
(0.580)
0.722***
(0.082)
A = 0.25 
0.119
7.664
EGS (1) 0.460**
(0.195)
0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.049)
-0.135
(0.155)
0.461***
(0 .120)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.192
6.998
(2) 0.450**
(0.223)
0.196***
(0.066)
-0.131
(0.179)
0.485***
(0.067)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.804
0 2  =  0.25 
0.672
7.380
(3) 0.515***
(0.067)
0.874**
(0.421)
0.381***
(0.123)
-0.255
(0.349)
0.485***
(0.067)
A =  0.25 
15.384***
7.380
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.78. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated
Expectations -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X)Ei, t [n t+h\ “  01 Ep,t[n t+h\ +  0 2 n t +  0 3 ERE,t[n t+h\ +  0 4 ^ - 1  Nt+ft-l] +  €t 
( 2 ) E ix[ n t+h\ =  (f>iEpt [ n t+h\ +  0 2 ?rt +  <I>3 E r e  t [ n t+h] +  (1 — 0 i  — 0 2 — 0 3 )£ i,t - i[7rt+/i-i] +  € t 
(3 )E t,tf[irf+/l] =  A (0 1g t.P[ire+fc] +  0 2 ^ t- i  +  (1 ~  0 i  +  0 2 )Eft£,,t[7rt+/l]) +  (1 — A) ^ 1 ] +
A 0 i 02 0 3 0 4 W ald x 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
ELHS (1) -0.336*
(0.191)
0.232**
(0 .100)
0.963*
(0.506)
0.294
(0.216)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
1.895
3.939
(2) 0.088*
(0.050)
0.040
(0.030)
0.115*
(0.067)
0.756***
(0.036)
0 !  =  0.25 
10.612***
02 =  0.25 
47.433***
9.786
(3) 0.244***
(0.036)
0.363*
(0.213)
0.165
(0 .121)
0.472*
(0.250)
0.756***
(0.036)
A =  0.25 
0.031
9.786
EHSD (1) 0.057
(0.109)
0.071
(0.076)
0.641***
(0.167)
0.301***
(0.085)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
9.630***
4.648
(2 ) 0.118**
(0.049)
0.019
(0 .100)
0.190***
(0.042)
0.673***
(0.129)
0 !  =  0.25 
7 353***
0 2 =  0.25 
5.333**
11.126*
(3) 0.327**
(0.129)
0.361**
(0.144)
0.058
(0.286)
0.581**
(0 .222 )
0.673***
(0.129)
A =  0.25 
0.352
11.126
ESC (1) 0.168
(0.231)
0.048
(0.030)
0.258
(0.394)
0.544***
(0.148)
0 ! +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
1.048
6.373
(2 ) 0.187
(0.456)
0.014
(0.115)
0.143
(0.340)
0.657***
(0.236)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.019
02 =  0.25 
4.241**
7.529
(3) 0.343
(0.236)
0.543
(0.979)
0.039
(0.308)
0.418
(1.258)
0.657***
(0.236)
A =  0.25 
0.157
7.529
ECD (1) 0.210
(0.138)
0 .102**
(0.039)
0.455**
(0.213)
0.223***
(0.081)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.156
5.368
(2) 0.174*
(0.095)
0 .102**
(0.039)
0.519***
(0.117)
0.205***
(0.064)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.641
02 =  0.25 
14.364***
5.218
(3) 0.795***
(0.064)
0.219*
(0.125)
0.128**
(0.051)
0.653***
(0 .111)
0.205***
(0.064)
A =  0.25 
72.882***
5.218
EGS (1) 0.231**
(0.113)
0.159
(0.159)
0.293*
(0.147)
0.325***
(0.069)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
0.127
6.351
(2 ) 0.259
(0.554)
0.163
(2.922)
0.253
(1.441)
0.326
(0.930)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.000
02 =  0.25 
0.001
6.631
(3) 0.674
(0.930)
0.384
(1.349)
0.241
(4.002)
0.375
(2.665)
0.326
(0.930)
A =  0.25 
0.208
6.631
* * * * * *  jn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.79. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Education Disaggregated
Expectations -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) £ i  ,t[n t+h\ =  Q l Ep . t b t t +h l  +  02  n t +  (f>3^RE,t[n t+h\ +  04 ^ /,t-l [n t+h- l \  +  €t
(2 ) E i t [ n t+h] =  <f)iEP t [ n t+h] +  0 2 +  03^«£,t[7rt+/i] +  (1 ~  0 i  ~  02  ~  03)E f,t-i[7rt+/i-i] +
[jTt-Hfe] =  ^ (0 1 ^'t,p[7rt+/i] +  <t>2n t - l  +  (1 ~  01  +  0 2 )^fiC,t[7rt+ft]) +  (1 ~  ^)£t,ff[7rt+/t- l ]  +  € t
A 01 02 0 3 0 4 W ald x 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
ELHS (l)t 0.929*
(0.456)
-0.021
(0.070
0.091
(0.135)
0.456**
(0 .2 0 1 )
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1
5.553**
3.995
(2)t -0.289*
(0.142)
-0.002
(0.090)
0.350***
(0.078)
0.940***
(0 .111)
0 !  =  0.25 
14.300***
02 =  0.25 
7.820***
4.240
(3)t 0.060
(0 .111)
-4.840
(10.819)
-0.026
(1.488)
5.866
(10.156)
0.940***
(0 .111)
A =  0.25 
2.937*
4.240
EHSD (1)+ 0.286
(0.617)
0.036
(0.049)
0.180
(0.108)
0.692**
(0.308)
01  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.826
3.003
(2)t -0.293*
(0.143)
0.052
(0.046)
0.260***
(0.069)
0.981***
(0.068)
0 !  =  0.25 
14 4 9 7 ***
02 =  0.25 
18.850***
3.445
(3)t 0.019
(0.068)
-15.082
(59.454)
2.691
(10.036)
13.391
(49.661)
0.981***
(0.068)
A =  0.25 
11.585***
3.445
ESC 0 ) t 1.295**
(0.478)
0.021
(0.039)
-0.182
(0 .120)
0.252
(0.233)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
6.380**
3.954
(2)t -0.012
(0.095)
-0.001
(0.068)
0.095*
(0.052)
0.918***
(0.044)
0 !  =  0.25 
7.563***
02 =  0.25 
13.612***
4.639
(3)t 0.082*
(0.044)
-0.143
(1.160)
-0.018
(0.834)
1.160*
(0.660)
0.918***
(0.044)
A =  0.25
14 4 9 i***
4.639
ECD (Dt 1.348***
(0.154)
0.264***
(0.060)
-0.127**
(0.053)
-0.116**
(0.052)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
80.161***
4.061
(2)t 0.241
(0.161)
0.080
(0.113)
0.064
(0.071)
0.616***
(0.128)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.003
02 =  0.25 
2.271
5.338
(3)t 0.384***
(0.128)
0.626
(0.369)
0.207
(0.296)
0.167
(0.158)
0.616***
(0.128)
A =  0.25 
1.097
5.338
EGS 0 ) t 1 405***
(0.217)
0.259***
(0.043)
-0.128*
(0.069)
-0.151
(0 .101)
01  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
37.648***
3.971
(2)t 0.252*
(0.142)
0.116
(0.075)
0.099
(0.061)
0.533***
(0.098)
0 !  =  0.25 
0 .000
02 =  0.25 
3.206*
5.225
(3)t 0.467***
(0.098)
0.540**
(0.241)
0.249
(0.188)
0 .2 1 1 *
(0.115)
0.533***
(0.098)
A =  0.25 
4.915**
5.225
*** ** * in(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.80. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated
Expectations -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(1  ) E i ,A n t+h\ =  0 1 ^ P ,t[7rt+ft] +  0 2 7rf +  0 3  ^ R E ,d n t+h\ +  0 4 ^ i , t - l  [n t+ h - l \  +  € t
(Z)^l,t[^t+h\ =  0 l E p t [7Tt+ /l] +  <f>2n t +  0 3 ^ R £ ,t[7rf+/i] +  (1  — 0 1  — 0 2  — 0 3 ) ^ / , t - l  frt+h-l]  +  ct 
( 3 ) E t H [ n t + h ] =  A (< l > i E t p [ n t + h ] +  ( j>2n t - i  +  ( 1  ~  0 i  +  02)^~R E,t[7rt+ /i])  +  ( 1  ~  X ) E t ,H [ n t + h - i ]  +  c t
A 0 i 02 03 04 Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
( l - A )
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
MALE (1) 0.004
(0.041)
0.067**
(0.032)
0.158**
(0.073)
0.750***
(0.068)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
4.364**
11.0 2 2 *
(2) -0.029
(0.054)
0.091**
(0.037)
0.166**
(0.073)
0.773***
(0.067)
0 ! =  0.25 
26.983***
0 2 =  0.25 
18.604***
11.632
(3) 0.227***
(0.067)
-0.130
(0.248)
0.399***
(0.150)
0.730***
(0.277)
0.773***
(0.067)
A =  0.25 
0.114
11.632
FEMALE (1) 0 .020
(0.056)
0.014
(0.107)
0.193
(0.215)
0.781***
(0.269)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.251
8.704
(2) 0.042
(0.033)
-0.007
(0.105)
0.165
(0.383)
0.801*
(0.470)
0 ! =  0.25 
40.145***
0 2 =  0.25 
5.979**
9.229
(3) 0.199
(0.470)
0 .210
(0.572)
-0.037
(0.611)
0.827***
(0.132)
0.801*
(0.470)
A =  0.25 
0.012
9.229
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.81. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated 
Expectations -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( ! ) £ / , tf r t+ h ]  =  0 1  Ep,t\-n t+h\ +  02  +  0 3  ERE,An t+h\ +  0 4 ^ i , t - l  f r t+ h - l]  +  €t 
(2 )Et , t [n t+h\ =  0 1 ^ P ,tt7rt+/i] +  0 2 n t +  4>lERE,An t+h\ +  (1 ~  0 1  ~  0 2  ~  0 3 ) ^ , t - l [n t+h- l ]  +  € t
(3 )£ t,//[7l't+/J ~  l ( 0 1 ^ t ,f [ ^ t+ / i ]  +  0 2 7rt- i  +  (1 ~  0 1  +  02)^R g ,t[7rt+ft]) +  (1  ~  ^■)^t.l/[7rt+ /i-l] +  € t
A 0 i 02 03 04 Wald * 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
MALE (1) 0.170
(0.151)
-0.006
(0.031)
-0.022
(0 .101)
0.847***
(0.067)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
0.450
9.319*
(2) 0.151
(0.135)
-0.006
(0.028)
-0.011
(0.087)
0.867***
(0.058)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.537
02 =  0.25 
82.430***
9.503
(3) 0.133**
(0.058)
1.134
(0.683)
-0.048
(0 .2 1 0 )
-0.086
(0.638)
0.867***
(0.058)
A =  0.25 
4.007**
9.503
FEMALE (1) 0.132
(0.138)
-0.001
(0.036)
-0.061
(0.093)
Q  9 4  J  * 4 4
(0.065)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  +  04 - 1  
0.989
8.364
(2) 0.147
(0.137)
-0.007
(0.034)
-0.078
(0.098)
0.938***
(0.075)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.564
02 =  0.25 
55.715***
8.906
(3) 0.062
(0.075)
2.370
(2.683)
-0.109
(0.596)
-1.261
(2.243)
0.938***
(0.075)
A =  0.25 
6.309**
8.906
*** ** * jn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.82. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated
Expectations -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
{ l ) E l , t [ n t+ h \ —  0 1  E p , t [ n t+ h \  +  0 2 7 r t  +  0 3  E R E ,t[ n t+ h \  +  0 4 ^ - 1  [ n ’t + h - l ]  +  € t  
( 2 ) E ix [ n t+h\ =  0 1  E P t [ n t+h] +  0 2 ^  +  0 3 ^ 1 ? £ , t [ 7 r t + / i ]  +  ( 1  ~  0 1  —  0 2  —  4 >3 ) ^ i , t - l i 7rt + h - l \  +  € t
( 3 ) E t iH[ n t+h ~  ^ ( 0 l £ t , p [ 7rt+ /d  +  0 2 7rt - l  +  (1 — 0 1  +  <J^ 2 ) ^ R E , t [ n t + h \ )  +  (1 —  X ) E t ' [ { [ n t + h - l . +  € t
X 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4
( 1 - A )
Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
M ALE (1) 0.109
(0.209)
0.053
(0.063)
0.390
(0.295)
0.450***
(0 .122)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 - 1  
0.003
6.632
(2) 0.119
(0.116)
0.054
(0.059)
0.384**
(0.155)
0.443***
(0 .122)
0 !  =  0 .2 5  
1.270
0 2 =  0 .2 5  
11.005***
6.464
(3) 0.557***
(0 .122)
0.214
(0.235)
0.097
(0.095)
0.690***
(0.157)
0.443***
(0 .122)
X =  0 .2 5  
6.341**
6.464
FEM A LE (1) 0.127
(0.113)
0.088
(0.074)
0.513**
(0.251)
0.348*
(0.188)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
5.534**
5.095
(2) 0.127
(0.091)
-0.035
(0.025)
0.054
(0.041)
0.854***
(0.053)
<p1 =  0 .2 5  
1.817
0 2 =  0 .2 5  
127.095***
10.538
(3) 0.146***
(0.053)
0 .8 6 8 **
(0.336)
-0.238
(0.182)
0.370
(0.394)
0.854***
(0.053)
X =  0 .2 5  
3.905**
10.538
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 5.83. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Gender Disaggregated 
Expectations -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( i ) E l , t [ n t+ h \ =  0 l £ p , t [ 7 r t + / i ]  +  0 2 7 r t  +  ^ > 3 ^ R E ,A n t+ h \  +  0 4 ^ i , t - l  [n t + h - l \  +  € t  
( 2 ) ^ i , t [ ^ t + / i ]  =  < t> \E p ,t\n t+ h \  +  0 2 n t  +  0 3 ^ R E , t [ n t+ h \  +  ( 1  —  0 1  —  0 2  ~  0 3 ) ^ l , t - l [ ^ t + A - l l  +  € t
(3 ) E t„ n t+h\ ~  A ^ l ^ t . p b t t + h ]  +  0 2 ^ - .1 +  (1 — 0 I +  0 2 )^PE,t[7r t+/i]) +  (1 — X ) E tiH[ n t+h- 1] + € t
X 0 i 02 03 0 4
( 1 - A )
Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
M ALE ( l ) t 1.436***
(0.213)
0.090
(0.057)
-0.141*
(0.070)
0.001
(0.132)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
32.322***
4.995
(2)f 0.158
(0.134)
0.052
(0.066)
0.060
(0.067)
0.730***
(0.116)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.465
02 =  0.25 
9.053***
5.269
(3)t 0.270**
(0.116)
0.586
(0.386)
0.192
(0.256)
0.222
(0.227)
0.730***
(0.116)
X =  0.25 
0.031
5.269
FEM A LE ( l ) t 1.562**
(0.549)
0.075
(0.076)
-0.227*
(0.127)
0.095
(0.232)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
10.277***
2.745
(2)t -0.095
(0.091)
0.024
(0.074)
0.076*
(0.043)
0.995***
(0.041)
01 =  0.25 
14.551***
02 =  0.25 
9.288***
5.116
(3)t 0.005
(0.041)
-18.134
(138.723)
4.638
(29.982)
14.496
(110.292)
0.995***
(0.041)
X =  0.25 
36.518***
5.116
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.84. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated
Expectations -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( ! ) £ / , t f r t + f t ]  =  (t) l ^ P , d 7 l t+ h \  +  (l) 2 n t  +  0 3 £ f i E \ t [ 7 r t + f t ]  +  0 4 ^ / , £ — 1  [ ^ t + A i - l ]  +  e t
(2 ) E i t [ n t+tl\ =  <friEpt [ n t+h] +  0 2 ^  +  0 3 ^ ’«£,,t[7r£+/i] +  (1 -  0 l  — 0 2  — 03)£< ,t-i[7rt+/i-i] + €t 
l ]  +  e t
A 01 02 03 04 Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
(1 - A )
Period: Whole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 (1) -0.065
(0.070)
0.019
(0.074)
0.232***
(0.067)
0.839***
(0.048)
01 + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
1.435
7.285
(2 ) 0.029
(0 .1 1 0 )
-0.032
(0.251)
0.144
(0.169)
0.859***
(0.034)
0 !  =  0.25 
3.986**
0 2 =  0.25 
1.264
8.883
(3) Q i ***
(0.034)
0.209
(0.750)
-0.227
(1.742)
1.019
(1.043)
0.859***
(0.034)
A =  0.25 
10.151***
8.883
Y24 (1) -0.008
(0.040)
0.057
(0.061)
0.181**
(0.078)
0.774***
(0.069)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
0.130
8.746
(2) 0.008
(0.048)
0.047
(0.058)
0.169**
(0.058)
0.776***
(0.064)
0 i  =  0.25 
25.646***
0 2 =  0.25 
12.151***
8.789
(3) 0  2 2 4 *** 
(0.064)
0.036
(0.218)
0.209
(0.238)
0.755***
(0.243)
0.776***
(0.064)
X  =  0.25 
0.165
8.789
Y34 (1) 0.016
(0.073)
0.041
(0.039)
0.154
(0.115)
0.775***
(0.089)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 +  04 =  1
1.779
11.810
(2 ) -0.013
(0.073)
0.053*
(0.029)
0.175
(0 .1 1 1 )
0.785***
(0.085)
0 i  =  0.25 
13.064
02 =  0.25 
44.581***
11.911*
(3) 0.215**
(0.085)
-0.059
(0.334)
0.247**
(0.109)
0.812**
(0.360)
0.785***
(0.085
X = 0.25 
0.164
11.911*
Y44 (1) 0.274
(0.250)
0.108**
(0.050)
-0.019
(0.332)
0.590***
(0.085)
01 +  02 + 03 +  04 =  1 
0.500
10.338*
(2) 0.096
(0.197)
0.150**
(0.072)
0.144
(0.199)
0.610***
(0.080)
01 =  0.25 
0.610
02 =  0.25 
1.918
11.779*
(3) 0.390***
(0.080)
0.246
(0.537)
0.385***
(0 .1 2 1 )
0.369
(0.463)
0.610***
(0.080
X =  0.25 
3.089*
11.779*
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.85. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated
Expectations -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X)Ei,t\.n t+h\ =  01  Ep,t[n t+h\ +  02  n t +  03^RE,t[7rt+/i] +  0 4 ^ i ,t- l[7rt+/i-l] +  e t 
(2  ) E l t [ n t+h] =  <f>iEpt [ n t+h] +  0 2 n t +  (J>3^RE,t[7Tt+h] +  (1  — 0 i — 0 2  — 03)^< ,t-i[7rt+/i-i]
X 0 i 0 2 03 04 Wald * 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
+ ft 
l] +  e t
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
Y14 (1) 0.078
(0.134)
0.016
(0.064)
0.033
(0.193)
0.892***
(0.030)
01  + 0 2  + 0 3  +  04 - 1  
5.087**
7.706
(2) 0.135
(0.134)
-0.003
(0.087)
-0.027
(0.159)
0.895***
(0.082)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.738
0 2 =  0.25 
8.435***
8.911
(3) 0.105
(0.082)
1.285
(1.358)
-0.029
(0.845)
-0.256
(1.491)
0.895***
(0.082)
X =  0.25 
3.153*
8.911
Y24 (1) 0.087
(0.086)
-0.044
(0.065)
0.109
(0.071)
0.858***
(0.029)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.958
7.662
(2) 0.095
(0.079)
-0.048
(0.059)
0.096
(0.063)
0.856***
(0.032)
0 !  =  0.25 
3.810*
0 2 =  0.25 
25.568***
8.083
(3) 0 144***
(0.032)
0.662
(0.448)
-0.332
(0.373)
0.670
(0.452)
0.856***
(0.032)
X =  0.25 
11.195***
8.083
Y34 (1) 0.168
(0.243)
-0.003
(0.096)
-0.109
(0.132)
0.945***
(0.090)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.001
8.377
(2) 0.174
(0.181)
-0.008
(0 .121)
-0.108
(0.108)
0 942*** 
(0.071)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.177
02 =  0.25 
4.573**
8.638
(3) 0.058
(0.071)
3.017
(5.222)
-0.144
(2.226)
-1.873
(0.350)
0.942***
(0.071)
X =  0.25 
7.283***
8.638
Y44 0 ) 0.717
(0.515)
0 .020
(0 .2 1 0 )
-0.375
(0.538)
0.590
(0.512)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
0.037
4.396
(2) 0.616
(0.416)
-0.014
(0.099)
-0.312
(0.254)
0.710***
(0.105)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.773
02 =  0.25 
7.180***
5.896
(3) 0.290***
(0.105)
2.124**
(0.976)
-0.050
(0.333)
-1.075
(0.676)
0.710***
(0.105)
X =  0.25 
0.145
5.896
sfesle $ $ $ %indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.86. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated
Expectations -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( i ) E i t [ n t+h\ =  <t>lEp,t[nt+h\ + 02  n t + 03 ERE,t[n t+h\ +  04^1,1-1 +  €t
( 2 ) E i t [ n t+h\  =  0 i E P t [ n t+h] +  <f>2n t + 4>3^RE,t\-n t+h\ +  (1 -  0 i  -  02  -  03)£'/,t-i[^t+/i-i] +  *t 
( 3 ) E t H[ n t+h] =  A (0 1Et,p[n~t+/t] +  0 2 ^ -1  +  ( I  -  01  +  0 2 )^/?£,t[7Tt+/t]) +  ( I  -  *)Et.fyfo+ft-i] +  €tw n J
A
' t , P L " ' t + t l J
01 02 03 04
( 1 - A )
njy ' v
Wald Test J-Stat
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
Y14 (1) 0.065
(0.173)
0.060
(0.100)
0.949
(0.682)
0.105
(0.441)
01 +02 + 03  + 04 - 1  
6.002**
4.525
(2) 0.165
(0.157)
-0.107
(0.165)
0.043
(0.144)
0.900***
(0.134)
0! = 0.25 
0.295
0 2 = 0.25 
4.693**
9.735
(3) 0.100
(0.134)
1.659**
(0.777)
-1.075*
(0.589)
-0.256
(1.491)
0.895***
(0.082)
X  = 0.25 
1.259
9.735
Y24 (1) 0.092
(0.387)
0.061
(0.830)
0.356
(3.960)
0.531
(1.995)
01 + 02 + 03 + 04 = 1 
0.003
4.061
(2) 0.129
(0.141)
0.004
(0.069)
0.123
(0.085)
0 744*** 
(0.032)
0! = 0.25 
0.735
0 2 = 0.25 
12.766***
9.403
(3) 0.256***
(0.032)
0.504
(0.532)
0.015
(0.269)
0.481
(0.332)
0.744***
(0.032)
X  = 0.25 
0.040
9.403
Y34 (1) 0.092
(0.132)
0.089***
(0.032)
0.334**
(0.151)
0 495*** 
(0.081)
01 + 02 + 03 + 04 = 1 
0.467
6.387
(2) 0.132
(0.097)
0.086***
(0.032)
0.275**
(0.115)
0.507***
(0.087)
0! = 0.25 
1.478
02 = 0.25 
25.418***
6.683
(3) 0.493***
(0.087)
0.267
(0.198)
0.175**
(0.075)
0.558***
(0.181)
0.507***
(0.087)
X  = 0.25 
7.735***
6.683
Y44 (1) 0.175**
(0.079)
0.087**
(0.042)
0.365***
(0.100)
0.355***
(0.037)
01 + 02 + 03 + 04 = 1
0.744
5.694
(2) 0.105*
(0.056)
0.070*
(0.037)
0.477***
(0.093)
0.348***
(0.053)
0i = 0.25 
6.854***
02 = 0.25 
24.129***
4.942
(3) 0.652***
(0.053)
0.160*
(0.087)
0.108*
(0.061)
0.732***
(0.100)
0.348***
(0.053)
X  =  0.25 
56.869***
4.942
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.87. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Income Disaggregated
Expectations -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( X ) E l A n t+h\ =  Q lE p . t b t t +h l  +  <t>2n t +  4) i ^ R E lA n t+ h \  +  0 4 ^ i , t - l [ 7 r t + / i - l ]  +  €t
( Z ) E lit[ n t+h\ =  <t>\EP t [ n t+h\ +  02n t +  03£K£,t[7rt+/i] +  ( I  ~  0 i  — 02 — 03)^i,t-i[7rt+ft-i] + c t
(3  ) E t tH J l t + h l  ~  ^ (01  E t , p [ ^ t + h \  +  0 2 7rt - l  +  (1 — 0 1  +  $ l ) E r e , t \ j t t + h ) +  (1 -  X ) E t H [ n t + h - 1] +  € t
X 01 02 03 04
( 1 - A )
Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
Y14 0 ) t 1 9 4 4 *4 *
(0.548)
0.030
(0.049)
-0.248**
(0 .1 1 0 )
0.073
(0.250)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
13.825***
1.945
(2)t -0.247*
(0.126)
0.105
(0.064)
q 143*** 
(0.048)
0  9 9 9 ***
(0.048)
0 ! =  0.25 
15.621***
02 = 0.25 
5.125**
3.947
(3)t 0 .0 0 1
(0.048)
-227.865
(10267.23)
96.686
(4337.984)
130.458
(5776.105)
0  9 9 9 ***
(0.048)
X = 0.25 
26.400***
3.947
Y24 ( l)t 1 912*** 
(0.359)
0.144**
(0.052)
-0.152
(0.093)
-0.204
(0.186)
0! + 02 +  03 + 04 =  1 
39.967***
4.818
(2)t -0.216
(0.283)
0.034
(0.085)
0.246**
(0.115)
0.936***
(0.146)
0! =  0.25 
2.718*
02 = 0.25 
6.424**
4.394
(3)t 0.064
(0.146)
-3.376
(11.830)
0.534
(2.070)
3.841
(10.107)
0.936***
(0.146)
X =  0.25 
1.618
4.393
Y34 0 ) t 1 4 9 7 *** 
(0.324)
0.078
(0.046)
-0.245***
(0.083)
0.060
(0.177)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 + 04 = 1
18.770***
4.027
(2)t 0.108
(0.068)
0.024
(0.063)
0.028
(0.041)
0.840***
(0.071)
0 ! =  0.25 
4.330**
02 =  0.25 
12.949***
6.024
(3)t 0.160**
(0.071)
0.675
(0.428)
0.148
(0.340)
0.177
(0.278)
0.840***
(0.071)
X = 0.25 
1.600
6.024
Y44 (l)t 1.166***
(0.219)
0.223**
(0.092)
-0.095
(0.082)
-0.033
(0.154)
0 1  +  0 2  +  03 + 04 =  1
30.027***
3.279
(2)t 0.461*
(0.223)
0.143
(0.149)
0.037
(0.117)
0.359**
(0.147)
0 ! = 0.25 
0.891
02 = 0.25 
0.511
5.481
(3)t 0.641***
(0.147)
0.719*
(0.365)
0.224
(0 .2 2 0 )
0.058
(0.108)
0.359**
(0.147)
X = 0.25 
7.062***
5.481
*** ** * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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Appendix 5.88. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Expectations -  Whole Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( i )El t [nt+h\ =  0 1  ^ P ,t[ 'n :t+ h ]  +  0 2 ^ 1  +  0 3  E R E ,A n t+ h \  +  0 4 ^ , t - l  [n t + h - l \  +  € t  
(2 )E f , t [ n t+ h \ =  4 > \E p , t[ n t+ h \  +  0 2  n t  +  0 3  ^ R E , d n t+ h \  +  (1  — 0 1  — 0 2  — 0 3 ) ^ i , t - l  [ ^ t + h - l ]  +  € t
( $ ) E t H [n t+ft] =  ^ ( 0 i E t A n t+h. +  0 2 7r t - l +  (1 — 01  +  02  ) E REt TTt+ft]) +  (1  -  ^ )E t,//[7rt+h_i] +  et
A 0 i 0 2 03 04
( 1 - A )
W ald x 2 Test J -S ta t
Period: W hole 1982Q3 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.052
(3.620)
0.040
(3.844)
0.061
(3.074)
0.841
(2.699)
01  + 0 2  +  03 + 0 4  - 1  
0.000
11.536
(2) 0.015
(0.088)
0.056
(0.068)
0.098
(0.144)
0.831***
(0 .120)
0 !  =  0.25
7 179***
0 2 =  0.25 
8.207***
11.840*
(3) 0.169
(0 .120)
0.087
(0.576)
0.331
(0.206)
0.583
(0.486)
0.831***
(0 .120)
X =  0.25 
0.459
11.840*
NE (1) 0.042
(0.062)
0.176
(0 .200 )
0.280*
(0.155)
0.502
(0.319)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1 
0 .000
9.087
(2) 0.041
(0.050)
0.172
(0.171)
0.275*
(0.150)
0.512*
(0.308)
0 !  =  0.25 
17.596***
02 =  0.25 
0.207
9.203
(3) 0.488
(0.308)
0.084
(0.106)
0.353**
(0.157)
0.563***
(0.147)
0.512*
(0.308)
A =  0.25 
0.599
9.203
S (1) -0.003
(0.060)
0.048
(0.033)
0.158
(0 .122)
0.795***
(0.074)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
2.823*
12.677**
(2 ) -0.014
(0.058)
0.057*
(0.033)
0.168
(0.119)
0.789***
(0.071)
0 !  =  0.25 
20.649***
02 =  0.25 
34.410***
12.764**
(3) 0 .2 1 1 ***
(0.072)
-0.066
(0.258)
0.269
(0.169)
0.797**
(0.320)
0.789***
(0.072)
A =  0.25 
0.294
12.764**
w (1) 0.054
(0.058)
0.093
(0.069)
0.191**
(0.073
0.657***
(0.091)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.108
8.457
(2) 0.044
(0.059)
0.098*
(0.054)
0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.069)
0.659***
(0.084)
0 !  -  0.25 
12.073***
0 2 =  0.25 
7.860***
8.562
(3) 0.341***
(0.084)
0.128
(0.178)
0.286**
(0.115)
0.587***
(0.151)
0.659***
(0.084)
A =  0.25 
1.172
8.562
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.89. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Expectations -  Greenspan-Bernanke Sample Period
Testing Equation:
( l ) E i , t [ n t+h\ =  Q lE p . t fa t+ h]  +  02  n t +  03  ^ RE .ti^ t+ h l  +  0 4 ^ , t - l  fo t+ h - l ]  +  €t 
( £ ) E i ,A n t+h\ =  01  Ep,t[n t+h\ +  02  n t +  03  ERE,t\-n t+h\ +  (1  — 01  — 02  — 03)^1,t-1 [^ t+ h-l] +
(3)£'t,//[7r t+ft] ~  -^(0 1 ^t,p[7rt+/i] + (t) 2 n t - l  + ( t  ~  0 1  + 0 2 )^«C,t[7r t+/t]) + ( 1  ~  ^ ^ / / [ ^ t+ f t - l ]  + 6t
A 01 02 03 0 4 Wald * 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987Q2 -  2011Q1
NC (1) 0.272*
(0.160)
-0.003
(0.067)
-0.187**
(0.086)
0.918***
(0 .100)
01 +  02 + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
0.002
9.319*
(2) 0.276*
(0.153)
-0.005
(0.065)
-0.185**
(0.088)
0 914*** 
(0.061)
0 !  =  0.25 
0.029
02 =  0.25 
15.279***
9.600
(3) 0.086
(0.061)
3.204
(2.216)
-0.057
(0.749)
-2.147
(1.939)
0 9 1 4 *** 
(0.061)
A =  0.25 
7 259***
9.600
NE (1) 0.075
(0.123)
0.009
(0.194)
0.138
(0.136)
0.786***
(0.187)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.551
9.042
(2) 0.088
(0.125)
0.002
(0 .200 )
0.148
(0.129)
0.762***
(0.191)
0 !  =  0.25 
1.666
0 2 =  0.25 
1.538
9.394
(3) 0.238
(0.191)
0.372
(0.772)
0.007
(0.837)
0.621
(0.381)
0.762***
(0.191)
A =  0.25 
0.004
9.394
S (1) 0.160
(0.113)
0 .000
(0.041)
-0.025
(0.097)
0.869***
(0.047)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.048
10.547*
(2) 0.163
(0.107)
-0.001
(0.056)
-0.027
(0.093)
0.865***
(0.070)
01 =  0.25 
0.669
02 =  0.25 
20.116***
10.702*
(3) 0.135*
(0.070)
1.201
(0.844)
-0.005
(0.415)
-0.196
(0.685)
0.865***
(0.070)
A =  0.25 
2.658
10.702*
w (1) 0.084
(0.183)
0.014
(0 .101)
0.087
(0 .110)
0.819
(0.073)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
0.140
8.544
(2) 0.095
(0.195)
0.012
(0.113)
0.082
(0.133)
0.811***
(0.080)
01 =  0.25 
0.633
02 =  0.25 
4 4 4 4 **
8.740
(3) 0.189**
(0.080)
0.503
(1.138)
0.062
(0.578)
0.436
(0.606)
0.811***
(0.080)
A =  0.25 
0.576
8.740
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.90. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Expectations -  Stable Sample Period
Testing Equation:
(X )&i  , t[n t+h\  — $ 1 ^  P' t fo t +hl  +  0 2  n t +  4>zERE,t[n t+lA +  0 4 ^ i , t - l [ 7rt+ f t - l ]  +  € t 
( 2 ) E lit[ n t+h] =  <t>\EP t [ n t+h] +  0 2 n t  +  0 3 ^ f i£ , t t 7rt+h] +  (1 — 0 i  — 0 2  ~  0 3 ) ^ < , t - i [ 7rt + / i - i ]
A 0 i 02 0 3 0 4 W ald x 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
+ ct
i] + € t
Period: Stable 1990Q1 -  2006Q2
NC (1) 0.205
(0.184)
0.019
(0.051)
0.266
(0.252)
0.534***
(0.095)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
1.345
9.619
(2) 0.239**
(0.093)
0.016
(0.081)
0.126
(0.168)
0.619***
(0.171)
0 !  =  0.25  
0.015
0 2 =  0.25  
8.146***
0.429
(3) 0.382**
(0.171)
0.626
(0.472)
0.043
(0.197)
0.331
(0.317)
0.619***
(0.171)
A =  0.25  
0.590
11.213*
NE (1) -0.004
(0.152)
0.246***
(0.051)
0.620**
(0.290)
0.160
(0.132)
01 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
0.595
4.089
(2) 0.055
(0.065)
0.247***
(0.043)
0 497*** 
(0 .111)
0 .201***
(0.070)
0 !  =  0.25 
9.066***
0 2 =  0.25  
0.004
5.414
(3) 0 799*** 
(0.070)
0.069
(0.084)
0.310***
(0.052)
0.622***
(0.107)
0 .201***
(0.070)
A =  0.25 
62.225***
5.414
S (1) 0.096
(0.077)
-0.005
(0.048)
0.363***
(0.127)
0.576***
(0.082)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
2.823*
6.511
(2) 0.112
(0.068)
-0.040
(0.070)
0.137**
(0.063)
0.792
(0.047)
0 !  =  0.25  
4.121**
02 =  0.25 
17.256***
9.181
(3) 0.208***
(0.047)
0.538**
(0.237)
-0.194
(0.307)
0.656***
(0.238)
0.792***
(0.047)
A =  0.25  
0.806
9.181
w (1) 0.155
(0.151)
0 .112**
(0.049)
0.349
(0.271)
0.409**
(0.161)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
0.998
5.118
(2) 0.191**
(0.084)
0.098
(0.086)
0.202
(0.193)
0.509**
(0.219)
0 !  =  0.25  
0.504
02 =  0.25  
2.954*
6.560
(3) 0.491**
(0.219)
0.388
(0.306)
0.199*
(0.105)
0.412*
(0 .220)
0.509**
(0.219)
A =  0.25  
1.207
6.560
* * * * * *  indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 5.91. Heterogeneous Updating Model -  Regionally Disaggregated
Expectations -  Volatile Sample Period
Testing Equation:
=  0 1 ^ P , t [ 7 r t + / i ]  +  <t>2n t +  0 3 ^ R E , t [ 7 r t + / i ]  +  0 4 ^ i , t - l [ 7 r t + / i - l ]  +  € t  
(2 } E i t [ n t +h\ =  <t>iEP t [ n t+h\  +  4>2n t +  03^RE,t[7rt+/i] +  (1 — 0 i  — 02  — 0 3 )^ f,t-i[7rt+h-i] +  € t 
( .3 )E tiH[ n t+h\ =  A (iP i E t P [ n t+h] +  4>2n t - i  +  (1 ~ 0 i  + 02)^Rg,t[7rt+/i]) + (1 ~  X ) E t H [ n t+lt_i] + e t
A 0 i 02 03 04 Wald x 2 Test J-Stat
( 1 - A )
Period: Volatile 2006Q3 -  2011Q1
NC ( l ) t 1 9 9 3 *** 
(0.462)
0.024
(0.047)
-0.338***
(0 .100)
-0.119
(0.239)
0 1 + 0 2  + 0 3  + 0 4  - 1  
16.535***
4.663
(2)1' 0.033
(0.115)
0.029
(0.048)
0.022
(0.046)
0.916***
(0.063)
0 !  =  0.25 
3.548*
0 2 =  0.25 
21.418***
5.465
(3)f 0.084
(0.063)
0.392
(1.188)
0.349
(0 .725)j
0.259
(0.578)
0.916***
(0.063)
A =  0.25 
6 .8 8 8 ***
5.465
NE ( l) f 1.548***
(0.228)
0.090
(0.064)
-0.138**
(0.049)
-0.001
(0.146)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
47.285***
3.172
(2 ) t -0.051
(0.138)
0.036
(0.076)
0.142**
(0.057)
0.873***
(0.088)
0 !  =  0.25 
4.722**
0 2 =  0.25 
7 984***
4.082
(3)t 0.127
(0.088)
-0.401
(1.319)
0.284
(0.661)
1.117
(0.936)
0.873***
(0.088)
A =  0.25 
1.944
4.082
S ( l ) t 1.463***
(0.256)
0.037
(0.065)
-0 .2 2 0 **
(0.082)
0.134
(0.130)
01  +  02  +  03 +  04 =  1
29.913***
4.068
(2 ) t 0.094
(0.094)
0.006
(0.059)
0.025
(0.062)
0.875***
(0.059)
0 !  =  0.25 
2.741*
02 =  0.25 
17.340***
6.152
(3)f 0.125**
(0.059)
0.750
(0.687)
0.050
(0.457)
0 .200
(0.508)
0.875***
(0.059)
A =  0.25 
4.455**
6.152
w 0 ) t 0.948**
(0.381)
0.096
(0.070)
0 .000
(0.083)
0.249
(0.232)
01 +  02 +  03 +  04 =  1 
6.835***
3.365
(2 ) t -0.058
(0.152)
0.057
(0.060)
0.161**
(0.058)
0.839***
(0.091)
0 ! =  0.25 
4.076**
02 =  0.25 
10.266***
4.834
(3)t 0.161*
(0.091)
-0.358
(1.118)
0.353
(0.466)
1.005
(0.757)
0.839***
(0.091)
A =  0.25 
0.961
4.834
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
tD ue to length o f volatile period, no lag can be specified for the Newey-West covariance matrix
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APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 6
Appendix 6.1. SPF Forecast Updates -  Descriptive Statistics
PANEL A PA N ELB
W H O LE G-B STABLE V O LA TILE W H O LE G-B STABLE V O LA TILE
Ut,t — E t \n t \ U tlt = \ E t [ n t \ - E t _1 [ n t_ 1]\
M ean -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.047 0.825*** 0.753*** 0.563*** 1.488***
M edian 0.015 0.008 -0.025 0 .200 0.450 0.411 0.375 0.622
S.D. 1.399 1.306 0.835 2.475 1.127 1.064 0.613 1.947
Max. 4.100 3.420 2.000 3.420 7.900 7.900 0.380 7.900
Min. -7.900 -7.900 -3.800 -7.900 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015
Ut,t+1  — F t [ 7 T t + 1 ] 7 T t ] Ut,t+ 1 = \ E t n t+1 ]  — Et~ 1 7 T t ]  1
M ean -0.040 -0.023 -0.025 -0.066 0 297*** 0.275*** 0.229*** 0.400***
M edian 0.000 0.000 0.025 -0.093 0 .200 0.200 0.150 0.219
S.D. 0.440 0.435 0.362 0.643 0.326 0.336 0.280 0.499
Max. 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.943 2.091 2.091 1.900 2.091
Min. -2.091 -2.091 -1.900 -2.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ut,t+2 — E t [ 7tt+2] E t - i [ n t+i \ Ut,t+2 — | Et [ n t+2\
M ean -0.037 -0.023 -0.027 -0.034 0.207*** 0.183*** 0.157*** 0 .2 1 0 ***
M edian 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.037 0.150 0.140 0.100 0.143
S.D. 0.284 0.248 0.215 0.295 0.198 0.167 0.149 0.203
Max. 0.550 0.550 0.500 0.514 1.200 0.800 0.600 0.800
Min. - 1.200 -0.800 -0.600 -0.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ut,t+3 — E t [ n t+3] Ut,t+3 — | E t [ 7 T t + 3 ]  E t_ i \ n t+2\\
M ean -0.039 -0.024 -0.029 -0.027 0 J99*** 0.165*** 0.155*** q
M edian -0.024 0.000 0.000 -0.037 0.150 0.140 0.107 0.125
S.D. 0.255 0.208 0.197 0.193 0.161 0.129 0.838 0.123
Max. 0.600 0.450 0.418 0.387 0.900 0.490 0.490 0.400
M in. -0.900 -0.490 -0.490 -0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
Ut,t+4  ~  [ ^ 1+ 4 ]  ^ t —i [ ^ t + 3 ] Uf,t+4 =  \E t [ n t+4\ - £ t—i[n-t+3]l
M ean -0.035 -0.021 -0.031 -0.013 0.165*** 0.140*** 0.135*** 0.134***
M edian -0.050* -0.018 -0.038 -0.050 0 .100 0.100 0.100 0.133
S.D. 0.231 0.176 0.171 0.164 0.164 0.107 0.108 0.091
Max. 1.000 0.450 0.400 0.250 1.000 0.450 0.450 0.278
M in. -1.000 -0.450 -0.450 -0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** ** * fn(jicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.2. SPF Forecast Revisions -  Descriptive Statistics
PANEL A PANEL B
W H O LE G-B STABLE V O LATILE W H O LE G-B STABLE V O LA TILE
R t — Et [Tit ] \Rt\ =  \Et [n t ] - E t - i M
M ean -0.080 0.011 0.058 -0.126 0.663*** 0.631*** 0.481*** 1.241***
M edian -0 .100 -0.100 -0 .100 0.454 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.800
S.D. 1.053 1.016 0.673 1.897 0.820 0.794 0.470 1.411
M ax. 2.700 2.700 2.700 2 .100 5.493 5.493 2.700 5.493
M in. -5.493 -5.493 -1.450 -5.493 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031
E t - 1 — E t - i n t \ - E t - 2 [n t \ \R t - t \ =  i S t - J w c W t - z M I
M ean -0.108*** -0.051 -0.047 -0.083 0.272*** 0.231*** 0 .2 0 0 *** 0.324***
M edian -0.050** -0.001 0 .0 0 0 * -0.025 0.157*** 0.150*** 0.125*** 0.150***
S.D. 0.400 0.389 0.300 0.551 0.312 0.278 0.227 0.447
M ax. 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.700 1.798 1.798 1.000 1.798
M in. -1.798 -1.798 -0.750 -1.798 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E-t— i —  E t-z n t ] -  E t . 3 [n t ]
JsCO1
hj*1CM1IICM1
QC
M ean -0 114*** -0.084*** -0.098*** -0.079 0.218*** 0.181*** 0.159*** q 199***
M edian -0.090*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.041 0.157 0.102 0.100 0.114
S.D. 0.277 0.224 0.196 0.257 0.204 0.156 0.150 0.176
Max. 0.500 0.400 0.290 0.396 1.200 0.700 0.700 0.543
M in. - 1.200 -0.700 -0.700 -0.543 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
E t - 3 ~  E t-3 TTtl -  Et _4 [n t ] l ^t—3 1 — 1 E (—3 [ r^ t ] Et _4 [n t ]\
M ean -0.095*** -0.055*** -0.057** -0.073* 0.188*** 0.146*** 0.133*** 0.155***
M edian -0.050*** -0.009** -0.004** -0 .100 0.104 0 .100 0.100 0.127
S.D. 0.262 0.192 0.181 0.184 0.205 0.134 0.134 0.119
Max. 0.600 0.400 0.328 0.300 1.400 0.650 0.650 0.428
M in. -1.400 -0.650 -0.650 -0.428 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000 0 .000
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.3. Distribution of Forecast Revisions
1-Step to 0-Step Ahead Forecast Revision 2-Step to 1-Step Ahead Forecast Revision
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Appendix 6.4. Distribution of Forecast Updates
0-Period Ahead Forecast Update 1-Period Ahead Forecast Update
40
30
20
10
20
16
12
8
4
0
-10 - 8  - 6  -4 -2 0 2 4 6
2-Period Ahead Forecast Update
a? 10
-2.4 -2.0 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
3-Period Ahead Forecast Update
oc
CD
c r
-1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
4-Period Ahead Forecast Update
15
12
9
6
3
0
■1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
20
■1.2 ■0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
533
Appendix 6.5. Efficiency of Forecast Revisions
PANEL A 
Testing Equation:
R t-h =  c  +  P R t - h - 1 +  €t
P A N E L S  
Testing Equation:
Rt-h C K  + Ut
c P R 2 R 2 c a 2 ^3 R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982:3-2011:1
h  =  0 -0.024
(0.072)
0.485
(0.182)
0.035 0.026 -0.056
(0.107)
0.511**
(0.214)
-0.253
(0.360)
-0.030
(0.367)
0.040 0.014
h  =  1 -0.092**
(0.039)
0.139
(0.148)
0.010 0.001 -0.080**
(0.031)
0.122
(0.124)
0.129
(0.083)
0.018 0 .000
h  =  2 -0.109***
(0.033)
0.049
(0.105)
0.002 -0.007
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987:2-2011:1
ja­ il o 0.037
(0.080)
0.511*
(0.278)
0.033 0.022 -0.047
(0.108)
0.539
(0.325)
-0.918**
(0.400)
-0.274
(0.415)
0.076 0.046
h = l -0.044
(0.033)
0.084
(0.178)
0.003 -0.008 -0.047*
(0.025)
0.085
(0 .21 2 )
-0.061
(0.180)
0.004 -0.018
h  =  2 -0.084
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.139)
0.000 -0.011
Period: Stable 1990:1-2006:2
h  =  0 0.076
(0.095)
0.315
(0.238)
0.020 0.005 0.030
(0.145)
0.282
(0.215)
-0.443
(0.325)
0.093
(0.317)
0.039 -0.007
h =  1 -0.067*
(0.038)
-0.189
(0.224)
0.016 0.001 -0.059
(0.042)
-0.176
(0.186)
0.100
(0.170)
0.020 -0.011
h  = 2 -0.106***
(0.030)
-0.133
(0.142)
0.016 0.001
Period: Volatile 2006:3-2011:1
h  = 0 -0.067
(0.427)
0.722*
(0.364)
0.044 -0.012 -0.194
(0.207)
0.974**
(0.338)
-2.030**
(0.857)
-0.675
( 1.022 )
0.126 -0.048
h  =  1 -0.035
(0.055)
0.605**
(0.245)
0.079 0.025 -0.074
(0.062)
0.887***
(0.275)
-0.988*
(0.561)
0.170 0.066
h  = 2 -0.041
(0.063)
0.517***
(0.123)
iicate signific
0.137 
ance at 1
0.086 
5 and 10 Dercent levels
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Appendix 6.7. Formation of Discrepancy of Series
Exploiting the availability of quarterly multi-horizon inflation forecasts from the 
SPF for periods t  + h for h = — 1 , . . .  ,4, the discrepancy series concerning the 
difference between the annual inflation forecast and associated quarterly forecasts
O 1 -7
can be constructed . The discrepancy arising in calendar year s, quarter i is 
denoted Ss qi.
For calendar year s, the discrepancies arising in Q1 and Q2 can simply be calculated 
as the difference between the annual forecast and the weighted average of quarterly 
forecasts reported by professionals in the quarter. This is expressed in (0.1) and 
(0.2) below:
&s,Q l =  — 4  ( ^ s . Q l ^ s ^ l ]  T  E s.Q l [ ^ , ( 3 2 ] [t^s.Qs] T  ^ s ,Q1
Ss,Q2 =  F's,Q2 [7rs,/l] “  4  ( £ S,Q2 [ 7rs ,Q l] +  E s,Q 2[7Is ,Q 2 ]+ E s ,Q 2 [n s,Q 3\ +  ^S,Q2  [n s ,Q 4 ])
The forecast of quarter j  inflation in a given calendar year s for quarter i in the same 
calendar year is denoted E SlQ i [ n s,Qj]  an<^  E StQ i [ n A ] is the forecast of annual 
inflation for the calendar year produced in quarter i.
In the third and fourth quarters of a calendar year professionals provide a single 
backdated forecast for inflation for the second and third quarters respectively. For 
earlier quarters in the calendar year however, they are instead required to utilise 
information concerning the realised value of inflation in order to construct 
appropriate annual forecasts. The discrepancies between the annual and quarterly 
forecasts can thus be calculated as:
1
fis,Q3 =  E s ,Q3 \JIa \  ~  4 ( jts ,Q l,Q 3  +  ,Q3 [n s ,Q2 ] + F S,Q3 +  &s,Q3 [^ S .C ^ ]) ( 0 - 3 )
^S,Q4 ~  E s Q4 . \ t I a \  ~  T  (j^s,Q l,Q 4  T  ^ s,Q 2 ,Q4 ^~ESiq ^ [ ^ 5  ^ 4 ] +  E s  ^ 4 (^ * 4 )
213 To maintain consistency with the rest o f this study, the median annual and quarterly inflation 
forecasts from the SPF shall be employed in constructing the discrepancy series.
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Where s denotes the calendar year 7rS)(?;,Qi *s the quarter i estimate of realised 
inflation in quarter j  in calendar year s.
To form the discrepancy series, (0.1) through to (0.4) are estimated for each calendar 
year s between 1982Q3 and 2011Q1.
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Appendix 6.8. Discrepancy Descriptive Statistics
&s.Ql
Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min.
WHOLE: 1982:3 2011:1
j  =  1, ,4 -0.007 -0.025 0.323 1.155 - 1.012
7 =  1 -0.008 -0.025 0.191 0.537 -0.425
7 =  2 -0.046 -0.038** 0.253 0.888 -0.775
7 =  3 -0.019 -0.022 0.340 0.653 - 1.012
7 =  4 0.045 0.132 0.455 1.155 -0.860
Greenspan-Bernanke: 1987:2-2011:1
j  =  1, .. . ,4 0.014 -0.025 0.307 1.155 -0.860
7 =  1 -0.020 -0.029* 0.163 0.538 -0.199
7 =  2 -0.048 -0.038** 0.258 0.888 -0.775
7 =  3 0.014 0.017 0.305 0.653 -0.615
7 =  4 0.112 0.142 0.433 1.155 -0.860
Stable: 1990:1-2006:2
j  =  t  ,4 0.056* 0.000 0.262 0.924 -0.479
7 =  1 0.009 -0.025 0.180 0.538 -0.163
7 =  2 -0.006 -0.030* 0.244 0.888 -0.263
7 =  3 0.113 0.131 0.262 0.653 -0.266
7 =  4 0.113 0.142 0.338 0.924 -0.479
Volatile: 2006:3 2011:1
7 =  t . ..,4 -0.069 -0.076 0.400 1.155 -0.860
j  = 1 -0.127** -0.153* 0.067 -0.024 -0.199
j  = 2 -0.019 -0.027 0.055 0.055 -0.076
7 = 3 -0.194 -0.243 0.362 0.323 -0.615
7 = 4 0.073 0.014 0.729 1.155 -0.860
*** ** * in(jjcate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
Appendix 6.9. Tests of Attentiveness for Third and Fourth Quarter Forecasts
____________ :____________ 1 c | /? 1 R 2 1 R 2
Q3 Forecasts
Whole
1982:3-2011:1
-0.005
(0.061)
0.167*
(0.085)
0.124 0.093
Greenspan-Bernanke 
1987:2 2011:1
0.013
(0.062)
0.132
(0.106)
0.065 0.024
Stable
1990:1-2006:2
0.114
(0.068)
0.011
(0.159)
0.000 -0.071
Volatile 
2006:3 2011:1
-0.183
(0.139)
0.250
(0.161)
0.446 0.262
Q4 Forecasts
Whole
1982:3-2011:1
0.074
(0.070)
0.437***
(0.116)
0.344 0.319
Greenspan-Bernanke 
1987:2 2011:1
0.100
(0.076)
0.408***
(0.136)
0.290 0.257
Stable
1990:1-2006:2
0.126
(0.050)
0.621***
(0.115)
0.675 0.652
Volatile 
2006:3 2011:1
0.153
(0.353)
0.481
(0.582)
0.186 -0.086
***,** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Appendix 6.10. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) Test of Forecast Revision
Process
Testing Equation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
c P R 2 R 2 A = /? / ( l  +  /?)
Period: Whole 1982:3 - 2011:1
oII•si -0.049
(0.128)
-0.560***
(0.050)
0.383 0.378 -1.274***
h  =  1 -0.026
(0.126)
0.510***
(0.156)
0.055 0.047 0.338***
NII -0.069
(0.186)
1.046**
(0.411)
0.083 0.075 0.511***
h  =  3 -0.218
(0 .20 1 )
1.005***
(0.312)
0.059 0.051 0.501***
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987:2 -  2011:1
h  =  0 0.060
(0.129)
-0.564***
(0.056)
0.384 0.378 -1.295***
h  =  1 0.087
(0.117)
0.448*
(0.243)
0.036 0.025 0.309***
h  =  2 0.067
(0.115)
0.682
(0.700)
0.024 0.014 0.405
h  =  3 -0.062
(0.179)
0.045
(0.308)
0.000 -0.011 0.043
Period: Stable 1990:1 - 2006:2
h  = 0 0.072
(0.131)
-0.331**
(0.153)
0.136 0.123 -0.495
h  = l 0.128
(0.327)
0.303
(0.256)
0.017 0.001 0.232
h  = 2 0.086
(0.381)
0.271
(0.474)
0.004 -0.011 0.213
h  =  3 -0.046
(0.412)
0.145
(0.523)
0.001 -0.015 0.127
Period: Volatile 2006:3 - 2011:1oII•SJ 0.049
(0.304)
-0.664
(0.091)
0.521 0.493 -1.980**
h  =  1 0.067
(0.374)
0.740***
(0.235)
0.089 0.036 0.425***
h  =  2 0.089
(0.439)
2.790*
(1.529)
0.190 0.143 0.736***
COII-e -0.151
(0.440)
-0.423
(0.245)
0.002 -0.057 -0.997
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.11. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) Test of Forecast Revision
Process
Testing Equation:
n t+h E t\j* t+ h \ — c + P ^ E t [ n t+h] +  P 2E t _ l f r t+ h ]  + h
«0 P i P i R 2 1 R 2 X 2 P i  +  P z  =  0
Period: Whole 1982:3 -  2011:1
oII 0.194
(0.352)
-0.569
(0.043)
0.490
(0.125)
0.391 0.380 0.582
h = l 0.433
(0.345)
0.408**
(0.204)
-0.555***
(0.167)
0.088 0.071 1.840
II 0.734*
(0.410)
0.702
(0.470)
-0.957**
(0.397)
0.155 0.140 3.796*
h  = 3 0.934**
(0.427)
0.290
(0.340)
-0.649
(0.265)
0.180 0.166 9 224***
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987:2- 2011:1
h  =  0 -0.034
(0.363)
-0.564***
(0.060)
0.596***
(0.159)
0.386 0.372 0.087
h  = l 0.242
(0.227)
0.452**
(0.227)
-0.505**
(0.253)
0.039 0.018 0.170
h  = 2 0.311
(0.466)
0.677
(0.735)
-0.759
(0.752)
0.030 0.009 0.302
h  = 3 0.215
(0.717)
0.009
(0.301)
-0.102
(0.356)
0.006 -0.016 0.189
Period: Stable 1990:1 -2006:2
°11-e 0.031
(0.369)
-0.330***
(0.091)
0.344*
(0.190)
0.137 0.109 0.907
h  = l 0.423
(1.076)
0.289
(0.214)
-0.392
(0.321)
0.027 -0.004 0.110
h  = 2 0.480
(0.778)
0.137
(0.397)
-0.275
(0.371)
0.018 -0.013 0.460
h  =  3 0.630
(1.647)
-0.008
(0.495)
-0.218
(0.588)
0.038 0.007 0.194
Period: Volatile 2006:3-2011:1oII -1.373**
(0.491)
-0.673***
(0.089)
1.359***
(0.272)
0.602 0.552 0 .0 0 2 ***
h  =  1 -1.510
(1.567)
0.702**
(0.253)
0.030
(0.576)
0.143 0.035 1.107
MII-si 2.455
(2 .86 8 )
3.150*
(1.710)
-4.212
(2.830)
0.221 0.124 0.557
h  =  3 -1.289
(3.375)
-0.523
(0.368)
1.027
(1.990)
0.005 -0.119 0.089
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.23. Distinguishing between Information Rigidities -  GDP
Deflator
Testing Equation: 
n t+h ~  E t [ n t+h] = c  +  p ( n t+h_ t -  E,f- i [ 7rf+/t_1]) +  Y f a t - i l  +  t i t
c P r R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982:3 -  2011:1
SPF 
h =  0
-0.117
(0 .122)
0.646***
(0.137)
0.020
(0.034)
0.454 0.444
SPF 
h= 1
-0.054
(0 .100)
0.754***
(0.099)
-0.004
(0.029)
0.561 0.553
SPF 
h = 2
-0.035
(0.087)
0.854***
(0.051)
-0.009
(0.029)
0.727 0.722
SPF 
h =  3
0.045
(0.137)
0.863***
(0.051)
-0.048
(0.053)
0.738 0.734
SPF 
h  = 4
-0.094
(0 .102)
0.844***
(0.049)
0.007
(0.036)
0.737 0.733
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987:2 -  2011:1
SPF 
h  =  0
-0.172
(0.137)
0.708***
(0.124)
0.060
(0.059)
0.532 0.522
SPF 
h =  1
-0.117
(0 .110)
0.811***
(0.052)
0.043
(0.999)
0.691 0.685
SPF 
h  =  2
-0.146
(0.113)
0.812***
(0.059)
0.045
(0.039)
0.705 0.698
SPF 
h  = 3
-0 .2 1 0 *
(0 .111)
0.776***
(0.088)
0.065
(0.039)
0.661 0.654
S P F  
h  = 4
-0.356**
(0.168)
0.749***
(0.059)
0.119**
(0.059
0.680 0.673
Period: Stable 1990:1 -  2006:2
SPF 
h  =  0
-0.093
(0.067)
0.826***
(0.066)
0.041*
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.689 0.679
SPF 
h =  1
-0.102
(0.131)
0.885***
(0.034)
0.050
(0.054)
0.787 0.780
SPF 
h  =  2
-0.057
(0.136)
0.928***
(0.049)
0.029
(0.055)
0.822 0.816
SPF 
h  =  3
-0.262*
(0.133)
0.828***
(0.065)
0.104**
(0.046)
0.724 0.715
SPF 
h  = 4
-0.228
(0 .22 2 )
0.814***
(0.153)
0.075
(0.054)
0.695 0.685
Period: Volatile 2006:3 -  2011:1
SPF 
h  =  0
-0.853***
(0.203)
0.135
(0.107)
0 427*** 
(0.118)
0.454 0.386
SPF 
h =  1
-0.706**
(0.276)
0.251
(0.204)
0.362**
(0.128)
0.641 0.596
SPF 
h  = 2
-1.274***
(0.322)
0.079
(0.225)
0.612***
(0.157)
0.798 0.773
SPF 
h  =  3
-1 291*** 
(0.421)
0.038
(0 .2 0 0 )
0.646***
(0.178)
0.669 0.627
SPF 
h  =  4
-2 225*** 
(0.336)
-0.221
(0.151)
1.024***
(0.148)
0.913 0.902
***,**,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.24. Distinguishing between Information Rigidities -  CPI
Testing Equation:
n t+h Etlrt t+h] ~  c  +  P ( n t+h - l  E t - l l f t t + h - l ) +  Y f a t - i ]  +  Ht
C P Y R 2 R 2
Period: Whole 1982:3 -  2011:1
SPF 
h  =  0
-0.780***
(0.184)
0.102
(0.078)
0.254***
(0.071)
0.159 0.144
SPF 
h =  1
0.094
(0.168)
0.631***
(0.082)
-0.041
(0.050)
0.358 0.347
SPF 
h  = 2
0.323***
(0.114)
0.830***
(0.044)
-0.115***
(0.038)
0.580 0.572
SPF 
h  =  3
0.372***
(0.127)
0.853***
(0.043)
-0.136***
(0.040)
0.614 0.607
SPF 
h  =  4 f
0.296**
(0.142)
0.857***
(0.046)
-0.113***
(0.043)
0.655 0.649
Period: Greenspan-Bernanke 1987:2-2011:1
SPF 
h =  0
-0.816***
(0 .2 1 1 )
0.182**
(0.073)
0.295***
(0.090)
0.247 0.231
SPF 
h =  1
-0.071
(0.193)
0.510***
(0.118)
0.038
(0.063)
0.309 0.294
SPF 
h  =  2
0.156
(0.185)
0 7 3 7 *** 
(0.083)
-0.048
(0.067)
0.487. 0.476
SPF 
h  =  3
0.068
(0.167)
0.724***
(0.073)
-0.025
(0.051)
0.500 0.490
SPF 
h  =  4 f
-0.005
(0.197)
0.728***
(0.083)
-0.004
(0.058)
0.538 0.528
Period: Stable 1990:1 -  2006:2
SPF 
h =  0
-0.641***
(0.174)
0.113
(0.135)
0.235***
(0.061)
0.207 0.182
SPF 
h =  1
-0.021
(0.171)
0.676
(0.124)
0.025
(0.039)
0.462 0.445
SPF 
h =  2
0.151
(0.141)
0.874***
(0.052)
-0.040
(0.038)
0.665 0.654
SPF 
h  =  3
0.171
(0.154)
0.881***
(0.048)
-0.053
(0.042)
0.666 0.655
SPF 
h  =  4 f
0.162
(0.172)
0.905***
(0.078)
-0.050
(0.046)
0.706 0.697
Period: Volatile 2006:3 -  2011:1
SPF
h = 0
-1.156***
(0.173)
0.102
(0.170)
0.584***
(0.090)
0.423 0.351
SPF 
h =  1
-0.935
(0.430)
-0.070
(0.228)
0.435**
(0 .20 2 )
0.265 0.173
SPF 
h =  2
1.117
(1.322)
1.189
(0.728)
-0.544
(0.679)
0.410 0.336
SPF 
h  =  3
-0.064
(1.785)
0.643
(0.913)
-0.013
(0.883)
0.416 0.343
SPF 
h  =  4 f
-2.181
(2.239)
-0.271
(0.953)
0.911
(1.028)
0.458 0.390
*** ** * inciicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
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Appendix 6.26. Disagreement and News Intensity
Estimating Equation: a tit+h =  c +  f}xa t - l x - x+h +  P 2l t  +  @3 n t +  P * n t  +  P s ( & n t ) 2 +  u t
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags determined 
by Akaike criterion. _______  _^__________       _
Period c P i P i P s P a P s R 2 R 2
Whole:
1982:3-
2011:1
h  = 0 0.304***
(0.071)
0.513***
(0.041)
, 0.023 
(0 .21 1 )
-0.033
(0.023)
0 .0 1 2 **
(0.005)
0.115***
(0.034)
0.604 0.585
h =  1 0.312***
(0.068)
0.549***
(0.049)
-0.083
(0.166)
-0.034
(0.027)
0 .0 1 2 **
(0.005)
0.058***
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.579 0.560
h = 2 0  3 3 i***
(0.074)
0.514***
(0.066)
0.095
(0.143)
-0.063***
(0.024)
0.013***
(0.004)
0.044***
(0.008)
0.540 0.519
h  = 3 0.451***
(0.131)
0.426***
(0.092)
0.158
(0 .22 2 )
-0 .121***
(0.035)
0.026***
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.425 0.399
h  =  4 0.308**
(0.140)
0.572***
(0.057)
0.277
(0.247)
-0.086*
(0.045)
0.016**
(0.006)
-0.003
(0 .0 2 0 )
0.534 0.512
Greenspan-
Bernanke:
1987:2-
2011:1
h  =  0 0.457***
(0.126)
0.451***
(0.079)
-0.393*
(0.213)
-0.034
(0.043)
0.013
(0.009)
0 .11 1***
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.600 0.578
h  =  1 0.497***
(0.115)
0.454***
(0.093)
-0.492***
(0.154)
-0.056*
(0.033)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.055***
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.584 0.561
h  =  2 0.536***
(0.149)
0.395***
(0.149)
-0.309**
(0.155)
-0.097***
(0.033)
0 .0 2 2 **
(0.007)
0.043***
(0.008)
0.545 0.520
h  =  3 0.705***
(0.213)
0.242*
(0.133)
-0.372
(0.284)
-0 147*** 
(0.043)
0.034***
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.001
(0.007)
0.391 0.358
h  =  4 0.470***
(0.096)
0.494**
(0.206)
-0.120
(0.254)
-0.115**
(0.047)
0.024*
(0.014)
-0.007
(0 .02 2 )
0.538 0.512
Stable
1990:1-
2006:2
h  =  0 0.601***
(0.162)
0.244**
(0.114)
-0.727***
(0.208)
-0.026
(0.095)
0.020
(0.013)
0.046
(0.139)
0.455 0.410
h  =  1 0.375***
(0.124)
0.478***
(0.060)
-0.456***
(0.144)
-0.008
(0.089)
0.008
(0.014)
0.153
(0.106)
0.591 0.557
h  =  2 0.403***
(0.058)
0.317***
(0.059)
-0.436**
(0.205)
0.016
(0.081)
0.007
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.052*
(0.027)
0.456 0.411
h  =  3 0.396***
(0.115)
0.262*
(0.140)
-0.378**
(0.150)
0.027
(0.072)
0.009
(0.009)
-0.056
(0.074)
0.391 0.340
h  =  4 0.243***
(0.074)
0.390***
(0.074)
-0.156
(0 .122)
0.051
(0.052)
0.002
(0.007)
-0.023
(0.059)
0.453 0.407
Volatile: 
2006:3 - 
2011:1
h  =  0 0.115
(0.249)
0.095
(0.096)
4.709***
(0.613)
-0.231***
(0.025)
0.027***
(0.005)
0 .102***
(0.017)
0.745 0.647
h  =  1 0.618***
(0.183)
0.087
(0.161)
1.500**
(0.619)
-0.174**
(0.078)
0.037***
(0 .0 1 1 )
0.054***
(0.015)
0.511 0.323
h  = 2 0.696
(0.502)
0.131
(0.321)
0.920
(0.786)
-0.170*
(0.096)
0.028
(0.023)
0.033***
(0.009)
0.490 0.294
h  =
3 t
1.551***
(0.109)
-0.709***
(0.105)
0.307
(0.822)
-0.276***
(0.030)
0.064***
(0.007)
0.030***
(0.008)
0.625 0.481
h  =  
4 f
1.037***
(0 .101)
0.035
(0.154)
-0.304
(0.350)
-0.150***
(0.040)
0.031***
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.009)
0.568 0.402
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure w ith fixed lag specification o f  2
* * * * * *  denote significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.27. Disagreement and News Intensity (/?i = 0)
Estimating Equation: att+h =  c + P^t-ix-i+h  +  P2Vt +  P3nt +  PiPt + P s i^ t )2 + ut
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion.
Period
C
Whole:
1982:3-2011:1
oII-s; 0.925***
(0.118)
55* ii 0.861***
(0 .111)
h  = 2 0.785***
(0.108)
h  =  3 0.709***
(0.132)
h  = 4 0.632*** 
(0.230) |
Greenspan-
Bernanke:
1987:2-2011:1
h  =  0 1.109*** 1 
(0.085)
h  =  l 1.044***
(0.103)
h  = 2 0.975***
(0.076)
h  =  3 0.903***
(0.170)
h  =  4 0.856*** 
(0.232) |
Stable
1990:1-2006:2
h  =  0 0.830*** 1 
(0 .122)
h =  1 0.844***
(0 .2 0 0 )
h  = 2 0.669***
(0.109)
h  =  3 0.533*** 1 
(0.156)
h  =  4 0.453*** 1 
(0.073) |
Volatile:
2006:3-2011:1
oII.ei 0.202  1 
(0.162) I
h =  1 0.709*** 1 
(0.082) 1
»• ll NJ 0.842*** 1 
(0.128) 1
II 0.914 1 
(0.127) I
h  =  4 1.072*** 1 
(0.079) |
1 P i P 3 04 05 R 2 R 2
I 0.233 
1 (0.366)
-0.277***
(0.050)
0.054***
(0 .01 2 )
0.159***
(0.037)
0.409 0.388
I 0.077 
1 (0.360)
-0.226***
(0.044)
0.047***
(0.009)
0.095***
(0.016)
0.356 0.333
1 0.357 
(0.279)
-0.245***
(0.039)
0.048***
(0.009)
0.067***
(0.018)
0.323 0.298
1 0.468 
(0.349)
-0.217***
(0.041)
0.046***
(0 .011 )
0.027
(0.017)
0.282 0.256
0.859** 
| (0.348)
-0 .2 1 2 ***
(0.043)
0.041***
(0 .01 2 )
0.027
(0.024)
0.294 0.269
1 -0.777*** 
(0.294)
-0.219***
(0.052)
0.047***
(0 .01 0 )
0 144*** 
(0 .022 )
0.487 0.464
-0.840***
(0.276)
-0.192***
(0.052)
0.045***
(0.009)
0.083***
(0.009)
0.487 0.465
-0.537***
(0.161)
-0.214***
(0.035)
0.045***
(0.006)
0.058***
(0.009)
0.477 0.454
-0.439
(0.351)
-0.190***
(0.033)
0.044***
(0.007)
0.018
(0 .011 )
0.363 0.334
-0.143 
| (0.595)
-0.208***
(0.043)
0.045***
(0.008)
0.018
(0.014)
0.419 0.393
-0.925***
(0.285)
-0.068
(0.103)
0.032***
(0 .0 12 )
0.053
(0.148)
0.424 0.386
-0.892***
(0.321)
-0.085
(0.107)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.133
(0.099)
0.457 0.422
-0.631***
(0.181)
-0.031
(0.069)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.049
(0.059)
0.407 0.368
-0.450
(0.334)
0.023
(0.171)
0.013
(0 .0 20 )
-0.035
(0.103)
0.349 0.306
-0.198 
1 (0.186)
0.029
(0.070)
0.011
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.054)
0.375 0.334
5.032***
(0.920)
-0.270***
(0.030)
0.031***
(0.008)
0.104***
(0 .02 0 )
0.740 0.666
1.576**
(0.612)
-0 .2 0 0 ***
(0.046)
0.041***
(0.007)
0.057***
(0 .011)
0.508 0.367
0.955
(0.748)
-0.205***
(0.014)
0.034***
(0.008)
0.035***
(0.005)
0.486 0.339
0.282
(0.904)
-0 171*** 
(0.018)
0.042***
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.417 0.251
-0.315
(0.295)
-0.154***
(0.027)
0.032***
(0.008)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.568 0.444
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure w ith fixed lag specification o f  2
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.28. Disagreement and News Intensity /?4 = 0
Estimating Equation: 0 c>t+ft =  c +  M t - u - i + h  +  +  P s ^ t  +  / W  +  P s ( A n t ) 2 +  u t
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion
Period c P i P2 03
Whole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.209***
(0.054)
0.549***
(0.043)
0.006
(0.226)
0.032
(0 .0 2 0 )
h =  1 0 .2 1 0 ***
(0.056)
0.599***
(0.056)
-0.100
(0.133)
0.032***
(0 .01 2 )
h  — 2 0 .2 2 1***
(0.064)
0.574***
(0.060)
0.062
(0.125)
0.011
(0.019)
h  = 3 0.264*
(0.156)
0.531***
(0.072)
0.076
(0.219)
0.016
(0.028)
h  = 4 0.193
(0.135)
0.637***
(0.085)
0.208
(0.259)
0.001
(0.031)
Greenspan- 
Bernanke: 
1987:2 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.323***
(0.091)
0.509***
(0.065)
-0.344
(0 .2 1 1 )
0.039***
(0 .01 2 )
h  = l 0.286***
(0.084)
0.578***
(0.095)
-0.397**
(0.154)
0.041***
(0.015)
h  = 2 0.263***
(0.062)
0.585***
(0.113)
-0.201
(0.145)
0.019 j 
(0.019)
h  =  3 0.350**
(0.134)
0.522***
(0.144)
-0.297
(0.188)
0.025
(0.035)
h  =  4 0 .2 1 0 ***
(0.068)
0.722***
(0.157)
- 0 . 1 1 1
(0.168)
0.008
(0.029)
Stable 
1990:1 -  
2006:2
h  = 0 0.372***
(0.088)
0.295***
(0.097)
-0.685***
(0.204)
0 .101***
(0.033)
h  = l 0.275***
(0.073)
0.502***
(0.039)
-0.435***
(0.047)
0.047***
(0.163)
h  =  2 0.312***
(0.067)
0.348***
(0.092)
-0.417**
(0.125)
0.063**
(0.025)
h  =  3 0.301***
(0.066)
0.277**
(0.136)
-0.374**
(0.148)
0.083***
(0.030)
h  =  4 0.223***
(0.067)
0.396***
(0.088)
-0.155
(0.127)
0.062*** 
(0.019) |
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  Of 0.043
(0.328)
0.180
(0.115)
4.438***
(1.465)
-0.116** 1 
(0.048)
h  =  I f 0.312*
(0.174)
0.386***
(0 .111)
1.260*
(0.600)
-0.009
(0.031)
h  = 2 0.321
(0.338)
0.471*
(0.246)
0.841
(1.014)
-0.034
(0.046)
h  = 3 0.960***
(0.081)
-0.037
(0.038)
0.323
(0.934)
-0.028
(0.025)
h  =  4 0.684***
(0.098)
q
(0.087)
-0.175
(0.478)
-0.023 
(0.027) |
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure w ith fixed lag specification o f  2
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
P s
0.114**
(0.045)
0.056***
(0.013)
0.042***
(0 .012)
-0.009
(0.019)
-0.004
(0.027)
0.108***
(0.019)
0.049***
(0 .010)
0.037***
(0.009)
-0.016
(0.016)
-0.017
(0.019)
0.066
(0.128)
0.163**
(0.068)
0.061
(0.050)
-0.046
(0.075)
- 0.021
(0.060)
0.093*
(0.044)
0.037***
(0.008)
0.025***
(0.007)
-0.015
(0.009)
-0.023***
(0.007)
&
0.600
0.572
0.530
0.381
0.516
0.594
0.566
0.514
0.276
0.473
0.444
0.588
0.453
0.386
0.452
0.719
0.419
0.433
0.057
0.306
0.585
0.556
0.513
0.359
0.499
0.576
0.547
0.492
0.244
0.450
0.407
0.561
0.418
0.345
0.416
0.639
0.254
0.270
- 0.212
0.107
557
Appendix 6.29. Disagreement and News Intensity 0 3 = 0
Estim ating Equation: 0w+/l =  c +  010t-1,t-1+/i +  Pi ^ t  +  +  P s + u t
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion.
Period c P i P i
W hole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  = 0 0.257***
(0.082)
0.529***
(0.046)
-0.006
(0 .22 1 )
h  =  1 0.261***
(0.062)
0.571***
(0.052)
-0.113
(0.135)
h  = 2 0.283***
(0.054)
0.557***
(0.067)
0.031
(0.105)
h  =  3 0.290**
(0.124)
0 4 9 4 *** 
(0.070)
0.014
(0.288)
h  =  4 0.196**
(0.093)
0.622***
(0.082)
0.160
(0.275)
Greenspan-
Bernanke:
1 9 8 7 :2 -
2011:1
h  =  0 0.397***
(0.106)
0.475***
(0.067)
-0.399*
(0.218)
h  =  1 0.383***
(0.104)
0.514***
(0.094)
-0.486**
(0.159)
h  = 2 0.323***
(0 .120)
0.533***
(0.166)
-0.290*
(0.166)
h  = 3 0.440***
(0.144)
0.413**
(0.159)
-0.450
(0.339)
h  = 4 0.253***
(0.062)
0.656***
(0.242)
-0.203 
(0.252) |
Stable 
1990:1 -  
2006:2
h  =  0 0.556***
(0.098)
0.249**
(0.103)
-0.726*** 1 
(0.209)
h  = l 0.362***
(0.057)
0.480***
(0.043)
-0.456***
(0.126)
h  = 2 0.431***
(0.074)
0.310***
(0.104)
-0.438***
(0.124)
h  = 3 0.438***
(0.084)
0.261*
(0.138)
-0.374**
(0.144)
h  =  4 0.326***
(0.066)
0.380***
(0.092)
-0.150 
(0.127) |
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  0 -0.044
(0.311)
0.322**
(0.134)
3.320*** 1 
(1.073)
h  = l 0.306*
(0.160)
0.412***
(0.096)
0 .8 6 8 *
(0.434)
h  = 2 0.231
(0.368)
0.566**
(0.255)
0.569 I 
(1.019)
h  = 3 1.009***
(0.127)
-0.034
(0.069)
-0.504 I 
(0.948) 1
h  =  4 0.608***
(0.081)
0 494*** 
(0.064)
-0.599 1 
(0.420) |
/?4 0 5 R 2 R 2
0.007*
(0.004)
0.115***
(0.044)
0.603 0.588
0.007***
(0 .00 2 )
0.058***
(0.013)
0.577 0.562
0.004
(0 .00 2 )
0.043***
(0 .01 0 )
0.534 0.517
0.007***
(0 .00 2 )
-0.006
(0.016)
0.396 0.375
0.003 
L (0.003)
-0.003
(0.025)
0.520 0.502
0.008***
(0.003)
0 .110***
(0 .02 1 )
0.599 0.581
0.009***
(0 .0 02 )
0.053***
(0 .012 )
0.579 0.560
0.006
(0.004)
0.040***
(0 .0 11 )
0.526 0.505
0 .0 1 0 ***
(0.003)
-0.008
(0.017)
0.321 0.291
0.005
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.026)
0.490 0.467
0.016***
(0.005)
0.048
(0.144)
0.454 0.419
0.007***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.153**
(0.073)
0.591 0.564
0 .0 1 0 ***
(0.003)
0.051
(0.047)
0.456 0.421
0 .0 1 2 ***
(0.003)
-0.058
(0.076)
0.390 0.350
0.009***
(0.003)
-0.028
(0.057)
0.448 0.412
-0.008
(0.006)
0.092*
(0.044)
0.677 0.584
0.007
(0.007)
0.040***
(0 .01 2 )
0.432 0.270
-0.001
(0.008)
0.026**
(0.009)
0.416 0.249
0.011
(0.007)
-0.008
(0 .01 1 )
0.107 -0.149
0.005
(0.004)
-0 .0 2 2 *
(0 .01 2 )
0.312 0.116
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure with fixed lag specification o f  2
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.30. Anxiety and News Intensity
Estimating Equation: 0 t>t+h =  c + p 1(f)t - lit- 1+h + P 2r\t + P3 n t + P*n t + P s ( ^ n t ) 2 + u t
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags determined by 
Akaike criterion. __________________________________________________________ ______
Period c P i P i P 3 P4 P s R 2 R 2
Whole:
1 982:3-
2011:1
h  =  0 0.067
(0.104)
0.582***
(0.127)
-0.140
(0.145)
-0.014
(0.049)
0.007
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.034***
(0.005)
0.592 0.573
h  =  1 0.057
(0.090)
0.593***
(0.149)
-0.071
(0.068)
-0.019
(0.048)
0.008
(0.008)
0 .0 2 2 ***
(0.003)
0.675 0.660
h  =  2 0.061
(0.062)
0.521***
(0.180)
-0.002
(0.039)
-0.014
(0.029)
0.005
(0.005)
0.013***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.615 0.597
h  =  3 0.038
(0.024)
0.553***
(0 .110)
0.067**
(0.031)
-0.001
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.001
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.007***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.600 0.582
h  =  4 0.012
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.704***
(0.066)
0.072**
(0.030)
0.008**
(0.004)
-0 .0 0 1 *
(0 .0 01 )
0.004***
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.685 0.670
Greenspan-
Bernanke:
1987:2-
2011:1
h  =  0 0.022
(0 .120)
0.631***
(0.145)
-0.053
(0.174)
-0.011
(0.061)
0.007
(0.013)
0.035***
(0.005)
0.624 0.603
h  =  l 0.029
(0.099)
0.627***
(0.183)
-0.032
(0.093)
-0.013
(0.051)
0.007
(0 .0 10 )
0.023***
(0.004)
0.699 0.683
h  = 2 0.045
(0.062)
0.541***
(0.196)
0.023
(0.049)
-0.011
(0.028)
0.005
(0.005)
0.013***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.659 0.641
h  =  3 0.031
(0.026)
0.536***
(0.133)
0.106**
(0.049)
-0.003
(0 .0 1 2 )
0.002
(0 .00 2 )
0.008***
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.651 0.631
h  =  4 0.010
(0 .0 11 )
0.675***
(0.080)
0.107***
(0.033)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.001
(0 .0 01 )
0.004***
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.727 0.712
Stable
1990:1-
2006:2
h  =  0 0.236***
(0.049)
0.506***
(0.085)
-0.086
(0.119)
-0.140***
(0.044)
0.027***
(0.007)
0.086
(0.082)
0.593 0.559
h  =  1 0.245***
(0.053)
0.466***
(0.074)
-0.055
(0.088)
-0.135***
(0.033)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.054
(0.037)
0.710 0.686
h  =  2 0.206*
(0.114)
0.340
(0.223)
0.014
(0.060)
-0.098*
(0.057)
0.018*
(0 .0 1 0 )
0.012
(0.016)
0.640 0.610
h  =  3 0.087**
(0.041)
0.470***
(0 .100)
0.092**
(0.039)
-0.031
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.006*
(0.003)
0.006
(0.006)
0.529 0.490
h  =  4 0.023
(0.029)
0.680***
(0.084)
0.089***
(0.025)
0.000
(0.016)
0.000
(0 .0 0 2 )
0.001
(0.009)
0.650 0.621
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  Of -0.391**
(0.131)
1.233***
(0.075)
0.708
(0.501)
0.164***
(0.013)
-0.032***
(0.004)
0 .0 2 1 ***
(0.006)
0.834 0.770
h  =  1 | -0.169***
(0.047)
0.861***
(0.096)
0.477
(0.338)
0.030
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.005)
0.822 0.754
h  = 2 -0.073*
(0.037)
0.839***
(0.040)
0.226
(0.175)
0 .0 2 1 ***
(0.005)
-0 .0 0 1 **
(0 .00 0 )
0.009**
(0.004)
0.854 0.797
h  =  3 0.004
(0.009)
0.604***
(0.061)
0.186*
(0.088)
0.004
(0.005)
0.000
(0 .00 1 )
0.006***
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.746 0.648
h  =  4 0.039***
(0.008)
0.509***
(0.092)
0.116**
(0.051)
0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0 .0 0 1 )
0.003
(0 .00 1 )
0.651 0.517
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure w ith fixed lag specification o f  2
* ** *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.31. Disagreement and Anxiety
Estimating Equation: (jt t+h =  c +  0 1<rt-i,t-i+ /i +  0 20t,t+/i +  p 3n t +  /?47rt2 +  /?5(Attt) 2 +  u t
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion.
t  denotes Newey-West procedure with 2 lags (fixed)__________    _^___
Period c P i P i P3 04 05 R 2 R 2
Whole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.310***
(0.114)
0.514***
(0.032)
-0.006
(0.294)
-0.032
(0.048)
0.012
(0.008)
0.115***
(0.030)
0.604 0.585
h  = 1 0.322***
(0.088)
0.548***
(0.054)
-0.108
(0.271)
-0.051
(0.032)
0.015**
(0.006)
0.062***
(0.018)
0.579 0.560
h  =  2 0.302***
(0.115)
0.524***
(0.006)
0.207
(0.480)
-0.043
(0.031)
0.010
(0.009)
0.039*
(0 .02 0 )
0.541 0.520
h  =  3 0.337***
(0.080)
0.458***
(0.090)
0.778
(0.552)
-0.092**
(0.036)
0.019**
(0.007)
-0.014
(0.016)
0.433 0.407
h  = 4 0.279***
(0.104)
0.602***
(0.043)
0.438
(0.407)
-0.068
(0.042)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.016)
0.530 0.508
Greenspan- 
Bernanke: 
1987:2 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.314***
(0.105)
0.457***
(0.057)
0.178
(0.314)
-0.018
(0.064)
0.007
(0 .01 1 )
0.105***
(0.028)
0.597 0.574
h  =  l 0.299***
(0.106)
0.515***
(0.085)
0.132
(0.226)
-0.041
(0.044)
0.011
(0.008)
0.049***
(0.016)
0.565 0.540
h  = 2 0.319*
(0.171)
0 4 4 4 *** 
(0.134)
0.574
(0.474)
-0.060
(0.044)
0.011
(0 .01 0 )
0.031*
(0.016)
0.550 0.525
h  =  3 0.463***
(0.096)
0.305**
(0.153)
0.755
(0.743)
-0.135***
(0.027)
0.026***
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.009)
0.387 0.352
h  = 4 0.392***
(0.094)
0.493*
(0.271)
0.380
(0.483)
-0 .121***
(0.044)
0.023*
(0 .012 )
-0.008
(0 .02 0 )
0.542 0.516
Stable 
1990:1 -  
2006:2
h  =  0 0.395*
(0.234)
0.362**
(0.161)
-0.172
(0.255)
-0.064
(0 .110)
0.022
(0.013)
0.124
(0.128)
0.406 0.356
h  =  1 0.354***
(0.095)
0.565***
(0.073)
-0.404***
(0.133)
-0.094*
(0.053)
0 .0 2 1 **
(0 .01 0 )
0.230**
(0.108)
0.583 0.548
h  = 2 0.233***
(0.085)
0.432***
(0.095)
-0.070
(0.340)
0.013
(0.048)
0.005
(0.007)
0.086**
(0.040)
0.415 0.367
h  = 3 0.313
(0.196)
0.296**
(0.140)
-0.131
(0.411)
0.008
(0.186)
0.010
(0 .02 2 )
-0.028
(0.094)
0.355 0.302
h  =  4 0.244***
(0.075)
0.394***
(0.071)
-0.236
(0.258)
0.042
(0.046)
0.003
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.056)
0.448 0.402
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  Of 0.753***
(0.172)
0.035
(0 .122)
1.230***
(0.399)
0.058
(0.035)
-0.011
(0 .0 12 )
0.058
(0.035)
0.644 0.507
h  =  I f q
(0.280)
-0.118
(0.268)
1.062***
(0.285)
-0.088
(0.065)
0.020
(0 .0 12 )
0.028***
(0.009)
0.586 0.426
h  =  2 f 0.715
(0.569)
-0.018
(0.468)
1.930***
(0.377)
-0.109
(0.153)
0.010
(0.030)
0.000
(0 .02 0 )
0.701 0.586
h  = 3 f 1.197***
(0.161)
-0.613
(0.358)
2 .101***
(0.425)
-0.231
(0.172)
0.050
(0.036)
0.007
(0.051)
0.734 0.631
h  =  4 0.992**
(0.335)
0.044
(0.301)
-0.144
(0.432)
-0.156***
(0 .0 22 )
0.031***
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.009)
0.559 0.390
t  denotes HAC N ew ey-W est procedure w ith fixed lag specification o f  2
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.32. Disagreement and Oil Price Shocks
Estimating Equation: <Jt t+fl =  c + a  |An t ^ \  +  f3e?_x +  y \ E t+h[nt \ -  +  A|0 t -  Gt_ x \
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion. _______________________ _______________________ ________ ______
Period c a P r A R 2 R 2
Whole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.543***
(0.052)
0.006
(0.030)
0.036***
(0.009)
0.198***
(0.035)
0.023***
(0.003)
0.618 0.604
h  =  1 0.566***
(0.067)
-0.031
(0.032)
0.071**
(0.028)
0.326***
(0.089)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.336 0.312
h  =  2 0.566**
(0.072)
-0.060
(0.048)
0.057**
(0.024)
0.265***
(0.086)
0.008***
(0.003)
0.265 0.239
h  =  3 0.550***
(0.073)
-0.007
(0.013)
0.035**
(0.013)
0.607***
(0.129)
0.002
(0.002)
0.205 0.176
h  =  4 f 0.611***
(0.111)
0.000
(0.048)
0.050*
(0.026)
q 293***
(0.078)
0.000
(0.002)
0.287 0.261
Greenspan- 
Bernanke: 
1987:2 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.503***
(0.059)
0.033
(0.032)
0.041***
(0.009)
0.176***
(0.044)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.693 0.679
h  =  1 0.544***
(0.078)
0.021
(0.061)
0.056***
(0.017)
0.141*
(0.071)
0.021***
(0.003)
0.467 0.444
h  =  2 0.549***
(0.071)
-0.036
(0.054)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.088
(0.106)
0.017***
(0.003)
0.358 0.220
h  =  3 0.560***
(0.091)
-0.004
(0.056)
0.019***
(0.005)
0.325***
(0.120)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.125 0.086
h  =  4 0.638***
(0.140)
-0.001
(0.048)
0.015
(0.009)
-0.091
(0.195)
0.007
(0.005)
0.097 0.058
Stable
1990:1-
2006:2
h  =  0 0.467***
(0.077)
0.092*
(0.054)
-0.003
(0.012)
0.223***
(0.063)
0.023
(0.021)
0.438 0.402
h  =  1 0 419*** 
(0.036)
0.060**
(0.029)
0.136**
(0.057)
0.142
(0.121)
0.034***
(0.011)
0.438 0.401
h  =  2 0.469***
(0.055)
0.104**
(0.049)
0.005
(0.030)
0.113
(0.188)
0.031**
(0.013)
0.271 0.223
h  =  3 0.493***
(0.043)
0.098
(0.065)
0.015
(0.049)
0.078
(0.178)
0.023***
(0.009)
0.169 0.115
h  =  4 0.525***
(0.037)
0.053
(0.045)
-0.012
(0.027)
-0.019
(0.157)
0.025***
(0.007)
0.147 0.091
Volatile: 
2006:3 - 
2011:1
h  =  0 0.808***
(0.067)
-0.062
(0.059)
0.012
(0.013)
0.128**
(0.049)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.774 0.710
h  =  1 0.845***
(0.033)
-0.026
(0.037)
0.018
(0.014)
0.232
(0.162)
0.010*
(0.004)
0.455 0.299
h  =  2 0.780***
(0.081)
-0 114*** 
(0.031)
0.010
(0.010)
0.149*
(0.084)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.549 0.420
h  =  3 0.739***
(0.104)
-0.044
(0.038)
0.006
(0.012)
1.267**
(0.454)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.475 0.325
h  =  4 1 037*** 
(0.080)
-0.043
(0.027)
0.005
(0.009)
-0.972***
(0.248)
-0.003
(0.001)
0.284 0.079
f  Sample period adjusted to 1982Q4 -  2011Q1
* ** *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.33. Disagreement and Baseline Shocks
Estimating Equation: a t_t+h =  c +  «|A7Tt_1| +  +  Y\Et+h[nt ] -  I
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West 
procedure with lags determined by Akaike criterion.___________ ___________ ________
Period c a P Y R 2 R 2
Whole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.556***
(0.046)
0.032
(0.028)
0.046***
(0.013)
0.282***
(0.019)
0.547 0.535
h =  1 0.561***
(0.067)
-0.032
(0.033)
0.086***
(0.026)
0.450***
(0.088)
0.308 0.289
h  =  2 0.575***
(0.067)
-0.055
(0.047)
0.069***
(0.017)
0.310***
(0.066)
0.245 0.224
h  =  3 0.557***
(0.069)
-0.006
(0.043)
0.037***
(0 .01 2 )
0.598***
(0.119)
0.203 0.181
h  =  4 f 0.611***
(0.105)
0.000
(0.049)
0.050*
(0.025)
0.293***
(0.085)
0.287 0.268
Greenspan- 
Bernanke: 
1987:2 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.510***
(0.054)
0.044
(0.032)
0.052***
(0 .01 1 )
0.297***
(0 .02 0 )
0.614 0.601
h  = l 0.535***
(0.080)
0.002
(0.050)
0.087***
(0 .0 22 )
0.409***
(0.097)
0.359 0.338
h  = 2 0.558***
(0.078)
-0.038
(0.047)
0.059***
(0.014)
0.248**
(0 .110)
0.230 0.205
h  =  3 0.576***
(0.089)
-0.003
(0.043)
0.030***
(0.009)
0.338***
(0.124)
0.094 0.064
h  = 4 0.660***
(0.134)
-0.001
(0.042)
0.024**
(0 .0 1 2 )
-0.128
(0.226)
0.063 0.032
Stable
199 0 :1 -
2006:2
h  = 0 0.498***
(0.047)
0.103**
(0.051)
-0.010
(0.013)
0.275***
(0.044)
0.415 0.387
h =  1 0.463***
(0.062)
0.083***
(0.029)
0.160*
(0.091)
0.279**
(0.114)
0.356 0.325
h  = 2 0.510***
(0.164)
0.124
(0.089)
0.035
(0.032)
0.245
(0.154)
0.159 0.118
h  =  3 0.529***
(0.045)
0.121
(0.074)
0.027
(0.051)
0.171
(0.169)
0.098 0.054
h  =  4 0.578***
(0.052)
0.074
(0.057)
-0.001
(0.051)
-0.001
(0.187)
0.038 -0.008
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  0 0.877***
(0 .102)
-0.043
(0.058)
0.020
(0.030)
0.246***
(0.039)
0.648 0.577
h  =  1 0.849***
(0.092)
-0.046
(0.075)
0.024
(0.024)
0.475***
(0.118)
0.429 0.315
h  = 2 0  7 9 7 ***
(0.107)
-0 .122*
(0.067)
0.019
(0.025)
0.470**
(0.186)
0.443 0.331
h  =  3 0.722***
(0.039)
-0.045
(0.036)
0.003
(0.008)
1.247**
(0.459)
0.462 0.355
h  =  4 0.996***
(0.076)
-0.044
(0.029)
0.003
(0.006)
-0 .8 6 6 **
(0.366)
0.252 0.103
t  Sample period adjusted to 1982Q4 -  2011Q1
* ** *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively
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Appendix 6.34. Disagreement and News Shocks 
Estimating Equation: atit+h =  c + alAn^^ + + Y\Et+hint\ ~ Et+h-Ant-i]\ +  01 Vt ~ Vt-il
Standard Errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West procedure with lags 
determined by Akaike criterion. ____________     _^___
Period c a P Y 0 R 2 R 2
Whole: 
1982:3 -  
2011:1
h  =  0 0.532***
(0.039)
0.037
(0.030)
0.049***
(0.009)
0.288***
(0.018)
0.664
(0.948)
0.597 0.582
h  =  1 0.483***
(0.048)
-0.021
(0.031)
0.088***
(0 .02 1 )
0.456***
(0.083)
2.629*
(1.571)
0.337 0.313
h  =  2 0 474***
(0.052)
-0.039
(0.042)
0.073***
(0.018)
0.304***
(0.064)
3 469*** 
(1.258)
0.303 0.278
h  =  3 0.475***
(0.068)
0.006
(0.038)
0.039***
(0.013)
0.559***
(0.117)
3.095**
(1.288)
0.253 0.226
h  =  4 f 0.582***
(0.130)
0.004
(0.044)
0.051*
(0.026)
0.271***
(0.103)
1.150
(1.517)
0.292 0.266
Greenspan-
Bernanke:
198 7 :2 -
2011:1
h  =  0 0.507***
(0.038)
0.044
(0.034)
0.052
(0 .01 1 )
0.297***
(0.018)
0.105
(1.321)
0.614 0.597
h  =  1 0.506***
(0.063)
0.006
(0.046)
0.088***
(0 .02 0 )
0.410***
(0.098)
1.046
(2.249)
0.364 0.336
h  =  2 0.518***
(0.057)
-0.032
(0.043)
0.060***
(0 .010 )
0.244***
(0.092)
1.479
(1.555)
0.244 0.211
h  =  3 0.533***
(0.091)
0.002
(0.038)
0.030***
(0.009)
0.306**
(0.128)
1.726
(1.709)
0.115 0.076
h  =  4 0.608***
(0.107)
0.007
(0.036)
0.024**
(0.009)
-0.160
(0 .2 2 2 )
2.044
(1.667)
0.099 0.060
Stable
1990:1 -
2006:2
h  =  0 0.514***
(0.046)
0.104**
(0.048)
-0.008
(0.014)
0 272*** 
(0.042)
-0.556
(0.652)
0.417 0.379
h  =  1 0.517***
(0.057)
0.084***
(0.023)
0.158*
(0.093)
0.269***
(0.071)
-1 9 3 4 *** 
(0.644)
0.388 0.348
h  =  2 0.536***
(0.166)
0 127*** 
(0.045)
0.029
(0.140)
0.253
(0.578)
-0.903
(3.845)
0.169 0.114
h  =  3 0.525***
(0.051)
0.121
(0.074)
0.028
(0.046)
0.167
(0.161)
0.166
(1.039)
0.098 0.039
h  =  4 0.564***
(0.058)
0.074
(0.058)
0.001
(0.046)
-0.004
(0.190)
0.466
(0.890)
0.042 -0.021
Volatile:
2006:3
2011:1
h  =  0 0.767***
(0.092)
-0.027
(0.049)
0.018
(0.016)
0.244***
(0.026)
4.109**
(1.843)
0.664 0.567
h  =  l 0.496***
(0.072)
0.010
(0.028)
0.037**
(0.013)
0.481***
(0.081)
11.361***
(1.770)
0.745 0.672
h  =  2 0.592***
(0.066)
-0.089***
(0 .0 2 1 )
0.013
(0.009)
0.524***
(0.125)
7 279*** 
(0.630)
0.633 0.528
h  =  3 0.606***
(0.089)
-0.026
(0.025)
0.002
(0.006)
1.160**
(0.474)
4.657**
(1.698)
0.562 0.437
h  =  4 0.920***
(0.050)
-0.028**
(0 .01 1 )
0.002
(0.008)
-0.951***
(0.265)
3.168
(1.971)
0.329 0.137
t  Sample period adjusted to 1982Q4 -  2011Q1
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%  and 1% levels respectively
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